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This study attempts to analyse the relationship between
economy and society in fifteenth century Castile# The
sources of wealth of various social groupings are examined
and set against the general economic background#
The Castilian economy showed signs of an increasing
diversification of economic activities * especially in the
peripheral areas of the kingdom. But there were also
signs of a growing agrarian crisis which assumed serious
proportions by the 1460s. Nominal prices remained fairly
stable till about 1450 but rose very sharply during the
second half of the century,
The seigneurial and landed income of the nobility
declined in real value as prices rose. There was little
demesne exploitation and such income tended to be inelastic*
The great nobSity recouped their losses by acquiring gifts
and pensions from the Gjomrehy, The lesser nobility often
resorted to brigandage but also found an outlet in the
Civil ware of the period*
The Church was faced with similar problems of static
income, However, unlike the nobility, the Church on the
whole failed to find a solution to the decline in the real
value of revenues. Moreover, monastic and parochial
revenues were usurped by the nobility.
Political control of the towns fell to the great
nobility /
nobility, although the vast majority of urban offices were
held by patrician oligarchs, Tho latter were often deeply
involved in the finances of urban and royal government and
tended to invest their profits in activities and forms of
wealth which identified them with the nobility, Many
converses made remarkably successful careers for themselves
in the Church and also acquired high offices in urban and
roya1 government»
The political history of the period was the expression
of the disparity bstwen static incomes and rising prices.
Towards the middle of the century, popular insurrections
in the towns, hatred of the conversos. and noble intrigue fus
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THE E.V ID£NCE AM) THE PROM-EM
This chapter is intended to provide a brief outline
of printed and archival source material and to survey the
inadequate nature of historians* knowledge of the Castilian
economy and society in the fifteenth century*
1 • Printed Sources
Most of the chronicles for this period of Castilian
history were written in the vernacular and the centre of
attention was usually the royal court** Indeed the
fifteenth century inherited the work of one of the most
remarkable chroniclers of Castile, Pedro Lopes do Ayala,
whose narrative for the period 1350-96 covered three
entire reigns and part of a fourth* Subsequent
chroniclers did not always maintain the high standard set
by Lopes de Ayala. Yet there was one essential point of
continuity in that the fifteenth century saw the continu¬
ation /
1 See generally B, Synches Alonso* Hlstorla de la
his toriografia espanola (Madrid* 194? )* i* 24* -353 * The
various chronlcles edited by J. de Mata Carriaso contain
detailed and valuable introductions* On the revival of
Latin historiography in the second half of the fifteenth
century see the comments of R.B* Tate* *The Anacephaieos1s
of Alfonso Garcia Santa Maria** in Hispanic"studies
in honour of 1* Gonaaies Llubera* ed* F» Pierce (Oxlord,
1959), pp.387-4ol*
2 Ldpea de Ayala* Cr^nicas de los Reyes de Casti11a Pedro
J1 Isvlfr"1 i-27i?riy**~ lx^»
2.
continuation of an 'official* version of political events.1
Not all these 'official* histories are favourable to their
royal patrons. Alfonso de Palencia, chronicler and latin
secretary to Henry IV, was responsible for a masterly and
2
vicious attack on the king.
Two chronicles which are. in effect, 'knightly*
biographies provide additional information for Castilian
history during the reigns of John 11 and Henry IV. The
hero of one of these chronicles is Alvaro de Luna.^ It
provides an interesting contrast to the 'official* version
of events but it is marred by excessive adulation. Far
more interesting is the chronicle which deals with the
activities of Henry IV*s constable. Miguel Lucas de Iranzo.4
The constable spent most of his time at his own court at
Jaen and the chronicle is a useful source of information
for the style of life of the nobility and for the military
situation along the frontier with the kingdom of Granada.
The number of 'official' and 'knightly* chronicles is
impressive. In contrast, other kinds of chronicles are
not available. The monastic historian had long since
5
disappeared. /
1 Cronica de Juan II da Costilla (B.A.E.) Lxviii. 273*695j
Cronica de J^ri^uejV de gastil la (B.A.E.) Lxx. 99*222.
2 Crdnica de Enrique iv. ed.'A» Pag y Melia (Madrid, 4 vols,
1904-8T.
3 Crdnica de Don Alvaro de Luna, ed. J. de Mata Carrlaso
(Madrid, 1940).
4 Hechos del condcstablo don Miguel Lucas de Iranso. ed.
J. de Mata Carriaao (Madrid,1940}.
5 For a comparison with England see E.S, Proctor, Alfonso
X of Castile, patron of literature and learning TOxford,
1951), chap. v.
3.
disappeared. There is evidence that the town chronicle
may not have been unknown but no examples survive.* There
are two works, however, which surpass all other chronicles.
The collections of short biographies written by Fernan
Peres de Guzman and Fernando del Pulgar are indispensable
2
tools for the historian. ' They provide a remarkable
series of biographical sketches of the politically import*
tant figures of the century • kings, queens, nobles,
favourites, masters of military orders, prelates, men of
learning, and administrative officials. The value of
these short biographies lies in the fact that they follow
a pattern of analysis which rarely omits to present the
reader with a comprehensive but brief picture of the
individual i n question. The biographies of prelates
serve as a good example. In the case of almost every
prelate there is a discussion of his social origins, his
physical characteristics, the history of his career, his
education and learning, his relationship to the Crown, and
his religious qualities. both authors are on the whole
remarkably accurate and objective and the two works must
rank as the two gems of Castilian historiography in the
fifteenth /
1 Juan Guillen was commissioned by Seville to write a
chronicle which has not survived: A.M.S., caja 1445*6,
4th Aug. 1445. The Anales de Garcl Ranches. ed» J. de
Mate Carriaao (Seville,' i liowever, devotes its
attention to urban history.
2 P4rea de Guzmin, Geaeraciones y Semblanzag ad. J.
Domfnguez Bordona (Madrid, " Pulga!r, Claros varones
de Castilla ed. J. Dominguez Bordona; (MadrI<1 ' 19541*.'
4,
fifteenth century*
From a general point of vie* three collections of
laws are especially useful to the historian of later modi-
ieva1 Castile* The Biete PartIdas of Alfonso X give a
systematic ami very comprehensive expression of the grow*
:ing and unifying power of the monarchy* They are
indispensable for the legal aspects of the relationship
between government and society* The Qrdenanaas healeg de
Cast ilia* produced in 1404, relied heavily on the legis¬
lation of monarchs of the late fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries and, for this reason, they are an obvious and
useful source of information. The third collection of laws
is Philip II * s Noeva Kecooilaclon de las Leyeg de t-anana
which appeared in 1567. This compilation is useful, above
all, for one reason * the bulk of medieval legislation
which it contains is a salutary reminder of the marked
continuity between the later middle ages and the early
modern period,1
The acts of the cartas for this period of history have
2
to be used carefully. Legislation could result from
joint action by king and cortea and a good deal of this
was incorporated into the law codes* Yet the king could
issue /
1 These and other law codes are published in the twelve
volumes of Los Cddlgos espanoles concordados v anotados
(Madrid, 18481 .
2 Cortes de lost antijRUoa reinos de Leon y Castillo, publish*
i'ed'by the Heal Acadera! a de fa Historic, 7 vols (Madrid,
1861-H03).
5.
issue laws by virtue of his own power and he could change
decisions which had been made during meetings of the cortes.
Moreover most of the recorded deliberations of the cortes
consist of petitions to which monarch* made extremely-
vague and evasive replies* Bearing in mind the limited
powers of the cortea. these petitions can provide much
information on a wide variety of topics*
2* Archival Sources
The central machinery of government in Castile was
fairly well articulated and in theory almost all its
documents should have survived* Ail documents issued by
the chancery were supposed to be registered. Clerks re*
:corded the deliberations of the royal councils* The
chief court of justice, or audlencia. had been separated
from the centre of administration and had its own adminis-
j native machinery* The finances of the monarchy were
carefully controlled by an impressive array of officials
and registers* A good deal of this documentation is to be
found in the archive of Simancas* It was well on into the
sixteenth century before Castile possessed a proper reposit¬
ory for documents at Simancas. However there is evidence
that the Castilian monarchy was moving in this direction as
early as 143? for, in that year, John IX ordered that all
financial /
6.
financial records should be deposited in an archive in
Segovia,* This measure, and similar measures by the
Catholic sovereigns, may account for the amount of
documentation which is preserved in Bimancas,
Nevertheless, considering all the administrative
controls and checks that existed, the surviving document'*
:ation is meagre. Undoubtedly a great deal of material
was lost through the simple fact that the royal court was
forever on the move. Once documents and registers ceased
to be of immediate importance they were presumably left in
the nearest convenient place and there is at least one
late fourteenth century ordinance ordering officials to
burn documents,2 The hacards of war, both in the fifteenth
and subsequent centuries, were also probably responsible for
the loss of a great deal of documentalion. It is still
possible, however, that the chancery registers may one day
3
be discovered in some cathedral archive,
ecclesiastical bodies kept records which were less
subject to loss and dispersion than those of the nomadic
monarchy /
1 A.G.S., C, y J, de Hac•, leg 1, no,5, See also A, de la
Plasa Bores, "Notieias sobre algunos depositos documentales
castellanos anterlores al de Simanc&s*, R,A,B,tf,. Separata
(1958),
Z A.M.J,, caja 12, no,2 de orden no,33, contains a royal
order of 20 April 1396 that accounts of the ,<*e
albaquias should be burnt,
3 A chancery register for the years 1283*6 is published
and studied in M, Gaibrois Ballesteros, Hiatorla del
reinado de caacho IV de Castllla (3 vols,, Madrid, i922*
in ''
7.
monarchy, The result is that cathedrals such as those
at Leon, Toledo, Salamanca, and Burgos retain impressive
collections of fifteenth century material. However, the
difficulties presented to the historian who wishes to work
in cathedral archives are considerable and time can be more
profitably spent on monastic documentation. Many monas¬
teries, such as Han Zsidoro in Leon, still possess valu*
:able collections of documents, The great bulk of monastic
material, however, is now to be found in the Archive
His torIco Nacional in Madrid, The range of this material
varies greatly but enough has survived to enable the
historian to work on particular examples or to hazard wider
generalisat ions,
The great nobility maintained administrations which
were a reflection of the royal pattern of government.
Surviving material of this kind is intermingled with
documentation of a more private nature relating to such
matters as marriages, wills, personal expenses, and dowries.
Two archives, above all, contain a vast amount of docu-
:mentation on the Castilian nobility - the Archive de los
Duques de Fries, near Cordoba, and the Archive de los
Duques de Medlnacell in Seville, This thesis makes use
of the material in the latter archive. The Medinaceli
archive contains documentation which dates back to at
least the ninth century. The documentation, far from
being restricted to the region, of Andalusia, covers the
whole Iberian peninsula* For the kingdom of Castile
alone /
8.
alone there are almost 2,000 leuajoa or bundles of
documents relating to Galicia, 900 for Castile, Leon,
and the Basque provinces, 65 for Extremadura, and almost
1,500 for Andalusia. Many of the documents contained
in these legajoa date from the fifteenth century. More*
lover, the vicissitudes of time can. work in the historian's
favour. Opportune marriages and the extinction of male
lines have resulted in the possibility that the historian
working in the Medinaceli archive can obtain documentation
on many of the great noble families of the fifteenth
century - the Figueroa, Guzman, Ponce de Leon, Farraieato,
Acuna, Aguilar, Portocarrero, Manrique, Sandoval, Silva,
Fernandez de Cordoba and Medinaceli.
Two main kinds of documentation in municipal archives
are useful for the study of towns. In the first place
there are the registers of the deliberations of town
councils. At present the earliest known examples of this
kind of evidence are in Burgos where the municipal archive
contains a series of Libros de Actaa Municlgales starting
in 1388. Fince these registers have largely been ignored
by historians it is possible that other towns may possess
earlier registers. The municipal archive of Murcia has
fifteenth century- Actas Capitularcs. Palencia has at least
one register dating from 1421, and Jeres de la Frontera
has an almost complete set for the whole century. It
seems valid to argue that such registers were kept by most
towns /
towns since the archive of the real chanciller(a, at
Vall&tfolid, possesses fragments of the fifteenth century
registers of the very small town of Villalon*
In most cases the registers give invaluable information
on the urban oligarchies and urban finances. However in
at least one case. Seville, the financial records survive
as a separate series. The financial records of the town
of Seville must surely be one of the most remarkable
collections of documents to survive from the later middle
ages in Castile, Most of this material remains uncata-
ilogued but there is an almost complete series of yearly
accounts for the fifteenth century. These accounts are
a mine of information on the urban oligarchies, urban
administration, prices and wages, agrarian crises, the
military organisation of the frontier, and royal and urban
taxation.
It has, of course, been impossible to work in all the
big municipal archives. My choice was determined by the
fact that historians were working on fifteenth century
material at Burgos and Murcia, Their work was not
focussed on social and economic history but on political
ami religious history. Nevertheless there was the poss¬
ibility that such work might help to complement my own
research in more neglected archives. The municipal
archives of Leon and Cordoba proved to be disappointing
but these disappointments were balanced by the rich
archives /
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archives of Seville and Jeres and the diacover/ of frag®
jmente of the Villaion registers in Valladaiid,
3# Historians and fifteenth century Castile
How have historians used the evidence which has been
briefly outlined? On the whole they have concentrated
on the sources which are best suited for the writing of
the narrative of political history# Thus, the published
sources - chronicles, law codes, and acts of the cortes -
figure prominently in most historical studies. This does
not mean that archive material has been neglected but, in
iuos fc eases, it has been used to rectify or elaborate the
political narrative of the printed sources.
Few studies have appeared on economic and social
history and on the history of royal institutions, More*
•over the attention of most of these studies has been
focussod on the last two decades of the fifteenth century
and on the sixteenth century. Indeed it is no exagger¬
ation to state that almost ail information on the history
of fif teenth century institutions, economy, and society
is to be derived from works which deal mainly with the
reign of the Catholic sovereigns. The result is that
our knowledge of the fifteenth century prior to the reign
of Ferdinand and Isabella is fragmentary and inadequate.
There /
11*
There has been too much emphasis on the simple and
archaic formula which contrasts anarchy and civil war,
on the one hand, with the emergence of a 'modern* economy,
society, and state on the other hand. In these circum*
(Stances the researcher is extremely grateful for those
studies which are exceptions to the general rule. There
are excellent works on the Mesta,* the role of the Jews
2
and converses in political and social history, and on
3
particular towns or regions of the kingdom of Castile.
Above all, despite the inadequate information available
in print, there are the remarkable and valuable syntheses
4
which were inspired by Vicons Vives.
This thesis attempts to analyse the sources and value
of the various forms of wealth of the politically signifi*
:cant groups in socioty * the nobility, the Church, and the
towns. Juridically, Castilian society was divided into
three /
1 J, Klein, ihe keata. A study in Spanish economic history
(Cambridge, Mass., 1^20). " ""
2 Y. Baer, A history of the Jews in Christian Spain (2
vols., Philadelphia, 19661.
3 J.A. Garcia de Cortaaar, Viaqaya en el lillfjfca Mftgfclfift
economises y sociales (Bilbao, 1966}J H» Bancho de
Sopranis. Hls"torla Social de Jeres de la Frontera al JIB
de la edad aiedia (3 vols., Jerea, 19691• (Hencefor th
cited as Isaacho, Historia). Both these works, however,
tend to concentrate on the reign of the Catholic saver*
(eigne. / ^
4 J. Vicens Vives, Uanual de Materia economics do Espana
(3rd ed,, Barcelona, 19b4)j J. Vicens Vives (ed.),
Historia socially economics de Eapafih y America (3 vols.,
Barcelona, ' 195?-9T, IFTHenceforth cited as~*Vicens,
Manual and Vicens, His toria).
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three estates, Yet the legal division into estates was
not a phenomenon peculiar to the later saddle ages. More-
«over the estates were not so clearly marked oft frots each
other as the law3 or the acts of the cortea suggest. To
reveal the realities behind the facade of the juridical
criteria, the whole range of evidence has to be used and
this in itself produces problems.
Even in an estate society the quantity and quality
of wealth helped to determine political power and social
status, Research into this problem ia still at a rudi¬
mentary sfcuge as far as the kingdom of Castile is concerned.
The wealth of the nobility and the Church, for example, has
been gauged by using the totally inadequate evidence of
royal grants of lordship and the documents founding
laayoraagos. Royal grants of lordship, however, emanated
from a chancery whose officials continued to use the same
phrases nnd concepts for long after realities had changed.
The secretary of the chancery, like his counterpart in
France, worked on the basis of a style book.* Once again,
therefore, the juridical formulae of such documents obscure
the realities of the sttuation. Yet, problems well known
to English and French historians ♦ for example, the decline
of /
1 B.N,, MG#, 6711, for example, is a style book of over
200 folios#
u
of the manorial economy * cautiuue to bo obscured behind
swooping generalizations about lordships and jurisdictions*
Accounts provide the ideal basis tor calculating the
value of the various sources of wealth and for comparing
the wealth and power of different social groupings*
However, accounts are not always available* Municipal and
ecclesiastical accounts survive in greater numbera than the
accounts of the great nobility. The evidence of tax farms
and notarial records help in the case of merchants. There
is no direct evidence which can be used to calculate the
wealth of members of the lesser nobility. The paucity
of information on the great nobility, however, may reflect
a genuine lack of interest by thaia in certain sources of
revenue such as agrarian income* The few accounts of the
landed income of the nobi 1 ity which do survive, provide
striking examples to support this view. Moreover, a
whole mass of documentation survives to show the interest
of the nobility in another direction * the acquisition of
royal revenues*
It*4s this desperate search by the nobility for royal
privileges which attracted tay attention to the subject of
this present thesis. The later middle ages in Castile
witnessed /
1 A general discussion on the scarcity of this kind of
documentation in G» Duby, 1-urai hconomy and Country Life
in the Medieval West {London, 1966}, pp*2 89«»90'.
14,
witnessed a revolution in the royal iinances waich was
similar to that in k"ranee,* By the early fifteenth century
the monarchy had at its disposal an impressive power to levy
taxes without the consent ol the cortes. Theoretically and
in practice this actaea a groat deal to the political and
economic power of the monarchy* Yet the f if teenth century
in u&stilian history m usually depicted in terms of a weak
monarchy which was threatened by nobles whose immense landed
fortunes also allowed thorn to dominate the Churcn and the
towns, '».hy, with such landed fortunes at their command,
did Uie dastiiian nobles seek so desperately to acquire
royal revenues? ».nat nau happened to the Church and the
towns?
nn investigation into the wealth ox the nobility, the
Church, ana the towns has to be related to the economic
background, indeea, the economic conjuncture forms the
point of departure for such an investigation. The argu¬
ment, when briefly stated, is deceptively simple, Monetary
devaluations, a rise in the nominal price movement, and the
decline in the manorial economy affected fixed incomes and
provoked a political crisis. This situation was not
peculiar /
1 The only study to throw light on thic important subject
is S* do lloxo, 1 hjercito, diplomacia y finanaas como
medioa do aecion del ectado en la fo&ja edad media',
Ttudiuu ihogota, Colombia}, iii (19&V), £5-104.
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peculiar to fifteenth century Castile. It seems likely
that the origins of tins problem can be traced back to the
afterm.Lb of the Black Death. moreover there are close
parallels to the situation in the kingdom of Portugal and
in. the Crown of Aragcn. although in both there cases the
political manifestations and the chronology.of the crisis
were different•* But it is fifteenth century Castile,
and Uioro particularly the reigns of John II and Henry IV,
which will be examined in the following chapters.
| «- %s* _ «. i J „• . * t / ^ ..a _ * • * ..





I, Hie Physical Environment*
Castile was only one of five kingdoms in the Iberian
peninsula in the later middle ages* In many ways a false
impression is derived from treating this peninsula as a
unit* The sea as well as the land served to unite
economies and societies. Catalonia* "Valencia, and
Andalusia were linked to Italian centres as much as to
other parts of Iberia* Granada was part of Africa* The
Basques constituted a unique society within the kingdom
of Castile and had strong maritime associations with the
Bretons*
No doubt this picture is exaggerated* Yet the
internal barriers to communications in the peninsula were
formidable and Castile had possibly the worst share of the
land division*
In the north, Castile was hemmed in by the Cordillera
Cantabrlca /
1 For the following discussion see generally, A* Ferrari
Nunez, Cast ilia dividlria en dominion (Madrid, 1958)}
J. Ga rcla Fernandez * ""Acpec tos deT p&isaje aRrario de
Gas til la la Vieja {Vailado lid7^9^31} J. Garcia
Fernandez7 *Champs ouverts et champs clotures 1, A*K«S«C«,
xx (1965), 692*718} R* Tamames, I-.s tructura ecorvSmic'a""""
de I spana (Madrid, 1965), chap* i | '"P* "Chaunu, •Les
Lspagnes Periph^riques* R.C.S*» xli (1963), 145-82}
M, Brain vud P. Ponsot, 'Les paysages agraires de
l'Andaiousie Occidental®*, m.c.v.r ii (1966), 73-95.
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Cantabrica and the Sis tenia Iberico* To the east* the
same Sistema Iberico and the Serrania de Cuenca served
to block off Castile from the Mediterranean coast* To
the south, Castile was again hemmed in * this time by the
Sierra Moreaa, the Sistema Bet ice and the Sistema Suhetico.
Finally to the north west, Galicia and northern Portugal
were cut off from Castile by a whole complex of mountain
ranges from the Serra da Katrelha to the Montes de Leon*
Castile, in the centre, was isolated from what has
been described as peripheral Spain, The coastal areas
of the peninsula formed narrow and continuous strips*
Geography helped to link the societies of these areas
together. Thus Catalonia and Valencia wore linked
together and were part of the Crown of Aragon. Galicia
was linguistically closer to Portugal than to Castile,
Yet, although geography does seem to impose a pattern
which runs from north to south * Galicia and Portugal
linked together, the kingdom of Castile from Bilbao down
to Seville, and the Crown of Aragon from Barcelona down
to Valencia • this pattern is only useful as an element
of a much more complex picture* For there were just as
formidable obstacles within the kingdom of Castile* The
mountain barriers of the Sierra de Gata, the Sierra de
Gredos which in the eleventh century had marked the
frontier of the Keconquistai further south the Sistema
Betico which marked the limit of the Keconqujsta in the
later /
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later middle ages* Those harriers running from west to
east. In conjunction with the timetable of the Reconqulsta,
were profoundly to affect the social and even the eccles¬
iastical structure of the peninsula,
A high table land cut off from the narrow literals.
This picture too must be qualified. After all Castile
did trad© by sea with other parts of Europe, Access to
the sea, however, was not facilitated by the river systems.
At first sight the rivers Duero, Tagus, Gaudiana, and
Guadalquivir might seem to present the natural means of
communication * especially since the south west of the
peninsula is the one area which does not present the
formidable mountain barriers to the sea.
Yet of the rivers mentioned only the Guadalquivir was
navigable. If the Tagus or Duero had been navigable then
Lisbon or Oporto would have been the seaports for Castile,
Even the Guadalquivir did not present as easy a means of
communication as has sometimes been thought. Genoese
ships preferred using Cadis to Seville because ©f the
difficulties in going up the river to Seville. Small
boats, on the other hand, could and did use the Ouadal-
squivlr as far as Cordoba.1
Lacking /




Lacking a river network for transport, Castile could
nevertheless be linked up with the coast through the gaps
in the mountain barriers* Bilbao could be reached from
Burgos across the upper reaches of the £bro, Murcia,
Cartagena, and Valencia provided an outlet to the
Mediterranean* Seville was linked to Cordoba* Hence
the importance of the puertos or mountain passes which
served as communication links, customs barriers ami stra¬
tegic military- points* Through these passes merchandise
was carried by muleteers and carters * a slow, laborious,
and dangerous method of trade which only served to under-
tline the superiority of the ships and the sea*1
Climate and land also played an Important part in
determining economic activity* The pattern of rainfall
today is extremely uneven* The north and west have the
highest rainfall with Santiago de Compostela having an
annual rainfall of sixtyfour inches* Moving south and
east rain becomes less plentiful - thirtytwo inches in
some parts of Extrem&dura, sixteen inches in eastern La
Maneha, and as little as less than eight inches in some
parts /
1 Tolosa, for example, served as a puerto and tax collect-
ting point for the trade from Navarre to the Cantabrian
coasti Gorosabel, l/oscmefq de la villa de TolosaCfolosa, 1853), pp*xvT*XViiT* Thestrategic importance
of the puertos near the Granadan frontier emerges very
c1early in Grcm, Lucas de 1ranao•
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parts of south east Andalusia and Murcia. In the fifteenth
century the parched and arid regions of the kingdom of
Castile were not served by any extensive systems of
irrigation, Elsewhere • notably in Valencia * systems
of irrigation were inherited and maintained from the Moors,
but in Castile only La Kio j& and Seville seem to have
enjoyed the benefits of some irrigation,* Indeed even
today the tterras de secano - dry and unirrigated lands •
constitute 95,SS of the cultivated areas of Cast ilia la
Vieja.*
If rainfall is important so too is the nature of the
land and the extremes in temperature. In 1890 Mail^da
made his famous analysis of the land which is still used
by modern writers * 10% of Spanish land consists of bare
rock, 35% consists of land which is barely productive
because of its composition* altitude, or lack of rainfall,
45% is fairly productive land, and only 10% is good land.
It is not surprising therefore to find that requests for
economic privileges in the fifteenth century were often
based on the sterility of the land and came from areas as
far /
1 Vicena, Manual, p.230? C.O.R.A.H.. pp.295-6 (Ixxxix,
2 Garcia Fernandez, op.cit., p,l.
3 Cited by J.H. Ullott. imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London,
1963}, p.l and K, Tamames. op.clt»» p.6.
far Apart at Plaaencia* Vitoria ami Alava.*
In the north, especially in Guipuscoa and the Basque
country* the land is mountainous and stony. Further
south much of the land of the meseta is also a land of
climatic extremes. The winters are cold and the summers
so hot that it is not surprising to read of soldiers on
campaign going temporarily mad because of the heat and
2
lack of water. The harshness of the winters* the meagre
rainfall* and the dry* long* and hot summers helped to
determine the pattern of agrarian cultivation and tech*
tniquo*.3
Much of Castile was uncultivated. Little is known
about the extent of forests in Castile, Pine forests
existed round M©ya and the Aragonese frontier. The naval
*
dockyards at Seville were supplied with timber from the
forests of Galicia, Extensive forests existed in the
area roughly corresponding to the triangle formed by Toledo*
Segovia and Avila, For most of the forest areas there
is /
1 See, for example* £. Ibarra y Rodrigues, El problema
cerealista en Eapana durante el reinado do " loo "nevea
Catolicos (Madrid, 194417' pt>,42, '841' "Conaalea, dot'»
Cedulas, i ? i. 47*51 (23 Doc,1475)} Garcia do Cortassar,
JjjEfiJJ7, pp.90-2,
2 Cron, Lucas de Iranao. pp«62,329, Even in the north
hoasiitai and his entourage found the heat unbearable:
The Travels of Leo of Roamital, 1465-1467, «d* M.Letts
(Hakiuyt Society* cviii, 1955)* 78-82, (Henceforth cited
as lioatal ta 1)«
3 Garcia Fernandas, op.cit.. passim,
4 Fragmentary evidence in Vicens. Historia, pp,275-6;
Garcia de Cortasar, op.citpp.i04-9j M.Lombard* *Le
bois dans la Meditcrranee musulmane** A.E.S.C,. xiv (1959),
234-54} lloamital, p,8, Some interesting speculations on
changes in the forestation of the Valladolid area in B,
Bennassar* Valladolid au aiecle d'or (Paris* 1967)* pp.
31-9.
22.
is evidence of some sort of royal forest administration.
It may be the case, however, that the extent of the
forest areas and more especially the extent of deforestation
in the late medieval period have been exaggerated. The
climate and soil of Extremadura and La yancha were in-
2
:capable of supporting extensive forests. In these hot
and dusty areas of the Castilian peseta. grass and drought-
resistant shrubs predominated. These grasslands of La
Maneha and Extremadura, covering areas as wide apart as
Badajoz and Albaeete, were the lands that provided the
greatest stimulus to concentrating economic activity on
sheep. For the grass in these areas has a peculiar
advantage in that it grows not only in spring but also in
autumn. Hence the dehesas or tracts of pasture lands so
often mentioned in the medieval documents dealing with
3
these regions." Hence also the tranahumance of sheep
4
from the north to these southern grassing steppes.
2. The Basic Products of the Economy
In fifteenth century Castile the difficulties of
transportation /
1 For example Cortes, Hi, 404 (6, 1442)} C.P.R.A.H.,
390-2 (cix, 14OTP
2 For what follows see C.J. Bishko, 'The Castilian as
Plainsman; The Medieval Ranching Frontier in La Mancha
and Extremadura *, in The Hew World Looks at its History,
ed. A.R.Lewis and T.F»"""kcCann (Texas, 19637, pp.47-69
and E, Rodriguess Amaya, *La Tierra en Qadajox 11230-1500),
R.E.L.. Separata. (1952).
3 See below,yy. - f
4 Bishko, ubi supra, passim.
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transportation were often greater than those presented by
the nature of the soil and the climate* The contrasts,
indeed, were great, Olive oil, for example, was exported
in large quantities and yet the olive was cultivated,
under adverse conditions, to the north of the present
olive line, Similarly the growth of sheep ranching did
not turn Castile into a pastoral and nomadic society!
grain and bread still remained the peasant's first pre-
{occupation. Hence, although there was an increasing
tendency towards economic specialisation, it lit almost
possible to talk in terms of closed economies as far as
some areas of the kingdom are concerned.
The evidence shows that the grape was cultivated all
over the kingdom of Castile - unlike the present day
situation. The documents are conclusive on this point.
For almost all areas from Hterto de Santa ^ar4 in the
extreme south, to Laredo, Castro Crdiales and Bermeo on
the Basque coast, and from \ivero, Camera, Salamanca and
Plasencia in the west, to Ledinaceli and the Aragonese
frontier in the east, there is evidence for the cultiva-
1
ttion of the vine.
Undoubtedly
1 For the north coast see the ordinances of 1459 in M«
Ciriquiaiw-Caiztarro, JLpnograf&t. hist^rica de . ortugalete
(Bilbao, 1942), pp.223-55, For CatIcia, Cortes, ii. bfi-9
(36,1351). For the frontiers of Aragon and Navarre,
Cortes, ii. 60-1 (24,1351)| A.D.M., Cog,, leg.11, doc.
40 and Led,, leg,4, doc,24, For other arsaa sec the dls-
:cussion which follows and, generally, Garcia Fernandas,
op.cit.. pp.8-20,
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Undoubtedly there were area# which can be singled
out for attention. On the whole they were the same areas
that were to retain their importance into modern times as
wine producing areas. Chief of these was the area round
Jerez, Puerto de Santa Maria, and Sanlucar de Bar ranteda. *
The growth of these wine producing centres was fairly
recent, In the thirteenth century, after the Kcconquista.
Gascon wines had to be imported into the south of Spain.
Following the Reconquista, however, vineyards were planted
and the importation of Gascon wines gradually declined and
wine production was by the fifteenth century one of the
^ 2
chief occupations of the Jeress area. Other important
areas of wine production were to be found in La Mancha,
La Rioja, Palencia, the area between Zamora and Valladoiid,
Madrid, Avila, Caefcellon, Toledo, Segovia, Cordoba and
t 3
Jaen. Most of these areas retained their importance
into the early .modem period although some, for example
Palencia, declined in the seventeenth century. Not that
these areas wore necessarily important for the quantity
produced /
1 H, Sancho de Sopranis# Documentoa para la his toria del
vino de Jerea (Teres, 1957), passim. (Hereafter cited as
Sancho, Documentos)
2 On these points see Y, ilenouard, *Le grand® commerce des
vins de Gascogne au moyen age*, R.H,, ccxxi (1959), 261-
304 and C.Verlinden, *The rise of Spanish trade in the
Middle Ages*, Econ.H.R., x(i</40), 44-59.
3 M, Grau, 'En torno al "vino1, K.S.. iii (1951), 449-56}
G, Herrero Martinez, *£^vino en Palencia*, l.T.T.M..
no.17 (1958), 17-41, The famous wines of the period are
listed in Jorge Manrique's Coplas a una beuaa que tenia
empenado un brial.
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produced. In this respect no area could compete with
Jerez, Puerto, and Sanluear. Some areas produced very
little wine. This was true particularly in the extreme
north. In Galicia and the Basque provinces the deficiency
fc ,£
in wine production was compensated^by the production of
cider.* Here, what impressed Roamital and his companions
was not the sight of vineyards but the abundance of apple
orchards:
Round about this town and in those mountains
there is such a profusion of fruit trees as
I have not seen in any other place. They
plant them as we sow hemp. One townsman or
peasant owns several thousands of them. The
reason why they plant so many Is that they
have no wine or beer. They make a drink
from apples. This district is surrounded by
mountains and is called Biscaia.
Of the different types of wine very little is known.
Vino romania was a much priced wine produced In the Jerez
3 / /region. a vino torrontes produced in Jaen was also
highly thought of and was made from a white - almost
seedless - grape with a very delicate skin. In the
centre and north of the kingdom the wines of Tore and
Medina /
1 Garcia Fernandez, pp.cit.. p.11; Garcia de Cortaaar,
op.cit,. pp.102-4.
2 £P*2ii«l# P.77,
3 This wine may have been a variation of the vino baatarda
produced in the south. There are conflie ting opinions"
on the nature of this vino baatardo but the documenta*
ttion, for example A.P.S. fll, Francisco Sanchez, fo.31
(3 April 1472), suggests that there were several kinds
of vino bastardo. See also J* Craeybecka, Un grand
commerce d'importation: lea vins d© Franco aux anciens
rtgTeVTp??To :'19ES) ■ a.ii note- 40.
4 See the description by Carriazo in his prologue to Cron*
Lucas de Iranzo, p.liii.
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Medina were regarded as being especially excellent.
Few wines were allowed to mature and it is clear that
although the word motto existed, the word vino was often
2
used to denote freshly made wine*
Apart from vineyards, each village, each area, each
town also had its own orchards * or huertas. As might
be expected * because of the climate and the Moorish
legacy - fruit and vegetables played a more important role
in the south of Castile than in the north. In G&llcia and
the Basque provinces apples and pears predominated. In
the south the variety was much greater both in fresh and
dried fruits - apples, oranges, poaches, cherries, plume,
melons, pomegranates, quince, figs, dates, raisins and
3
almonds are among the products most often mentioned.
In contrast to the orchards of the towns and villages,
beekeeping was regionalisad in those areas lacking popula¬
tion after reconquest. The moat important areas were in
effect /
1 Garcia Fernandas, op.clt*. pp#11-13*
2 The white wine of Medina was one of the few which was
allowed to mature, ibid, pp*12-13. The distinctions
which were made between 'old* and •new' wine may be
misleading since 'old* wine may have matured for no
longer than one year. See, for example, Cortes, ii.
60-1 <24,1351) and 172 (28,1369)#
3 A.M.S., caja 1468-70, Condiclones da las imousiclones.
deals with a 5% tax on fruit entering 'SevTfTe^and gives
data on the orchards for two leagues round the town.
See also Sancho, Oocumentos. pp.23-32 and Cron* Lucas
de IrangQi pp* 33-4, 119, 138, 164, 433,
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elfect the Canapo de Caiatrava and Murcia. The beehives
were situated in the hills and in tracts of uncultivated
ground between Toledo and Ciudad Real, and in the deserted
regions around Murela. But although the activity was
scattered over wide areas the beekeepers themselves were
capable of banding together to protect their interests.*
V*heat and barley were the most important agricultural
2.
crops. Cereal production was important in the previncia
of Leon, the tierra de cawpos area between Valladolid and
Palencia, the lands round Burgos, the vast area of La.
Maneha, and lastly the areas round Cordoba such as Ecija,
Carmona, and Aguilar. Guipuzcoa, Galicia, and the Basque
provinces were seriously deficient in cereals, The £sggs
of Viacaya of 1452, for example, simply stated that
the land .is very mountainous, grain is not
sown or harvested, and it also lacks the other
foods to maintain itself so that wheat, barley,
meat, beans, and other vegetables are usually
imported by sea.
Parts of Andalusia, including Seville, existed at a fitful
level of subsistence, and Mureia perhaps also suffered
f roffl /
1 J, Torres Pontes, E'staiepag de la vide en Murcia (Madrid,
1965), 28*32 (Henceforth ciTe<T as'Torres"Pontes, Cstampas)j
A.H.ft,, Cal«, Pergs,, See. dip., Realas, leg.4, no.24& ,
containing a» enquiry on the colraeneros of the Canan© de
Caiatravaj L, Suares Fernandes, 'Evolucion histoxica
de las hcrm&ndadee castell&me', C,H»E>, xvi( 1951),
pp,29*38, ,
2 For what follows see Ibarra y Rodrigues, op,c11«, pp.16,
42*3, 68j and Garcia de Cortacar, op.clt.. pp.89*99J
and bsl owty-T^-Si.
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from deficient cereal production.
There was. in short, a contrast of production
between the central dry land area and the periphery.
This was a pattern that also implied difficulties of
production. For the * bread carrying lands* ftterras da
pan 11ever) were also lands lacking irrigation and moist*
:ure. Given the quality of the land and the climate
grain production was largely based on the ano y yea
system,* This system * still prevalent today in many
areas of Castile • entailed ploughing the land every year
but only sowing every alternate year. In some areas the
land rested fallow for even longer periods. Hence in
the systems known as cultlvo al tereio, al cuarto, and
al quinto. the units of land only produced a harvest every
2
three, four, and five years respectively. These systems
no doubt reflected the poverty of a soil which lacked a
suitable chemical content for store intensive grain pro*
3
*due lion. They al*o. however, reflected a need for
pasture lands for livestock* These were systems which,
to a greater or lesser extent, allowed a balance to be
achieved /
1 Garcia Fernandas, op.clt.. pp.29*37,
2 *bjd, PP.37-43,
3 TEfd. pp.28-31, 37.
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achieved between the needs of the soil and an agricultural
and pastoral economy,*
The rise of the pastoral society* can be traced back
2
to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.
It has been argued that the boost in sheep farming was due
to the expanding markets for wool and to a switch from an
agricultural to a pastoral economy as & consequence of the
Black Death. There may be some truth in this but, on the
whole, these arguments appear unconvincing. Far more
important was the change in the physical environment
brought about by the Keconquista which led to ranching on
a wide scale. Ranching had, of course, existed in the
north before the reconquest of the Extremadura and La
Mancha regions. But it had been a limited affair with
livestock being kept close to the towns and alternating
between the lowland and the highland pastures of the
locality, With the reconquest of Extreraadura and La
Mancha, however, the dehesas of these regions opened up
the possibilities of alternating winter and summer pastures
throughout wide areas. So began the organisation of
transhumanee /
1 Ibid, pp.31-2, 36, 38-42, This view of these systems as
Selng empirically sound should, however, be qualified
by noting the primitive burning of vegetation practised
in parts of Gaiicia, Leon, and Asturias, the lack of
irrigation, and! the remarkable absence of windmillsi
J.L, Martin Galindo, *Los cultivos sobre cenisas en la
provincia de L«6n*, A.L., vii (1953), 78-95j Ibarra y
Rodriguez, on.clt,, ppTUO-l,
2 For what follows see generally J, Klein, The Mesta
(Cambridge, Mass,, 1920) j fiishko, ubi supra, passlat
Vicens, His tor la, ii.277-84 j V 1cens. ifenuat» pp.230-6.
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t ranshuraance on a large scale until, by 1467, there were
at least seme 3,000,000 sheep involved.
Sheep farming on this scale obviously required organ¬
ization. One need was for protection. This was pro*
Jvided by the bands of guards (rafale or eaculca) who
convoyed the sheep to the pasture grounds. The Mesta,
probably originating from somewhere in the period between
1260*65, existed primarily to organize the sheep walks or
ca&adas which allowed transhumance between the northern
and southern pastures.
The areas of sheep farming and the routes of trans*
thumance were situated as follows. In the north the
centres of organization were L«on, Soria, Segovia, and
Cuenca. The southern pastures were located in Extremadura
and la Mancha. The routes or sheep walks collected sheep
as far north as Leon and Logrono and moved them south into
La Mancha, Extrcmadura, and Andalusia » as far south as
Cordoba and Mureia ,
Sheep, of course, were not the only livestock in
Castile. Even camels were to be found in the south, But
the relative importance of the different forms of live*
I stock may, perhaps, be deduced frost the royal documents
granting exemption from royal taxes on livestock. Here




animal* exempted from taxation!
.swatelHEg
2*000 sheep
000 cattle (cows, hulls)
500 pigs
50 horses


















These examples are taken from areas share sheep farming
was the predominant economic activity* In other areas *
especially- the extreme north * sheep must have played a
much more insignificant role* It is, however, interest*
ling to note that even in a region like Jeras where
ranching was definitely not the primary economic activity,
sheep /
34 The figures are from royal privileges in Kscorial,
£*1«6«, fos* 242d*246aj A.D.M., Med., leg.40, doc * 50 J
A.G.S,, D.de C., leg.4, no.118.
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sheep still predominated, Thus in the Jerea area in






Of the many salt producing areas In the kingdom of
Castile the most important were probably Salinas do Lents
Kooio, F'oaa, Anana, Avilee, Villaf^f ila, San Felises,
Atiensa, Espartinas, La Mata and Torrevieja. Of these,
none * except perhaps La Lata - were as important as
Setubal in Portugal»
How was this salt produced? the only contemporary
description that exists is one which deals with salt
production at lioeio.
Two miles away is a place belonging to the
same count where salt is made, hardened by
the sun, in this ways water is conducted
into a small pond or basin and is left there
for some time until it thickens and grows
hard, so that salt is produced in the likeness
of stone*
It seems probable that the same system applied to the
other salt producing areas inland, and also, with adap*
; tat ions /
1 Sancho, Historla* i,62,
2 See generally R, Pastor do Togneri, "La sal en Castilia
y Leon*, C.K.S., xxxvii-xxxvili (1963), 42-8?? M,Gual
Camarena, *Para un mapa do la sal hlspana en la edad
1965), 483-97. For the location of salines and docu¬
mentary references see below \\-22s-t
3 koaaltal p.83.
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adaptations# to the salines of the southern coast*
There are indications# however, that brine or sea water
1
say have been boiled in the Seville area.
There was also a significant difference In the dis¬
tribution of the salines In Castile* Generally th#
north and east - and especially the north east * were
well provided with salines* But the area round Leon,
and the whole area from Salamanca to Badejoz were far
away from the centres of production* To a certain
extent this was alleviated by Villafafila and also by a
saline somewhere on the Castilian side of the Portuguese
border* Yet the fact remains that the west and parts
of the south of Castile were poorly provided* It is
true that there were salines in the south but it would
appear that their production was not significant*
Cordoba and Alcaudete certainly seem to have been of
little importance* Seville, at the beginning of the
fifteenth century had to construct new salines on the
Is la Mavor in the marismaa because of the grave shortage
2
of salt in the previous years.
Salt, of course* was a peculiarly important ingred-
stent in the medieval diet - meat, fish, butter, even
cheese /
1 A.M.S., caja 1416-1?, no,160, lists calderas and calderones
among the items for the construetion of salines in
1412 and 1413, - If is hard to envisage what these
were intended for except boiling.
2 A,M.S., caja 1416-17, no.160, relates the discussions
on the problem of the salt supply for Seville and the
choice of an area for the construction of a new saline*
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cheese, were preserved by using salt# Yet in the south#
olive oil could be used# to a certain extent, as a sub*
istitute for salt, Certainly olive oil was part of
the staple diet of the Castilians, Schaseck, with
pardonable exaggeration, alleged *that the peasants do
not know what butter or cheese is like. In place of
1
butter they use olive oil of which there is abundance*.
There was an abundance of olive oil * especially in the
2
south, The financial administration in the south had
a special section to deal with the taxes on olive oil,
Even the Crown, collecting and storing thirteen hundred*
{weights of olive oil in the years 1428-32, played a
part in this trade,5 In 1412 alone the town council of
Seville sold twenty tons of olive oil in order to raise
some desperately needed money, And in the south olive
oil was often used instead of salt to preserve fish.
This was certainly true of the flourishing tunny fisher*
lies round Cadiz * despite the fact that Cadiz was itself
5
a salt producing area.
Fish /
1 Koxmital, p.65,
2 The olive 'line* in modern times has been marked by the
central cordillera. In the medieval period the olive
was cu1 fcTvated' in the north in Castilja la Vieia where,
today, only 0,3% of the cultivated'area fa™dedicated to
the olives Garcia Fernandez, op.cit.. pp»l*6.
3 For examples of the place of oil in the royal adminis*
:tration, A.D.M,, Priego, leg#38, doc,3? and Med#, leg,
25, doc,8j Cortes, Hi, 556*7 (52,1447)# Figures for
1428-32 in A.G.S#, i>,de C,, leg.4, no.12,
4 A•&#&>«, caja 1412*13, no,138,
5 See, for example, Heera, GSnes, pp.488*9,
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Fish seems to have played an extremely important
part in the Gastiiian's diet* Even such inland towns
as Jaen, Burgos, Cordoba, Vlllaion and Guadalupe, were
well supplied with fish. The variety of fish mentioned
by the documents is bewildering although only a few seem
to have been caught in significant quantities.* Sardine
fishing was important on both the northern and southern
2
coasts. Whaling was important on the northern coast
3
in almost all areas from Galicia to St* Jean de Lua.
But undoubtedly the most important fisheries were
the tunny fisheries of the south. As Heers has pointed
out, the importunee of the tunny fisheries can hardly be
exaggerated. The aIroadrabas or tunny fisheries were
situated in the areas round Conil, hota, ami Cadis. That
wars were fought between the southern nobility to control
5
these fisheries is hardly surprising. As early as 1441
complicated transactions involving the tunny fish of
these /
1 Cod, haddock, mackerel, shad, dog fish, sea bream,
octupus, lampreys, trout, salmon, eels, ravas. rioradaa.
aapateras. and :hicharros are mentioned.
2 Sardines were important enough to be treated as separate
items of trade and taxation. For example, A.G.b., Exp.
Hac«, leg.2, no,205, deals with sardine trade in Calieia
while A.k.S,, cajas 1433-9, 1454-6, and 1468-70 contain
condiclones for the farm of taxes on sardines and 'other
f ishj'T
3 Garcia de Cortazar, op.clt., pp.114-7 and Ciriquiain-
Gaiztarro, op.cit., pp.77-9•
4 Heers, G&nes. pp#488-9*
5 Evidence of such warfare in the 1470s in k.A.H*, 9-30-7,
6483 which contains a royal confirmation of a settlement
of this question, 28 Aug,1474. Henry IV himself made a
special visit to see the tunny fisheries: Mem.Diva.Haas*.
p.36 and Cron* Lucas de Iranzo. p.xi.
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these areas can be found,* In 1475, 987. barrels were
f ^
sold in Saniucar de Barrameda to Genoese merchants* In
October 1480, seventy barrels were sold to two Venetian
merchants»^ But the importance of the fisheries is,
perhaps, best underlined by the continuous stream of
boatmen who carried barrels and staves to the fisheries
from Seville*
Castile imported cloth from England, Flanders,
Brabant and France* To the east, in the Crown of Aragon,
there were important textile centres in Barcelona, Gerona,
Lerida, and Valencia* To the south, Granada, Malaga,
Tunis, Fes, Rabat and Uarrakech were important silk raanu-
:facturing centres* Yet, despite this, the textile
industry was the most important industry in Castile * a
fact which underlines the lack of development in Castiiian
industries generally*^
Silks and velvets were produced in Seville, Cordoba,
and /
1 A»P»S», V* Gonzalo Bernal, £o«51v* (20 Sept,1441)t an
official of the count of Niebla orders Pedro Rodriguez,
merchant of Seville, to pay 4,164 mrs to Pedro de Soto
from money owed for purchases from the almadra.be*
2 A.P.fc., iv* Pedro Alvarez, fo*247 (29 Nov,i475J*
3 Ibid. fo.4ilv (2 Oct,1400)*
4 Ibid** Xos,266v-274v, for example, shows that between
I6-19 June 1475 three boafcmen carried 105 barrels and a
boatload of staves to the Conil almatirabas♦
5 For what follows see the valuable, but"badly organized,
information in F*L»May, bilk Textiles of Spain, (New
York, 1957), pp*60«2, 102, 103, 131, 160-1, 174, 193-4,
201, 223-5 and Yicene, Manual. pp,237-8*
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and above all Toledo, From Toledo plain coloured velvets,
velvets io a two colour comb illation, silks embellished with
gold and silver threads, figured silks, satins, damasks,
and gold and velvet brocades supplied a market in which the
Church was the chief customer, Stindal *> which could
denote a very fine linen as well as a light silk tissue -
was produced in Toledo and Cuenca.
•Silks arid velvets were, of course, expensive ami
valuable fabrics. With the cheaper fabrics it is hard to
elucidate the differences which lie behind the Caatilian
names for the various cloths, Woollen cloth (panoa de
lana, frlsas) was produced in Cordoba, Murcia and certain
unidentified areas in the bishoprics of Oema, Siguenza,
and Calahorra.* Seville also produced linen cloth
/VV\
J ^
(lienzos), cloth mad© from help (canamo) and fustian.
Falencia and i.amora produced a cloth known as picote which
was probably of an extremely coarse texture.^
There is little information on the size of the
Castilian cloth industry and the techniques of production.
There is evidence that fitful attempts were made to foment
the industry. In the Cortes of Toledo in 1462 it was
33reed /
1 For <dsma, sigueziaa, and Olahorra see f os ,68k and 69K
of the Cuaderno of Pi camps of 1457 in Eecoria!, x. 11.14.,
fos.57R-264V.
2 Cuadernq of a1cabalas of 1438, decoria 1, a.1,8., fos•
24t>U*268Ii. "
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agreed to reserve a fixed proportion of wool for the home
market,* As tarly as 1409 Seville granted fiscal privi¬
leges to five wool dressers, five weavers, two dyers and
four merchants, as an incentive to produce cloth made
from hemp, A similar provision, this time relating to
the production of woollen cloths, can be found for
/ 2
Cordoba, In Murela cotapl lea ted regulations » dealing
with dyes, prices, and the technique of dyeing - were
3
drawn up in 1431 and revised in 1442, Documents, but
dating from the end of the century, also seem to imply a
4
fairly complex organization in Seville, For the present
that is all the evidence that can be put forward. Can
this evidence support assort ions that 450,000 pounds of
silk were used in Toledo in 1480, and that towards the
end of the century there were 13,000 looms in Toledo,
38,000 textile workers (no less!) in Segovia and 130,000
textile workers in Seville in 1519?^
Cloth making centres covered most of the country.
Other industries tended to be highly localized. Of these
one /
1 Cortes, ill, 721-4 (27,1462),
2 A.M.S,, caja 1408-9, no,91 and A.G.S,, D,de C«, leg.4,
no,82, fol.OR,
3 Torres Pontes, Patampas. vi, 10-20.
4 For example the format! on of a coaipanla in 1489 between
a master silk weaver of Seville and a silk spinner from
Valencia, the purchase of 50 loads of pastel tolosano
by one Seville dyer alone in 1489, and a contract of~1480
for the finishing of cloth over a period of one yeart
A.P.S., 111. Anton Ruiz de Porras, fos.168v and 275 and
ibid, XV, Pedro Alvarez, £o,367,
5 figures from May, op,c11». pp.223-5j C.Espejo and J,
Paz, Lag Antiguas ferine de Medina del Csiapo (Valladolid,
1908)7 pffff • See also tfee comments oif Vicens, Manual.
p.2 38.
39,
one of the most important was soap** This industry was
lucrative enough for it to he coveted by the highest
nobility and to be involved in the confiscations attached
to the inevitable purges during the fifteent^'century
civil wars* Cant red on the Seville area* It earned for
the feevlllanos the nickname of laboaoros, or soap makers,
in the literature of the period,^ The soap - both black
and white •» was raade from olive oil# The making of the
soap itself was naturally farmed out by the nobles who
monopolised the industry# The Triana district of
Seville was the centre for the production and storing of
soap* but soap was also made outside Seville in Castil de
las Gu&rdas* Aanaleaser, Saniuca? la Mayor, Lebri ja, and
Aleala de Ouadaira#
Castile held the csonoply of mercury since it was
virtually the only significant producer in Europe, The
mercury mines at Aliundea, in the deserted area to the
west of Ciudad heal, also produced vermilion. Both these
commodities were in great deia&nd abroad but, as will be
seen in a later chapter, the Castilians themselves failed
to /
1 The data that follow* is taken from A.D.M,, Ale,Due#,
leg,55, docs,16-2?, 29-30, 32-4, 36* 33; ibid, leg,56,
docs,2*4, 6, 10*12, 14, 18} A,M.S., caja 1405-6, noft*
70, 90, 129, 131, 132j Ibid, caja 1406-7, no,58} ibid,
caja 1407*8, no,85} A.P.S,, 211, Anton hula de Forms,
fo,259v. For noble monopolies sea below VV
2 See Diego Catalan Menendea-Fidal, »**Nu»ea viera jaboneros
tan bier, vender an jabdn", Romance his tor ico del rey
don Pedro, del an© 1357*, Bol,R,A,E., xxxii(1952),
233-45.
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to exploit their monopolistic position properly.* Iron
was mined in Guipuacoa and the Basque provinces. Some
iron manufactures were produced in these areas but on the
whole the iron that was mined was intended for export
Alum was far less important. Documents hint at several
possible areas of production in the kingdom of Murcia but
the main centre of production was Uaaarron. Production
was, however, on a small scale except perhaps during the
short period of crisis in the European alum market between
the fall of Phocaea in 1455 and the discovery of the Tolfa
mines in 1462."*
Another important industry was the leather industry
which thrived in the archbishopric of Seville .and bishop-
jric of Cadia. Perhaps •industry' is too optimistic a
word to use. It is true, for example, that there were
a good many craftsmen such as shoemakers and wine skin
makers in Seville who must have relied on these areas for
their leather. On the whole, however, the leather was
exported as a raw material. The importance of the
operation in leather emerges quite clearly from the docu¬
ments, As with soap and tunny fish the groat noble
families f
1 A. Mat ilia Tascon, Hiatoria de lag minas de A1maden
(Madrid, 1958) ; Hecrs. figngs. p.490; see below un
2 Garcia de Cortaaar, op.clt.. pp.123*41; 1. Zumalde,
Historia de Print e (San f-ebastia'n, 1957), chaps. i-ii*
3 Torres Pontes, Eatampaa. vi.16; Torres Fontea, Don
Pedro Fajavdo (Madrid, 1953), P.87 (Henceforth cited
as Torres Pontes, Eajardo)j B.N., MS,,887, fos.423K*
425V.
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families of the south fried to establish monopolies on
leather* Both Henry IV and the pretender, Alfonso XII,
tried to create monopolies in favour of their supporters**
Moreover when transactions involving sixty tons of leather
2
skins could be made In Seville, it is not surprising that
the town council should try to raise revenue by taxing the
leather trade*
Other industries, which may have been important but
about which little is known, included ceramics in the
south, paper at Toledo and silverwork in Valladolid.*
Inevitably the main economic activities and the most
important centres of production have been emphasised*
Yet mixed economics prevailed in most areas of the king*
5
tdom* Sheep farming and grain production existed side
by side* Without such a balance where would the Castil*
sians obtain their grain? they certainly could not
obtain it from Catalonia, Valencia, Andalusia or the
Basque provinces and, although the periphery could import
wheat from abroad, this was certainly not the case for
the regions of the centre* It is true that complaints
were /
1 See C.O.R.A.H.. 381*2 (cix,1465) and R.A.H., 9-30*?,
6483, no.291,
2 Sale of cueros vacunos al pelo by Juan Tristan of
Seville to Juan de Hajera, merchant of Burgost A.P.S.,
III# Anton Ruia de Porras, fo.?l (18 May 1489),
3 A,M.S. caja 1404*5, no.9? and caja 1454*9, does* on
4 CspejpPandCPaz?8op*c11*. p.188} Vicena, Manual, p.239.
5 This, indeed, is the whole argument of Garcia Fernandas,
2P,.f.<rAy* £*
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were occasionally made about the damage caused to agri*
(culture by sheep, but these complaints were never as
numerous as might be supposed.' Some complaints were
made by villagers who wanted to use pasture lor their
own livestock and resented the competition from outside
interests. Tet the really violent antagonism did not
come from the villagers. On the contrary, the violent
clashes were between two separate ranching interests*
For the northern and southern ranchers fought lor posse*
ssion of the rich pasture lands in La liancha and
iuxftremadura, Hence the violent methods used by the
southerners in their light against the Mosta which
essentially protected the interests of the tr&nshumant
2
sheep of the northerners.
The Conditions lor Trade within the Kingdom
On first analysis the obstacles to the development
of trade in Castile seemed unaurmountable. Everything
seemed calculated to block the flow of an interchange of
goods and produce*
there /
1 For an example of such a complaint, Cortes. ii.25-6
(44,1351).
2 Bishko, ubl supra, p.63.
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There wee no uniform system of weights and measures*
From Alfonso X to Philip II the Crown and the cortee tried
to bring about some unification of the various systems
existing* In the cortes of Madrid of 1435 a uniform
system was, theoretically, established* The weight of
gold and silver was to be determined by the systems pre*
svailing in Toledo and Burgos respectively* Similarly,
for example, the Toledo system with regard to wine, and
the Avila system with regard to bread, were to be enforced
throughout the kingdom* Yet despite this laudable attempt
to produce one uniform system,, and despite confirmations
in 1462, 1476 and 1496, the whole system of weights and
measures had still not been unified by the reign of Philip
II*1
Taxes were the greatest obstacle to trade* In the
first place there was the percentage sales tax, or
Cabala, which theoretically applied to the whole king*
sdom* Customs duties were also important* On the north
coast they were known as the dlesmos do la mar de Castllla*
Similar customs duties existed on the Aragonese frontier
and, to a lesser extent, on the Portuguese frontier* In
the south a different tax * the almoiarlfaggo * served
the same purpose* on the Moorish frontier there were
further customs duties known as dlesmo s medio diesmo de
is I
1 £ap«jo and Paa, op.ctt.. p.209j Ibarra y liodrigoea,
QPaClta, p#I05a
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lo morisco, Finally the levying of taxes on sheep *
aervicio and roontaggo • and sotne other less prevalent
taxes, such as the portasao* should be no ted
Municipal and seigneurial tolls on goods in transit
also directly affected trade, A good many of these were
of doubtful legality and, because of this, these were the
taxes which were most bitterly resented* Levied near
castles, at fords, ferries, rivers, bridges, town boun¬
daries, and seigneurial estates they caused continued
protests to be made at the meetings of the cortes*^ The
nsajority of these taxes were levied without royal consent,
licence, or privilege. Declared illegal, the taxes -
portasgp, roda, pastellaJe. asadura. pasaje, peale.
barcaje, pontaje * continued to be exacted on ail passing
merchandise* The sine of the problem Is difficult to
envisage* These were arbitrary taxes varying in amount
arid varying in location. A provisional count of places
legally levying only one of these taxes, the portaggo.
3
gives a figure of forty.
The /
1 There is no study of these taxes for the later middle
ages but see the excellent discussion by JR., Carande,
Carlos V y sus Banqueros, ii (Madrid, 1949)# chaps, V*
XX 'and S. Moxo. La a1cabala (Madrid, 1963),
2 Cortes Hi, 75 (24, 1433}, 347*50 (42, 1436), 428 (26,
1442), 634 (46, 1455), 699-700 (27, 1455), 711 (13,
1462), 797-8 (15, 1469), 843-5 (5,1473), 868*70 (18 and
19* 1473), A fairly detailed example of merchants1
criticisms in the Cuaderno in Consoles, Col. C^dulas,
i» 1-28 and an account of the vexations involved" in""
Kogtoital, pp.78-9, 82-3,
3 Ute figure of forty results from a quick review of the
documentation and is, therefore, a very conservative
estimate.
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The economic policy of the Crown also 3earned to lay
an intolerable burden on trade. there were finicky and
detailed regulations intended to make the levying of
taxes easier. Cloth made in Palencia and Zamora had to
be registered in case alcabalae were evaded. Grain and
bread coming into Seville could only enter by the three
gates of Triana, Carmona, and the Macarena, Cattle
near the frontiers of Aragon, Navarre and Portugal had
to be registered, Each saline had its marketing area
carefully limited,*
As far as general economic policy is concerned,
however, the main effort was directed at preventing the
export of what were deemed vital commodities. Chief of
these were gold, silver and money. As might be expected,
allegations were made about the steady drain of gold and
silver to the Papal Court, Portugal and Aragon, To
avoid the drain of gold and silver it was stipulated,
as a general rule, that foreign merchants should register
their goods on arrival and, on departure, should only
take with them an equivalent amount of Cast!Han roerchan-
3
}diee. Other products, the export of which was gener-
tally /
1 These examples are taken from Escorial, Z,l»8,t foe,
231v»2 33v. 249d-250a and Cortes, ill# 307-10 (41.1436),
366-7 {59,1436).
2 On this Cortes, iii, 65-6 (22,1425), 660-1 (15,1453),
693-4 (20,1455),
3 Cortes, ill, 18-19 (15,1419) and K Bataillon,
TVendeja*, HlSP.Eev.. xxvii (1959), 228-45,
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generally forbidden, included horses, breed, wheat,
barley, rye, vegetables and all forms of livestock.
The ordinances were especially emphatic about horses
and grains, and especially emphatic about the prohibition
with regard to the kingdom of Granada, Prohibited
imports included wine, vinegar and salt,*
It would be a mistake, however, to take into
account only the economic policy of the Crown, For the
striking feature was the extent to which local or regional
economic policies vitiated any coherent overall policy.
The extent to which the economies of the areas under
the jurisdiction of towns and lords was regulated appears
really formidable,* "rice fixing occurred frequently,
Regulations relating to the entry and marketing of mer-
ichandlae were legion. So too were attempts to cut out
the regaterog or middlemen. Even the control of produce
:tion itself was not uncommon. Thus the town council of
Sahagua fixed prices for oil, butter, candles, and
sardines,"* The town council of Vlllalon determined the
price of fish,4 Ships arriving at Portugulete could not
sell /
1 A.D.M., Priego, leg,14, doc,3; ibid, lied,, leg,59, doc,
25{ Cortes, ii, 433-49 (139011 HtTd. iii, 721-4 (27-8,
14621: Y, Eenouard, *L#exportation de chevaux de la
ficninsule ibdrique a\t raoyen Sge', in Horaenatge a Jatime
Vic ens Vivee. 1 (Barcelona, 1965), 571-77".""
2 An outstanding example was the municipal control over
the me* t market and prices in Segovia t M. Grau, 'Las
carnicerias de Segovia en el siglo xr', E,S,« viii (1956),
205-13.
3 A.H.N,, Clero, Pergs•, carp,943, doc,7.
4 R.C.V., Actas de Villaion, B, fo«.iv-2R.
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sell their merchandise in bulk for nine days in order
to prevent prices rising at resale. The same town had
an extremely complicated system for the marketing of
goods,* Most towns tried to regulate harvesting. Some
towns went further* Jerea laid down detailed regulations
on the harvesting of grapes, the techniques of making
raisins, the sine of barrels, and even the type of seal
2
to be used on the barrels,
Such examples could be cited endlessly. But what
ia important here is to stress the degree to which the
local economic policies clashed with each other. For
example Bilbao and Portugalete had a long and acrimonious
dispute about the levying of taxes on ships; but despite
attempts to solve the problem, in 1463 and 1473, ships
going up the river to Bilbao had to pay two lots of taxes
3
* one at Portugalete and one at Bilbao. Two commodities,
wine and grain, were generally affected by such clashes
of interest.
In the case of wine the problem was one of protecting
the local producer. Hence the regulations made - by
Segovia, Avila, Sepulveda, Villalon, Seville, Falencia -
4
to prevent competition from outside. In the majority
of /
1 Ordinances of Portugalete in Ciriquiain-C&istarro, op*
cit.. pp.?23-55.
2 ancho, Pocumentos, pp.19-32.
3 Ciriquiairi-Gaiastarro, op.cit., pp.62-7,
4 M. Craw, *En torno al v irior, £«?•'.. iii (1951), 449-56;
Marques tie Foronda, 'Las Ordenansas de Avila1, B.&.A.H.,
lxxi (1917), 381-425, 463-520; Col.Dip.Sepulveda. 1.
358-64, doc,ill (1 May 1415); K.C.V., Actas deTillalon,
A, fos.l4v-13E, B, fos.4R and v; yearly conditions for
the farm of municipal revenues, A,M.S., passim; Martlnes
de Ascoitia, ubi supra, 17-41,
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of cases this was attempted by simply forbidding the
importation of wine into the area until home production
had been used up. In some cases, for example Seville,
a solution was attempted by imposing a special tax on
imported win®, nosto. and grapes.
The case of grain and bread presents an almost
complete contrast. Regulations, in this case, aimed at
protecting the consumer and not the producer. Invariably
the export of grain outside the area was prohibited with*
Jout special permission. The reason is obvious. The
sale of grain to areas hit by had harvest® produced large
profits but was detrimental to the area of production.
In area® perpetually short of grain elaborate provisions
were made to attract grain, Portugal etc, for example,
decreed that nothing oould be sold to muleteers from out¬
side the region unless they brought grain or flour in
exchange* That these regulations were not empty formulae
# especially in years of crisis * can be seen in the
measures taken to enforce the regulations, Seville some-
{times had a whole amy of officials, working on land and
sea, trying to prevent the escape of wheat and barley out
of the large area under its jurisdiction. At the same
time attempts were made to persuade other areas to relax
exactly /
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exactly the same policies so that grain could be import*
, 1iod,
Despite the obstacles which, hampered trade there
were certain favourable factors*
In the first place there was the great mass of
privileges acquired by towns and individuals which, once
given, were confirmed by successive monarcha• Thus the
trading privileges given to the town of Lequeito by
Ferdinand IV (1295*1312) were still confirmed by Philip
2
II in 1564* A privilege given to the town of Caeo in
1447, aid involving similar privileges, was repeatedly
3
confirmed down to 1817 and the reign of Ferdinand VII#
But here the problem is to try and deduce a pattern of
factors which benefited trade# Such a pattern did exist
Above all it benefited the coastal regions of the north
and the south#
The extreme north and the extreme south of the king*
:dora of Castile were not grain producing areas# A whole
series of special privileges were therefore intended to
alleviate this situation. Foreign merchants bringing
grain to the southern ports were not subject to the rule
that an equivalent amount of Castilian merchandise had to
be /
1 For grain policy in the Modinaceli estates, Med
log.50# doc#?# For Cordoba, A.D.M,# Priego, leg# 14,
doc,3. For Portugalefce, Ciriquiain*Gaist«rro, op.clt.#
pp#227*9# Many of the Seville documents cited in
Appendix A deal with these attempts to control the
saca de pan; see below H-ssl*'t'-
2 Gonzhles. Col.C&julat. i# 420*3 (12 July 1334),
3 O. Armayor, '31 privilegio de C&so*, B.I.E.A.. x (1956)
136*54# ~~~
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be exported. Merchants bringing grain to Seville were
given pref©rential tax treatment. In many places in the
north too - Bilbao. Bermeo, Castro '^rdiales • customs
duties ami regulations were relaxed in order to allow for
a sufficiency of food supplies. All of Guipuascoa, for
example, was exempted from the customs taxes on food
supplies in the bishoprics of Calahorra, Gsma and
Piguenaa.*
Royal policy also clashed with municipal policies
with regard to the free circulation of grain. As has
been shown, many towns tried to protect themselves by
prohibiting - at least in theory * inter-regional trade
in wheat and barley. The Crown, on the other hand, con-
iis is ten tly asserted (both in ordinances and in the cortes)
the principle of unrestricted internal trade in grain
2
supplies. Nor were these merely vague declarations of
intent, for attempts were made to break down the resis¬
tance of the towns. John II, for example, wrote to
the town of Cordoba ordering the officials to allow grain
to be sent to Seville,"* and Henry IV sent a sharp letter
■i 4
on the same subject to the town council of Jeres. No
doubt /
1 Evidence for these points in Gonaalez, Col.Ceduiaa. i.
1-28, 52-3 j ibid. iii.34; Cortes, iii.91 (27,1430),
260-3 (3,1436}V Eacorial, Z.I•8., fo.246d; Rataillon,
ubi supra. 228—45.
2 Cortes, 1i. 26-? (45,1351); ibid. Hi.664 (19,1453),
694-5 (20,1455), 720-1 (26146217" C.P.R.A.H.. 416-7
(cix,1465); A.Sierra Corella, 'Libro cartulario de
jurados de Toledo', R.R.A.H.. xciv (1939), 193-213.
3 A.D.M., Priego, leg.TiTdoc.3.
4 A.M.J., Actas Caps., session of 8 March 1455.
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doubt the reason for this was partly military* The
Moorish frontier had to be populated and the garrisons
provisioned* Hence the exemptions from taxation* the
attempts to secure a steady supply of provisions* and
the suspension of all taxes on the movement of provisions
when any major campaign was mounted against the- kingdom
of Granada*
Royal policy, however, did not merely benefit the
northern and southern periphery in relation to grain
supplies. Both areas were also incidentally favoured
by other factors. Basque trade must have benefited from
the almost total immunity from taxation which the Basques
enjoyed* Guipuacoa enjoyed immunity from customs duties
for its imports and exports* In the south, Cadis was a
•free* port and Henry IV is alleged to have given complete
freedom of trade to ports like Sanlucar de Barrameda,
2
Buelva, Ayamonte, Lope and La Redondela* Even trade
on a large scale with the kingdom of Granada was sometimes
sanctioned by the Crown* As early as 1310 at least,
treaties between Castile and Granada made provision for
trade across the frontier* By the fifteenth century
quite f
1 One of inany examples on the privileged position of towns
on the frontier is the privilege to the towns of Alcali
la Real, Antequera, Teba, *v otras villas y loaares de
worn* in A.D.M., Priego, leg.40, doc,72* An example
of suspension of all taxes for military purposes in
A.M.S., caja 1409-10, no.83.
2 Gonzales, Col.C^ciulas. iii* 47-51 j A»M. J ,, caja 1, no*
36 de orden '"SMj "Setai 1 Ion, ubi supra, passim; C.P.R.A.H.
427-8 lcix,i465).
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quite positive measures were taken to protest this trade*
In the treaty of 1439 the Crows selected three specific
areas in frontier bishoprics where Christians* Jews* and
Moors could safely trade with each other under royal pro*"
i taction*1
It could be maintained that royal policy also helped
the economy of the interior in two specific ways » by
protecting the pastoral economy and by protecting the
fairs* Both these points* however, need reexamination*
Certainly the owners of the really large flocks of sheep
must have benefited from the privileges which granted
♦
them exemptions Irata the stovvicio and montaago taxes*
Yet these privileges were not granted for economic
2
reasons. Indeed even the connection between the Crown
and the .Mesta seams to have become completely vague and
tenuous* Nor is there any real evidence to support the
view that the fairs benefited to any great extent from
royal protection* True, there is an impressive cata¬
logue of royal privileges which give permission to found
fairs and markets* and which give immunities of one sort
or another to the fairs and the merchants going to them*
Thus /
1 The scale of trade naturally depended on the state of
diplomatic relations and customs duties were accordingly
adjusted! see* for example, A.G.S., S.M.H,, leg.2, no*
24, For the treaties and a detailed picture of frontier
complications* J* da Mala Carriaso, *Un alcalde antra
los crietianos y las uoxos1, Ai-And*. xiii (1948),v 35-
96 and the same, 'Kelaciones fronterisas antra Jaen y
Granada1, R.AJB.M*. Ixi (1955), 23-51*
2 At least not for any that can be discerned.
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Thus, Brihuega was founded by Henry 1 {1214-121?), and
Burgos was founded by Alfonso XI In 1339* These were
intended to be big fairs. Grants for smaller local
markets were not lacking either, Henry XV, for example,
granted Toledo and Vill&garcia the privilege of holding
a merc&do jfranco once a week,
These privileges were not, of course, unimportant•
Merchants were generally guaranteed freedom from arrest
for such things as debts and were generally granted
exemption from paying alcabalas, The lack of restric¬
tions attracted merchants, tended for an increase in
population, and caused the procuradores to complain of
the leniency with which foreign merchants were treated,
Yet the most important fair of all, Medina del Campo,
was not a royal creation, Nor were the seigneurial fairs
of Yillaion and Medina de iiCoseco which ranked next %p/
importance after Medina del Campo, Indeed the activities
of the nobility in stimulating and protecting seigneurial
fairs caused frequent and bitter complaints to be made in
the cortes
On balance therefore, it would appear that there
was a whole series of barriers and impediments to trade,
How /
1 See generally %.*pejo and Pas, up.ci i., chaps, i and ii.
There are, of course, many privileges of markets and
fairs. The examples of Toledo and Villagcrc£& from
A,G.S ♦ , fbep.Hac. , leg.2, no.137j 9*30-7, 6483,
no,259: £« Benito huano, Toledo en el si^io xv (Madrid,
1961), 89, (Henceforth ciTecf"as Benilto fnia.no. Toledo)
Complaints of the procuradorea in Cortes, iii, 77 '(41,
1425), 09-90 (25,1430),103 t16,14311, 260-3 (3,1436),
633-4 (45,1451), 656-7 (9,1453), 706-7 (5,1462),
$%•
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How did the merchant manage to deal with these obstacles?
There is plenty o1 evidence to show that smuggling#
fraud, and corruption were frequent* It was an easy
matter to avoid the royal tan officials* Jeres, for
example# had a special privilege which exempted merchand¬
ise needed by the town from taxes and customs duties*
Merchandise which arrived at the ports of Cadis and
Puerto de Santa Mar^a, therefore# was nominally sent to
Jeres in order to avoid payment of duties. Once in
Jeres the merchandise was redistributed further inland*
Taxes levied inland could also be easily avoided*
merchants in Seville, who wanted to send goods to Medina
del dampo, avoided faxes levied in the Seville area by
first of ail sending the goods to areas within the town's
jurisdiction; from these areas it was easy to transfer
the goods past the town boundaries and tax officials*
further north, cloth was smuggled into Castile across
the hragonese frontier* Small wonder that the
prucuradareg of the cortcs complained repeatedly about
smuggling* At one stage it was suggested that, since
so much wheat was smuggled abroad out of Andalusia, the
smuggling of grain should be made legal*
Corrupt tax officials could also be found to help
the smugglers* There were u1legations that customs
officials in the bishopric of Calahorra, in Galicia, and
in Aaturias co-operated with merchants in a schema to
lower /
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lower the cuetoam duties. Alcabala officials in the
Seville area were accused of actively helping smugglers*
Even military and naval officials, including the admiral
and his lieutenant, were alleged by the Crown to have
lined their own pockets by protecting exporters from
the tax officials.1
Two other points about the internal structure of
trade need to be examined. The first concerns the
pattern of commuaications and the second concern® credit,
finance, and the fairs of the kingdom,
internal trade, it has been suggested, followed a
simple cosoaunicat ions network. Goods moved along the
same routes that the sheep of the &<ssta. used. Moreover
the carrying trade was also a seasonal matter. The
carters spent the winter in the region, of Toledo. In
the spring the carts set out for the north and south
covering some forty kilometres per day. To the north,
they carried wool. At Vitoria iron was added to the
wool and both commodities were taken thereafter to the
ports on the north coast. In the south, the carts
* stopped at A1maden and loaded up with quicksilver for
Seville /
1 For a flagrant example of complete disregard of the
laws see Hears, Cftaes. pp.70*1, Evidence for examples
cited in A.M. J, ,""ea ja 1, no.36 de order* 338{ A.M.C.,
section 5, pa trimonio municipal, darechos aobre el
puerto de Guijo, ij A.G.S., D.de C», leg.4, no.29 and
no. 102, fo#» 1a«*1QVi ibid, leg.5, no.£3; Escoriai,
x,l1.14., foe,68k«69hj Gonaaies, Col.Cedulas, i.i*23.
See also Cortes. ii. 10-il, 24*3 (i-i,"IS,'^3, liSl 5, 280
<8.1377)1 Ibid, iii. 149 (41,1432), 411 (17,1422),
684.5 (10,1453).
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Seville* On their return journeys* from the north and
south* the carters loaded up with salt Ior distribution
inland*1
This pattern is too simple. bvan for the specific
merchandise mentioned qualifications have to be introduced*
Wool* for example* had to be collected fro® such diverse
points as Segovia* Vitoria* Logrdno, Yalladolid* and
Medina de kioseco* Again the pattern suggests that there
was one particular time for the departure of the fleets
from the northern porta and yet documents speak of two
7
such periods - one in March and one in October*"
The obvious point* however* is that there were far
more goods involved in trnnspo?tation than those mentioned*
Imports such as cloth were distributed inland« Exports,
such *>a wine sent out from the northern ports* had to be
brought from the hinterland# Jvea goods which were
neither exported or imported wore subject to infernal
circulation over largo areas* Seville* for example*
distributed fish and sardines to Alexia la heal* nntequera*
Jaen and Guadalupe* Fish from Calicia could be bought
/ 3
in Seville for a town as far away as Ubeda*
Markets /
1 Mari& del Carmen Carle* Hiercaderes en Cast ilia (1252*
1312)$ GjHjE,, xxi-xxii 11934}* 221$ Vicons, anual.
pp. 240-f, "As so often happens* the situation described
applied In the sixteenth century ami has boeii assussed
as valid for the fifteenth century.
2 h.fi.emith, The Spanish Guild Merchant (Jurhum, 1940),
chap,vj Gonaalez, Col.C^dulas,•1 * 1-2S.
3 A,M,S#* caja 1447-8* doc** '"dated 20 June 1449$ Ibid,
caja 1468-70, condictones for the saca of pescado 4resco
e aatado e sardine, 1470-i,
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Markets and fairs served as focal points for trade*2
The earliest reference to markets occurs in a document of
Qrdono 1 of 657* From the tenth century onwards the
number of markets increased rapidly* Sometimes held at
the town gates* sometimes in a town square* these markets
were usually restricted to one day in the week * for example*
Mondays in Kiaza, Wednesdays in Leon* Fridays in Avila* A
whole network of these markets covered the country and
facilitated trade at the local or regiona1 level*
However* historians have been interested less in
markets than in fairs. These fairs were usually held
annually and facilitated trade on at least an inter*
regional level* Appearing in the thirteenth century,
there were some twenty five fairs by the end of the
f if teenth century. Attention has* however* centred
principally on the most famous of these fairs * the fair
at Medina del Campo*
The importance of the Medina del Campo fair* as the
centre round which the whole Castilian economy evolved*
has been regularly asserted* Undoubtedly fairs such as
Medina del Campo and Vlllalon facilitated inter*regional
and international trade* Regulations relating to the
fairs provide evidence for the presence of merchants
from /
1 For what follows generally see L.Garcia de Valdeaveilarto*
* El mercado* Apuntes para su estudio en Le&n y Cast ilia
durante la edad media*, A.H.P.E,* viii (1931), 2Gl-405f
Vie ens, ' anual * pp.252*4j Claris, ubi supra* pp. 146*64;
Lspejo and Paz, op * c11.. chaps.l*vi*
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from various towns in Castile and from Valencia,
Portugal, Catalonia, Flanders, Genoa and even Ireland*
The merchandise bought and sold included everything from
silk to livestock.
Vet the argument lor the Importance of the Medina
del C&mpo lair is based primarily on the role of credit
in the settlement of inter*regional and international
obligations. The lair, in other words, provided lor a
systematic clearance of inter*regional transactions of
all kinds* In Castile there was a particular need lor
such a credit and clearance structure* The central
royal financial administration followed the itinerant
court* The sheep were transhumant and wool merchants
dispersed over a wide area* Consequently a whole range
of financial transactions * the farming of royal revenues
for example • carried clauses requiring payment to be
made at the fairs of Medina del Campo*
In many ways the basic essentials of this picture
are probably correct* Royal tax farmers, lor example,
did make payments at the Medina fairs.1 Vet it should
be emphasised that no adequate fifteenth century evidence
has been produced to substantiate the importance ol
private /
i A.G.S., E.M.R., leg.l, foe.374R-375V stipulates such
payments for fairs during the period 1458*60} ibid.
Exp.Hac., leg.l, no.164 for the fairs of 1466; ibid
leg.i, no*106 and leg*2, no*27 lor the fairs of 1463,





There is also, surely, a case for arguing that in
the fifteenth century other economic centre* were far
more Important for trade than Medina del Carapo. The
importance of towns like Seville, Cadis, Burgos, and
Bilbao hardly needs to be stressed. These were towns
which were important centres for marketing and distri¬
bution throughout the year* A high degree of economic
activity in these towns was a permanent feature of
society,*" Medina del Campo and Villalon, on the other
band, only became important during the fairs. When
these fairs were not being held there was nothing to
distinguish these towns from the other small towns of
the Castilian meseta.3
Bills of exchange, which remain a largely unstudied
body of evidence, may well provide a method of assessing
the respective importance of these centres, Certainly
payments /
1 Espejo and Pas, oo.cit., chap,Hi argue that private
transactions were more important than royal financial
operations until the reign of Charles V, Presumably,
since no evidence is put forward, this view is arrived
at by allowing for the increase in royal operations
after the arrival of silver. Carl^, ubi supra., p.164
admits that the formula a pagar en la 'jferia de Medina
was not frequent,
2 Vlfc - U iT
3 K.C.V,, Actas de Yillalon, passim, reveal a small town
whose activities cannot even Hie"compared to those of a
town like Jeres - far less Seville, Burgos, or Bilbao.
4 As far as medieval Castile is concerned the only work
which seems to touch on the problem is E» Benito Auano,
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payments - especially those of the royal finances - were
stipulated for Medina del C&mpo* But it is also clear
that bills of exchange were operating between* and
involved* such towns as Valladolid* Burgos* Toledo*
Seville* Cordoba, and foreign centres** Merchants and
their companies had factors and agents outside their own
regions and transactions such as these indicate an
exchange and credit structure which was not based on
Medina but on the main economic centres of the kingdom*
Moreover* unlike their successors in the sixteenth century,
the merchants and merchant bankers of the fifteenth cent*
:ury did not become involved in the royal finances*
Consequently they were not tied to the royal financial
settlements at the Medina fairs in the s;arae way as the
2
Jewish and converso financiers were* Thus* without
denying the importance of the fairs* if seems probable
that /
1 For example the bills of exchange both issued on the
same day, 27 Nov*1475, by Mosfeo de Camila on Grogorio
Pynolo and company in Toledo and the Medici bank in
Homes recorded by the notary in A.P.s.*lV» Pedro
Alvarez, fo*244* It should be noted* however* that
bills ai exchange in these notarial records date from
the 1470s and that Cortes* iii*340*l (35*1438) petitions
that Castilian merchants should operate exchanges
betweea" CastiTian towns and such foreign centres as
Genoa, Venice* Florence* Zaragosa* Barcelona* and
Valencia*
2 There were* of course* exceptions* For example A,G»S,*
Exp.Hac** leg.2 no.96 records bills of exchange in
1457, involving members of the famous tax-farming
Bienveniste clan and Genoese merchants of Seville* in
which the Medina fairs and Seville are stipulated as
places of payment* But, generally* the world of the
royal finances (Jews and converses) and the world of
the important Burgos and Genoese merchants remained
separate: see below \\uus -t>.
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that, throughout most of the fifteenth century, mercan¬
tile transfer and credit operations continued to be
based on the towns already mentioned#
4, Imports and Exports*
Wool was Castile1« most valuable export# As early
as the twelfth century Cactilian wool was imported into
England. But it was only in the second half of the
fourteenth century and the fifteenth century that the
volume of wool exports became really important* Further*
susore Flanders and France * not England * were the
principal customers* From the northern ports, such as
Bilbao, Fantender, and Portugalete, the wool was shipped
out to Rouen, La RocheUe, Nantes, Dieppe, Marl"lour and
Bruges* These were the principal centres to which wool
was exported* Doubtless much of this wool was then re*
{distributed Into the hinterland* In 1458, for example,
Casti1i -n wool worth 33,800 gold ecus reached Paris* Yet
the trade in wool was not restricted to the northern
ports* Wool was also exported from Cartagena, Seville, and
in the Crown of Aragtrn, Valencia* From Cartagena wool
was exported to Mallorca, Barcelona, Savona, Genoa and
Venice /
1 See generally Vicens, Manual. chap*21 and C, Vorlinden,
ubi supra, pp.44*59. Documents from A.G.S., Est*, leg 1
cited in this section, although undated, are clearly
early fifteenth century and specific internal evidence *
a report on Tamerlane1 a disruption of trade and the
imprisonment of an important official of Seville •
suggests a date in the period 1402*9#
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Venice, The export of Cast!Han cloth, on the other hand.
i
was restricted to Portugal and was not important.
Castile exported both cochineal and orchil.
Cochineal • kermes, grana • was exported from Seville
which not only served as the distribution centre for
Andalusia but also for cochineal from the Canary islands
and the Barbary coast. Orchil was imported from the
Canary islands and then re-exported from Seville and
Cadis to Flanders. Normandy and Italy. Castile was not
the only supplier of cochineal but. from the 1450s.
Cast!lian grana began to capture the greatest share of
2
the European market.
Cast!Han wine began to be exported regularly to
northern markets from the fourteenth century. Most of
this wine came from the Jeres region although some wine
was also exported from the northern ports* A wine for
which there was considerable demand was the vino romance
of Jeres. Rota, and Puerto de Santa Maria* For England
there Is evidence that the wine was sent to Southampton.
London /
1 H* Touchard. Le commerce maritime Breton (Paris, 1967),
pp.217-6; E. Trocad and M. "'ue la fosse'/ Le commerce
rochelais (Paris, 1953), p.69; J- Heers, Lfenea. pp.
462-3.49It F. Melis* Aspetti del la vita economica
iwdi.Cl. lib)', pp.iilZYi M. MolUt7&-
commerce normartd (Paris. 1952), p,113j C* Ver linden.
TT'proptis do ' la politique economique des Dues de
Bourgogne*. Hisp., x (1950), 695; K«S* Smith, op.cit »*
chap.v.; A.G.S., Est., leg 1, nos*56, 60, 63, 64
contain data on wool exports from Cartagena,




London, Bristol, fire* Plymouth, Rouen and Honfleur
imported winei; from J or r.z, In the 1450s Spanish v. ine ,
almost certainly C&stilian, even reached Paris, But
the biggest market was in Flanders where, f ram Oct ober
1451, the town council of Bruges agreed to exempt Spanish
wine merchants from extraordinary taxes on imports. The
southern ports of Castile exported fruit along with the
cargoes of vine. Raisins, figs, lemons, oranges, dates,
honey, and almonds, were sent to Brittany, Normandy,
*>
Flanders and England,'"
Seville and Cadiz were the centres for the redistri*
:but ion, both inlaw! and abroad, of sugar brought from
•'adeira and the Canary islands. This trade in sugar did
not really begin to function until the second half of the
fifteenth century. Basica.i iy the change came with the
transformation of production from grain to sugar in the
islands. From the 1460s the cultivation of sugar made
great strides. In 1468 the first known cargo of sugar
[ rem /
1 Hears, Genes. p.488j Mollat, op.cit,, pp,i13, 230,239}
L.Gi11iodts-Tan-Fevoren, Cartnlairc de 1 *ancien consulat
d* Fspagne (Bruges, 1901)97»ld?*Tdocs• of **1454,
*14 55, 146?) ; L.Suare* Fernindea, NatrenacitSn y comercio
(Madrid, 1959), p.119 (Henceforth cited""as Suarcz,
Navegacion)j Garcia de Cortazar, op.cit,, p,237 j A,A.
Ruddock, op. cit ., pp.77,80i baneho, t?ocumento8.pp.5*9.
2 Sancho, Documentos. pp.11-13; Batailion, ubl supra.
pp.22 8-4Tj* F.Mei'is, op.cit . , p,276| Garcia d#
Cortazar, op.cit.. p,237; E.M.Carus ^iiaon, 'The Over-
issaa Trade of Bristol', Studies in English Trade, ed.
If,Power and .M.M.Postan (London, "I93TT7 pp»2i"4*$, It
should be noted, however, that fef al 1 the documents on
this commodity in A.Doehafrd and C.Kerremans, I*es
relations commercialea. (Brussels-Home, 1992), the
majorlty deal with! fruit exported fran Granada.
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from Madeira was sent off to Flanders* Thereafter •
with the Andalusian ports as entrepots * sugar was sent
to England* Italy* Flanders* Normandy and the Levant.*
Hears has underlined the importance of the grain
trade in the fifteenth century. Given the difficulties
of land transport* ships ranged far and wide and carried
enormous quantities of grain. Naturally this trade was
subject to considerable fluctuations. Thai was the
place of the kingdom of Castile in this trade?
Grain was exported. Ships* according to Hears*
carried grain from Seville* Fanlucar, and Cadis to Genoa.
In 1456 five ships sailed for Genoa and four shiploads
of grain were sent in 1457.^ Complaints by proeuradoreg
to the cortea seem to contirm this picture. In the
coartes of Ocana* 1422* it was pointed out that* whereas
Henry 111 had only licenced the export of some 100 cahicee
of grain* John 11 had given similar licences for 1*000
cahices in the previous three years alone. In the
cortes of Valladolid* 1447* it was alleged that grain had
been sent to the kingdom of Granada with the king's licence#
Again* in 1455* the procuradores alleged that grain had
been t
1 Keers, og.clt.. 495-7j M©1lat, op.ctt«« 2461 H. Sancho
de Sonranlel Loe Genoveses en Cadia""'(ie res. 19391. pp.11-
12* Llnlcs between < evllL* cMU? and Madeira* lb£d and
A.P.S.* IV, Pedro Alvares, fo.289v. Sugar was also dis*
j tributed inland; A.H.H.* Clero* Papeles, leg.1422* for
example* refers to sugar arriving at Seville for the
monastery of Guadalupe.
2 Heers, Genes, p.344.
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been exported to Aragon, Granada and Portugal«* Vet
this evidence does not substantiate a regular export
trade* The export of grain to Genoa was certainly not
a routine matter# The evidence, a® Hears himself points
out, it constituted by only tor documents and refers only
to the years 1456-50. This was clearly a rare - perhaps
unique * situation*
For the evidence points the other way* The north
of Castile had to rely on imported grain* Probably most
2
of this came from Brittany. But wheat also arrived at
the northern ports from Sluys, Kouen, Dieppe, and La
3
hochelle# The evidence for the south of Castile is
more detailed* Grain was imported from places as far
apart as Sicily, Loglaud# Flanders, and Brittany# But
the iain area from which grain was imported was north
Africa*4
Again it must be stressed that this trade fluctuated
enormously* It iff not* however* misleading to contrast
some figures with the nine shiploads of grain which Heers
shows were sent to Genoa in 1456-5?# In 1413 Genoese
sic rchant s /
1 Cortes* ill* 38-9 (5*1422), 545-6 (4o*l447), 684-5 (10#
TSSsTT
2 The basic element of Breton trade to Castile was grains
Touch&rd. op«cit** pp,210-12#
3 Heers, pfnes* o#345j Mollat, on.cit., pp.227-8, 232j
Trocme anduelafasse, op*clt». pToTT
4 See following note and A»lyt,8», eaja 1447-8, doc# 8 Nov#
1448 for Imports to Fanldcar* Puerto, and Cadisj 2hs1
banchas, pp *47 h 60 j Sancho de Sopranis, »Los conversos
y la inquisle ion *» AjJjA*, iv (1944), 595-610#
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merchants brought 1,075^ cahices (approximately 2,560
tons) of wheat to Seville* lit 1469 some 6,720 tons of
grain were imported from the Barbery coast* In 1473
the town council of Seville arranged for foreign merchants
to import grain* The English merchants agreed to bring
some 300 cahicea. the Florentines 250, the Venetians 100
and the Genoese 1,104 cahices • a total of some 4,212
tons of grain* These figures also, of course, are
exceptional# But the fact is that Seville was often
in the position of having to import grain and rarely In
a position to export it**
Another lucrative ejqport was olive oil* From
Seville and Cadis it was sent to places as far apart as
2
Chios, Flanders and England* As usual most of this
trade was in the hands of foreign merchants who even
managed to store their oil inside the customs bouse in
Seville*^ But, significantly enough, the profits must
have been large enough to attract the Crown, for in 1429
the Crown arranged for the export of olive oil on its
own account to Flanders*4
Castilian exports of salt could not hope to compete
with /
1 A*&*£«, caja 1412-13, no*189| Ibid* caja 1468-70,
Pel pan de berueriai ibid* caja 1473-4, Relaclon del
man q« fuera parte* The figures only denote imports
arranged by the town council and are not, therefore,
totals*
2 Gilliodts Van Severed, op.cit*. pp.61, 62-4, 87? Heers,
Cfrncs, pp.361 4881 Ca'rus Wilson, ubl supra. p»2!5.
3 A.P.S., IV Pedro Alvares, fo.250 Tl Dec.1475).
4 A,G» F*, D.de C•, leg*4, no*12*
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with salt from the Bay of Bourgneuf and Setubal*
Nevertheless there is evidence that salt was exported
to Bristol* In the Mediterranean, moreover. Castilien
salt was not faced with such competition as in the
Atlantic ports. Cadis at one stage supplied salt to
the kingdom of Granada and Genoa imported a considerable
quantity of salt from La Mata. In 1450, for example,
some 1,400 tons of salt were imported by the Genoese from
La Mala**
Tunny fish were exported from the ports of the Cadis
and Seville area to England and Italy* Southampton had
regular imports of barrels of tunny, Bristol occasionally
imported them also, and Genoa and Venice seem to have
2
Imported considerable quantities.
There is clear evidence that the export trade in
soap was lucrative and yet the details remain somewhat
obscure* It is known that Castilian soap was Imported
into Bristol and Southsa^ton, The Port Books of
Southampton reveal that cargoes of soap, especially
black soap, were regularly imported."* Furthermore, one
historian /
1 Heers, Genes* pp.352*5i Cartas Wilson, obi supra* p.215*
2 Heers, Gftnea. pp.358, 488*9} A.P.S., IV Pedro Alvares,
foa.247,411,
3 If all the soap came from Castile then we are faced with
a flourishing industry* Barely, however, do the Port
Books indicate the origins of soap, although the author
of the Libel I e of ICnqlyshe Foiyce identifies it as
Castilian. But see H.S. Cobb. The Local Port Book of
Southampton. 1439*40 (Southampton, 1961), p* 124'j Cartas
Wi1son, ubi supra. p.215j J,W* Sherborne, The Port of
Bristol In the Middle Ages (Bristol, 1965),p.26*
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historian has argued a ease against the prosperity of
Southampton in the fifteenth century precisely because
the trade in really valuable commodities, such as soap
1
and sweet wine, was in the hands of foreign merchants•
And yet It is difficult to establish the connection
between the 'valuable commodity* in England and the
export of it from Castile, In effect there is only
fragmentary evidence. In 1424 John II granted a privi-
tlege which exempted a good deal of soap from the usual
2
export duties. Several documents make vague references
3
to the export trade in soap* The only substantial link
is a document printed by Doehaerd and Kerremans which
relates to the insurance of a cargo of soap being sent
4
to Southampton from Seville#
Both the northern and southern parts of Castile
exported leather#' England probably received leather
via Bayonne and from Seville, Leather imported into
Harfleur found its way to Kouen and Paris, Pisa received
leather from Seville and there is evidence that some
5
leather was sent from Cartagena to Genoa and Venice,
Castilian iron from the Basque provinces seems to
have /
1 O. Coleman, 'Trade and prosperity in the fifteenth
century: some aspects of the trade of Southampton*,
Kcoo.H.K,. xvi <1963), 9-22.
2 AlcDuc,, leg.55, doc,18,
3 Ibid.« docs.24,25.
4 Doehaerd and Kerreiaans, op.cit., pp,492-3 <24 Oct,1430),
5 A.G.S., Est., leg ,1, no*64 for leather to Genoa and
Venice; Carus Wilson, ubi supra, PP#20?,2l5j Heers,
Genes, p.444; .^ollat, on.ci'tp« 17,
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have enjoyed a quasi monopoly on the western European
markets. The most important market was England. It
seems more than probable that all Basque ships arriving
at English ports during this period carried a cargo of
iron or of iron manufactures such as anchors, brigandines,
and crossbows. But France, too. imported large quanti-
Hies of iron. Iron was a regular cargo of ships going
2
to Brittany, Dieppe and Rouen also appear to have
imported Castilian iron regularly. As early as 1408-9.
for example, iron manufactures were sent to Dieppe nnd
between 1476-83 no ship arriving at Dieppe from Spain
failed to contain iron in its cargo. In the Low Countries
at least Bruges, Middelburg and Sluys imported iron from
Castiie«*
The mercury produced at Almaden was exported to
Valencia, Bruges, Genoa, Marseille, Florence. Chios and
Syria, Mercury figures in the Libelle of Saglyshe Polyce
as an import from Spain, and some of it. perhaps, also
5
found its way to the central European silver mines.
All /
1 See. especially, Garcia de Cortazar. op.cit.« pp.237-8
and M.K, James, *A London merchant of the fourteenth
century1, Econ.H.R., viii (1955-6), 364-76. See also
L.Gilliodts Van Severer, op.citpp.32-3] C.Verlinden,
•A propos de la politique economique Hisp., x
(1950), 6911 Doehaerd and Kerremans, op.cit.. pp.210-
12, no.204,
2 Touchard, op.cit.. pp.69, 217.
3 Mollat, op.clt.. pp.18, 227-8,
4 L. Gi 11 iodts Van Severer^ op.cit .♦ i » 39-40, 42*3, 58-60,
62*4, 78, 81 (various documents from the 1450s).
5 A, Matilla Tascon, op.cit.. i. 5-29} Heers, Genes,
p.490} Ruddock, op«clt., p.77.
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All the evidence points to cloth &s the single most
important commodity imported into Castile.* A wide
variety of cloths from various countries was available*
The greatest amount of cloth came from the Low Countries*
Brabant cloth * from Malines, Brussels* Vilvorde and
Louvain * did not appear in Castile until the fourteenth
century. Moreover the Brabant cloth * with the exception
of Malines * never acquired the iaqportance enjoyed by
Flemish cloth. This preponderance of Flemish cloth may
be explained by the immunities and privileges which were
enjoyed by the Castilian merchants in Flanders,2 But
whatever the reasons* the regular supply of cloth from
Bruges and Courtrai cannot be doubted* In Seville
officials regularly received Flemish cloth as part of
their salaries and the cloth itself could be purchased
3
easily in the alcajceria and calie de francos*
Cloth imported from iiouen must have been of a
quality inferior to the Flemish and Brabant cloth.4
Lopes de Ay&la makes one of the merchants in the ii±2£*2
dei /
1 For what follows see C* Verlinden, hi cornersto de pafios
flamencos y brabansonea (Madrid, 1952); ' the same*
"*PaSTos belgas en fuentes literarias1, C.H.E.. xxix-xxx
(1959), 218-30} the same, *Draps des Pays-Eas et du
nord de la France1, M*A«. xliii (1937), 21-36; H*
Laurent, La draperie des .Pays Baa (Paris, 1935), pp.
181-3*
,
2 Suares, Navar.acion. p. 119.
3 Hence the graph of cloth prices in Appendix C.
4 The luxury pa9fos franeeses of the chronicles probably
included cloths Trom the "Cow Countries: for example,
Cron* Lucas de 1ranao, pp.99, 153, 170, 435.
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del Palaclo try end sell Rouen cloth as cloth from Bruges
or Malinea* and, in Seville, cloth from Rouen was not
outside the reach of a baker's purse.2 Llensos from
Brittany were also imported into the southern ports.
Large quantities of cloth * most of it ungrained
broadcloth - were i sapor ted from England. London and
Bristol are the places mentioned by the documents and it
3
seems likely, too, that cloth was sent from Southampton.
The rare cloths and fabrics present a problem since
it is difficult to determine exactly where they came
from. Silk was certainly brought across the frontier
from the kingdom of Granada. In February 1444, for
example, two witnesses at an enquiry declared that they
had made a contract with merchants to bring 1,000 llbrat
of silk from Granada,4 There were silk exchanges in
Toledo and Seville at least, and there Is evidence which
indicates that Venetian and Genoese merchants brought
silk to Seville and Cartagena*4 Gold cloth (panoa de
pro) and sendal were also brought to the southern ports *
probably from the East*4
Slaves /
1 B.A.K.. lvii* 440, stanza 468*
2 A.P.S. IV* Juan Garcia» two sales of Rouen cloth, 26
Jan.1447.
3 See the English cloth among those listed in the Cuaderno
in Gonzalez, Col.C^dulas. i. 2-28; A.P.S,, IV* Pedro
Alvarea, fo.369 for an'English merchant's sale of cloth
worth 14,200 tarsi ibid. Ill, Francisco Sanches, fo.13,
for a dispute between a Jew and a Genoese over Bristol
cloth*
4 A.G.S*, Lxp.Bac,, leg 1, no,22*
5 A.&.S., caja 1407*8, no.49| A.P.S„, Ill* Francisco
idinches, fos. 12*13*
6 A royal agent awaiting a Venetian ship with arables
fangs de pro e seda in A.G.S., Est., leg 1, mis.61 and2|' a similar ituation, ibid, no 163.
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Slaves were imported into southern Castile from
1
Granada, the Black Sea, the Canary islands, and Africa.
The Italian colonies in the Black Sea provided Tartar
slaves* Slaves from Granada were the victims of
frontier incidents* Slaves from Africa were brought
across the Sahara from the Sudan and, later, by the sea
route opened up by the Portuguese* The first batch of
170 Guanche slaves from the Canaries was. sold in
2
Andalusia in 1385*
By the late fifteenth century the trade in slaves
seems to have attained considerable proportions. In
1475, for example, a special Negro judge was appointed
for the numerous Negroes, both free and slaves, who lived
3
in Seville. Yet it is probable that the growth in the
slave trade was a late development. An early fifteenth
century dispute, involving the tax farmers of the slave
trade in Seville, makes it possible to assess the im-
jportance of each branch of the trade. The dispute
arose as a result of a royal decision to prohibit the
slave trade from the Canary islands. This decision was
later /
1 For what follows see generally C* Verlinden, *L'
esc lavage dans 1* Europe medi^vale (Bruges, 195157 » i.
54^*614?
2 After Lanzarotto Malocello's expedition in the 1330a
the initiative passed to the Basques and Castilians.
For this and more data on Guanche slaves, ibid*, pp.
550*1 and lisera, Genes, p.494*
3 Verlinden, op.cit♦. pp.566-7*
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l&fc er annulled but, in the meantime, an adjustment bad
to be made to the tax farm in order to compensate for
the losses resulting from the prohibition. The details
of this adjustment are interesting. African slaves are
not even mentioned and the references to the Tartars
suggests that their numbers were of little importance.
As for the Moorish slaves, fluctuations in the trade had
to be taken into account* For, in the original assess*
:meat of the tax farm, Castile and Granada had been at
peace 'with the result that Moors were rarely sold in
tuis city as they are at present', In the end the
amount deducted from the tax farm was more than two thirds
of the total * a fact that clearly underlines the pre*
"•dominance of the trade in Guanchea
The picture which emerges from the adjustment of
the tax farm is not surprising when the general background
to the slave trade is taken into account. The demand *
a limited one * was for domestic and not 'plantation*
slaves# Moreover the Granada sector of the trade was
limited by the conditions on the frontier. The popula*
:tions on both sides of the frontier frequently co*oper*
rated in order to prevent an escalation of the frontier
incidents which, enabled a trade in slaves to flourish.
Hence there was an exchange of information and petitions
abou t /
1 These details in A.M.S,, caja 1406-7, no,26,
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about captives. Skilled negotiators from both sides *
the alfaqueques * moved freely across the frontier to
%
secure the freedom of captives. It was only with the
rise in the number of African slaves, after Portuguese
expansion was well undar way, that the slave trade showed
signs of substantial growth.
The southern ports of Castile, especially Seville
and Ca-Ua, wore also at the centre of the complex flows
of gold and silver distribution. In Europe generally
there was an acute shortage of both gold and silver*
But the patterns of scarcity varied. In 1435, for
example, the bimetallic ratio in north Africa was 9:1,
2
in Spain 10:1, and in northern Europe 11:1, In general
terms the variations Induced a flow of silver to southern
Spain and north Africa and an opposing flow of gold north*
:wards. The most important source of gold was in the
western Sudan and its hinterland,"^ from whence gold
arrived in Seville and Cadiz by several routes. A
trans*Sahara network took the gold to Tripoli, Tunis,
Oran and Konein. In these ports a good deal of gold
was i
1 Compare, for example, the ra ther fragmentary data on
slaves from Granada in Verlinden, op.cit.* pp.555*7
with J, de Mata Carriaaso, •Relaciones fronterizas entre
Jaem y Granada en el an© 1479*, R,A»B.M., hi (1955),
23-51.
2 V. MagaIhnes-Godinho, op,eit.. p.97.
3 M. Malowist, 'The socialarnJ economic stability of the
western Sudan in the middle ages', P.P., no,33 (April,
1966), 8.
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was collected by the Genoese and by the Moors of Granada,
In both cases gold filtered through to Seville and Cadisj
from the Genoese because of an unfavourable balance of
trade and from Granada because of the yearly tribute of
20,000 golden doblap which the rulers paid to the Castil-
iian kings. Later, from the 1460#, a sea route took
gold directly from port# In west Africa to Seville and
Cadi#.*
✓
In a very real sense Seville and Cadis were the
centres of the distribution of gold. From here gold
was taken by Florentine ships to Flanders and England*
Figures for gold imports into Genoa far 1177 show that
S
by far the largest supplies came from Seville and Cadis*
i
The reasons for the dominance of Seville and Cadis seem
to stem from the unfavourable balance of trade which the
Genoese had with Castile, The Genoese had a favourable
balance of trade with the north African ports* Hence
the drain of gold across the Sahara to north Africa# But
the Genoese In turn had to use some of this gold to prop
up their unfavourable trade balance with Castile and with
the Cast. They also used gold to obtain eackfuls of
small Cast!liar* silver coins which they sent from Seville,
/
Cadis, ami Cartaguna to Genoa, This silver helped to
alleviate the chronic shortage of silver in Italy and the
coins /
1 Het;r«, Genea, pp.66*73, 478<»82, A.F.S., IV. Pedro
Alvarez, fo,276v for data on a contract to bring gold
from the mina de ora.
?6#
coins were easily adapted to the Genoese economy.*
The evidence indicates, therefore, that Seville and
Cadi* were, by 1460, among the chief gold and silver
markets of the Mediterranean world. And yet there is
one obvious difficulty about this argument. If there
was a shortage of silver In Italy, there was also, surely,
a shortage in Castile, If the Genoese obtained silver
in Castile where did the silver in Castile come from?
A royal enquiry into the farm of the Castilian mints
provides a clue to an answer. One of the points revealed
by the enquiry was that, at one stage, Genoese merchants
in Seville had sent information to Flanders in an attempt
to rig the price of silver in C&etilt* Castile, there*
ifox-e, ia;p©rted silver from Flanders. Does this indicate
that silver from the central mines reached Castile via
Flanders?2
£, The Economic Conjuncture
The discussion which follows deals with two funda-
imental problems• In the first place there is an attempt
to /
1 H«sers, Genes, pp»66«?3, 478*82,
2 Tho royal enquiry in A.G.S,, D.de C., leg,4, no«56•
Titers is no proof thai German silver reached Castile,
Castilian mercury, however, raay well have gone to the
German minest Hears, Genes. p,490 and L^Occident aur.
xive et xve sieclea (Pari a",' 1966), p, 1?X."" "**" That fcKe"~
south "Germans' had penetrated to the Low Countries and
a»«idc cvailuble supplies of silver is shown by H, Van der
growth.of tht> Antwerp ..marhfft lLouvaia , 1963)
ii, 124, Hence, perhaps, the cargoes of silver} A.G.S.,
Est, , leg,!, nos,60 and 63, for example, show the
Venetians unloading 1,000 roarcos of silver in Cartagena,
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to locate the short term crises of subsistence in
fifteenth century Castile# The second problem concerns
the nature of the general economic trend in the fifteenth
century# In both cases statistics of an elementary
nature * lacking in all previous discussions of these
problems * are provided in order to substantiate the
tentative conclusions which are put forward#
i) Crises of subsistence.
Crises of subsistence were frequent during the years
1400-74 and appear to have become harsher during the last
twentyfive years of the period# (Table I)»* Inevitably
there was a relationship between climate* bad harvests*
chronic shortages of grain, and plague#
Many of the crises naturally coincide with the
fluctuations of wheat and barley prices in Seville#
(Tables II and III)But these prices cannot be used
as evidence for the existence of a crises* The reason
is that other factors, such as debasement of the coinage,
slight have caused a sharp rise# The prices, therefore,
may confirm but do not themselves reveal the existence
of a crisis# Another point to notice is that the crises
were often limited in area# It uwty b® that any one
crisis /
mm "W'"* WE***" m ■-mmmi '-mm <mi»> nwm*iii#u.a.i#,i)M1>,»,4>. i » m«K» m>»m» i» W
1 f;ee Appendix A, VV-ssu_t , for this table* No references
are cited in the following discussion since a list of
ail the evidence i® given in this same Appendix,
2 bee Appendix B, sfil -11.
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crisis affected more areas time those which hare been
listed. Yet without further evidence it would be totally
misleading to regard most of these as other than local
crises. Prices, supply and demand differed from one
region to another* Seville could arrange to import
massive amounts of grain from north Africa; Salamanca and
Segovia could not. Finally, it can be argued that the
mechanism of crisis was fairly consistent* The crises
may have affected different areast the causes and
results were usually the same* This is at least true
for Andalusia* An examination of some examples confirms
this point#
The evidence of the chronicles shows that there was
a drought in the year 1413 which resulted in bad harvests
and starvation throughout the kingdom. This type of
evidence is notoriously untrustworthy* Yet in this case
it can be substantiated by evidence for Seville which
slows that the crisis of 1412*14 affected most of
Andalusia, In fact the drought started in 1412* On
the 9th December 1412 the town council of Seville met and
discussed the great shortage of grain due
partly to the war against the Moors* to the
bad .harvests of the previous two years, and
the Inability to sow grain because of the lack
of rain*
They had good cause to be worried* The prices of wheat
and barley shot up* Between January 1412 and January
1413 the price of a faneaa of barley rose from 15 tars to
51 /
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58 rare. The price of one fanega of wheat rose from 16
«ar^ and 5 dlnaros In Angust 1412 to 80 mr* In April 1413.
Faced with this situation the town councillors embarked
on a whole series of measures to meet the crisis. All
taxes on grain were removed in order to facilitate import,
not on_y from abroad, but from places like Medal 1 In and
the Alcantara lands as well. Officials were constantly
sent out to examine allegations that grain was being
exported to other areas. That the crisis covered a
greater area then feeviiie is shown by the activities of
thebo officials# Some of them were seaborn® and keeping
a watch on the coasts# Others were in Jerea* Puerto de
Santa Maria and Cadis* indeed in some of these areas
the officials had a problem in persuading the authorities
to allow grain for Seville to pass through* Two other
problems remained * to arrange for the import of grain
and to raise money for this importation. A commission
of five councillors was set up to treat with foreign
merchants and anybody else who might provide relief# in
the event the Genoese brought 2*580 tons of wheat in 1413.
Yet the whole operation must have been fairly costly, for
the town council in the end not only borrowed money from
individuals but also had to help itself to crusade
revenues kept in the•cathedral»
U is not surprising, therefore* to find that there
were /
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were epidemic* during this period. Already at the
beginning of the century there had been a serious enough
outbreak to cause Henry IIX to change the laws regarding
marriage. Now the pestilencia broke out again. By
1416 all the financial and military assessments for the
Seville ares had to be redrafted because of "the change*
occurring during the past years of starvation and death1.
Most of the crises were probably limited to particu*
liar regions. Two others, however, probably affected
most of the kingdom * the crisis of 1434-38, and the
crisis of 1465-73. The winter of 1434-35 was little
short of catastrophic. VaTJauoiid, Medina del uampo,
Madrid, and Seville were ail affected. Grain became
scarce, cattle and men died, ploughing and sewing were
affected in many areas. The price of wheat in beville
rose from 13 mara. in July 1433, to 43 mro in November
1435. Complaints about the situation were made in
successive cortes. In the cortea of Madrid, 1435, the
procuratore* put forward a petition relating to the
•great shortage of wheat, barley and rye'. The follow-
: ing year, in the cortes of Toledo, complaints were .made
about pestiIencias, depopulation and high prices. Plague
in fact, was to be found in at least hoa, Valladolid and
Medina del Carapo in 1437. In the corte* of 1436 the
progura-Jores once -core brought up the subject. They
declared that the whole kingdom was suffering from a
grave /
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grave shortage of grain because of bad harvests* due to
cliraatlc factors, and because of the exportation of grain.
They pointed out that there had been a sharp price rise
and that the areas which were suffering most were
Andalusia, and the areas on the frontiers with Ar&gon,
Navarre and Portugal,
The crisis of 1465*73* coinciding with the anarchy
towards the end of Henry 1V» roiga, wua particularly
severe in Andalusia, and affected the rest of Castile as
well. The evidence provided by the Seville archives
reveals the familiar pattern. The same Mechanism of
crisis as in 1400*2* 1412*14, 1423*6 and 1447*9* There
were* of course* slight differences from the crisis of
1412*14 outlined above. Warfare made this crisis worse.
This time the town council contracted for wheat imports
with Hnglish, Florentine and Venetian as well as Genoese
merchants. Fheat was imported from Brittany in 1467*
But apart from these and other minor differences the
pattern was the same. There were prolonged periods of
drought. Attempts were mace to prevent the export of
grain. Plague, described ee aran nestiloncia. afflicted
the town in 1467.
There is evidence that the crisis was widespread.
Drought and bad harvests caused a grain crisis in J&en
arid in Teres, In Jaen the price of a i&aeaa of barley
had /
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had risen to ISO mrs by 1468. In Jeres the price of
imported wheat by 1473 may have been as high as 1,200 mrs
per faneaa* All foodstuffs were, in fact, very scarce*
There was no beef or pork and fruit and vegetables were
in short supply* The evidence for Castile proper also
indicates crisis* Prices quoted show that a fanena of
wheat cost between 130*160 mrs* The inevitable pestilencia
broke out in several places* When don Juan Ponce de Leon
captured Cadis in 1466 he found it deserted because of
plague* Plague affected Jaen intermittently during the
whole period 1458*1469■ In Burgos the plague lasted the
summer of 1466. Indeed the whole political situation
changed when the pretender, Alfonso XII, left Arevalo
because of the plague and died while making for Avila.
ii) economic expansion?
Historians are unanimous that Castile in the fifteenth
century enjoyed an economic boom* In a general context
the point is significant* The depression which affected
Curope from the early fourteenth century was not prolonged
in Castile throughout the fifteenth century* The same
is true for Cenoa and Portugal* It would seem, in
fact, that economic revival affected those places which
led the way in the exploration and expansion which was to
have /
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have each momentous effects in the sixteenth century*
The picture is confirmed by Vilsr's analysis of the
Catalan depression of the fifteenth century* There was
not an overall expansion of the kediterranean world but
an economic expansion of certain specific areas.*
As far as Castile is concerned two problems arise
out of such an interpretation. In the first place can
generalisations be made for such a vast area? Secondly,
what is the evidence? Generally speaking historians do
not argue that the economic trend in Barcelona would also
affect the whole of the kingdom of Aragon. Nor do they
argue that the economic trend in Italy can be assumed
from the evidence for Genoa. The same surely holds
true for the kingdom of Castile. The evidence put
forward for Castile* s expansion, moreover, is often
contradictory and often extremely dubious* A quick
review of the evidence will help to pinpoint the problems.
Factors which may have served to produce a favourable
conjuncture are demographic growth, a price-wage gap
of the Hamilton type based on price or profit inflation,
royal economic policy, expanding and changing markets.
Demographic statistics for this period are almost
totally lacking. Figures from the Quintan!11a census
of /
1 For the general trend in Europe as a whole see D, Hay.
Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (London,
1966|, pp.l87-8^ "For the specific areas mentioned.
Vlcens, Kianua1 * chaps.14-22; Hears, G&nes. pp.SOl-7,
Vilar. ubi supra, pp.1-62; Ver1inden. Pr&cedents
Medidvaux o» li*colonie en Amdrlque (Mexico, 1954),
passim; V, Magalhaes-Godinho. oplcit*. pp.30-9.
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of 1482 suggest a figure of some six to eight million
inhabitants for the kingdom of Castile, Perhaps this
represented a significant increase in the else of the
papulation, Ho deductions can be made from this evid-
tence. Far more significant was the distribution of
the population within the kingdom. It seems probable
that the south of Castile benefited from a considerable
increase in population.
Generally speaking there seems to have been an
exodus of the population from the countryside into the
towns in Andalusia, Certainly the towns of Andalusia
were far larger in population than the towns of the centre
and north. That the growth of the Andalusian towns was
proportionately much greater than the growth of the
other towns of the kingdom Is shown by the following
1
figures. The figures refer to town population at the







1 For Bilbao, Garcia de Cortassar, op.clt., p.72, All
other figures from Vicena, Manual, pp.223-4, I use
the term 'growth* because it seems probable that this
was the case even for the towns of the centre and
north* See, for example, the case of Valladolid in















The figures reveal the pre-eminent position that
Seville held in the kingdom. It is also surprising to
find that towns like Baesa and Bbeda were almost twice
the sise of Burgos and Segovia, For the moment it is
enough to note the greater weight of population in the
south and the sise of the southern towns*
Ever since Hamilton it seems to have been impossible
to discuss Spanish economic history without reference to
price history* As far as fifteenth century Castile is
concerned, no proper price series exist. Despite this,
however, historians have not been deterred from specula-
:tion. Ordinances on prices and wages have been solemnly
examined and artificial wages have been divided into
artificial /
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artificial prices at great length in order to establish
hypothetical conclusions.1. The secular trend for the
whole of fifteenth century Spain has been deduced from
prices in Valencia, unsubstantiated generalisations about
Seville prices, and monetary evidence derived solely from
2
the reign of the Catholic sovereigns.
In fact all generalisations about the secular trend
of prices remain pure speculation and, in order to avoid
adding to the confusion, if is vital to indicate the
limitations of the price series which are presented in
this study.^ These are the only price series which
exist for fifteenth century Castile. Almost all the
prices are from Seville and this immediately poses the
problem of whether any generalisations, based on this
evidence, should apply to the south west of the kingdom
only. The grain prices (Tables II and HI) do not form
a proper series and cannot therefore be presented on a
graph,4 /
1 An involved discussion of little value on thirteenth and
fourteenth century ordinances in Vicens, Hlatoria. ii.
305-11.
2 See Braudel in Cambridge Economic History of kurope. iv.
401*2. Braudel is' very careful '' to"underline the specu-
:iative nature of his conclusions. However there seems
little point in using Valencian prices for the kingdom
of Castile since the two areas were not politically *
or even economically • united, Bayous* evidence, cited
by Braudel, is almost certainly confined to the reign
of the Catholic sovereigns and is clearly contradicted
by the prices in this study. Finally the apparent
stability of the money of account was a feature of the
last two decades of the century only: previously the
exact opposite was the case.
3 See Tables II and III in Appendix ; the graph in
Appendix C,\j Table IV in Appendix B,j>si-h ,
4 Presumably, because of seasonal variations, the minimum
condition for such & graph would be prices dating from
the same month in each year.
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All prices are given in money of account and not in terms
of silver* As a result the prices are clearly more
helpful in establishing the effects of price movements on
society than In establishing the secular trend of the
economy** In ehort the evidence is limited in scope
and will not go far In helping to solve the relevant
problems *
The prices clearly provide evidence of an economic
crisis* On the whole the price level remains stable till
about 1435* Thereafter prices begin to rise in a move*
:ment which become® especially pronounced for the period
1460*79* This movement is confirmed by both the prices
of cloth and grain*
It must be remembered* however* that these prices
constitute a 'nominal* price movement. The maravedi
was the money of account and not a coin as such. Techni¬
cally, therefore, the maravedi was not subject to debase*
iment in the way that coins were debased* But moneys
of account ware subject to devaluation and the maraved1
was no exception* Debasement of the coinage entailed
a devaluation of the roaravedi since the raising of the
face value of coins* in terms of the money of account*
was followed by a devaluation of the maravedi in terms
of /
1 An interesting discussion on this problem in J.D* Gould*
•The Price Revolution Reconsidered** i-con.H.R., xvii
(1964*5), 249*66.
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of gold* silver, and forsign exchange.
The nominal movement of the grain and cloth prices
is, in fact, so sharply upwards as to suggest that the
roaravedl was suffering from devaluation. In effect two
currency factors have to be taken into account. From
at least the reign of Henry II {1369*79) there was a
persistent debasement of the coinage,^ In the fifteenth
century, however, debasement was particularly marked
during Henry IV*s reign (1454*74) and resulted in a state
of monetary anarchy. Hence, throughout the fifteenth
century, there was a 'normal* trend in the devaluation
of the maravedi which assumed the proportions of a crisis
in the reign of Henry IV, The clearest manifestations
of this debasement and consequent devaluation are to be
Seen in the exchange rates of coinage in terms of
maravedis. The raising of the face value of coins was
very pronounced. In 1438, for example, the real de
Plata was worth 8| mra but by 1468 it was worth 30 airs.
At the beginning of John II's reign (1406*54) the dobla
de la banda was worth 90 aura. It then rose to 111 ars
by 1438, 150 mra by 1462, 200 mrs by 1465, and 365 mra
by 1487,2
The /
1 The late medieval Castilian coinage still awaits proper
examination, The best general discussions are O, Gil
Farres, His toria de la moneda espanola (Madrid, 1959)
pp.214 f jf'I' ahd Vici»nsJ"'''(U"'sto'rla. 11, 94*106 and 430*4,
2 For more examples see Gil Farres, op,cit., pp,214 ff,
and Vicens, Historla. II, 430*4,
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The fact that the prices are expressed in terms
of maravedls* therefore, makes it impossible to separate
the effects of devaluation from the other causes of price
inflation* It would be useful to convert from maravedis
into silver prices but the lack of data makes this
impossible at presentIt is clear, however, that
such a conversion would reduce the violence of the
nominal inflation and the extent of this reduction is
obviously crucial to establishing the secular trend,
Since this cannot be done the stage of speculation has
once again been reached. Two general possibilities
present themselves.
It is possible that devaluations of the maravedi
were sufficiently serious to cancel out the rise in
prices when expressed in terms of silver* In such a
case the secular trend would show stability or even
stagnation. There is fragmentary evidence to support
this hypothesis* Silver supplies may well have been
overvalued and the devaluation of the taaravcdl could be
regarded as a demand for silver* The price of silver
worried /
1 The mint prices of silver would, X suppose, be best
for such a conversion* An alternative solution would
be to convert the prices into a foreign - and stable -
currency. I have tried this, as far as the evidence
of exchange rates will allow, with the Aragonese gold
florin* The result confirms the argument which follows
* namely that other factors were causing inflation.
worried mint officials in the 1440s and some minting of
silver coins was suspended in the next decade because
1
of a scarcity in suj^ply.
The second - and more attractive - possibility is
that debasements did not account for all of the price
rise. The nominal price inflation began round about
1435 but the debasement crisis was mainly concentrated in
Henry IV's reign. Debasements, therefore, aggravated an
existing inflationary trend. Such an inflation of prices
could have been caused by an increase in the supplies of
silver although this would appear to be unlikely. In
any case to concentrate on the supply of silver is to
subscribe implicitly to the quantity theory of money and
ignore other relevant and vital evidence. In fact the
prices of grain and the chronology of the crises of sub-
2
:sistence (Tables I - III) clearly suggest that, after
1435, grain prices rose not just because of debasement
but because of a crisis in the supply and demand situation
in cereals. The grain crisis, moreover, became espec¬
ially serious from 1460 onwards and this parallels the
evidence of the prices. The seriousness of the crisis
in this staple commodity must have influenced other prices
and /
m ■ II >(|,. t' at#?" *■MKf, <***. r."f» ii r m.h » i iu irr i i ir.:.. n j-frr -"Iiiit- _.f- i_ nji -
1 A.G.S., D.de C., leg.4, no.56; Gil Parres, op.cit.,
pp.216-9.
2 Appendices A and
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and in itself is a good indicator of the secular trend.
The agrarian crisis of the second half of the century
affected -dob t of the kingdom. The grain and cloth prices,
however, can only be used with precision for the Seville
area and it may well be argued that important demographic
factors were also stimulating inflation. It has already
been seen that the southern towns were subject to demo*
{graphic pre?sure and Seville, of course, was the largest
town in the kingdom.
The evidence of prices can, therefore, support certain
firm conclusions and some purely speculative suggestions.
It is certain that there was a sharp rise in the nominal
price movement. This rise in prices began before mid*
century and lasted till at least 1480* The rise in
prices affected the whole kingdom and not just the Seville
area, ^'e can be certain of this because the gravity of
the debasements affected all prices (T&blelV)It is
impossible to calculate how far other factors stimulated
a price rise. Here there may well have been a distinction
between the south and the centre of the kingdom. In
terms of silver prices, there may have been a price rise
In the south which did not affect the centre and north
of the kingdom.
One historian, Vines Mey, has stressed the part
played /
1 See Table IV, Appendix D,y suv
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played by the Crown in the economic expansion#* Accord-
*ing to this view the genesis of the mercantilist state
was due to the fifteenth century kings# L&rr&s considers
the whole period from 1500-1700 as 'the age of mercanti1-
2
: Isra* # If the same policies were attempted in the fif¬
teenth century# mercantilism must have existed then as
well# In fact the opposite is true# The same policies
do carry over from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century.
But they were not mercantilistic policies. Preoccupation
over the alleged drain of gold to the papal court was a
common attitude all over Europe# There is very little
evidence to back up Vinas Wey* s assertion that the
Castilian kings were preoccupied with the balance of
trade. Economic clauses in treaties with foreign powers
do not const!ttite mercantilism. Protection for merchants
was nothing exceptional# John IT of Brittany and Philip
the Good of Burgundy did more to protect Castilian mer¬
chants in their dominions than did the kings of Castile#
An alleged 'mercantilism*, together with other such
factors as the 'spirit* of the reconguista, do not really
help /
1 C. ViJias &ey 'Be la edad media a la modevna'# Hlsp## i
(1940) no.l# 52-70, no#2, 64-101, no.3# 41-1057 the
same, 'El esplritu castellano de aventura y empresa',
A.P.P.# v (1952), 13-83#
2 J# Larrae, La epoca del mercantillsmo en Cast ilia (3rd
ed#, Madrid, 19®3)« ' ~ "
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help touch in explaining the alleged expansion of Castile.*
The vital factors in Castiliar* expansion were the
changes in the trading pattern which placed the ports ol
Castile at the centre of European trade," The first change
occurred after the recoaquest of Andalusia, By the end
of the thirteenth century the sea route from the Mediter¬
ranean to the North Sea via the straits of Gibralter was
in regular use* This route replaced the fairs of
Champagne as the ."tain economic artery between the north
and the south, fceville and Cddix obviously benefited
from the changeover to the North Sea merchant trade, A
second change came after the period of 1406-10« It is
argued that the activities of Tamerlane aa.de some of the
Italians switch their merchant activities from the Cast
to the western Mediterranean, But the decisive change
came just after 1450 with the Turkish advance in the Cast,
The Venetians managed to hang on to their trade with the
Bast, The Genoese, however, were forced to shift their
attention from Phocea and Chios to the western Mediter¬
ranean and the Atlantic, Hence the 'colonisation* of
Andalusia /
1 H, Carande, 'La economjfa y la expansion de Espaaa',
B,R,A,H,, exxx (1952), 213-55; the same, 'Gobernantes
ygobern&dOs en la hacienda de Casti1la*, Arbor, xviii
(1951), 187-209; H* Lapeyre and R. Carande, lelaciones
comerciaies ca el Medlterraneo (Mad rid, 1957pp»'^6-7,
2 For "what follows~generally see Heers, Gfence. pp.482-5;
J, Heers, ♦Les Italiene et 1'orient Medit crraneen• and
Vicens Vives, Suitress Fern&ndess, C, Carrere, 'La econom(a
de los paises de la corona de Aragon1 both of which are
*n VI, Cong, Hist, Ara&on (Madrid, 1957),
$4*
Andalusia and the kingdom of Granada* In these areas
the Genoese found some of the cargoes • fruit, vine,
grana * which they exchanged for the products of Flanders
and England* In England at least, the Castilian produce
was welcomed as England1* hold on Gascony declined* tike
fragmentary statistics for the trade oi Bristol suggest
that, by the end of the century, Spain had become Bristol * s
principal supplier and consumer.* Southern Castile thus
became a vital link of the Genoese sea empire. These
factors, along with the activities in Ceuta, Madeira and
the Canary islands were to serve as the springboard for
the American expansion of the sixteenth century*
2
Yet these changes affected Andalusia only* One
cannot argue that because Seville and Cadis prospered
the whole kingdom prospered as well* In fact the
northern ports also enjoyed a boom on a minor scale* It
has already been pointed out that the export trade in
iron and wool was channelled through the northern ports*
The main factor for change here was the increased impor-
t tance of Castile as a wool supplier* The cause for
this is usually held to have been the prohibition against
the importation of English cloth into Flanders* This
policy /
1 Sherborne, op.cit.* pp*ll, 25*6*
2 They al^o aTfecTed Valencia and Granada, Indeed the
contrast between Catalan decline and Valencian pros-
tperity adds point to the arguments for Castile#
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policy is held to have resulted in a switch of demand to
Castilian wool. Another reason also appears convincing•
the increased burden of taxation borne by the nglish
wool Interest during the Hundred Years War was passed
on to the foreign customer. The latter, therefore,
looked elsewhere for his supplies and ended up buying
Cast!lian wool.^
The increased exports of wool must also have bene-
tfited the centre of Castile. But on the whole there
are good reasons for doubting that there was a general
Castilian expansion which also affected the centre of
the kingdom. At the beginning of this chapter it was
argued that the economically unifying feature was the
sea and not the land. In fact, of all the Castilian
exports only one - wool • was supplied from the centre
of the kingdom. Alt the other exports were produced by
the northern and southern peripheries. The changes in
trade and markets affected Andalusia above all. It has
been seen that there was an extension of trade in the
northern and southern ports. There is no evidence, on
the other hand, that trade increased across the frontiers
with Portugal and the Crown of Aragon*
The procuradores of the cortes described the situa*
stion well* According to them the whole problem of grain
shortage /
1 See M.to, Pas tan, •The Costs of the Hundred Years* War*.
P.P. no.27 (April. 1964), 40-1,
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shortage in Andalusia and Seville was due to the lack of
balance between economic activities*
It is a land full of many and diverse people
who live by rents and trade* A land where
there are few farm workers* A land where
many towns* frontier castles* and ships are
dependent on the work of these few farm
workers#*
The crises of subsistence that affected Andalusia have
been studied* Was this due to an increase in population
as well as the weak state of agriculture? Another, and
appealing, conclusion Is possible* Grain production was
not remunerative except in times of crisis. Sugar, wine*
fruit* raisins* mercury* leather* and soap rendered greater
profits# Grain production was sacrificed for more rearnne-
jrative products# The Andalusian economy complemented the
economies of Flanders* England and north Africa and, in this
way* exports were profitable# Hence grain was imported
from the Barbery coast and sugar production replaced grain
in Madeira and the Canary Islands* Perhaps the conclusion
is exaggerated. Nevertheless the contrasts between the
south and centre are too great to be ignored* It was a
contrast between Seville and Toledo* Seville had three
times the sise of Toledo's population* Seville had trading
links to England, Flanders, Genoa and the Fast* Toledo*
despite its cloth production, exported nothing# On the
one /
1 Cortes, Hi. 38-9 (5,1422).
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one hand there wee the central trieseta where so imny areas
had sma 11 scale mixed farming economies. On the other
hand there were the towns of the south where the Genoese,
Florentine, English and Breton merchants had resident





This chapter begins with a discussion of the nobility
as one of the three estates of society* The main object,
however, is to analyse the sources of wealth of the
nobility* How far did the nobility benefit from the
economic activities outlined in the previous chapter and
did their income keep pace with rising prices? A con*
jsideration of these problems leads on to an examination of
the royal finances as a source of income for the nobility.
1. The Estate; terminology, criteria* privileges
Social labels are always unsatisfactory and vague.*
Fifteenth century Castilian terminology for the various
groups of society was no exception. There seem to be
three main difficulties about these terms* In the first
place social labels continued to be used for long after
the social reality to which they corresponded ceased to
2
exist* The second problem is caused by the vagueness
of some of the terminology. A word such as caballero*
for example, had several different meanings. Lastly,
there /
1 For what follows see generally Vicens, Historia. ii.
114*5, 130-8.
2 Carle, 1Infanaones e hidalgos*, C.H.E. xxxiii-xxxiv
(1961), 73-4 gives an excellent example of the survival
of terminology which originally referred to wergilds.
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there is the problem of tracing the broad differences
within society implied by these labels. Was the nobility
the same as the estate? It is necessary to state what
the labels meant in order to avoid confusion.
The terms ricos omcs. ricos hqrobrca, grandes. and
personas de estado were used to describe the great
nobility} great in 1ineage, wealth and political power.
Of these,grandes. although only appearing in the later
fifteenth century, came to be the most widely used term.
The titles of cgndjg, dTOe. marquoa. and were
given to members within this group of grandes. Xn the
fifteenth century the main criteria for bestowing these
titles was political* The titles themselves did not
indicate anything more than honour. Hardly ever did
they hold any meaning in an administrative sense since
public office had never been feudalised in Castile* In*
;deed all these titles were themselves a late innovation
due to French influence. The one exception * conde *
had originally meant a board companion of a great lord
or king.*
Two terms, segundones and infansones. designated
those in the vague area falling between the greater and
lesser nobility or hidalgos. Often those involved were
the younger sons of the great families of the ricos
hombres /
1 For the * feudal* background generally see Garcia de
Valdeavellano. *Las instituclones feudales en Espafta*.
in the transl. ©f Ganshof. El feudaliamp (Barcelona.
1963), pp.229-300, See, also,'is. Lourie, *A society
organised for war*, P.P. no.35 (Dec., 1966), 62-3.
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horobres or grandeg. The term infanaones had, by the
fifteenth century, fallen out of use except in the north
of Castile,
The term or served to distinguish
the leaser nobility from the ricoe hombres or grandee.
It was, however, often used to designate all the nobility
down to the level of the hidalgo (the term hidalguia
served the same purpose). The criteria involved here
was strictly one of birth, further distinctions obtained
by using the terms eacud^yo or cab*}1pro. Thus an hidalgo
escudero was a noble squire and an hidalgo caballero was a
knight.
The tern caballero itself was the one which was
probably- used with the greatest variety of meanings. In
the military sense it could be used to refer to a man who
had been dubbed for his military prowess. Such a man
might be a caballero noble or a caballero hidalgo. In
the first case the man was a noble because he had been
knighted, despite the fact that he had not been born into
hidalauia. In the second case the man was already a noble
since he was an hidalg£.
The term caballero, however, was also used to design
snate a non-noble knight* These non-noble knights
(caballeros villanos, caballeros dc cuantta or aiarde)




All or most of these labels had specific meanings.
Many of them, however, were used in a very general sense
in order to mark off social boundaries. Hence the word
aobleaa was used to designate grandes. hidalgos and
cabal!eros nobles. So too was the word, caballero.
although it was also used to include the non-noble knights
in opposition to all those in society who did not enjoy
exemption from taxation (pecheros? . Indeed, for contest*
:poraries, the great dividing line in society was provided
by exemption from taxation. Castilians thought of
fiJosdalgos and caballeros on the one hand, and pecheros.
or tax payers, on the other hand. Both the terms noblesa
and cabal lerfa could be used to denote the military estate
or order of society. The term estado itself, however,
was less frequently used.
There were two general ways by which a man's noble
status was juridically acknowledged. Noble status was
accepted if the individual was a notorio fijodalgo de solar
conoscido * that is, if it was an undisputed and well known
fact. Alternatively an individual could have himself
declared a nobleman by the law. There was a fixed pro*
scedure for obtaining such a judgment* The case was
heard by a special judge (alcalde) at the king*s court or
in the chanci lleria. evidence had to be submitted and a
representative of the area where the individual lived had
to be present, as also did the king's procurador fiscal.
The /
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The resulting sentencia, or judgment, was then given and,
if favourable to the individual, was accepted as proof
of his nobility.
These generalities do not indicate, however, which
specific qualities pertained to the nobility. Undoubtedly
the most important single factor was lineage. The over*
riding factor which determined nobility was descent,
>Fidalguia*, says the Siete Partidas, * is nobility which
2
comes to men by lineage*. As early as the eleventh and
twelfth centuries the nobleman was defined by his blood
and genealogy and not by his occupational role*'' The
result of this was the idea that the king could not confer
this nobility because it was only conferred by ancient and
noble lineage. It was a quality which belonged primarily
to the grandea and to a lesser extent to the hidalgos.
Thus the king could dub a knight but the hidalgo had to
be born as such. The distinctions imposed by lineage
were quite clearly understood by contemporaries. Indeed
Fernaa Peres de Gusrnan, in his pen pedPtraits of the leading
figures of his day, tended to describe men almost exclus¬
ively in terms of lineage, A consequence of this in¬
sistence /
1 O.K.. Lib, iv, tit, ii, ley vi. This procedure was
given definition towards the end of the fourteenth
century, Cortes, II, 293-4 (19,1379), For an example
of such a case see below tyiia--?
2 S.P,, Ft, ii, tit, xxi, leyes i, ii*
3 Vicens*, Hjgtoria. ii, 132-3.
4 Thus Pedro de ^rfas, cardinal of Spain, is described as
an * ombre de baxo linage* while Alvar P6re» de Osorio'a
lineage is 'fcrantje e antiguo* i Generaciones, pp.77, 111,
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insistence on lineage was the detailed legislation which
aimed at preventing a debasement ol the noble order.
Generally it seems that the husband's status determined
the status of the wife and children. A noblewoman, for
example, who married a pechero or commoner lost her status
of hidalguia. On the death of her husband, however, she
could recover her status by knocking on her husband's
coffin three times with a halberd and saying, each time,
'Commoner, keep your status and give me back my nobility'*
The children of a noble father and commoner mother (madre
viliana) were considered as noble* Yet if the father was
a commoner and the mother originally noble the children
were commoners.^
Inevitably confusion arose in cases of lineage. In
many cases an individual's hidalguta was disputed - he was
not a notorio fijodalgo de solar conoscldo. In these
cases nobility could be proved by reversing the equation.
A noble had certain privileges* Enjoyment of these pri*
ivi leges over a certain period of time proved nobility. On
both points » privileges and time * the laws were fairly
specific. Since all these cases inevitably concerned the
lesser nobility the practical issue at stake concerned the
noble privilege of exemption from taxation. Therefore,
if the claimant's grandfather and father had lived in the
same area and had enjoyed exemption from taxation because
they /
1 Faero Viejo. Lib, i, tit. V, ley xvii; Carle, loc.clt..
p.?3l sTfT. Pt.ii, tit. xxi, ley iii; Q.R.. Lib. iv,
tit* ii, ley vi.
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they claimed hicialguia, then the claimant's right to
hidalguia was recognised. This procedure was, in effect,
a way of proving that a man was a notorio fijodalgo de
solar conoscldo.*
A unique feature of society in the kingdom of Castile
was the geographical criteria of nobility. Everyone born
in Viacaya, Guipuzcoa, and to a certain extent Asturias
was ipso facto a nobleman. Paradoxically a collective
and democratic nobility existed in these areas* Obviously
in such a case status lost much of its meaning. But the
privileges of nobility* especially exemption from taxation,
were strongly defended. Henry 111, for example, asked
the towns of Guipuacoa in 1392 to contribute 12,000 francos
for the Lancastrian debt."2 On the 30th January 1393 the
representatives of the towns of Guipuzcoa stated in their
reply
that the town councils and places in the letter
»•« were not and are not obliged to pay the
amounts stated *.* since ••• these councils and
areas and their inhabitants ... were immune and
lived from their foundations as fiJosdalgos
having a status of such a kind that never, at
any time in the world up to thd present day,
have they, or their predecessors, ever had to
pay and never have paid any mrs. of any such
gervicio *.•^
Lineage determined the nobility of the ricos hombres.
grandeg. and hidalgos. Castile, however, was no different
from /
1 C.K., Lib, iv, tit. ii, 3eyes vi, vii.
2 This debt was the legacy of John of Gaunt* s claims to the
C&stilian throne: P.E, Kuasel1, The English Intervention
(Oxford, 1955), chap, xlx.
3 A.G.S., D.de G*, leg.6, ».o.l89. See alsothe highly
interesting study by Arrocena, * ^a exencion tributaria de
Guipuzcoa*, B.R.V.P., :eparata (1954),
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from other societies in its concept of the three estates
of society,
Defenaores are one of the three estates which
t5od ordained should maintain this world. For
inasmuch as those who pray to God for the
people are called oradores: and inasmuch as
those who work the land .♦* are called
labradores: so too are those who protect
"everybody called defengpres.*
How did this criteria of military service and protection
fit in with the concept of nobility? As a result of the
absence of 'feudalism' in early medieval Castile and the
continuing military necessities imposed by the reconquest,
Castiiian society presented several unique features* It
it not proposed to deal with this general evolution from
the early medieval period but merely to describe the
situation as it existed in the fifteenth century,2
In practice the nobility only had to perform military
service in return for a cash benefice. It is true that the
idea of an intimate relationship between military service
and nobility remained strong. Indeed the idea was far
stronger than is generally supposed. The Frince of
Aafcurias, in 1444, threatened that all the nobility who
did not turn up to perform military service when summoned
would be reduced to the b t&tus of commoners and would lose
all /
1 JbP., • ii» tit, xxi, preamble.
2 The best study on 'feudalism' in Castile is Garcia de
Vald^aveliano, ubi supra, passim.
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all their privileges.* Yet in practice the two concept#
were no longer synonymous.
Feudal terms such as bcneficlo. honor, vasallo. vasallaJe*
and imciunjdadea had become current from the twelfth century
onwards. These terms reflected French influences rather
than Castilian realities. By the fifteenth century there
was no link between land and military service. The bene*
:fice in Castile had never fused with vassalage to produce
the fief. Moreover, from the civil wars of the fourteenth
century onwards, the granting of land by the Crown took
the form of seigneurial jurisdictions or estates and
bore no relation whatsoever to the semi-feudal benefices
which had existed earlier. Benefices, in this sense,
did not exist in the fifteenth century and. in fact.
Castilian society showed no trace of the serai-feudalism
which had existed in the early and central middle ages.
There were immunities but these were the immunities of
the senorio. Vassals and vassalage remained if the
benefice did not. But the idea of vassalage was a de»
Jbased one* The king still retained vassals in the feudal
sense in that they were linked to him by vassalage. But this
vassalage was not linked to any benefice and a more generalised
meaning of the word vasa11o was prevalent. All the king's
subjects were I
1 C.P.R.A.H.. 9-13 (vi. 22 May 1444).
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wex-e called vasal log.* In this general sense all the
king's subjects had to serve when called upon. In this
general sense, also, the nobility were supposed to serve.
But the concept was too generalised and hardly supports the
t / 2
idea of a. societe vassalatique.
The link between the nobility and the military role
of the estate of del en so res was now one which was largely
based on cash. The Castilian Crown in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries made specified yearly payments of
cash in specified areas in return for specific military
3
service* A payment of 1,500 mrs per year, for example,
entailed an obligation an the part of the recipient to
provide a knight for military service* Military service
was not, therefore, obligatory on the nobility. A noble*
iroan might possess huge eeigneurial jurisdictions and
estates* lie may not necessarily have been a vassal
except in the generalised sense. Consequently there was
no specific military criteria of nobility in such a case
unless he received specified payments of moneyThese
payments /
1 All the subjects in the sense of ail those included in
the three estates. Even in the early middle ages the
word vasallo was not linked to homage but referred to
the general"" relationship between the king and his
subjects or a caudillo and his soldiers. See Pescador,
'La caballeria popular*, C.H.g.. xxxiii-xxxiv (1961),
129.
2 See Garcia de Valdeavellano, ubi supra. pp.247*61 and
H.k.. Lib, vi, tit, vi, ley if.
3 For the origins of a standard system of military service
based on a fixed money ratio see Carle, loc.cit., pp.
85-6.
4 This is clearly the iraplication of John ll's law of 1432
in N.R.. Lib, vi, tit. vi, ley i.
IOC,
payment# of money were known as ticrra or ncostainionto,
Tierra literally means land. In fact tierra involved
annual payments by the Crown to the holder,and the total
corresponded to the number of lances which the nobleman
had to produce for military service. Strictly speaking
tierra did not constitute a money fief since the money
benefice was not linked to any form of specific homage or
Yaas&lage, This type of money benefice varied little in
practice from acostawiento. The theoretical difference
seems to have axisen from the idea that the retinue, paid
by acostamiento, lived and travelled with their lord.
In some cases military criteria still played an
extremely important part in determining status. In a
frontier society the defensures were still needed and
this gave rise to a non-noble class of knights who enjoyed
the privileges of nobility without actually having noble
status. There were two groups within this classt the
caballeros villanos (commoner knights) and the caballerps
do cuantxa or alarde (assessed knights).*
in both cases the factors leading to the enjoyment
of noble privileges wore roughly the same, A pechero *
that is a tax payer or commoner - could enjoy some of
the privileges of nobility provided that he maintained a
horse /
1 On these cabal1 eras see generally Pesc&dor, 'La
c&ballerjuT popular7, C.H.E,, xxxi i i-xxxiv (1961), 101-238
ar«l ^artinea Kui* 'La caballeria vi liana on Castilla',
Nordeste, no.3 (1961), 83-111•
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horse and armour of stipulated value and provided that
ho performed military service along with the noble hld&laog
who held tierra and acostamiento from the Crown. In
short, if the commoner performed the same function in war
as the noble knight he enjoyed the same privileges.
Unlike hia noble counterpart, however, he did not receive
a benefice of cash in the shape of tierra or aeos tamjento,^
The criteria was a purely military one, although
wealth played an Important part in enabling the military
criteria to be applied. The pechero, or commoner,
enjoyed the privileges as long as he fulfilled the
obligations. Failure to fulfil the obligations meant
2
loss of status and privilege* Lineage and descent
counted for nothing, A son could inherit his father's
3
status only if he fulfilled the same obligations*
The caballaroa villanos appeared as early as the
tenth and eleventh centuries. Land was not in short
supply and the granting of benefices of land was not
therefore particularly attractive. Indeed, it was pre*
:cifielv because these men had sufficient landed wealth and
because there was a demand for knights that they could
afford /
1 Ojil., Lib, iv, tit ,1, ieyes iv,v,vi, ix. In 143a and
1447 John II decided that the horse's value must be
3,000 mrsi Cortes, iii, 144 (34,1432) and 539*43
(36,14TTT,
2 A short period of grace was* usually allowed: Pescador,
'La caballeria popular*, C.H.E,. xxxv-xxxvi (1962), 37-8.
3 More details in ibid, pp.76*7•
no.
afford the re 1 evant horse and armour and thereby enjoy
noble privileges.*
The caballerog do cuaatia or alarde were different
in origin. There is evidence that they existed as far
as back as the twelfth century. The great increase in
their numbers, however, took place in the fourteenth
century whan the military needs of the Crov/n led to an
increase in the enforcement of military obligations on
commoners whose wealth rose above a certain limit* In
the same way as noble vassals had to provide a fixed
number of knights in relation to tierra and acostaroiento
received f ran the Crown, so did these commoners have to
maintain a fixed number in relation to their wealth.
2
These assessments of wealth varied from place to place.
The word cuantLa. obviously referred to the rsl&tionehip
between military obligation and assessed wealth. The
worc* &lard3 referred to the obligation of the cabal 1 ero
to review his horse and armour, twice & year, before the
officials of the municipal jurisdicHon in which he
lived. These caballeros dt> cuant/& owed their existence,
primarily /
1 Pescador, *La caballeria popular*, C.ll.K, xxxi i i-xxxiv
(1961), 134, 150.
2 ibid, pp.160-1, 202-6, 210, 213, 228 and in C.H«£«.
xxxv-xxxvi (1962), 67-76.
3 Q.K., bib.iv, tit.iii, ley xxi. But there are signs
that the alarde was becoming leas frequent and that the
caballores villanos wore also affected by it. Hence
the distinctions between the two groups became blurred.
See Cortes, iii, 542 (36,1447).
Ill*
primarily, to the military needs of the frontier and it
is, therefore, easy to unci e rs tand that they were to be
found almost exclusively in Andalusia and Marcia by the
fifteenth century,*
Both these groups of knights may be designated by
the general title of caballerra popular and, generally,
it seems that they were an urban class. At an early
stage of the reconquert the depopulation of the Duero
valley created a large class of free landowners in a
society where a strong nobility was lacking. In such
a society the towns and the cabalIcrla popular therefore
played a decisive part in frontier life. Later, in
Andalusia and Murcia, the task of selecting the caballeros
de cuantia was one undertaken by municipal officials.
This does not preclude the fact that such caballeros may
have lived on seigneuriai estates. Yet, even in such
cases, they were an urban phenomena in that they were
related to the aeigaeuriai towns, indeed, by the end of
the middle ages, a strong relationship Lad been built up
between the caballeroa and the towns. Thus storae towns
rejected individuals from their lists of such caballeros
on the grounds that they rlived* with a different senor
or /
1 These frontier trends were encouraged by the Crown, For
example, John 11, in a letter of 22 June 1406 justifies
privileges on the grounds that the frontier areas should
be 'siempre poblados dc amaa dd cabalio*i A.M.C*,
Sec,18, rnoneda forera, 2* Tee also Peecador in C,H»K.




Two factors reinforced this relationship between the
caballeros and the towns. In the first place there can
be little doubt that the selecting of the caballeros de
cuantia was done by town officials. A letter of John II
to the town council of Jeres shows exactly how the procedu
worked. Officials of each barrio or district in the town
selected individuals on the basis of the tax assessments.
An individual selected in this way became a cabaliero de
cuantia after being presented to the town council by the
2
district official* The second factor was that some
municipal posts became the preserve of these caballeros.
The word caballero, or knight* was used extensively
by contemporaries and had a wide variety of meanings.
However* it is quite clear that the cabaliero villano or
caballero de cuantla was not the same knight as the
cabaliero fijodalgo and it would be useful* at this stage*
to clearly stress the differences# The noble or ft,*gal go
was born into hidalgula. Yet he was not born a caballero
It is true that most noblemen were also caballeroa since
the occupational role of the nobility was still considered
to be military. But the noble was made a caballero.
theoretically /
1 Pescador in C.H.g. (1961), 133-4.
2 A.M.J,, Actas Caps., fol. 14R, 1426, letter dated 15
Sept. 1420.
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theoretically, ior some deed of military prowess. More*
:over when he was dubbed a knight he had to be dubbed in
a special ceremony. When he was dubbed a knight he did
not gain any special privileges since he enjoyed these
privileges because of his noble birth. All that happened
was that he ceased to be a noble squire (caballero escudero)
and became a noble knight.* The commoner, an the other
hand, underwent no ceremony. He gained no privilege
because of his birth. His status and privileges were
obtained exclusively by military criteria. If he failed
in his obligations he, unlike the noble, was deprived of
his privileges. The difference was neatly summed up by
a twelfth century statute which distinguished between a
2
miles per naturaua and a miles non per naturam.
The word, caballero, therefore, was open to more
than one interpretation and it Is clear that, unless
qualified, the status of the non*noble cabaliero was open
to anyone with the appropriate wealth. It was, perhaps,
for this very reason that negative criteria ware applied
to the status of caballero. A caballero or knight,
whether noble or commoner, could not make a living by some
mean /
1 The ennoblement of Miguel Lucas de 1ranso Illustrates
these points. He was first ennobled and then made a
n an impressive ceremony.
2
. . e statute but it sums up




mean occupation* Already In the Stele PartIdas It was
declared that a merchant could not be a caballero. In
the fifteenth century John II went even further and listed
a whole set of occupations which were to be held as being
incompatible with the status of caballero. All the
occupations listed were artisan occupations* The reasons
for these further negative definitions derived from a
f«ar of excessive upward social mobility.*
hhat privileges pertained to the nobility? A great
many privileges were, of course, purely honorific* Minute
regulations, for example, were laid down with respect to
2
dress, insignia, and noble conduct* The non-noble
knights were allowed to enjoy many of these privileges*
Judicial privileges were of greater importance* The
noble proper could only be tried by a royal tribunal and
special judicial machinery existed to deal with cases in*
Jvolving the nobility* From the reign of Alfonso X on-
Swards, special judges, the alcaldes do los hidalgos, dealt
with such cases. These judges at first residing at
court, were later incorporated into the chancillerla
created in the reign of Henry 11A noble could not
be /
1 For deroqeance generally see S.P.. Pt.ii, tit.xxi,
1eye's xii, xxv j Q.R,, Lib.iv, tit.i, ley ix and ti t.ii,
ley vi. This last law applied to tax farmers and
collectors. A*M*L., doc.214, 19 June 1409, is a typical
example of contemporary fears of excessive social mobility
- John II attempts to obstruct the numbers of pecheros
who are successfully claiming nobility in Leon,
2 For example O.R*. Lib.iv, tit.i, leyes i,ii,iii.
3 On the chanclllerla or audiencia see F. MendIsabel, 'La
real chancillerla1, R.A.'^.M.. "xxx( 1914), 61*72, 243-64,
437-52, In 1442 there was an attempt to have competence
over the great nobility transferred to the noble domin-
:ated royal council; B.M., MS., 13259, fos* 332R-336R.
us.
be imprisoned lor debt. He could not be tortured save in
cases of treason,* If sentenced to death this sentence
could only be implemented by decapitation or starvation.
The military equipment of both the nobility and the non«
2
noble knights could not be confiscated for debt. Many
3
municipal offices were reserved to the nobility.
The most highly treasured privilege, however, was
that of exemption from royal and municipal taxation. At
the beginning of the fifteenth century the general position
was that the nobility proper and the non-noble caballeros
enjoyed fiscal exemption from royal and municipal taxes.
During the century, however, the Crown attempted to re¬
strict this fiscal privilege in several ways. There was
an attempt to limit exemptions in Andalusia. An attempt
was also made to limit the immunity of those pecheros or
tax payers who became non-noble caballeros> Detailed
regulations were also laid down in order to prevent the
extension of fiscal immunity to a privileged person*a de¬
pendents. Finally a concerted effort was made to pre-




1 But see O.K.. Lib.iv, tit.ii, ley iv.
2 But see O.K.. Lib.iv, tit.i, ley xii.
3 See below
4 This whole problem of tax exemption is complicated in
detail: in practice the great nobility were generally
exempt, apart from the alcabala. A list of relevant
evidence would be enormous, A general idea is given
by O.K.. Lib.iv, tit»i, ieyes iv,v,vij ibid, tit.ii,
ley vT| ibid, tit.iii, ley xxij Ibid, tit,iv, ley xxiv.
In practice the lesser nobility were often forced to
pay taxes: see below, ft-*"8*-•«
116.
The juridical criteria of nobility and the privileges
they possessed,naturally figured prominently in court cases
over claims of nobility. In such disputes,the rather dry
criteria which have been described became legally meaning*
tful, as the following two examples illustra te.
On the 19th of December 1395, Kodrigo Alvarcs de Toro,
alcalde of the hidalgos at court, pronounced sentence in a
case of hidajguta. The case centred on the status of a
certain Gonsalo de la Torre who lived within the municipal
jurisdiction of the council of Barajas near Madrid.
Gonaalo de la Torre claimed that he was an hidalgo and
consequently exempt from faxes imposed by the Barajas town
council. This claim was challenged by a representative
of the town council and by the royal procurator fiscal.
Three basic arguments were put forward by the prosecution.
With respect to lineage, it was alleged that Gonaalo de la
Torre was the son and grandson of tax paying commoners.
If was also claimed that he was neither the legitimate or
bastard son of the man whom he declared to be his father.
Hie claim to nobility was, in the second place, challenged
on military grounds since the prosecution alleged that he
failed to perform military service as a vassal along with
the other hidalgos when summoned to do so by the Crown,
Finally, it was alleged that the defendant had paid taxes
for such a long period of time that this, in itself, proved
that he had no right to claim the privileges of an hidalgo.
Gonzalo /
U7*
Gonaalo de la Torre; in hie defence, summoned a good
any witnesses whose evidence was of a very detailed
nature* As far as military service was concerned, he
argued that the summonses were never made public in the
area in which he lived and that, in any case, he was too
young to have performed military service* On the other
hand, evidence was put forward shoving that his forebears
had, in their time, served along with other hidalgos in
the campaigns of Alfonso XI, and in the civil wars between
T'edro I and Henry II* Nor did the defence have any
trouble in proving that Gonssalo de la Torre*s lineage was
beyond doubt, as far as legitimacy was concerned* More*
saver, witnesses fully backed up his claim that he, and
his father and grandfather, had lived like hidalgos and
more especially that they had never paid taxes save those
normally paid by other hidalgos*
As a result the alcalde of the hidalgos, in his
sentencia* declared that Gonaalo de la Torre was an hidalgo
and possessed all the privileges belonging to htctoW*.1
As can be seen this case involved several of the
legal criteria which have been discussed* Was the claim*
sant an hidalgo by birth? Were his claims to nobility
substantiated by military service performed when the Crown
summoned all the nobility as vassals? Lastly had the
claimant /
I The document of this case in R.C.V,, ejecutorias* leg.l*
us*
claimant ,Ti>d his family lived nobly? In effect this last
problem inevitably centred on the most important privilege
of nobility * had the claimant's family enjoyed exemption
frem taxation?
The second example involves the status of commoner
knights* The son of a commoner knight could not inherit
the noble privileges of his father unless he also performed
the necessary military service and maintained the etipu*
slated horse and equipment. On the other hand the widow
of such a knight retained his privileges until her death,
provided she remained chaste. On the 1st of August 1394,
Luis iiartfnes de Santa Catalina, alcalde of Cdrdoba, pro*
inounced sentence in a case involving the widow of a
commoner knight of Cordoba* The fax collector of the
district in which the woman, Catalina ^artinea, lived,
alleged that her assessed wealth made her liable to a
payment of forty eight mrs in taxes*
In her defence, Catalina Martinea denied that she had
to pay this or any other amount* iter husband, Pedro
Alfonso de hojas, was one of the caballeros of Cordoba
because he had maintained the appropriate horse and arms*
Since his death she had remained chaste and was still his
widow* Legally, therefore she had gained the status and
privileges of her husband.
The prosecution then alleged that she had never
married /
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married Pedro Alfonso de lloj&s and the rest of the case
was taken up with this point* In the end the widow won
*
her case*
2* The Wealth of the Nobility
Wealth was not a fundamental criteria for the juri*
idical concept of nobility* Nevertheless wealth made
all the practical difference between an impoverished noble*
;man of Guipusscoa and the great estate owner of Andalusia*
What were the sources of wealth of the nobility? Two
general fields of enquiry are worth following up# The
first entails a succinct account of conclusions reached
by historians on the juridical structure of lordships
Cso&or^os)» Such an account does not lead to any really
useful results as far as the wealth of the nobility is
concerned. The reason for this is that the evidence
mainly consists of law codes and the diplomatic formulae
employed by the chancery in the royal grants of such lord*
:ships. Nevertheless the results do provide a general
framework of reference and* more important* they do show
how even the juridical structure of lordship changed as a
result of political and social developments in the fifteenth
century*
The I
1 The record of this case in Priego, leg.?9* doc«i*
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The second Held of enquiry consists of using direct
evidence relating to noble revenues and income. The
grant!ng; of a lordship or aenorfo in Castile implied, as
elsewhere in western Europe, a lordship over the land, a
Jurisdictional lordship, and a mors personali^ed lordship
over the people on the land. Here only some general
points will be made about the situation in Castile »
sufficient to riiake an intelligible general picture, Vdiat
is of more direct concern is to try and delineate the
sources of wealth derived from the soigneurial regime.
i) Lordships and bastard lordships*
In the fifteenth century the Crown granted ssnorCow
In perpetuity,^ The recipient, moreover, could not only
transmit the •siksla to his relatives at death * he was
also empowered to cell or gift the land as he wished.
This latter power was usually qualified, A senorjo could
not be sold, gifted or exchanged to a foreigner or the
3
Church without royal permission.
Royal /
1 For what follows see generally the excellent study by
Moxo, *Los senorlos*, Bisp. Separata (1964), A.M.
Guilarte, i«cn sffir 1 aLen^els 1^ 1 o xvl (Madrid,1962) also contains useful material for the later middle
ages,
2 Henry 11, in his will, imposed restrictions on the
fffilter»Pf which h« lmd c*««*ed, Moxo, loc^cit., p.5.
other restrictions seem to have applied uore specifically
to members of the royal family. See, for example, the
limitations imposed on the lordships held by the queen and
princess in John II*s will* C.D.R.A.H., 111*25 (xlvi,l454),
3 Lee, for example, the licence"granted by Henry IV enabling
an exchange between Alfonso d# Carillo and the bishop of
Siguenza* B,N,, M.s«,6368, fos.425R-427R, 16 Nov,1469♦
in.
i\oyal permission was also necessary for the foun¬
dation of a taayoraago or imbarrable entail,* The
mayofiago, of course, could contain several senor£o»•
It could also contain other sources of wealth • for example,
specific feifts of alienated royal revenues which were
granted by the Crown for varying purposes and which were
not contained in the grants of senortos. The mayorazgo
did not i*ecessari ly settle all the family*g wealth on the
one son. Sometimes mayoraagos were set up for different
individuals within a family and the daughters were usually
2
provided for. It does not seem to be the case, as is
often suggested, that the aayoraggo returned to the Crown
in default of direct male heirs* The mayoraggo documents,
in fact, often mace detailed arrangements for descent by
3
female branches in default of male heirs.
The document granting the senorxo granted lordship
over the land involved. Thus the formula used in almost
all cases granted the
'town /
1 For example Henry IV*s licence to Kodrigo Portocarrero
contained in A.D.M,, Medell£n, leg,3, doc,8, 15 May
1450, Often the Crown actually founded the mayoraago
on behalf of the recipient, s for example, A«D,m, ,Tin.,
leg.4, doc.14 in which John II founds the mayoraggo of
Pedro Y&xeg (2 Jan, 1439).
2 For example »'iego Gonzalez de Toledo settled mayorazgos
on two of his sons while also providing for his daughters:
A.G.S., D.de C,, leg.38, no.16, 28 Feb.1443.
3 Ibid, In default the mayoraggos were to go to the
eldest daughter and her eldest son.
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town (or place} of X,,, with its castle and
fortress with all its land and area,,, and
with all its meadows am! pastures a»d hills
and common and wooded lands and thickets and
rivers and fountains and still and moving
waters and with all the entrances and exits,»•
This direct lordship over the land, implied in the grant,
obviously also implied some income. This would depend
mainly on the structure of cultivation; direct exploita*
:tion by the lord, or income deriving from rents or share
cropping •
iiie sehor£o in the fifteenth century also granted
important powers of jurisdiction. The diplomats them-
.'selves, however, concentrated almost exclusively on the
judicial powers. Almost without exception the juris-
:diccion civil y criminal, alta y baja, y mero y mjxto
imperio, was included in the grant. In some cases these
powers were specified in greater detail or clearly
included administrative as well as judical powers.* There
were, therefore, two elements to this jurisdictional lord-
:ship. The first involved the administration of justice.
The second involved some degree of control over urban
adminietration. Both these facets of jurisdictional
lordship obviously implied revenues or income of some sort.
Indeed the grants themselves usually specified the judicial
fines /
1 A.G.S., C, y J, de Mac#, leg.l, no,20, 28 April 1445,
for example, specifically names the officials whose
nomination fells to the lord.
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fines and punishments as belonging to the lord*
Lastly, the grants of aenorip also included revenues.
It seems impossible to give any precise juridical concept
to this aspect of lordship. The most obvious way out of
the difficulty is to argue thai the revenues alienated in
this vay were not royal revenues as such » they were
revenues paid to the king as seigneur and, therefore,
were now paid to the new lord. The argument is decep¬
tive. There was no hard and fast rule and the formula
«fr
for ul reflating these revenues varied. Another approach,
which has recently been suggested, envisages these reve¬
nues as accruing to tbe lord because of the personal
dependence of the vassals on the land,* A good many of
the revenues do, in fact, fit neatly into such a category
and the concept, moreover, helps to include other residual
powors belonging to the lord. These revenues might
include such taxes as the fonsadera. portasgo, peaje,
aaartiniaaa. yantar. and taxes on Jews and ^oors. The
formula of the grants, however, always added that the
grant included all other rights and revenues attached and
^ 2
belonging to the senorio. ' Hence this included such
things as the revenues derived from the lord's mill and
the /
1 Uox6, loc.cit«, pp.50-3, The vasallos were invariably
grant e3 witli' the land and the jurisdiction.
2 Minor variations can be ignored. The most accurate
picture is obtained by noting the reservations made by
the Crown and ascribing all else to the lord.
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the military service of the vassal, usually compounded
by the fonsadera.
Tbs Crown, of course, reserved to itself certain
powers and revenues. Briefly these were as follows:*
1) Hie Baayor{a de la jtistjcia. This was the supreme
jurisdiction which implied the right to intervene in the
s enor1o if the lord's justice proved to b« in any way
inadeoua te.
2) Coinage. Minting itself was reserved to the Crown
and only the royal coinage could be used.
3) Taxes and regalian rights. These included the
alcabala. the terciaa. pedidos and monedas, moneda forera,
and any metal deposits of gold and silver.*
The juridical structure of lordships or senorios
which has been discussed applies to the later middle ages.
The stricture, however, was not constant through time and
its general evolution shows how the fifteenth century
structure marked a transition to the sixteenth century,
and how these juridical changes were the reflection of
changing political and social circumstances«
What were these changes in the general evolution of
the /
1 Among the hundreds of grants of lordship 1 have only
encountered two where no reservations were ta»de. Both
were issued by Prince Henry, later Henry IV: A.D.M.,
Ale.Mar., leg,13, doc,20 and Model 1in, leg.l, doe.3.
In at least the latter case John 11 made the usual
reservations whan he confirjoed the grant: A.D.M.,
Modellin, leg.l, doc.8. Hence these reservations
were invariably part of grants of lordship.
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the juridical picture? In the first place the general
factor* giving rise to the seigneuri&l complex changed*
Until the end of the twelfth century the most important
motivating factor was undoubtedly the rapid advance of
the reconquest* This necessitated a process of re*
:population and defence which was best served by the
creation of lordships granted to the nobility and the
military orders* The extension of this process was also
helped by the Cistercians and Trench influence generally.
The thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth
century also gave rise to the same process although there
was a marked geographical difference in that the needs of
repopulation and defence were felt not in the north but
in the south * in Extremadura* Andalusia and >'«urcia.
However* from the twelfth century in the north and the
early fourteenth century in the south* the principal causes
for the setting up of lordships changed* Previously*
the motivating factor had been the needs of repopulation
and defence arising from reconquest * With minor excep¬
tions* however* the reconquest now ceased until the taking
of Granada* From now on the granting of lordships by
the Crown was a matter of political expediency in order
to win support from the nobility* From the reign of
Henry II (1369»1379) up to and including the reign of the
Catholic /
I See Moxo, loc*cit»> passim.
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Catholic sovereign* the Crown was plunged into one
pollticel crisis after another* In the fourteenth
century- the civil war between Pedro the Cruel and Henry
11 also entailed wars against the Portuguese, English and
Aragonese* In the fifteenth century there followed the
minority of John IX, the civil and national wars provoked
by the Infantes of Aregon, the noble uprisings against
Henry IV, and the disputed succession to the throne and
the Portuguese war* Hence the so-called mereedee
cnriqucnas (Henrician gifts) which included the alienation
of crown lands to the nobility in order to buy political
support* This period lasted until the reign of Charles
V when the granting of lordships became a matter of raising
money for a financially hard pressed monarchy*
One immediate and practical result of the Trastamaran
grants of lordshipa was that, by the sixteenth century,
the seigneuriai structure of Castile largely derived from
these grants of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centur*
ties* Hardly any lordships from the previous period
survived* In general, the civil wars of the later middle
ages had thus brought about an almost complete change in
those families controlling the lordships of the kingdom.
If the reasons for the creation of sehorlos changed
through time so too did the nature of the senorlo itself*
Eight up to the end of the twelfth century in the north,
and /
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and the early fourteenth century in the south, the Impor¬
tant element in the grant of the senorlo was the lordship
over land. These were territorially compact lordships
with the emphasis on the land and not the jurisdiction.
It is true that, by the twelfth century, there was a
tendency toward the granting of immunities and achninis-
81retire functions which marked a progression toward juris¬
dictional lordship, Yet there was a royal reaction
against this trend, especially in the reign of Alfonso
VIII (1150-1214), and even at the end of the thirteenth
century some lordships were granted which made no mention
of justice and which aimed at the repopulation and defence
of newly reconquered territories.
It is obvious that the lordships of the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries were quite different in character,
It is true that the royal grants make a point of carefully
mentioning the lands involved. But this was pure formula.
The lordship was no longer granted over newly reconquered
land which had to be repopulated. If was granted over
areas already settled where towns and villages had their
own forms of organisation,* Often cose jurisdiction had
to be abolished before another could be created. The
emphasis /
1 On 5 Nov,1397, Henry III granted the senorio of Buendia
to Lope Vasques de Acuna: A.D.M,, Ad'.,' 'leg, 10, doc,79,
Ibid, doc,80 deals with the complex process whereby
Acufia had to adjust his newly received powers to the
realities and conventions of the society in Buendia.
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emphasis was now almost totally on the lordship of juris*
I i
idiction* The lordships were no longer compact • on
the contrary they consisted of a diffused collection of
rights and immunities which the lord enjoyed over widely
scattered areas* If a seigneurial map could be drawn it
would show a quite chaotic state of interlacing, and some*
'times conflicting, jurisdictional rights.^ An exception
to this general picture must be underlined. In the south
of Castile « ibctremadura, ha ^ancha, Andalusia, and Mureia
* the territorially compact senor^os survived.
That the trend toward jurisdictional ae&oriog was
complete by the fifteenth century is illustrated by a few
remarkable grants which have received scant attention • if
any. These few examples differed from the usual form in
that the Crown granted to the recipient a specified number
of vassals without specifying the land* The vassals had
to be located geographically and then the land on which
they lived was incorporated into the grant* Nothing shows
more clearly the fact that lordship consisted of revenues
and jurisdiction over people* On the 20th day of January
1453, for example, John XI granted 300 vassals to the count
of /
1 The process could be extremely complicated. When, in
1445, John 11 wished to grant Casas Buenas to Alfonso
Alv&res de Toledo, the lordship and jurisdiction of
Casas Buenas changed hands three times in the space of
one week, A.G.S., C.y J.de Hac., leg.l, no,20.
Z For example the mayorazgpg set up by Diego Gonzalez
de Toledo included places, jurisdictions, revenues and
houses in areas scattered over the bishoprics of Calahorra,
Burgos, Segovia, and Toledo. A.G.S,, D.de C.,leg.38,no.16.
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of Medinaceli• These were to be selected from the area
round the town of Atlens* and a minor royal official was
dispatched to locate them* Once they had been located a
lordship was granted by John 11 over these vassals.*
Even more explicit was the grant by Henry IV to Per©
Lopes df Padilla of 300 vasallos in Vinuesa. Vinuesa
itself was detached fanm the jurisdiction of the town of
Soria * that is* it was to be a town with its own auto-
moaiy. But 300 vasal los from the town were given to
Padilia along with the jurisdictional and territorial
lordship'be longing to the senorio of the places where *.«
these 300 vasallos might be? Thus, within the town,
300 vassals along with their lands and the iurfsdlcclon
civil v criminal aita e baxa e mar© e mlxto irapcrio and
the revenues went to Padilla, Ironically this grant of
lordship reserved the usual regalIan rights including
2
metal deposits.
The reasons for this insistence on vassals instead
3
of land was probably due to two reasons* In the first
place since people provided the revenues, the lords were
only interested in them and not in the land on which they
were /
1 A,D»M,f Med,, leg *63, doc,14, 9 Aug*1453,
2 A.D.&i,, Ad., leg.37, doc.42, 14 Sept«l471*
3 The weakness of the monarchy can be discounted since
similar grants were made by the Catholic sovereigns.
See the example examined by M, Grau, "On pleito secular
de la comunldad y tierra de Segovia*, £,$*, vi (1954),
377*91.
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were settled. Secondly, pressure by this time had become
quite alarming in comparison to available resources.
Political demand was outstripping supply.
This can be seen quite clearly in the operations
which Henry IV carried out to grant a lordship to the
count of Feria in 1470. Originally the king had granted
a lordship to the count over three areas belonging to the
seltorio of the town of Bade joe. The town of Badajoa had
already, however, suffered enormously in this respect and
managed to persuade the king to grant Feriafs lordship
elsewhere. Henry IV, therefore, promised the count an
alternative of 409 vassals elsewhere in the kingdom. He
also promised that, if the 400 vassals had not been found
within one year, they would be selected in the areas of
the original lordship which had been granted. As a safe-
Jguard the count was empowered to see to the problem him-
iself, although the actual counting of the vassals in the
areas of Badajos was to be undertaken by royal officials.
Of crucial interest is the fact that the 400 vasallos
were to be listed house by house and street by street.
The result, of course, would simply imply that the
revenues which these people had previously paid to the
town of Badajoa would now be paid to the count of Feria,
In the event this is exactly what happened. After the
400 vassals had been listed they were given to the count
as /
131,
as a lordship. The grant contained the usual formulae
about lands, still and running waters, meadows, ami
pastures but the formulae obviously had no practical
m•sning,*
These lordships were in many respects very similar
to the typical pattern discussed above. There still re*
smained the one outstanding difference, however, in that
the emphasis was on people and not on the land. The
extent of the land could, therefore, fluctuate according
2
to the number of vassals living in the lordship, These,
however, were extreme cases. Yet the general picture
is clear. Lordship was envisaged primarily over people
and secondly over the land they lived on. In this res*
spect, for example, the senor^o granted by John II to
Pedro de Acuna, shows the right balance* Acuna had been
granted lordships confiscated from the king of Navarre,
For political reasons these now had to be returned to the
king of Navarre. John II, therefore, determined to
grant the lordship of Duenas to Acuna as being worth 600
vassals of the 1,000 vassals which he was to receive for
the lordships he had lost. The point, however, is that
this fact is mentioned incidentally and in almost all
other /
1 A.D.M., Feria, leg,25, doc,24, 31 Aug.1470,
2 Such a fluctuation was, in fact, envisaged in the grant,
already cited, of 300 vasallos to the count of Medinaceli,
Because of war and depopulation John II stipulated that
some of the areas would have to revert to the Crown once
the population drifted back since the lordship was over
300 vassals only.
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other respects the senprlo appears normal•
In conclusion, therefore, this first line of enquiry
on the juridical pattern of landholding by lordships does
not furnish much significant information on the sources
of the nobles' wealth. £uch an enquiry provides a general
framework of reference and also underlines the fact that,
by the fifteenth century, the nature of these lordships
had changed. The very emphasis of the grant® would lead
ub to suspect that land was the least important element in
the lordships,
ii) The Problems of . elgnettrial Income
According to Yicens Vives 'towards 150G, the nobles
owned 97% of the land of the peninsula, either by direct
proprietorship or by jurisdiction1. This generalisation
may be an exaggeration but, on the whole, it is a valid
one from the general viewpoint of lordships. More de»
i 3
«* tailed surveys, such as those by Mitre Fernandez and
Highfield,* merely serve to confirm the point by relating
each noble title to each parcel of land, A long cata*
:logue /
1 A.O.M., Ad,, leg,20, doc,28,
2 Vic ens, Manual, p.269, ^icens here uses the word
♦nobles' to include the church and the urban aristocracy
as well as the nobility proper,
3 E.Mitre Fernandez, Evolucion de la nobleaa (Vailadolid,
1968), especially pp. 141-9?.
4 J.R.Kighfield, 'The Catholic Kings and the titled nobi*»
slity of Castile', in Europe in the Eate Middle Ages,
ed. Hale, Kighfield, Sraal ley {London, 196$ fpp,3S6*05.
153*
catalogue of lauds and titles can thus be dispensed with -
a thankful dispensation since it is argued here that such
lordships did not provide the nobility with important
sources of incoiue «
Vs'h&t income did lordships provide to their holders
in practice? A brief answer to this question is that
the income was substantial but far below what a nobleman
could succeed in obtaining from alternative sources*
Moreover seigneurial income was relatively inelastic ana
this point must be related to the dramatic price rise of
the fifteenth century*
In the first place there is little evidence that the
castilian nobility exploited their lands agriculturally*
There is no real evidence of demesne farming* Thus* con*
*cepts such as 'crown land.' or 'seigneurial lordship over
land* hardly ever carry any implication of direct agricul¬
tural exploitation** Instead the great nobles preferred,
whenever possible* to lease the lands to tenants* The
rents were usually paid in kind* Normally the payments
consisted of grain but other forms of payment were poss¬
ible* Thus* for example* the great Extremaduran fau.i ly
of the Figueroa received land rents ia hafra of grain,
honey and wax*
The /
1 In the case of 'crown land * there is never any such
implication*
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The amounts which these rents brought to their lords
could be miserably small. In the example already quoted
the Figueroa lord only received three arrobag of honey,
fifteen librae of wax, and 418 fanegas of wheat from rents
i _
in Z&fra for the three year period 139B~1400, This i»-
JcotiQ, by any standards, was exceedingly anal i, The
example of the Mediaaceli counts, however, shows that* at
the other end of the scale, the amounts could be substan¬
tial# The accounts of the Genoese factor of the count of
Medinaceli in Andalusia show that, during the four year
period from 1425-20, the Medinaceli lands in Puerto d«
Santa liar fa and Teres brought in a total income of some
2
1,206 cahices of grain,' This latter example, however,
is also exceptional and must be balanced by the absence
of anything similar in the rest of the extensive Medinaccli
3
lands in the kingdom of Castile#
The two examples which have been cited arc exceptional
and what is needed is a complete view of the agrarian
incite of all the lands of a particular family. This is
pos » ib 1 e j
mm u, .,■■■. ' iwihwhsm. ■■ ■■ ■—
1 A.D.M,, Feria, leg.11, doc,25, 20 Nov.1405, This is a
sentencia against a seignaurial official and details,
at Tengtli, the seigneurlai income from this area, I have
not included the minutiae of rents such as the 30 mrs
per year for houses in Zafra•
2 A,D*M,, Cog*, leg,14, doc,52, account of Micer Oomonigo.
The total includes 208 cahices from the rent of mills
which 1 have not deducted,
3 The vast documentation, however, does contain plenty of
evidence on seigneurial dues and other sources of income.
The point is that there is evidence for everything except
a viable landed income.
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possible in the case of the Sanaiento family* The
example is especially apt since it reflects on the economic
background of J>ero Sarmiento • the noble who, in 1449, led
the town of Toledo into a serious anti-serai tic and anti-
royal revolution*
In 1433 Diego Peres Sarmiento, the father of Pero
Barmiento, died* Not all his lands went to the son*
Indeed, precisely because his sister was to inherit some
of the lands, a survey was carried out to assess the income
of Diego Peres at the time of his death (Table V*)* The
revenue derived from seigneurial taxes is discussed below*
The point to note is the poverty of the income deriving
from the land - 3,835^ tanegag of grain from agrarian
rents and 1,830 cant^ras of wine from direct exploitation
of vineyards*
Several points are worth noting about this survey*
In general it shows that the state of agrarian rents on
the S&rmiento lands was in poor shape* The revenue from
Vlllelga was noted as being alienated. The rents of
Boncorfa de Yuso were in dispute* Even the vineyards
which were worked a costa de casa (i.e. demesne farming)
were in bad shape* The 600 cantares of wine supposedly
obtainable from Ocio had not, in fact, been collected for
twenty /
I For this Table and the relevant documents see Appendix E,
fy-StS'fc-
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twenty years. This impression is conf irracd by another
survey which was carried out in greater detail in the
areas round Almaean.* This more detailed survey shows
that the general figures of the fi rot survey were optimise
Uicfilly high, that the rents were paid in a mixture of
wheat and barley, that the ano y vet system was being
used, and that leases seem to have been on a ten yearly
basis. Yet, even without these reservations, the figures
of the first survey were meagre.
At this stage it might be worth stopping - the figures
speak for themselves. And yet this is not the end of
the story. The situation for Diego Pereses son, Pero
Parmiento, was to be infinitely worse since he did not
inherit all these land3. Indeed, of the lands mentioned
in Table V, he seen® to have inherited some o£ the worst.
In June 1463 Pero Farmicnto set up a roayoraas&o. Roughly
half of the areas mentioned in this raayc.razKO were lands
covered by the 1433 survey * Oclo, Lagran, Marquinez,
Caranca and Astulex, Sobron, Valdegcvia, and Miranda and
Valverd®, In 1433 these areas were providing the meagre
total of 389 fanegaa of grain, and 859 cantarag of wine,
Tet, for the purely honorific post of chief butlor at
court Pero Sarmiento enjoyed an income of 12,000 tors per
2
year.
Deep it e /
1 A.D.M., Med., leg.64, doc.21•
2 See E, Benito Ruano* 1 Don Pero Sarmiento, repostero
mayor1, Hiap.. xvii (1957), 483-504.
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Despite the fact that the rents derived from lordship
over land were not very high they had one advantage * they
were paid in hind and were hit rather by the climatic flue*
:tuations of agriculture than by the vicious monetary in*
:flation of the century. The same was not true of the
eeigneurial dues paid in cash*
There were, of course, a far greater number of
eeigneurial dues than the martiniegag and vantages men*
itinned in the royal grants of lordship. To enumerate
all these dues would be impossible but several points are
worth examining,* Once again we are faced with the in*
{significant amounts involved. On the Sarmiento lands
(Table V) the total is only 42,901 mrs. On the lands
round Medinaceii there was a total of 01,645 ars for the
chief seigneurial tax, the martini ega. during the years
1432*33, compared with 241,400 tars for the royal tax of
2
the alc&bala for the same region and period of time.
The cm in problem with the seigneuri&l revenues,
however, was that they appear to have been inelastic, A
tax rendering the same amount of money each year, at a
time of chronic inflation, was obviously subject to diminish*
:ing /
1 The names and nature of the dues varied from area to
area. Here are examples, mainly self-explanatory, of
dues from the Hedinaceli landsi cameros para la mesa
y desponsa. tablero v cambio. tributo'de"las lanae,
servic'io e, hervagy. and entras. The examp 1 es are" taken
from various accounts, conditions of farms, and ducal
ordinances*
2 A.D.y,, Med., leg •40, doc*35, accounts of Samuel
Abenxuxe for 1432*33,
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diminishing returns. Worse still, some of the revenues
not only declined in real value but actually, in some
cases, dropped in nominal value. One example should
illustrate this point. The period running from 1454*
1466 was one of chronic price inflation. Yet during
this period the seigneuri&l due a of Pedro de Avi la,
derived from his lands at Villafranca ami Las N'avaa,
actually declined in some cases in nominal value. Thus
the chief revenue raiser, la renta delos fornos de la
pes, worth 9,000 are in 1455 was only worth 7,600 curs in
1466. Another tax worth 700 air a in 1461 was worth only
210 oars in 1464. Yet another had dropped from 1,300 mrs
in 1460 to 600 mrs in 1463. In no case did any seig*
jnourial due increase its nominal value although some,
of course, retained the amm nominal value throughout*
During the same period the royal tax of the terclas,
derived from the same areas, rose from 5,000 tors in 1454
to 14,200 snrs in 1466.*
The implications of the argument so far should be
clear. It is only indirectly true to state that land
was the source of all wealth. The great nobility were
a parasitic group. They did not work the land themselves.
In an age of massive price inflation the inelastic income
provided /
1 A.D.M., .Med» {Las WavaeJ^ leg.257, doc.l, 2 July 1467,
accounts of Alfonso Oonaalea for 1454-66,
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provided by agrarian rents and seigneurial tastes was in¬
sufficient to provide for their needs and also for their
increasing tastes in luxury* Given this situation it is
not at all surprising to find men such as faro Saraaiento
far from their lordships and playing an active part in
royal and town politics. A simple comparison of figures
clinches the point. We have seen the figures for se ig-
sneurial revenues in Table V. In 144? Pero Sarmiento
held 145,067 mrs per year from the Crown, Subsequently
he obtained another 144,067 cars per year from the Crown
as well as his salaries for municipal offices held in
Toledo, Money was provided by lordship: it was also
provided in much larger quantities by the Crown#* By
what means did the nobility attempt to bridge the gap
between an inconsiderable aeigneurial income and the
mounfcizig coats of expenditure?
One way was to make seigneurial income as profitable
as possible, There is evidence that the great noble
houses screwed every penny possible out of their lordships.
This would perhaps seem the most logical way out. However,
care must be taken with this generalisation. This was
not the first reaction to the revenue-expenditure gap.
On /
1 The figures for 1447 - 15,000 mrs for salaries, 78,46?
for privileges, and 51,600 for lances - in L. Suares
rernandes, *X1n llbro de asientos de Juan II*, H
xvii (1957), 350 (Henceforth cited as Suares, hihro)«
An incomplete list of subsequent acquisitions 'in Benito
Kuano, ubi supra# p.499.
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On the contrary, it seems to have been the last reaction.
It was tried after all other ways had been exploited and
failed. Up to the 1460a the Crown provided the necessary
income. During the civil wars between Henry IV and Alfonso
XII, however, the Crown finances collapsed. This was also
the period of highest, almost vertical, price inflation.
Moreover, with two kings, two administrations, and yet
the same amount of royal revenue, the battle for royal
revenues was crucial. The stakes were either ail or
nothing. The increasing or ruthless exploitations of
lordships, therefore, date from the 1460s onwards. In
October 1466, for example, the Stuniga count of Bejar
proceeded to levy 'contributions* and 1 forced loans* on
i
his lands amounting to a total of 633,000 airs. By
1482 the Pimcntel count of Benavente had driven the town
of Villalo'n to the most desperate measures in order to
keep him supplied with revenues. In June,the town
council had already had to pawn church plate to the Jews
of Yillalon in order to raise money. Less than a month
later, the count was demanding payments of a new pecho or
tax which he ordered to be levied to a total of 130,000
hits in the Villalon area alone. That the situation was
desperate /
1 Doc, dated Z Oct.1466 in R.A.H., 9-30-?, 6483. The
total was spread over 14 pueblos .4th Plasencia carry-
ting the highest assessment.
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desperate can be deduced from the fact that even the
hidalgos and escusados were forced to contribute their
share in order to make it possible to raise the money#*
Rather less startling, but perhaps more effective in the
long run. were the internal reforms of an administrative
sort such as those of the dukes of Medinaceii in the late
2
1480s and in ordinances of 1504.
ili) The Kobilitv and the Economy
The evidence shows that the nobility also attempted
to Impose their control on some of the lucrative economic
activities. Care must be taken in approaching this
problem since several misconceptions have to be cleared
away.
In the first place there is the traditional picture
of the Castilian hidalgo as being completely uninterested
in economic matters. He either lived well at court,
enjoying graclas and mereedes endowed upon him by the
Crown, or he lived a miserable existence such as that
depicted of the escudero in Laatarillo de Tonnes. Alter-
matively, the Castilian noble was interested in "honour1,
♦war*, and 'booty*.
These /
1 R.C.V., Actas de Yillalon, B, fos .26R,29R.29v32R.
2 A.D.M., Med., leg.50. doc.?, 9 Jan.14^9, shows a con*
:sidarable increase in revenues resulting from changes
In financial administration. The ordinances of 1504.
ibid, leg .40, doc.25, aimed at reforming administration
aTThe local level.
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These generalisations are misleading* The great
CastiHan nobleman stay not have been interested in
cap!talis tie concerns of a mercantile or industrial
mtare * although this is not entirely true either. But
this is a far different matter from saying that he was
not interested in economic affairs.
It has been seen that the chief economic activities
were of a *primary* economic nature. It is true that
there were industries such as ths cloth and soap industry*
But the most important money spinners were the export of
wool* oil* leather, and iron. The export of these goods,
the handling of bills of exchange * this was in the hands
of merchants. But ths great nobility also dorived soma
benefit from these economic activities.
There was in fact a profound connection between the
economic and social structures, The economic structure
allowed for the existence of a powerful noble group in
society who were not tied to the land by direct agricu¬
ltural exploitation. They lived off the profits. The
great flocks of sheep, for example, provided easy reven¬
ues for the great nobility and prevented a peasant class
from attaching itself to the land in a significant way.
The CastiHan nobility, in fact, far from abdicating
from the economic scene moved forward to command the
heights of the economy. A deficient seigneurial income
could be ignored by obtaining a monopoly over the soap
industry /
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industry or over the distribution of salt on a local
basis* All of which does not mean to say that they were
capitalistically minded* On the contrary* the interest
was purely one of accumulating revenues *
A fairly close look at the history of the control
of the soap industry in Andalusia proves this general
thesis* As has been indicated the export of soap*
especially to England* must have brought in considerable
profits although no figures can be given* The dealings
of the great Castilian nobility in this apparently small
industry are truly astonishing* A monopoly existed
throughout the fifteenth century and annuities from the
profits of this monopoly were bought* sold* confiscated*
and bequeathed* The annuities had a nominal value
calculated* usually* in terms of the estimated value of
the whole monopoly in the early fifteenth century.*
That these annuities were highly desirable is proved
by the fact that the political history of the century is
mirrored in these dealings* The fall from power in 1421*
22 of the constable* hoy Lopes Davaloa, is marked by the
Collapse of the monopoly which he had received as far
back /
1 In 1423 the Crown estimated the monopoly profits at
165*000 mra p*a» and established shares accordingly;
A.D.M.* Ale * ihic** leg *55, doc* 17* 1 £>epi*1423* A
year later it was calculated that the profits had
increased but that they should be shared according
to the original proportions of each share* Ibid.
doe*18* 20 July 1424* Hence a share of 5*006 tare p.a.
represented l/33rd of the profits in any given year.
Often the chares were also expressed In confusing
fractions* In 1447, for example* Alvaro de Luna's
casmrero gave l/6th of |s of 2/5ths of the Seville
profits to the admiral's sister-ln*law: Ibid* doc*34.
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back as 13% from Henry III* The uneasy political
compromise at court in the 1426s is reflected by the
setting up of a monopoly shared by the infante don Juan*
Alvaro de Luna, constable of Castile, the admiral don
Alfonso Enrique#, and Diego Comes de Sandoval, count of
Castro and adelantado mayor of Castile,1 The politically
decisive period before and after the battle of Qlmedo in
1445 is reflected by the imposition of an embargo on the
2
share of the admiral and the confiscation of shares held
by Sandoval,3 the Mendosa archbishop of Santiago,* and
Buy Diaz de Mendoza.8
The involvement of the great noble f&miliea may be
illustrated by a few examples* The exceedingly powerful
family of the Eitrlquez (hereditary admirals of Castile)
began by receiving a share in 1423 which was nominally
£.
worth 82,200 mrs. Four years later the admiral, don
Alfonso Enrique#, bought store shares from his Mendoza
7
sis ter*in»law for 9,000 Aragonese gold florins, At
the beginning of the 1440s his son was farming the
Enrlquez shares for some 120,000 mrs.8 per annum. By
9
the mid*14b0s the grandson had taken over and, by the
mid /
1 Henry Ill's actions from May 139b to Dec*1397, granting
a total monopoly to D&vales, A,D,M*, Ale.Due,, leg*55,
doc*lb. Confiscations and regranting of the monopoly
in 1423*4, Ibid, docs.17,18,
2 A.D.M*, Ale.Due., leg.55, doc.28, 18 Jan.1445*
3 Ibid, doc,36, 15 March 1445,
4 Ibid* doc,30, 10 June 1447 ami doc.32, 20 Aug*1447*
5 £ontained in a document dated 1 Oct,1459, Ibid, leg,5b,
doe.3*
b Ibid* l«g»33, docs,17 and 18, 1 Sept,1423 and 20 July 1424.
7 TSid, doc.19, 15 Nov.1427,
g fFii, docs.24 and 25, 19 Aug.1440 and 15 Sept.1440.
9 TSId, leg.56, doc.8, 15 Nov,1465,
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mid-1470s, had not only consolidated the Enxlques shares
of 190,000 tors p.a, but also seems, with the backing of
Ferdinand the Catholic, to have been well on the way to
establishing a one man monopoly,'' In short, the one man
monopoly of the early fifteenth century, enjoyed by lluy
Lopes Davalos, was being recreated towards the end of
the fifteenth century.
Other families, of course, also played a part in
this profitable concern during the fifteenth century,
These families included the Sandoval counts of Castro, the
Mendocas, the Silva counts of Cifuentes, the Ponce de Leon
counts of Arcos, and the Quaman dukes of Medina Sidonia.2
The latter two families provide interesting examples of
different attitudes to these profits. The Ponce de Leon
began business in 1439 and 1440 by buying shares of
relatively low value from the count of Castro's nephew
3
for 165,000 mrs. The interesting point, however, is
that Pedro Ponce de Leon, count of Arcos and one of the
most powerful noblemen in Castile, then proceeded to put
up a 'front* man to farm the shares of the soap industry
from other titular holders,4 By 1441 he had taken over
the farm himself and had invested money in improving the
5
industry /
iawiimi-#Hni ,111 -t ■ ■ ii iiii#m» "'[—i ii n in iifim i «• nr -nrmmir m win iiim, n n«» imiiii n ftnm n >i,in m »<r urnun . ■■n.n--n-Ti qiu,*«ii»i nr» n rri mi -liriiiin i;; mi i
1 Ibid, docs.19 and 21, 8 May 1475 and 19 Sept,1475,
2 "rEe Sandoval, Mendoaa and Silva families played a marginal
ro*ei ibid leg.55, docs,18,19,20,21,22,23,29,34 and
leg ,56, doe,4,
3 Ibid leg.55, docs.22 and 23, 2 May 1439 and 24 Feb.1440.
4 TST3L docs.24 and 25, 19 Aug,1440 and 15 Sept.1440,
5 Ibid, doc,26, 24 Jan,1441,
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industry* By the end of the 1460s the next count of Arcos
had quadrupled the nominal value of the * once de Leon
shares«* This procedure was in striking contrast to the
Guzman shares which ended up in the hands of administrative
officials of the duke*'
How typical was this particular interest of the
nobility in the soap industry? Certainly some of the
great noble families were equally interested in the pas-
itorai wealth of the country. Some of the nobility were
extremely well favoured* geographically* to derive benefit
from transhu.uanee. The Velasco counts of Haro sat astride
the northern end of the wool trade between Burgos and
Bilbao and ended up in control of all the customs duties
of the north coast trade. The Stuaigaa controlled one
of the vital links between northern and southern trans-
:humanee at B^jar. The Pacheco marquis of Villena con-
3
itrolled the sheep routes into Murcia* Added to this
is the fact that some of the sheep owners were the nobility,
/
^
The Stuniga count of Flasencia owned some 25*000 sheep.
The /
1 Ibid leg.56, docs.11,12 and 14* 10 Sept.1469* 6 Nov.1469*
nSne 1471,
2 Ibid leg.55* doc,36, 14 Feb.1452j leg.56* docs.3 and 4,
T~Oct,l459 and 2 Oct.1459.
3 See the data on Velasco control of the north of Castile
in A.G.S,* D.de C.* leg.4* no,94; the Pacheco control
of the sheep routes at La Koda* Chinchilla* Jorquera*
Hell in and ether places In ibid, doc.16j the desembarno
of the diezmog de la mar printed in Gonzales*
Ctsdulas, iii. 76-81 ll.liuares Fernandas* Cane 11as Lopez*
Vicens Vivos, Los Trastamarae de Gas til la y Aragon
(Madrid, 1964)* p.20 (Henceforth cited as Snares* Los
Trastdmaraa); A.Ballesteros* La marina cdntabra
Thantander, 1954), p.124,
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The Mendoza marquis el Santiliana had some 20*000 sheep of
which 8*000 were exempt from the aervicio and raontazgo
taxes* Lastly it should be noted that the Masta itself
was dominated by the aristocracy since the chief executive
office - that of entragador principal ♦ was held by the
AcurU. family*^
Other economic interests also boosted the income of
certain noble families. Hie Vi1landrando counts of
3
Libad eo, the Servientas, the Velasco counts of Haro,
and the counts of Medinaceli ail benefited from salines*
In the latter case there is sufficient data to gauge the
importance of the salt deposits generally* In the first
place the counts of Medinaceli were assured a regular
income by the obligatory consumption* on their own lands*
of salt from the count*# salines* In 1432* for example*
revenue from salt in the lands round Medinacell alone was
4
worth 83.333 mrs« On top of this* however* the counts
had privileges* dat ing back to the reign of Henry XI,
which /
1 Vicens* ManuaJ, p.236
Med,* leg.40,doc*50 and leg,59, doc*2, ^
2 Held successively by Gtxaez Carillo de Acuna, Lope
Vazquez de Acu&a, and Pedro de Acuna* Suarez, Los
Trast&maras» p»5,
3 It Is doubtful whether the Sarmieatos benefited greatly
from the Anana salines: Benito iiuano* ubi supra, 487*
493, The Velasco owned the hus£o salines and also drew
40*000 airs p,a. from salines in Castile, The count of
hibadeo controlled the salines of JUbadeo. See Su£rez*
Ljbro. pp.335,341,
4 The three cu&drilias round Medinaceli were assigned
5*000 fanegas ofsalt consumption which was calculated
at 16 tars and 4 cornados per fanega in 1432 ami 1433*
The ssS"pa11ern was" et'i 11 in operation in the early
sixteenth century. A.D.M,* Med** 1eg * 40, docs,35 and 57*
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which allowed their salt to bo sold anywhere in the king*
idosi* * privileges which inevitably led to disputes with
farmers of royal salines in other areas. The income from
this source must have been quite considerable since, at
the end of the fourteenth century, an acrimonious dispute
arose when the adeiantado mayor of Castile, Gomes Manrique,
tried to gain control of the Medinaceli salines at Santheli*
jscb, The dispute was serious enough for Henry III to try
and solve the problem himself »
The re 1ly important fairs also ended up under the
indirect control of the great nobility. The fairs at
Medina del Campo may well have owed their origin to
Ferdinand of Antequera and they remained a favourite centre
of attraction for his wife and sons. The Knriquez con*
jtrolled the fairs at Medina de Rfoseco. The Pimentel
counts of Bcnavente controlled the fairs at Vilialon,
In the 1480s the Pimentel and I-nrfquez united in an
attempt to prevent the Velasco from starting a fair at
Cueaca de Caiapos,^
The evidence presented so far, therefore, suggests
that /
1 The only 1imitation - no access to markets in Atienza,
Sori% and Almasan * aimed at protecting the royal salines
of the area. A.D.M., Med*, leg,92, docs,3,5,6,12, dating
frosa 3 Aug. 1379 to 6 Feb* 1411,
2 Details of this complicated dispute in a rolacion by
Gaston de la Cerda to Henry III and in a judicial' enquiry®
A.D.M,, Med,, leg.93, doc,5, undated and leg,92, doc,7,
24 Oct. 1.194,
3 Suares, Los Trastaaaras, p.8,
4 A.C.V., Actas de VIliaToa, B, fos.37ii, 38V.
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that the great Castili&n nobility profited from the main
economic activities. Yet, there is little evidence that
there was a direct economic involvement. Indeed it is
clear that in the majority of cases the nobility lived in*
:directly off the profits. The united action of the
Pimentel and the Enrique* against the nascent fair at
Coenca de Campos in the 1480s, for example, was in fact
instigated by those who stood to benefit most, • the town
council of Villalon,*
Only in. the south can a direct involvement in
economic affairs be discerned. This contrast between
the north and the south did not really coincide with the
distinction between the fragmented jurisdictions of the
north and the territorially compact aenorfos of the south.
Instead it coincided with the economic distinction between
a subsistence orientated economy in the centre and an
export orientated economy in the south. It has already
been shown that the Ponce de I<«on were willing, at one
stage, to take a direct interest In the farming of the
soap industry monopoly. In fact the direct involvement
in economic affairs by both the Guzman and Ponce de Leon
families contrasts sharply with the rather parasitical
involvement of the Castilian nobility proper. In the




of the leather trade centred on Seville*1 Both families
took a direct part in the tunny fisheries of the south
2
and actually fought for control of it* That this involve-
nmtit was not purely one of monopolists is proved by docu*
plantation which shows that the Guzman dukes of Medina
Sidonia ware directly involved in Castiiian expansion and
exports* Ducal officials dealt directly with foreign
merchants. Ducal officials directly administered the
ducal tunny fisheries, saw to the oxport of wine, and
p ae pared the ships owned by the duke for their voyages
3
to London and the Canary Islands*
iv) The Crown as a source of income for the nobility
There were four main ways by which the nobility re¬
ceived regular annual income from the Crown* One of
these ways was by privilege*^ Briefly* the royal privi¬
lege or merced was either held for life (merged de por
vida) i
1 K.A.H*, 9-30-?, 6483 (291)«
2 A.£},&», Med,, legajos 13 and 14 contain some hundreds
of documents on these disputes for the period 1445-1545,
3 Evidence on the activities of ducal officials in A,F,S»,
V, Gorizalo Bernal, fo*5lV| ibid. 111* Francisco
Ranches, fo*26V j Ibid, IV* Pedro Alvarez, ios*247,268,
270,274,411* Examples of ducal ships to London and the
Canaries in ibid, ill* Francisco Sanchez, fo*20V and VII*
Pedro Gonzalez, fo*?3V*^ Sec also the grant, by John II
in 1449 to Juan de Guzman, of a lordship near Cape
Bojadort Codojn, xxxvi, 499-501,
4 To avoid needless complications the word ^privilege'
refers only to mercedes of royal revenue* Other privi¬
leges did not add substantially to noble revenues.
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vida) or hold In perpetuity (merced do juro do heredad).
In the latter case the amount alienated by the Crown was
lost lorever: these were the privileges known briefly
as juros.*
The amounts involved were usually considerable.
Moreover the acquisition of jtiros over a lengthy period
of time could produce a large amount of revenue to any
one noble family* The counts of Medinaceli, for example,
piled up a substantial income in this way throughout the
century* In May 1454. John II granted the count 50,000
mrq p.a. in perpetuity. Henry IV added 100,000 tare p.a.
in 1464, 20,000 mrs p.a. in 1465, 400,000 mrs p.a. in
1467 • all in perpetuity,* In 1469 the count of Medinaceli
acquired another 30,000 mrs p.a, in perpetuity,4 To this
already large total the Catholic sovereigns added 406,000
mrs p.a, in perpetuity in 1478, and 4,500,000 mrs p,a« for
life in 1492. These privileges by themselves do not
constitute the total held by Medinaceli but they clearly
demonstrate that mercedes provided an enormous income for
the /
1 Both kinds of privileges were further classified by the
financial officials, for book keeping purposes, into
salvado and de cada ano.
2 Confirmed by llenry ' lV„ 17 Nov, 1464, All these rarg had
been sold or renounced by the count by Nov,1465,A.B.M,,
Med, ,
. leg ,2$, doc.2,
3 Privileges of 12 May 1464, 20 May 1465, 10 Nov.1467:
ib&, l«g ,25, docs.3 and 6,
4 Bought from Garci Alvarez de Toledo and confirmed by
Henry IV: ibid, doc,4, 15 Dec,1469,




In general terms the Importance ol the privileges
can be seen by referring to the tables. In 1429, 26.46%
of the estimated total gross income of the Crown was ear*
{marked for the payment of these privileges. (Table VI!*).
Of the incomplete total of revenue alienated by recurrent
expenditure in 144?, 39.49% was made up by privileges
(labia X2),
There are several other points which must be briefly
mentioned with reference to these privileges. It was
unusual for a privilege to state specifically the reasons
motivating the grant by the Crown, No definite conclusions
on this point can therefore be established although it is
.quite clear that the political situation played an impor¬
tant part.
It is also necessary to describe briefly how these
privileges were in fact paid, since this affected the
crucial issue of the control of royal revenues in the
localities* These privileges were not paid out in cash
by the central royal administration. Instead the amounts
were paid each year by officials of the local adminis*
! tration /
1 See Appendix G below
2 See Appendix J below
3 Occasionally a specific reason Is given* Martin
Fernandez de Cordoba, for example, was granted 40,000
tars p.a, for life in recognition of his services as
ambassador at the council of Constance: Con.,
lag .24, doc,63, 22 Sept.1418 and Ibid. leg.37, doc.6,
20 June 1420.
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administration. Sometimes these payments were made as
a matter of course: sometimes they were paid at the
command of llbramlentos issued by the central administration.*
Furthermore, the privileges stated the exact am mats to be
paid out from specific taxes in specific areas/
Finally, it is important to note that the Jurps,
or privileges in perpetuity, could be disposed of at the
discretion of the holder. Usually the permission of the
Crown was necessary if juros were to be alienated by the
3
holder to the Church or to foreigners. Otherwise there
was no real obstacle to a holder of a iuro who wanted to
bequeath, barter, sell, or renounce it.*
The great nobility also received regular annual pay
:stents from the Crown for military duties which they were
supposed to perform. By far the most important payments
were /
1 The term llbramlento in most cases referred to assign-
:ments but could also, in rare eases, refer to decharges.
There are few surviving 1 ibrand<mtos. a.d.m., a37r~tes7
24, docs.4,7,9,13 are 1ibramTentos of privileges held by
Fero Manrique from 1444'' to 1453* '
2 For example the 70,000 tars p.a, held by Fortocarrero were
assigned on specific alcafeala revenues in Trujillo and
Alfonso XII*# grant of i2d,000 tags p,a. to the marquesa
of Vi11ena was assigned on the servicio and montasKo,
A.D.M*, liedel lin, leg.5, doc.30, 23 Oct*1456 and R.A.H.,
9-30-7, 6483, 4 Dec.1467.
3 No licence was needed if the Church itself disposed of
juros. See, for example, the sale of a lure of 1,500
ears p.a. by the convent of Almadilla to the countess of
FeriaJ A.D.M., Feria, leg.47, doc.23, 14 Jan. 1470.
4 Though usually described as 'renunciations* some of
these dealings in luros were sales or barters, as the follow-
sing examples show™" Purchase by the count of Feria of
a iuro of 5,000 mrs p.a. on the almojarifaago of Seville,
A.D.M,, Feria, leg.27, doc.76, 2T Feb. 1396; Pedro de
Acuna surrenders 20,000 mrs from his iuro of 25,000 mrs
p.a* to the Crown in return for land. if>Td. Ad,, legTTT,
doc,53, 2 March 1454; Pedro de Silva buys 10 escusados
for 17,000 mrs, ibid. Med,, leg.309, doc.36.
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were those known as tlerra (literally land) which was
the Castilian version at the English money lee and the
French lief rente. This Caetilian form of military
obligation was first organisedf on a large scale, in 1390
and. throughout the fifteenth century, it consisted of a
payment by the Crown of 1,500 ars p.a* for every lance.
Other payments were also made by the Crown for tenancies
of castles and for defence of the areas along the Moorish
frontier.*
Once again the amounts involved were considerable.
As early as 1390, for example, the Guzman count of Niebla
2
was given an annual income of 50,000 mr» as tterra. In
3
1447 the admiral had 142,500 mra p.a. for 95 lances. In
the 1429 budget 22,47% of the estimated gross royal income
was set aside for the payment of these fiefs-rentes for a
total of some 9,000 lances (Table VII)4.
Tjerra payments were made in much the same way as
privileges were* The connection with land as such was
thus virtually non-existent since the amounts were assigned
on /
1 On the tierra system see Cortes, ii, 460-4 (1-5,1390)
and Highfield, ubl supra, p.362.
2 A.D.M., Priego, leg.38,doc.38, 28 June 1390,
3 Su£res, Libre, p.331,
4 Append ix G, be 1©w
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on royal taxes in the localities*^ Unlike privileges,
however, these money fees were not subject to buying and
selling, although they could be Inherited or even re*
:nounced to a third person,
A third source of income for the nobility was that
of roantenlmientos, The mantenimientas* literally *upkeep*,
were payment s made each year to individuals according to
their social and perhaps political status. Accordingly
the largest mantenimientoa were paid to members of the
royal family with substantial amounts also being paid to
the great nobility* In 1429, 7,91% of the total gross
income of the Crown was set aside for payment of these
roantenlmlentoa. (Table VII)2
The fourth and last source of regular income pro*
ivided by the Crown consisted of salaries paid to office
holders. These salaries were known as raciones and
32ii£Si2aSS«
Inevitably the sine of these salaries varied. In
1447 the constable had a salary of 40,000 mr.y p,a«, the
admiral 22,000 mrs p,a«, the keeper of the secret seals
12,000 mry p«a«, and the 'official of the knife* 6,000 mrs
p-a,3 /
1 In this respect Highfield, ubi supra. p,382 and i uares,
Libro. p.325 tend to be misleading',' The libramientos.
as well as mercede*. were, of course, usually assigned
on taxes near' where the holders lived. Examples of
tierra libramientos in favour of F«ro Manrique in A.D.M,,
Xcl##' '''cloctil012.X§■ 22p &ti€i docs114*20»
2 Appendix G, below*-*** ,
3 For these and other examples, Su&res, Libro* passim.
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p.a, Many of these salaries were for purely honorific
posts* Hiere was, in fact, a vast network of nominal
posts held by the great nobility in central and local
government* Many of these posts were relics of a previous
age yet they retained enough of their competence to enable
the holder to supplement his official salary with per-
:quisites, In the 1429 budget 15.44% of the total royal
income was set aside for the payment of these salaries,
the vast majority being held by the great nobility*
(Table VII)1
It would be tedious to establish which great noble
l
families actually drew which salaries. But It is impor-
itant to note that in many cases the nobility managed to
make these posts hereditary. Thus the Enr£ques, for
example* were hereditary admirals of Castile. Moreover
political support could be bought at a time of crisis by
increasing a salary. Thus the Fer&andei of Cordoba, who
held the post of alcaide de loa doneeles (master of the
pages) throughout the fifteenth century, had their salary
raised from a mere 4,000 mr.f p.a* to a siseable 20,000 mra
p.a. by Alfonso XII,* In some cases the nobility acted
unilaterally /
1 Appendix G, below \ si,<g
2 The evidence is not lacking and is conveniently gathered
together! for example, A.G.S,, Q.de C,, leg.l, passim,
3 A.D.M., Com., leg.24, doc.62, 30 July 1466,
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unilaterally without even consulting the Crown. kodrigo
PoTtocarreroi count of Modellin, for example, quite arbit*
»rarily included his post as repostero mayor (chief butler)
in the caayoraggo which he founded in 1462. In the event,
despite protests from royal officials who pointed out that
the post should revert to the Crown, Henry IV allowed the
taayorasso to stand and it was also confirmed at a later
date by the Catholic sovereigns.
The Crown, of course, also provided wealth for the
nobility indirectly, The towns, the Church, and the
military orders -all these provided the nobility with
alternative sources of wealth. For the moment it is
enough to note that, although these sources of wealth were
not charged directly on the royal treasury, they were
highly desirable. In 1430, for example, the Velasco
count of liar© managed to obtain from John II various
promises regarding royal policy on easily tapped sources
of wealth. These included a promise that all income held
of/ the Crown by any of the count's entourage should be
regranted by the decision of the count if it should revert
to the Crown, a promise that the count's advice would be
taken on all other alienationa of royal income, a promise
that /
1 A.D.M., Medellin, leg,3, doc.8, 20 May 1462. Usually,
however, royal permission was requested first: see the
example of the count of Castro bequeathing his poets as
adelantado mayor and canclller del s&llo do la porldad
In""1" Ibid"Ad.» Teg • 37, doc .2 8,""2 5 Oct *1444
2 See befow w, v
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that royal backing would be given for the count's candidate
for the second bishopric falling vacant, and a promise that
the king would, in all other appointments in the Church,
try and please the count,*
v) General analysis of noble income derived from
the Crown
It is now time to tackle the problem of the actual
sums of money involved in the relationship between the
Crown and nobility. The statistical tables on the whole
speak for themselves* Generally the tables have been
drawn up with two problems in mind* How much of yearly
royal income was alienated to the nobility on a yearly
and recurrent basis? How much annual revenue did parti*
tcular noble families hold from the Crown?
For purposes of comparison Table VI gives data on
2
royal income at different stages in the fifteenth century*
How much of this royal revenue was creamed off to the
nobility? Table VII gives a breakdown of the recurrent
3
expenditure envisaged in the 1429 budget-* Money fiefs
(tierra) • 22.47% of the gross royal income • were almost
exclusively paid to the nobility with the great nobility
holding /
1 Agreement between John II and the count in BN», MS., 638,
fo.5?K, 12 Feb.1450.
2 Appendix F, below fsa
3 Appendix G, below ?SfeS
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holding the greatest number, Mantenimlentos. 7.91% were,
by definition, paid to individuals of the highest social
status. The great bulk of the mercedea or privileges,
26.46%, went to the nobility. So far, therefore, an
extremely conservative estimate would suggest that 50*55%
of the total gross income of the Crown ended up in the
hands of the nobility. It must not be forgotten, how*
lever, that a good deal of the expenditure on defence
and salaries - almost certainly more than half » also
ended up in noble pockets. In fact a cautious estimate
would show that 65% of the royal gross income went to the
nobility.*
How much annual income did members of the great
nobility actually hold frcsa the Crown? Without doubt the
two most important political figures of the fifteenth
century, apart from the Casti1ian kings themselves, were
Alvaro de Luna and the Infante Juan, son of Ferdinand of
Antequera, leader of the opposition against Alvaro de Luna,
and successively king of Navarre and king of Aragon.
These two men were undoubtedly of the highest political
and social status. In both cases it is possible to
assess their income and compare it with Crown income.
In 1429 the Infante Juan, already king of Navarre,
and nine other members of his political persuasion had
their incomes confiscated by John II. The income lost
by /
1 This 65%, however, included some large sums paid to
members of the royal family.
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by this group amounted, by itself, to about 11-12% of the
royal income in the same year. Of more particular interest,
however, is the income confiscated from the king of Navarre
I
himself (Table VIII) , All this income was directly held
from the Crown, The total shows that he held, from the
Crown alone, a total worth about 5% of the royal gross
income in the same year and equivalent to almost 50% of
the royal net income.
Much more data is available for the king of Navarre's
2
income in 1444 (Table IX) « The sources of this income
have to be carefully distinguished. In the first place
there was the revenue held directly from the Crown, Com-
:pared with similar data for 1429, the king of Navarre now
held less revenue from this source - 2,881,697 airs in
1444 compared with 2,988,729 mrs in 1429. Moreover,
since royal income had increased over the same period,
this only represented 3.92% of royal income in 1444
cosapared with 4.91% in 1429. To this figure, however,
must be added revenues held by the king of Navarre from
royal taxes reserved to the Crown in grants of lordship -
alcabalas, almojarifaagos. and terclas. Also included
in the data are sources of income deriving from lordship
- martiniegas. yantares. and infurciones« Finally we
have some sources of income, portazgo. eacrivanfa. cabeza
de pecho do judioa, which, although usually reserved to
the /
1 Appendix H, below
2 Appendix I, below
3 These figures include sums which the king of Navarre,
in his turn, had alienated.
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the Crown, were so^<etimes granted aith lordship. If we
class these last sources as indefinite sources of income,
then the king of Navarre derived 93*3*6 of his income front
the Crown, and only 5.5% of his income from his lordships,
idvea despite the fact that no agrarian rents, if indeed
he lie la any, are included, the figures show not only that
the Crown provided a vast annual income but that this
income was vastly superior to income derived from other
sources. In general terms;the total Castilian income of
the king of Navarre in 1444 was equivalent to 10*36% of
the estimated gross royal income for the same year.
In 1444 the king of Navarre's total estimated annual
income was in the region of 7million mrs p,a. In the
late 1440s and early 1450s Alvaro de Luna's income was in
the region of 6*6^ million mra p»a., although this figure
does not include income derived from his position as
master of the order of Santiago, This income was equi»
Jvalent to about 8,5% of royal income in 1444 or 7,3% of
royal income in 1458, A detailed analysis of the sources
for Luna's income is impossible but what is clear is that
once again the overwhelming majority of his income was
derived /
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derived from the Crown.*
Clearly the greatest political figures of the age
had massive revenues at their disposal and equally clearly
the Crown provided most of this income. What about the
rest of the great nobility?
Some detailed examples are given, in Tables X and XI.
of income held by members of the great nobility directly
from the Crown,^ The basis for the data is extracted
from a Libro de Asientos of 1447 - a document which lists
the alienation of royal income to specific individuals*
Unfortunately this Libro is incomplete so that general
conclusions on the total amount of revenue alienated by
the Crown are impossible to make. However, despite the
fact that the Libro is incomplete, some generalizations
are not affected by this. The income of any individual
listed in the Libro can be compared, not with the in-
tcoiaplete total of the Libro itself, but with royal
income. Moreover, the actual sources of the income can
be /
1 This estimate of Luna's income is based on three
sources. There are two surveys for his income in
1453 in A.G.S., leg.540 (676 antiguo), fos.
10,11,12 and 237,238,239. An approximate total can
only be reached because, although the surveys largely
agree with each other, some figures differ and aoaie
revenues do not appear on both lists. Moreover figures
given in the 1447 Libro de Aslentos. not included in these
two surveys, must Se 'taken into account. A detailed
analysis of these figures is not attempted since it
would have to be by area and not by distinguishing royal
from lordship revenues,
2 Appendices J and K, below sit-*
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be ascertained. V.h&t picture emerges?
The largest incomes have been tabulated and these
show that, in 1447, the great noblemen of Castile held
revenues directly from the Crown which were equivalent
to |ft-2ft of the royal income for 1444. Thus, at one
end of the scale, the admiral and his brother had a total
worth 2.14ft of gross royal income and, at the other end
/
of the scale, the count of Trastaiaara had a total equi¬
valent to .45ft, In general terms the 14 noblemen listed
held a total of 7,771,257 mrs p.a. which was equivalent
to 10.56ft of gross royal income in 1444 and v.as greater
than the net income of the Crown in 1429 and 1463. More*
Jover, it should be noted that, although the Crown did
provide the am.in source of the great nobility's income,
other sources of revenue have not been added on to the
total.
The geaexal conclusion from all the statistical data
is obvious. About two thirds of royal income was aliena-
ttad.to the nobility, These alienations constituted the
chief income of the nobility * as much as 93«3ft in the
case of the king of Navarre,
Finally it is worthwhile glancing at the theoretical
justifications of these alienations by the Crown, Let us
assume that the noblemen listed in Table XI actually did
do some work for their salaries and actually did perform
the /
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the military service in return for tierra.* It still
remains true that all the noblemen listed held the great-
test part of their income a quite gratuitously and freely
either as privileges (mercedee) or as privileges and
mantenlmicnto. In six of the cases 70-80% of the 1n-
icomes was provided by the Crown freely and with no corres-
rponding obligation. In another six cases 60-70% of
income was provided in this way. In only one case -
the count of Trastamara - did this gratuitous income fall
to 61.27% of the total income provided by the Crown.
Political bribery by the Crown? Political pressure by
the nobility? Perhaps the two concepts are interchange-
Ubic.
Yet the whole story of noble income is not yet coa*
'•pie te. On the whole the aspects discussed so far illus¬
trate the problem from the centre of political activity.
It is now time to return to the lordship - for here, if
anywhere, the real picture of the fifteenth century crisis
in government and society begins to appear,
vi) The control of royal finances at the local level
It has been seen that in the juridical grants of
lordship the Crown always reserved to itself certain taxes
such /
1 An assumption that is unjustified.
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such as the alcabalas and tercias,* In practice royal
taxation in seigneurial areas often foil into the hands
of the nobility* Moreover, the great nobility also
managed to attain some degree of control over royal taxa¬
tion in crown land areas*
Inevitably the taxes reserved to the Crown in a lord-
:ship were used for the payment of privileges and iferra
which the lord held from the Icing, When, for example,
the Catholic sovereigns granted 406,000 rara p.a* in. per-
Spetulty to the duke of Medinaceli, this sum was all
2
assigned on royal taxec collected in the duke's lordships*
This system was reinforced by attempts to tidy up existing
assignments so that they would correspond with the geogra¬
phical areas of lordships. These attempts were s-eflected
in the buying, selling and bartering of privileges, but it
was & process which was also assisted by the Crown. The
example of payments assigned on royal revenues in Puerto
de Santa Mar/a illustrates this point, The town of Puerto
was in the lord3hip of the Medinaceli house. Naturally,
some of the income held by Medinaceli from the Crown was
paid from royal taxes in the town* Yet other members of
the great nobility were assigned sums of money on the same
sources /
1 See above -12.M.
2 A.D.M., Wed., leg,25, doc.?, 24 Jan.1478; 226,000 on
the a1cabalas, terciaa. and aduanaa of Medina, Lu«on,
Darahona, Arcos", Sotillo, Deae. and Ziguelaj 140,000
on the alcabalas of Puerto, Enciso, and Arbeteta; 40,000
on the aIcabalas and tercias of Cogolludo.
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sources of revenue. This was an unsatisfactory state of
affairs for all concerned.* Consequently, in 1467,
Alfonso XII agreed to a request by the duke of Medinaceli
that Medinacel i assignments should be concentrated in the
town and assignments to other members of the nobility should
be reassigned elsewhere.^" Clearly, therefore, 1 ibra-
♦ aiientos in favour of the nobility which were assigned on
royal taxes in their lordships, helped to place royal
revenues in the aenor(oa under noble control*
iloyal revenues in seigneurial areas further augmented
the income of the great nobility since privileges existed
which, instead of alienating specific sums of money,
actually alienated the taxes themselves. In short, the
very taxes reserved to the Crown in grants of lordship
were in fact alienated by separate privileges. Even the
alcabala tax was alienated in this way and the large
number of such privileges shows that this was not an
exceptional occurrence,* It should also be noted, more*
lover that lordship and royal taxes, though granted by
separate /
1 The duke of Medina Sidonia, for example, found trouble in
collecting money assigned on Puerto revenues since the
town argued that priority should be given to the duke
of Medinaceli. Agreement over these difficulties in
A#D,h,, Cog», leg.3, doc.79, 6 duly 1467.
2 Ibid, doc.78, 14 March 1467.
3 For example, the grant by Henry lil of all the tercias
of the Olmedo area to Arias Gomez de Silva and by Alfonso
XII of the portazao of Alexia la heal to Alfonso dc
Aguilar, Ibid, leg.3G9» doc.10, 2 May 1399;
ibid, Priego, leg.39, doc.4, 26 Aug.1465.
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separate privileges, were often given to the same indivi-
:dual, Indeed the two separate privileges of lordship
and royal taxes within the lordship could lead to an
identification in subsequent eonf irroa t ions of lordship,
and founding of taayoraggoe. In 1461, for example, Henry
IV granted the lordship of La Puebla de Mentalban to don
Juan Pacheco after confiscating it from Alvaro de Luna's
widow and, in the same document, he also included the
*
tercias. ojcueados, and derechos del paso de ganado, which
the countess had held from the Crown by separate privi-
:leges,A Another case, involving the lordship of Medallin,
was startling by the totality of the alienations which
were made*
In 1449 don Rodrigo Portocarrero was given the lord*
:ship of ^edel 1 in and its lands by the prince of Asturias
who was later to become Henry IV* This grant of lordship
was confirmed by John 11 and in this confimat ion the
2
usual revenues were reserved to the Crown,*" Yet already,
in 1449, other privileges had alienated these royal
revenues to Portocarrero, On the 14th of April the taxes
on Jews and Moors were granted to him for life. On the
3rd of May one fifth of the proceeds of the alcabalas and
tercias were added* Finally, on the 15th of November,
the /
1 C.D.R.A.H., 226-34 (Ixviii, 24 Dec.1461).
2 A.D.M, Model lin, leg.l, docs.3,4,6, 15 Nov,1449, 22
Dec.1449, 15 May 1453.
168.
the proceeds of all royal revenues were granted to him
for life. Within one year, therefore, both the lordship
and all the revenues reserved to the Crown went to
Portocarrero.* It is true, perhaps, that there was an
important difference in that the lordship was granted in
perpetuity whereas the royal taxes were only granted for
life. A glance at the T'ortocarrero mayoraggo founded in
1462, however, shows that the privileges for life could be
2
made hereditary.
The examples quoted above are not, of course, meant
to prove that all royal taxes in seigneuriai areas were
alienated by the Crown to the lords of the se^onoe,
Clearly the Crown in many cases still reserved the royal
revenues. Yet even here two more factors tended to place
at least some of this income at the disposal of the nobility.
The administration and collection of royal taxes in
seigneurial areas often depended on the seigneur i<ul and not
on the royal officials. in essence this was simply a
matter of political power at the local level and the noble
lord /
I Alienation of these revenues at the dates stated In ibid.
3, doc.19, end leg.5, docs.4 and 5. The royal
revenues of four other areas were also included. Further
inroads into royal reservations in Medellin, but on the
jurisdictional side, ibid leg.©, docs.13,14,15 and lag.l,
docs.1,2.
Z 1 bid, lag.3, doc,8, shows that many revenues held dc por
vida were included in the mavoraago, 20 May 1452, and
confirmed by Henry Iy and Hie Ce rholic sovereigns.
169.
lord was invariably more powerful than the royal tax
farmer.* In October 1478, for example, an agreement was
drawn up by don Alfonso de Aguilar and tbe royal official
who was charged with levying royal customs dues and other
taxes in the town of Priego. The agreement shows that
the administration and effective control of these taxes
lay with the lord: only one quarter of the proceeds of
these royal taxes was to go to the royal official while
2
three quarters was retained by don Alfonso de Aguilar.
This state of affairs existed all over C&stile, In the
Agnilar lands the seigneuriai administration also collected
the royal pedidos. atonedas. and alcabalas. as well as the
3
customs duties. In the Letiinactli lance the alcabalas
were collected by seigneurial officials throughout the
4 /
fifteenth century and, in Villalon, the Piaientel adminis-
:t rat ion saw to the he remmlact revenues as well as to the
5
royal pedidos and moneuas.
The /
1 Sec, for example, the letters of the Infante Ferdinand
to JUiego Fernandas and John 11 to Pedro Alvarez de Osorlo
printed by Serrano, 'Los seSiores de Daena y Cabra*,
a.h.A.B., Ixxxvii (19251, 456-7, 460-1.
2 "me agreement covered the period 1478-80: A.D.M., Priego,
leg#20, doc,74,
3 Ibid, leg.14, doc.8, 18 April 1459? leg.20, doc.66, 14
June 1453; leg.30, doc.27, 19 Feb.1452, doc.28, 21 Jan.
1455, doc,29, 18 April 14595 ail these show royal
officials having to deal with the seigneurial adminis-
stration for taxes in the Aguilar lands.
4 For example ibid. Med,, leg,40, doc.57, accounts of 1432-
3? Ibid, Cog., leg.3, doc.75, 13 March 1459, receipt for
alcabalas collected by seigneurial officials; ibid. Med.,
leg3d,"doc.7, 9 Jan,1489, farm conditions of the seig-
:neuriui administration for tax farms which included the
5 TcfS^v^ie'tas de Villa Ion, A, fo.XSR, pedidos of 1445}
ibid, B, f os ,2 3R-24K, 26&, 32V-37K. hermandad revenues
Tnl482.
no.
The fact that royal revenues were also usurped by
the nobility must also finally be taken into account.
Taxes which were not held legally* by a grant from the
Crown, could be withheld illegally front royal officials,
Xn 1452 John IX addressed letters to the groat noble
families in which he painted a grim picture of the usur-
•'pations of royal revenues,
concerning which 1 called before me my chief
financial off ic ials^who told me that in all
the lands of the senorios my officials are
not allowed to coTlect any core whatsoever
and these sums are suspended each year
in their accounts ,«*
The king was not overstating the case and later matters
became even worse. Pedro de Acuna, for example, usurped
all royal revenues in the Acuna lordships from 1463-1470,
In 1476 the Catholic sovereigns gave what amounted to a
free pardon to the count of Medinaceli for all the royal
revenues which he had usurped during the years 1464-
1476,3
In effect, the lordships of the great nobility were
often independent states within the state. In practice,
if not in theory, there was only one administration within
the /
1 An example of such a letter, aent to Pedro de Aguilar,
A,D,M., Priego, leg,37, doe.4, 6 March 1452*
2 ibid. Ad., leg,29, doc,4, 15 Oct.1470. This is a con-
TTirination by Henry IV of the agreement whereby Acuna
was to pay 400 enrlques of gold for all these usur-
:pa tion#.
3 Carta de fin v quito. 20 May 1476, ibid. Med, leg.40,
doc.&l,
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***« senorio. It is not. therefore, really surprising
to find the great nobility exempting their subjects from
royal taxes - a power theoretically vested in the king
only. The counts of iaedinaceii, for example, could grant
exemptions from alcabalaa and even exempt one area from
1
all taxes except those paid to the count himself.
ft'hs, t difference did these royal taxes make to the
value of lordship in iifteenth century Castile? The
fact that the purely seigneurial income (deriving from
the juridical grant of lordship) was negl igible has already
been argued. A comparison between the income provided
by alienated or usurped royal taxes and the income provided
by seigneurial taxes will emphasise the point still
further.
Data on the revenues of the king of Kav&rre (Table IX) ^
shows that 49.24'i of his total income was provided fran
the royal a1cabalas in his lordships. From the comments
of royal officials it is quite clear that the king of
Navarre collected the royal taxes in his lordships and
held on to the proceeds in most cases, although he did
not have a legal right to their enjoyment. A note for
the lordship of Cuellar, for example, states that Navarre
had /
1 ibid. leg.46, doc.48, 30 April 1470, exempts Somen from
all non soigneurial taxes; ibid. ieg«4Q, doc.64, 1 Jan.
1490, exempts yeclnqfl of Medinaceii from certain alcabalas;
ibid. Cog., leg.ll, doc.40, 7 Jan.1461, exempts merchants
from alcabalas in Cogolludo on Wednesdays.
2 Appendix 1 below S 3© - \
172.
had 180,000 ags p.a. from the alcabala revenues and that,
although he had ordered 80,000 mrs p.a. to be paid to the
royal tax farmer, nothing had in fact been paid. For the
70,000 mrs.p.a, which he collected from the tore las in the
same lordship no sum was ever even theoretically paid to
the royal tax farmer.
The income of the king of Navarre has been tabulated by
lordships as well as by taxes. It is, therefore, possible
to see at a glance the immense difference which these
aliens tad or usurped royal taxes mads to the value of a
lordship. In the case of the king of Navarre the
alcabalas and terciae alone provided by far the greatest
part of the income derived from any one lordship * in the
lordship of Medina del Campo 93%, Olinedo 82%, Cuellar 78%,
Penaliel 85%, Roa and Aranda 90%, Atienaa 79%, the aaarquesado
of Villena 78%, The same was true of other lordships. An
approximate estimate indicates that about two thirds of
the income of the house of Medinaceli* derived from lord*
:ships in the Medinaceli area, was provided by the
alcabalas alone,^
The economic power of the nobility, however, did not
reach its greatest extent with the conquest of royal taxation
within /
1 The document itself is in L. Sulrez Fernandez, *La»
rent&s castellanaa del infante don Juan1, Hjsp.. xix
(1959), 192*204.
2 Accounts and farms of revenues with data for the years
1432-3, 1488, 1489-91 in A.D.M., Med., leg.40, doc.57
and leg,50, doc.7.
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within the lordships* In many esses the nobility* by
using political pressure at court* managed to take over
the royal taxes and administration in some areas of
crown lands* The full extent of this pressure did not
become fully felt until after 1460* but before that date
the nobility had already established a basis for action*
The state of affairs outlined above * the system
of assignments* the alienation and usurpation of royal
taxes in the lordship * helped to bring about this
further extension of noble power over royal revenues*
After ail* where could new privileges be assigned once
the royal taxes within a lordship were already lost to
the Crown? Where could the 4*300*00 mrs p.a* which the
Catholic sovereigns granted to the count of Medinaceli
be assigned after the lords of Medinaceli already had
assignments of privileges on the royal taxes in their
lordships? The only available resources were royal
taxes outside the lordship* Thus* the 4*500*000 mrs p.a.
in question were assigned on royal taxes in Seville*
Jeres* Atienaa* and customs posts on the Aragonese
frontier.
The real process of the disintegration of royal
power /
1 A.D.H,* Med., leg.25* doc.8* 1 Oct*1492. Previous
privileges assigned on royal taxes within the lordship:
Ibid, leg.25, doc*6* 10 Nov.1467 and doc*?, 24 Jan*1478*
power in favour of the nobility came to a head about
1460. From 1460 onwards royal taxes were alienated
on a massive scale. Moreover, not only were specific
taxes alienated but the administration of them was altena¬
nted as well: not only did these alienations apply to
seigneurial areas but th-sy also applied to the crown
lands. In 1466, for example, Alfonso XII made & free
gift of all the revenues still owing to the Crown in
Andalusia for the period 1452-65 to don Alvaro de Stuniga
and don Juan Paclieco.* The latter's political impor¬
tance was further emphasised by another grant, in the
following year, of 120,000 tars p.a. assigned on the
2
revenues of the servicio and iTontazgo. Yet the poli¬
tical power balance had to be maintained. Accordingly,
on the same day, the count of Benavente was granted the
adminis tration and taxes of the serviclo and montaggo
3
taxes at two important puertos of the sh »ep routes.
This alienation of both the royal taxes and the
administration was not an isolated case# In the follow-
:ing year, for example, a similar grant was made, with
/ 4
respect to tereisa, in favour of the countess of Suendia.
What /
1 R.A.H., 9-20-7, 6483, 20 July 1466.
2 1 bid. doc. dated 4 Dec.1467.
3 lbid. doc. dated 4 Dec.1467* The puertos we*e Villa-
:harts, and La Perdiguera. The value of the grant can
be gauged by the condition that it would revert to the
Grown if Alfonso XI1 granted 1'imentel 2,000 vassals
and 2,000,000 mrc p.a,
4 A.D.M., Ad., leg.29, doc,3, 18 May 1468.
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What did such a grant imply? One last detailed example
will show how these royal revenues were gained by the
nobility.
In 1467 Alfonso XII granted the customs duties or
alroojarifaggo of the bishopric of Cordoba to the powerful
don Alfonso de Aguiiar whose lordships lay to the south
east of the town. The grant itself described the process
whereby this particular revenue came to be totally all©-
inated: indeed the chronic state of the customs duties
was used to justify their total alienation to Aguilar,
First of all the figures for the farm in 1467 were quoted.
The gross total was 1,844,759 mra and 5 dlneros, Of this
total 1,250,804 mrs and 6 dlneros were already earmarked
for the payment of annual privileges and tlerra. Then
the grant listed another 514,900 art which had been
alienated to Aguilar during the few months since the
farm had been established. This left the Crown with a
mere 79,054 mrs and 9 dineroa - that is, 4,7% of the farm
total. Since these new payments had been added to the
sums already held by Aguilar, and since the Crown was
left with only a meagre income which would disappear when
non-recurrent expenditure had to be paid, the grant alie-
:nated the whole revenue and its administration, Ironi-
*e&lly the grant used the same sort of formulae as those
in grants of lordship. In the first place the taxes
and /
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and adminis tration rere granted in perpetuity. Even
more astonishing. Aguilar was given complete licence to
sell, exchange, and gift the taxes and administration.
This licence, unlike the usual grants of lordship, did
not exclude the Church. Aguilar was to administer and
collect the taxes as he wished » that is, either by farming
them or by direct collection. The only limitation in*
Wolved was that presumably he had to see to the payment
of existing assignments. Since, in any case, Aguilar
was probably the main beneficiary such a limitation was
not a hindrance.* Moreover, it was categorically stated
in the grant that all subsequent increases in the pro*
:ceeds of the taxes, over and above the total of the 1467
farm, were to remain hie.*"
The great nobility, then, were remarkably successful
in obtaining royal privileges, tierra, official salaries,
and control of the local financial administration of the
Crown. Lordships, which by themselves were of relatively
little value, could be made extremely remunerative once the
control of royal taxes was acquired by the nobility. So far,
however, the discussion has centred on the great nobility.
Did the lesser /
.1 Aguilar income included large payments theoretically
designed for frontier defence. As early an the 1390s
the Aguilar fam ily was cornering at least 30% of royal
taxes in the bishoprics of Cordoba and Jaen: ibid,
Priego, leg.38, docs.37 and 38,
2 The grant of the alroojari f aggo and its administration,
ibid, leg,39, doc.5, 5 tea.y 1467.
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nobility manage to obtain alternative sources of income?
3. The Lesser Nobility
Of all the groups in society the lesser nobility was
one of the least static* It is true that a definition
of those included in the lesser nobility appears a straight*
iforward task* There were the younger sons of the great
nobility * the scaundones * who, because of the iaaypraggos.
were denied direct access to titles and wealth* Then
there were the lesser rural nobles * the hidalgos.
cabalIeras, and infansonea * who were scattered throughout
the lands of the Crown, the Church, and the great lords*
Finally the urban aristocracy may be considered as forming
part of the lesser nobility* But such a definition must
be qualified by noting the effects of social mobility*
The younger sons of the great noble families could sink
into the relative obscurity of the rural hidalgula*
Alternatively, they often attained great social status and
wealth by office in Church and state. At the other end
of the scale the social frontiers were even vaguer* Sons
and daughters of poverty stricken escudaros and hidalgos
married into the peasantry and wealthy commoners became
caballeros de cuantia* In this discussion the incidence
of social mobility is taken into account* The urban
aristocracy /
ITS*
aristocracy* however* is discussed elsewhere,* although
the connection between town and countryside is mentioned
in order to round oil the general picture.
Three general factors have to be examined in order
to assess the economic position of the lesser nobility.
These three factors are the geographical distribution of
the nobility, the agrarian basis of their Income* and the
availability of alternative sources of income.
It has been calculated that in late fIft©onth-c«m-
Jtury Spain there were some 55,000 nobles of whom 50*000
2
were members of the lesser nobility. The geographical
distribution of this lesser nobility had important effects.
There can be no doubt that the majority of the lesser
nubility were densely concentrated in the north of the
kingdom, especially in Guipuscoa and the Basque provinces.
It 1ms already been noted that the Basque provinces
3
claimed universal hldalguia. In practice, a non-noble
class of peasantry existed in the Basque provinces at the
beginning of the fifteenth century; the distinction
between noble and nou-noble depending on possession of
land• The number*of hidalgos, however, was very high and
it was probably because of this very fact that the univer*
seal /
1 Below,
2 Vicens, His toria. ii, 417-6.
3 Above,
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universal claim of hidajgula came to bo mads* In an
hereaandad of 1394 the peasants or labradores of the Basque
area were distinguished from the hidalgos. By the fuero
of 1526i however, it was asserted that all the inhabitants
of the Basque provinces were hidalgos.*
To the south of these areas the geographical distri¬
bution of the lesser nobility conformed to the pattern of
the reconquert»^ The pattern of reconquest in the Duero
valley in the ninth and tenth centuries had been one of
small advances - slow advances, carried out on a small
scale by groups of colonists. It was the work of
individuals who later became hidalgos, or who, grouped
together, formed the behetries or villages inhabited by
free men who possessed the privilege of choosing and
changing their lord.
The next wave of reconquest crossed the Duero into
Extremadura (Extrewa PurIi). With the conquest of Toledo
in 1065, a sudden advance was made possible toward the
valley of the Tague• This time the problems of recon-
:quest and repopulation were largely undertaken by the
towns who assured themselves of a sturdy political and
juridical position based on fueros. In this area there
were no behetrias. The hidalgos who lived in the areas
controlled /
1 See generally Garcia de Cortazar, op.cit.. pp.297-322.
2 For what follows see generally Vlcenstoria. ii.
chap. 1 and especially C. anches A1 bornon," * The frontier
and Castilian liberties*, in The -"ow World looks at its
history, ed. A.R. Lewis and I Texas, 196 3 J,
pp.25-46.
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controlled by the towns were not as numerous as in the
north. Nowhere else in Europe was there
sueh a density of powerful free rural councils
possessing such an important influence in the
political equilibrium of the state, Nowhere
else do we find such a network of municipalities
under royal patronage, a network so dense that
It hardly leaves room for the appearance of
feudal holdings,*
The last stage of the reconquest which is relevant
to this study took place in the thirteenth century.
Within the space of. fifty years the kingdom of Castile
doubled its territory by pushing south from the Tagus right
down to the mountains round Granada. This massive annexa¬
tion of territory could not be consolidated easily. Thus,
whereas the Aragoneae Crown supervised the problems of
colonisation in Mallorca and Valencia right down to the
smallest details, the Castilian Crown was forced to dele-
:gate this task to the military orders, the Church, the
nobility, and one or two great towns. Hence the large
area® of land dominated by the military orders, the town
of Seville, and the southern nobility. The town of
Seville, for example, was assigned a jurisdiction which
in itself was larger than the kingdom of Valencia annexed
by Jaime 2# The same was true for the nobility: south
of the Tagus the nobility were few in numbers and possessed





In short, the numbers of lesser nobility decreased
from the north to the south of the kingdom. Naturally
this general structure became modified through time* The
political power of the towns and the behetr^aa declined
at the sam® time as the power of the great nobility in*
»cr«ased* Yet the basic geographical distribution of
the lower nobility remained the same. In the sixteenth
century royal financial officials still based calculations
of demographic fig\tre# on this decrease in the numbers of
hidalgos from north to south.
It has already been argued that the purely seigneurial
income of the great nobility during this period was in*
{sufficient to maintain proper standards. The same was
true of the fifteenth century rural hi da. lgu fa • indeed
their situation was worse. The rural hidalgo was poverty
stricken if his only basis of income was made up of seig*
incurial dues and agrarian rents.
A factor of crucial importance was, of course, the
size of the estates of the lower nobility. There were,
inevitably, great variations as far as this was concerned.
This was particularly true of the younger sons of the
great nobility. Provision for younger sons obviously
depended /
1 See, for example, the italacion de los vecinos pecheros,..
y de los hidalgos quo so preaupone j o !rXHhaber en cada una
de las di'chaiTprovlnclas W C^olnTxTii (lfifiH 521*30,
The officials calculated that there were as many hidalgos
as vecinos pecherps in the kingdom of Leon whereas in the
province of &evilie their estimate was 6,181 hidalgos as
against 74,166 vecinos pecherps.
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depended on the power and wealth of the family and also on
the number of children* The eeaunaones who inherited
substantial lands despite the tnayoraggo system often
acquired titles and sufficient prestige to enable them
to remain within the ranks of the greater nobility# The
admiral don iadrique finr{quez, for example, managed to
make substantial provision for all his four sons# Thus#
although the fourth son with only one small lordship and
an annuity of 20,000 tars on royal revenues was clearly a
vary poor relation to the eldest son who inherited the
chief umvoraago. he was, nevertheless, equally clearly a
1
cut above the general hidalguia. similarly, the second
son of hero Maarique was given, the lordship of Paredes
by his father and was later given the title of count of
Paredes by John II#
Yet while noting, and even emphasising, these excep*
:tiorvS, it nevertheless remains true that the land con*
itrolled by the great mass of the hldalguia was small*
The hidalgo or caballero usually had a very limited lord*
:ship over one place, or a castle with three or four
villages#3 /
1 The second son was given a mayorazgo of sizeable lord*
{ships, 120,000 sirs p«a* assigned on the soap industry,
and 80,000 mrs. p.a# assigned on royal taxes in Andalusia.
The third son inherited minor lordships, 15 of fixe 95
lances held from the Crown, and 30,000 sirs p«a, on royal
taxes. See Condesa de Yebes, 'Teatamentos de dofta
Marina de Ayala y de don Fadrique Enrique®', B#R.A.H.*
exxiii (1943), 561*85.
2 Claros Varones. PP.90-1#
3 ncans. Histo'rla. i 1 • 139#
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villages. In the north these lordships were even
dual 1 or. One of the fundamentai characteristics attri-
: but eel to the Basque nobility is that their lands were
even entail or than the lands of the rural hidalgos of
1 /
Castile. The same pattern prevailed In Cuipuzcoa,
Asturias* and to a lesser degree in Leon* In these
northern areas generally, the hidalgo usually had a
fortified house with an adjoining stretch of land barely
sufficient for subsistence* At a time of rapid price
rise it was inevitable that this lesser nobility would
suffer* Direct evidence for a decline of income does
not exist* yet the circumstantial evidence pointing to a
decline in the fortunes of the lesser nobility is (omi*
liable.
Part of this evidence relates to the relationship
between the hidalguia and store powerful sectors of society*
The great nobility maintained their position against the
Crown but the lesser nobility had to defend themselves
against the groat lords* the monasteries* and town
councils* For obvious reasons the establishment or
existence of a tax exempt hjdalguia on the ecclesiastical*
noble* and municipal lordships was not regarded favour*
:ably* Dvery attempt was consequently made to prevent
such /
1 Garcia de Cortasar* op.cit »* p.314.
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such a situa tion.
In the first place there was an attempt to prevent
the entry and settlement of the lesser nobility into the
areas in question. The very first of the ordinances of
Riaasa of 145? dealt with this point i-
can be an inhabitant of this town of Kiasa
or its lands since this would be and is of
great ham to this town and its lands.
Secondly, there was an attempt to prevent inter*
tmarriage between taxable oecheros and tax exempt hidalgos.
The example of Riaza could be used again but, instead, I
shall quote an exampie concerning the monastery of San
Salvador de 0$a. In 1476 the abbot wrote to various areas
belonging to the monastery;«
... inasmuch as 1 have been informed by
responsible and credible persons that some
natives and inhabitants of these areas, con*
strsry to the privileges of this monastery
and the ordinances of the abbots and against
my will, have married some of their daughters
to omes fijosdalgos ... and since this would
cause great problems and scandals ... 1 order
that no one marry his daughter to an hi dale:o
on pain of a fine of 10,000 mra ... Further*
imore no hidalgo can live in or inhabit any of
these areas ...
Lastly, there was an attempt to prevent the lesser
nobility from buying up land from the pecheros, since land
bought /
* Col. Dip, Klasa. p.141.
2 A.H.N., Clero, Papains, leg.1284, doc. of 16 Sept,1476.
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bought in this way ceased to provide taxable wealth. Con»
:sequent Iy great care was always taken with leases of land
to the peasantry. These leases always stipulated that
the beneficiary could not alienate or sell the land to
members of the lesser nobility. Thus, when the monastery
of Sahagun leased a vineyard in perpetuity to a pechero
in 1434 it was:-
on condition that you cannot sell or alienate
or pass it on to an escudero podexoso. duefta.
monastery or church, but only to a labrador
Uang." -
This preoccupation with the possible loss of taxable
land could go even further# In the kedinaceli lands no
hidalgo or caballero could buy land from a pechero unless
the payment of taxes was also assumed. Naturally it was
recognised that much land had already passed into the
control of caballeros and hidalgos. Consequently registers
were ordered to be drawn up listing lands which had changed
hands in this way. The problem was further complicated
by the fact that caballeros and hidalgos leased their land
to the peasantry who thus had the direct usufruct if not
the actual sovereignty over the land. The ducal ordina*
mces, therefore, laid down that these peasants either
had to return all such lands to the direct exploitation
of /
1 Ibid. Pergs,, carp.943, doc.3, 25 Jan.1434. Most leases,
like this one to a yacino of Perroao, included this
provision#
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of the hidalgos and caba 11 eroa. or els® pay taxes as if
they were the nominal owners of the land* Furthermore,
taxes collected in this way were to have precedence over
the rents owed by the peasantry to the caballoro or
hidalgo.1
Some of these measures directed against the lesser
nobility date back to the fourteenth century and they do
not by themselves constitute clear evidence of a decline
in the fortunes of the hidalgos and caballexos» Yet it
must not be forgotten, that the great nobility tended to
increase pressure on the lower nobility whose saigneurial
income was also declining. 1t is not, therefore, sur¬
prising to find evidence of a decline in social status.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the point is to give
an example of an individua I bigle|g9 at the moment of
being depressed into the ranks of the peasantry.
In 1470 the abbot of San Salvador de Ona drew up
some ordinances. These ordinances contained the usual
>
anti-hidalgo measures - prohibition of marriage with the
hidalgofa. prohibition of the sale of any land to the
hidolgufa. and the prohibition of the entry of any of the
lesser nobility into the areas of the monastery except
on surrender of hidalgo status, The ordinances then
ended /
1 A.D.M., Mod., leg.40, doc.35, ordinances of 1504 which
make it clear that a fifteenth century precedent is
being repeated,
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ended with the following declaration!
Furthermore the said abbot ordered that Juan
Alfonso do Valdivieiso, although he is an
hidalgo, should nevertheless pay two thirds
of the pedidp assessment whenever a royal
pedido has to be collected; such payment
not being in derogation of his hid&lguia
but for the common good and peace of the
inhabitants* To this Juan Alfonso agreed
but stated that he should now bo allowed to
buy or sell Is ntl in the area like the other
inhabitants on condition that he should still
not bo allowed to marry off his children in
the said area *«•
Exemption from payment of the royal pedido was one of the
most cherished privileges of the nobility* Indeed this
very exemption was often taken as a proof of nobility,
CIearly, therefore, this hidalgo lost one of the most
essential marks of the nobleman. Furtheremore. it is
hard to envisage any taxes from which he would now be
exempt since his ability to deal in land made him liable
to the payment of the corresponding dues to the monastery.
Although still managing to retain the label of an hidalgo.
this individual was well on the way to becoming a non-
noble pechoro.
How widespread was this depression of the lower
nobility? For those whose income was confined to their
lands the depression was inevitable, Other examples show
that /
1 A.II.N,, Claro. Papoles, leg. 1284. ordoaausae de
Cillaperlata e otros lugares, 14 June 1470*
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that this depression was not confined to one hidalgo on
the lands of the monastery of One. In the late fourteenth
century hidalgos on lands belonging to the monastery of
Santo Toribio could haughtily reject all claims made by
the prior and maintain that their only obligation was
one of military service. By the mid-fifteenth century,
however, the position of the hidalgos had changed, No
longer did they control all the localities. In 1443,
for example. Count Pedro de Stuniga drew up some very
revealing ordinances for the area round Curlei. The
supposedly privileged hidalgos had to pay a whole series
of taxes and services which were listed in detail, More*
:©ver, they had no favoured position as far as the local
governing oligarchy was concerned, indeed, one of the
hldalftps' most bitter complaints w3s that they had to
pay taxes which were imposed by an officialdom from which
they were excluded. Once more it is clear that this
rural hidalgula had lost the all important privilege of
exemption from taxation. Their lands were probably no
larger than those of their non«noble neighbours. Indeed,
so depressed was this rural nobility that the count even
decreed that everybody was free to buy or sell land - there
was now no danger since everyone paid taxes,*
U /
1 For these examples sec N. Porro, 'Tress document©* sobre
fijosdalgo castellanos', C.H.E.« xxxiii»xxxiv (1961),
355-66.
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It is now time to turn and discuss the outlets
which could enable some of the lesser nobility to amelio-
5rate an increasingly precarious economic existence* The
moat striking reaction to this decline took the form of
banditry and brigandage. This generalisation needs
elaboration since the evidence for it has lent itself to
other explanations.
One of the permanent features of the history of the
kingdom of Castile in the fifteenth century was the state
of total anarchy which prevailed in the north, from
Galicia to the Basque provinces. Historians, on the whole,
have tended to ignore these areas and, when they have been
studied, there has been a tendency to make the anarchy
intelligible in terms of political history. Thus, Basque
history in the fifteenth century is seen largely in terms
of a bitter struggle between the rival bands of the
'o&acinos* and the *gamboinos*, No convincing explanation
has yet been put forward o£ why the struggle took place,
who formed the bands, or indeed what the course of events
was. One explanation sees the roots of the anarchy in a
quarrel over procedure at a traditional ceremony. Another
explanation is that the Basquefs character includes a
desire to dominate rather than to be equal or inferior:
moreover honour demanded vengeance for any slight and,
once a quarrel started, the Basque spirit of vendetta gave
it /
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It a law of perpetual motion.1
The real explanation for the permanent state of
anarchy in the north does not rest on political factors.
There is no evidence of a constitutional struggle, poli¬
tical programmes, or even any cohesive political group-
lings. The events were exactly what they appeared to
be - acts of banditry and brigandage. They were the
result of the increased precariousness of the nobility*s
economic position, the fact that the north was the area
most densely populated by the leaser nobility, and the
equally important fact that the least productive and
sterile land of the kingdom lay in the north. This ex¬
planation is made even store likely when it is realised
that the anarchy was, on the whole, a rural phenomena and
that the culprits were the rural nobility. The Basque
towns, for example, remained outside the sphere of oper¬
ations as did those of the rural nobility who migrated
to the towns.^
Brigandage /
1 For the Basque provinces see Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit..
pp.316-7 which briefly recaps the various explanations.
There is no good study for Galicia although the anarchy
is grimly depicted in S. Portela Pesos, Galicia en tierapo
de log Fonsecas (Madrid, 1957).
2 In the Basque provinces the situation was aggravated by
the clan system prevailing among the nobility* The
parientes mayores. relying on the support of the paxientes
atenores, used the jaureguj or fortified house as the
centre of operations. From the basque point of view
the division of the parlentos into mayores and menoreg
corresponded to a division into greater and lesser
nobility although it is clear that the mayores were the
approximate equivalent of the Casti lian"*rural hidalgula.
Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit.. pp.315, 317,
m*
Brigandage and banditry ware not confined to the
extreme north. Immediately to the south there lay the
areas of the behetr^as which, by the fifteenth century,
had fallen to the great nobility. Consequently one point
that has pusuled historians is why John II, in 1434, should
have made an attempt which seemed to aim at eradicating
the nobility frost the areas of behetrlas. In fact the
measures were specifically directed against the lesser
nobility, not against the great nobility, and one of the
reasons given was the desire to end the permanent state
of *bands, anarchy, brawls, disagreements, and struggles',^
Nevertheless, it seems true to say that to the south
brigandage shaded into meaningful military service for the
achievement of the political aims of the various factions
in Castile, There can be no doubt that war provided an
outlet for some of the impoverished lesser nobility. The
situation was strikingly described in a memorandum drawn
up in 1471 by a hi shop and addressed to Henry IV, After
indicating the state of civil war and anarchy all over the
kingdom, the memorandum continued
and seeing ineu of a few lances rise up in these
turbulences and, by dint of stealing and theft,
reach a stage where they have one hundred or two
hundred lances which they maintain by the sweat
of the poor . • • as was done in.Fr&nce during the
time of her great misfortunes,^
The /
1 bscorial, Z.U.6., fos,119b«12la, 22 April 1454, The
measures were clearly directed against the lesser nobi-
:lity, Moreover the cortes had requested such a measure
and taxation had been disrupted} C,1>,K,A,B.,19 (viii,
1447),
2 Ibid. 637-9 (clxxxix, 1471),
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The comparison with France was apt as the career of
a liodrigo de Viliandrando illustrates* For Pulgar this
was obviously a case of a poverty stricken hidalgo who
gained fame, wealth, and titles by his military career
1
as a mercenary in the civil wars of France and Castile*
If all the nobility did not practice their functional
military role, there still remained many professionals*
Indeed Pulgar sets aside a special section of his work in
order to describe the activities of these caballeroa
2
fIiosdalgo who made wax their px'ofession* Often such
men offered their services to the great nobility* Here
there were great variations* At one end of the scale
such services were simply arranged on the basis of the
great lord affording security and protection* Alfonso
de Gusudm, for example, afforded protection in his port
of Lepe to Juan Peres de la Barrera and his pirates*^
But more common were the caballeroa and escuderos who
served in the households and administrations of the great
nobility* On the Medinaeeli lands, for example, there
were several alcaldes (castellans) who held aeostarnientos
(livery and maintenance) from the duke and were described
as cabal!eros y escuderos de tlerra de caaa de su senoria,4
Many /
1 Claros Varones* pp.62-71*
2 Ibidi. pp.96*107.
3 aTmTs., caja 1414-15, no,78.
4 A.D.M., Med., leg,50, doc.7, 9 Jan.1489.
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Many of the lesser nobility also received payments of
tlerra for one or more lances.
Church and state also provided obvious outlets for
some members of the nobility. Enough has been said about
the usurpation of royal taxes. The Church also had to
face encroachments and usurpations by the lesser nobility.
By the fifteenth century, however, this phenomenon was on
the whole restricted to the north. In the Basque provinces
the nobility virtually controlled all the churches and
monasteries as lay patrons. InGalicAa, whole bishoprics
2
fell to the nobility. Two general points only should be
noted about this situation at this stage. In the first
place, ecclesiastical wealth was the object of attention
precisely because of the economic hardships of the nobility.
Secondly, this nobility was, in Castilian terms, a lesser
nobility*
Further south the situation was different and con*
{formed more to the general European pattern. For, instead
of a crude attempt at encroachment, the Church was used as
a means for providing careers for the lesser nobility and,
more especially, for the younger sons of the great nobility.
Thus ecclesiastical positions, regarded with disdain in
the extreme north, were coveted in the rest of the kingdom.
A /
1 Examples in the accounts of the Cordoba region in 1^.
Priego, leg.38, docs.37 and 38.
2 See below, ^
194.
A career in the Church or state often prevented the
segundones from a decline into obscurity* The key middle
posts * archdeaconries and encomiendaa in the military
orders - tended to be the preserve of the segundonea*.
Per© hianrique's second son, Rodrigo ^anrique, for example.
started his career as a comendador in the order of
Santiago* Don Juan ^anriqxte, the fifth of Pero Manrique's
fifteen children, was pushed into a career in the Church
which would provide him with a respectable status and
income* After some time spent in the households of the
bishop of Burgos and the archbishop of Seville, he was
made a canon of Burgoo cathedral in 1450* Five years
later he was given the important post of archdeacon of
Valpueata, Subsequently John II made him an honorific




1 The nobility, of course, could also exercise important
lay offices without actually becoming ecclesiastics*
Pedro Fernandas de Frias and Diego Ruiz de Trias, for
example, held the important offices of roayordomo and
merino of the monastery of Las Hueigns in the early
"f if teenth century t L, Huidobro y Serna, 'Apuntes para
la his toria de Burgosi la noble familia de los Frias *,
B.R.A.K.. exxiii U948), 547-60*
2 Claro& Varones* pp.90-1« Many of the younger sons of
The"great 'nobility were comendadore*. See, for example,
A,D»M,, Feria, leg.55, doc.22, 8 Oct.1409, where, apart
from Lorenzo Sua re as de Figueroa, master of Santiago, two
other Pigueroas are listed as comendador of Montiel and
co&endador mayor of Leon.
/
3 X7 Blanco Dfez, 'Dlgn&t&rios eclesiasticos burgaleses.
Los arcediano® de Valpuesta1, B.K.A.H., exxi (1947),
443-87, The two previous archdeacons of Valpuesta were
segundonea of the Velasco family.
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Similar examples could be 8* ven with respect to
careers in the royal administration# Yet royal adminis*
5trative posts were, on the whole, regarded as being
below the dignity of the knightly class# Zt is true
that this did not apply to all pools in the royal adminls*
*tration. Honorific poets, such as chief butler# and
posts which were partially honorific and partially
military, such as adelantados. were the preserve of the
great nobility and the segundones# Other more bureau*
:eratic posts in the civil service, however, were regarded
as being degrading# Indeed Pulgar even hints that these
administrative jobs were more suited to some of the northern
nobility# As far as Pulgar was concerned, the hld&lguia
of Guipuacoa could not be compared with that of Castile#
The northern hidalgo either dragged out a miserable
existence in his own region or he moved south# When he
did move south he was not to be found acquiring the
knightly virtues of combat in the household of the con*
'stable * instead, he could be found learning to read and
write in the households of the king's secretaries or in
the household of a merchant.
During the fifteenth century some of the lesser
nobility drifted into the towns* This did not always
imply that the hidalgo sold his lands* At the same time,
however /
1 F. Centers Burgos, 'Fernando de Pulgar y los converses',
Sef#* lv (1944), 298*9#
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however, there were prominent townsmen who were willing
to buy up land * men described as "honourable men* (ombres
onradoe? and "gentle men* (gentiles hombres). Thus there
were two contrary movements the extent of which cannot yet
be accurately gauged* In some cases this nobility may
have succeeded in joining the highest social ranks of the
town and fused with the urban aristocracy* It is worth
pointing out, however, that not all the towns received
the lesser nobility readily and it is probable that some
of them lost their status as nobles* Accounts for Seville
for the year# 1449*1450, for example, contain evidence of
nobles who were utterly destitute* Escuderos of the
barrios or district® of ranta Marina and San Vicente, for
example, are listed, along with others such as fishermen
or ♦workers", as being poor and having no possessions or
wealth* They, like Laaarillo*s escudcro a century later,
lived among non-noble townsmen who were at least wealthy
enough to be t axed.*
fhtts, despite the outlets, the fifteenth century
probably /
I A»M*S*, eaja 1449*50, bundle of accounts of the cfulebras
in the various barrios of Seville* The situation with
respect to noble exemption from taxation in Seville
varied during the century* At this.point the nobil ity
were being assessed, along with the rest of the popu*
slation, for the pedido* Most of those listed in the
quiebra* are described" as "nobrea* but occasionally an
occupation or social indication, such as 'escudero*«
"pescador*, or * trabaiador*, is also given*
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probably saw a decline in the social and economic fortunes
of the lesser nobility. It is true that some of the
younger sons of the great nobility escaped the worst con-
Jsequences of the mayoraggo system. But what about their
sons and the great mass of the escuderps. hidalgos. and
cabalieros? Undoubtedly the political crisis was aggra*
ivated by the needs of a declining sector of society anxious
to recoup its fortunes by traditional military means*
4. Changing valuesf the quality of noble life
The traditional ideals and values of the nobility are
portrayed in the biographies which were such an important
element of fifteenth century historiography. Among these
biographers Fernan Pare* de Guzman and Fernando del Pulgar
were admirably objective. *at this 'objectivity* was a
relative one measured in terms of a set of conventions and
ideas about society which coloured everything they wrote.
They, and to a greater extent the other biographers,
praised or denigrated individuals according to criteria
which, though not always explicitly stated, were neverthe-
iless real. An examination of these criteria and values
reveals much about the quality of life of the nobility.*
The /
1 For much of.what follows see J. Romero, 'Sobre la
biogafla espa'&ola del aiglo xv*, C.H.E., l-4i (1944),
115-38,
m*
The fundamental idea that prevails in the biographies
is that the quality of an individual depends on his line*
'age. When Feraan Perez de Guaaoan and Fernando del
Pulgar present an individual to the reader, one of the
first points they examine is his lineage# Unless an
individual belonged to the first or second estate it is
clear that these biographers would not consider him as
worthy of study. The exceptions to this rule are highly
interesting# New men of doubtful or base lineage entered
the first and second estate and were too important to be
omitted from the gallery of c lares varones, In such cases
the biographers went to considerable lengths to clear up
the doubts over lineage or to use these doubts as a form
of eondemnation. Thus Fernan Alfonso de Robles is con*
fdemned by his base origins as well as by his conduct**
Pablo de Fanta Marfa, bishop of Burgos, on the other hand,
may have been a converse but he was "of great lineage among
that people* #2 The most interesting example is the bio*
sgraphy of Miguel Lucas de Iranso* In this case royal
favour raised a man of base origins to the highest social
staUis. His biographer, however, begins his story with
the ennoblement of Lucas de Ir&nzo and completely dis-
3
tregards his previous existence* Thus despite the
important /
* Generaclones, pp.105*8*
2 TbU* p»$9i 1 fue ebreo, de grant linaje de aquella
nayion1*
3 Horaero, ubi supra* p*l20*
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important changes in society * for example, the growth of
towns • the third estate of the labia.Gores did not merit
attention.
The characteristics which the biographers praise and
condemn in individual noblemen reveal the qualities needed
by the perfect noble. 'I'he noble should have a consider*
:able amount of physical strength. Courage, essential in
any good noble, can, however, make up for a lack of strength.
It is because the good noble has courage, a sense of honour
and no fear of death, that he is able to stand his ground
in battle at a time when the villanos have taken to flight.^
Fighting is the nobleman's profession and because of this
he must devote his time to acquiring military skills* The
profession of a noble, however, is not merely a matter of
technical skills. The good noble should have a clear
* /
concept of life's scale of values. In the words of Dies
de Games,
victory in battle is the greatest glory in
this world .. . it is the greatest good and
the greatest glory of this life.
Military virtues are, therefore, vital for the good
noble. There are other qualities, however, which are also
very /
1 These qualities are specifically discussed in hi
Victoriai. chaps, viii and xxx-mii and are referred
to throughout the Generaciones and Claroe Varones.
2 £1 Victorial. p.41.
3 Ibid« p'."2oi"» This is Oxer de Games' conclusion after
reviewing other views of * el mayor bien*.
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very important* The noble should have a firm faith in
God, hate avarice, be loyal to kings, vassals and friends,
and keep his distance from evil men and women of easy
virtue. A good noble shoeId always measure his words
The old ideals and qualities of the nobility un-
:doubtedly survived in the fifteenth century. Indeed
these were the very ideals and qualities which flourished
on the frontier with the kingdom of Granada, Frontier
life produced the verses and songs of the romances
fronteriaos which celebrated the deeds of valour whose
heroes were individual nobles and the alcaldes of the
2
frontier castles. The adeiaatado Diego de kibera,
killed /
1 Ibid, p.64, Chaps.xix-xxi, generally, contain advice
on the buenas maneras and cos tumbres which a noble
should acquire,
2 There is no good study on the frontier. In general, and
for the following points see} L» Snares Fernandez,
Juan 11 y la frontera de Granada (Yalladolid, 1954)
which is corrected on poibo points by M, Arribas Palau,
Las Treguas entre Cast ilia / Granada (Tangier, 1956);
S. de M, Carri&zo, 'Cartas de la frontera', Al ,And,,
xi (1946), 69*130; the same, 'heiaciones fronterizas',
JR.A.B.M,, Ixi (1955), 23-51} J. Torres Fontes, 'La
intromision Granadina', Al-And., xxvii (1962), 105-54g
the same, Xiquena, castillo de la frontera (Murcia,
I960) ; h»'''ken£ndes pjdal. Fior* nueva de "romances viejos
(22nd ed., Madrid, 1968),
/
and give wise advice but learning, according to Dies de




killed at the seige of Alora, became the tragic hero of
Alora. la bjen cercada. The crashing defeat inflicted
on the Moore at the battle of Alporchones, in 1452, was
celebrated in Alia en Granada la rica. Fajardo el Bravo,
alcaide of Lorca, victor of A1porchonea, and a legend in
his own lifetime, is portrayed playing a deadly game of
chess *ith the king of Granada in Jugando eataba el rev
mora. Descriptions in prose of frontier life, such as
those in the biography of Miguel Lucas de Iranao, only
serve to emphasise the fact that the traditional ideals
and qualities of noble life still survived. Moreover,
such traditions were not confined to the frontier. oUz
de Games' LI Victoria! epitomises the ideals of chivalry
and exalts them by describing the activities of Pedro Ni'So
in places as far apart as Lag land and the Mediterranean.
The traditional ideals of noble life, however, had
to be adapted to political and social realities. Above
all the growth of royal power and the attraction of the
royal court affected the quality of life of the great
nobility. The court advocated a policy of royal absolu¬
tism and, in such a setting, men like Alvaro de Luna
appeared, first and foremost, as supporters of royal power.
The king could confer high social status and grant mercedes
of /
1 For the policy of royal absolutism see be! ow
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of immense value. Despite the great displeasure of seen
like Faraan ).'area de Guzman, the monarchy could elevate
Fernan Alfonso de Aobles to a position which even the
great nobility respected. Indeed Fernando del Pulgar
finally recognised this situation when he reluctantly
agreed that the prince can change thecconstituciones de
la caualieria*in order to adapt them to the new order of
things.
The court, however, was not merely a ceiitre of poli¬
tical power or the distribution centre of eagerly sought
me reedeg. Despite the fact that the king «as perpet r<& I ly
on the move, the court had cultural pretensions. It is
true that much attention was devoted to the traditional
pastimes. John II went to considerable lengths to ensure
his supply of falcons from Murcia and Henry IY was devoted
2
to hunting. But it wag also a period when the court and
manners were becoming increasingly refined. Theoretically,
military prowess cauid be exhibited as much in the tourna¬
ments at court as on the frontier. Elaborate tournaments
now formed part of the pageantry which, as in the rest of
Europe, was the essential court setting for great marriages
and /
1 Claros Varones, pp.42-3.
2 See, for example, J. Torres Fonteg, gl halconero y log
ha 1conea de Juan II de Cast!1 la (Murcia,"1961), pp,12-16,
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and diplomatic occasions.1 Moreover this was also a
period when an interest in the classical world and in the
works of Dante* Petrarch* and Boccaccio, became increas-
2
singly influential on court literature. Francisco
Imperial* for example* used the whole arsenal of Dante
to endow John II with all the sublime virtues and portray
him aa a perfect figure on whom the Gods had showered their
gifts.
In many cases the works of court literature were, no
4
doubt, the result of 'badly assimilated erudition*. But
the essential point is that the tone of the court influenced
the style of life of many of the great nobility. The old
values had to give way, to a certain extent* to new ones
and this was exemplified by these Janus-faced nobles. Of
these* Inigo Lopez de ^endoaa* marquis of Santillana,
stands out from the rest. He fought on the frontier and
in the civil wars but he was also an avid collector of
literary works, personally encouraged translations of
Plata, Vergil* Ovid and oeneca, and read widely in Italian,
French /
1 See Hay* op.cit.. p.70 and £. Benito Euano, Los infantes
de Arag&a (Madrid. 19521* pp.41-9 which is a convenient
summary of the chroniclers* descriptions of the chivalric
element in court life.
t
2 See the detailed study by M. Menendea y PeiayP, Poetas
de la corte de Juan II (Madrid, Austral, 1959) and more
recent general surveys such as J, Garcia Lopea, i istoria
de la lifceratura egpanola (9th ed., Barcelona, 1965) and
M, de Riquer, *La culture au baa rnoyen Itge', ,?.VV.H.. vi
(1961), 771-66.
3 J. G imeno Casalduero, 'Fuentes y significado del "Decir
al naciauento de Juan II" de Francisco Imperial', Bev.
Lit. Coyp.. xxxviii (1964), 115-20.
4 Garcia Lopez, op.c1t.* p.89.
204,
French and Catalan. Moreover, if Petrarch inspired
Santiliana's sonnets, 'fechos al italico modo*. the
serranlllas derived their inspiration from Provence and
depicted the encounters of sweet maidens with chivalrous
and elegant knights in a pastoral setting of spring land*
i scapes. Don Enrique de Villena, Blaster of Calatrava.
although not as outstanding as tantiliana, provides an
example of a curious mixture of magical nonsense and learn*
:ing. ilere was a noble who translated the Aeneid into
Castilian and yet dabbled in sorcery to such an extent
that, on his death, the king ordered much of his library
to be destroyed,* '
Santillana and Enrique de Villena were not, of course,
typical representatives of the great nobility. Yet, if
we return once more to the biographers, it is possible to
discern a new emphasis in the values of the good noble
Diea de Games, as we have seen, bluntly dismissed 'learning*
as being of little use to the noble. The same is not true
of Fernan ^'erea de uuaman and Fernando del Pulgar. The
count of haro, for example, is not only praised by Pulgar
for possessing all the traditional virtues but also because
'he learned to read Latin and devoted time to studying
chronicles and the past',46 Moreover, Santillana emerges
as /
1 Ibid. pp.94-8, 118; Kiquer, ubi supra, pp.782-3.
2 Claros Va.rones. p»33.
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as the ideal model of the noble. All the traditional
virtues are stressed. His victories in battle and his
military skill are described. So too is his generosity
arid complete disdain for financial matters. Tet the new
values are stressed as much as the traditional ones. He
is depicted as serving the king, who, recognising his
virtues, makes him marquis of Santiliana and count of El
Real de ^ansanares, But, above all, his learning is
stressed as much as his military- qualities. Despite
some excusable sins of the flesh, Santilla is the perfect
noble and prototype of the courtier because he combines
learning with military success.* The combination is
important for the biographer. ^*en of learning who are
not nobles, for example Juan de hena, find no place in
the works of ^erez de Gusman and fulg&r. But, equally,
those nobles who add learning to the traditional military
virtues are accorded greater praise.
Finally, is it an accident that the decline in the
value of selSorica or lordships and the increased interest
by the nobility in the court and its wealth is accompanied
by a similar change in the emphasis of noble values and
literature? 'The 14th century", writes Tate,
was the aristocratic century par excellence.
Its legends and its literature, the deeds of




t ipendcnce ox the nearlysefiorio**
This aristocratic literature based on the 'self-sufficient
senorio* disap ears in the fifteenth century. Tate quite
rightly stresses the rise of political and literary propa¬
ganda which aimed at stressing the divine nature of the
2
king. But it is also true that the rebel nobility
3
focusaed their attention on the court* Here the example
of Jorge Henrique's famous Coplas por la muerte de su padre
is interesting* The J«anriques supported the rebels against
the monarchy. The poem itself belongs to the traditional
4
'ubi sunt?* theme in Castilian literature. But what
examples does Henrique use to evoke his wistfulness of
remembrance? On the one hand* reflecting the acquisition
of 'learning* by the nobility* he summons up the heroes of
the classical world. But they are preceded by the court,
The only contemporaries cited by Manrique are those who
were intimately connected with the court - John 11* Henry IV,
Alfonso /
1 H.B, Tate* 'An apology for monarchy'* Bona.Phi1.. xv <1961)*
122*
2 Ibid, pp.111-23.
3 The nobility wished to control the court and not diminish
its influence* See below \\
4 The theme stresses the vanity and frailty of all earthly
endeavour and the sentiments expressed by ^anrique are
similar to those of Villon in his Ballade des dames du
temps jadis.
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Alfonso XII, the infantes of Aragon and Alvaro de Luna.
Moreover* Manrique evokes* above all* the atmosphere and
world of the court * the tournaments* jousts* women*
dresses* music* dances* and roerccdee. The aeuprio has
disappeared and has beer* replaced by the court.* This
is surely no accident. The vast documentation on the
Medin&celi family includes one large and complete le^ajo
of accounts dealing with senorro income for the period
1367*92, The legajoa of fifteenth century documentation*
on the other hand* contain little on scnorro income and
a great deal on the royal atercedea which were dispensed
at court.
1 As far as 1 know this point remains unstressed although
from the point of view of literature rather than history,
there may be other explanations for the change of emphasis,
2 A.D. M,* Mad., leg.82, passim.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY ORDERS
THE CHURCH
Estate of the Church* Terminology. Privileges,
Geography
The Church in Castile was an integral part of the
western Church* Consequently, as far as juridical
aspects are concerned, there is little that needs to be
discussed in detail* Variations in terminology from
the general European pattern were few and not really
significant* Thus, for example, in the Basque provinces
the word monasterio was generally used of churches,*
Similarly the dignitaries of the ecclesiastical hier*
:&rchy bore the same names and performed the same func*
itions* The exception here was the arcipreste or arch*
spriest. In Castile the archpriest seems to have re*
jtained substantial power and was not necessarily the
1
agent of the archdeacon as in France*
The criteria relating to entry into the first
estate was also the same as in the rest of Europe* The
special /
1 Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit.* pp.282, 310*11*
2 Royal and ecclesiastical letters often sing le out arch*
spriests and vicars general from the general body of
ecclesiastical judges. See, for example, the letter
of Henry III to the chapter of Toledo, 14 March 1404,
and the letter of the archbishop of Toledo to the arch*
spriest of La Guardia, 14 July 1431, in B*N., M.S.,
13018, fos.141R-143V, 223R-224R and the data on tithe
disputes in the farms of 1412*13 in A.G.S., D.de C„,
leg.4, no.95*
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special jaridleal position of the military orders,
however, needs to be stressed. The members of the
military orders were juridically monks and, from the
twelfth century onwards, they were theoretically governed
by the same rules as the monks of the orders to which
they belonged, As late as 1459 Pius II confirmed the
jurisdiction of btorimond over the Cistercian military
orders, and the abbot of Clteaux entitled himself 'Supreme
Piaster of the Orders of Calatrava, Alcantara, Montesa
1
and Christ1* Juridically, therefore, the paramonastic
warriors of the military orders were monks* In practice
their military functions, their ability to marry, and
their invariable noble status, served to differentiate
2
them sharply from the other monastic orders,
The privileges of the elergy were also, on the
whole, the same as in the rest of western Europe* Church
courte and benefit of elergy meant a large measure of
protection from the secular courts. This protection,
along with the seigneurial jurisdiction wielded by the
Church on its own lands, gave rise to the usual conflicts
with royal justice. The Church was accused of inter*
tiering /
1 Maur Cocheri1, *L'implantation dec abbayea cisterciennes*,
A.E.M., i <1964), 242-4,
2 The variation between theory and practice hardly needs
stressing, See, for example, Alfonso XII*s letter
ordering officials to desist from the embargo on an
encomienda belonging to the wife of a comendador:
C.P.K,A,H*. 519 Tcxxxii, 20 Feb.1466),
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interfering with royal justice, protecting malefactors
with excommunications, and abusing benefit of clergy*
1
Royal laws tried to clarify and settle the problems.
At first sight, the exemption from taxation which
the Castilian clergy enjoyed might seem even greater
than that enjoyed by the nobility* Theoretically this
may have been the case, although the exemption was not a
total one* John II clearly laid down the extent of
the privilege* The clergy were exempt from all royal
taxes except the alcabala which they had to pay in
certain circumstances* They were not exempt, however,
from municipal taxation which was destined for sueh
projects in the common interest as bridgeworks and
repairs to town walls*2 The fiscal privileges of the
clergy, like the judicial privileges, also led to fre*
'quent complaints and friction* The main burden of
the complaints centred on the interference of ecelesias*
:tical courts in fiscal matters and on the attempts by
the clergy to exempt their lay dependents (panianuados)
from royal taxes«^ Other complaints, less often voiced,
argued that the clergy should contribute to the crusade
against /
1 See O.R.. Lib.i, tit.iii, leyes vi-viii, xi*xv; ibid,
tit *vii, leyee i,iij ibid. Lib.ii, tit.i, ley V| ibid.
Lib.iii, tit.i, leyes ii*iv,vii,viii,x. A useful summary
of complaints from both sides in C.P.R.A.H*.370*3 (cix,
1465).
2 Q*R,.Lib.i. tit.iii, leyes i and xiii; ibid,Lib,iv,tit.iv,
leyes xix.xxxiii.
3 See, for example, Cortes, iii,650*1 (3,1453) and J.Palanco
Romero, Estudio* dell reinado de Enrique iy (Granada, 1914),
pp,66»7* The conditions oltaxfarms tried to vitiate the
powers of the vicars general in fiscal disputes involving
the clergy and attempted to have independent judges nomi*
snafed by the bishops) A.G.S.,0.deC.,leg«4,no.97,13 May
1432.
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against the Moors and that lands given or sold into
mortmain should continue to provide royal taxes.*
Undoubtedly the clergy enjoyed a highly privileged
position with regard to the royal taxes. It should
not be forgotten, however, that the Church itself taxed
the clergy and that the proceeds often went to the Crown.
Although the Castilian Church was an integral part
of the western Church, several practical differences
deserve to be s tressed. The first point concerns the
ecclesiastical geography of Castile. There was clearly
a radical difference of structure between the north and s°u
of the kingdom. North of Toledo, the kingdom of Castile
was densely settled with monasteries. South of Toledo,
2
however, there were only soma five monasteries* Juri¬
dical ly the members of the military orders were monks:
in practice they were nothing of the sort. The southern
half of the kingdom of Castile, therefore, must surely
have been the least monastic area in the whole of western
Europe,
A similar situation existed with regard to bishop-
tries. North of a line drawn through Toledo there were
eighteen bishoprics. The line itself cuts through four
bishoprics. South of the line there were only six
bishoprics. Apart from the bishopric of Cadie the
southern /
1 See the undated petition by procuradores in A.G.S.,
D.de C., leg.4, no.15 and Q,R,. Lib.i, tit • ill, ley i.
2 This conclusion is based on an approximate count of
the fifteenth century references to monastic houses
which 1 have encountered in the sources.
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southern dioceses were vast* Only Burgos among the
northern bishoprics can really be compared in si so to the
southern dioceses.*
The reasons for this difference of structure between
north and south are not hard to find. Quite obviously
the diocesan structure corresponded to the timetable of
the reconquest. The quick and vast advance in the thir¬
teenth century accounts for the fast bishoprics of Toledo*
Cordoba* and Seville* The fifteenth century conquest of
the reaiaining Moorish area accounts for the four moder-
lately siaed bishoprics which somewhat helped to restore
2
the balance between north and south*
equally obviously the geography of monasticism
corresponded to the timetable of the reconquest* with
the Tagua acting as a barrier.3 It was natural that the
monasteries should be situated in areas well defended from
the ebb and flow of the reconquest. Added to this was
the fact that the lands of the south went to the military
orders. The other factor that influenced the geography
of monasticism was that its impulse declined prior to
the /
1 The four bishoprics in the centre were Coria* Plascncia*
Toledo, and Cuenca* Figures for the whole of Spain are:
30 bishoprics to the north* 6 on either side of the line,
7 to the south*
2 The bishoprics of Malaga* Granada* Guadix and Almeria
together formed an area roughly equivalent to the single
diocese of Cordoba,
3 Maur Cocheril* ubi supra, p.245.
4 Ibid, pp.240-2.
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the reconquest of the south* The eleventh ami twelfth
centuries had been the great age for Cluniac and
Cistercian houses. The thirteenth c entury sav both a
decline in the number of monastic foundations and the
reconquest of the south. Neither the Cistercian; nor
Benedictines pushed south. Only the Benedictines of
Silos founded monasteries in Madrid and Seville.* In
the later middle ages the Jeronimites founded a few
houses to the south of the main northern field of raonas-
:teries. The Cistercians founded one house in Seville.
In short the total number of foundations in the later
2
middle ages was not impressive*
It is not too risky to conclude that the south was
an area of purely nominal Christianity where the fabric
of the Church was extremely weak* In this connection
it is interesting to note that Fernando del Pulgar viewed
the situation in much the same way at the end of the
fifteenth century* He argued that the problem of the
Jews and the lack of Christianity in Andalusia could only
be solved by following the example of the north of the
kingdom* According to Pulgar's estimate there were some
10*000 young girls in Andalusia between ten and twenty
years /
1 Peres de Urbel* Los monies espaftoles. ii* 526#
2 Ibid. pp.527»8j iiaur Cocherll"'I'J"ttSi"supra. pp*239-40*
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years of age* From birth these girls never left their
houses and knew of no beliefs save those practised by
their parents* Moreover, the majority of the population
were not proper Christians for the simple,reason that
they were not given a lead* These comments suggest that
there was a shortage of parish clergy. Indeed Polgar
argued that this lead should be given by people* pre*
•sumably clergy* sent to the south* Moreover some of
these should be converted Jews of the same calibre as
those who had for long been giving an outstanding lead
in the north. In this way* by example and by proper
teaching of doctrine* the problem in the south could be
solved,* Pulgar's analysis perhaps lacks the proper
factual content to support the conclusion that is being
put forward* Nevertheless the conclusion is also
supported by the fact that a similar situation has pre*
ivailed in the south of the peninsula down to the present
day.2
How far did ecclesiastical frontiers coincide with
political frontiers? In some ways the identification*
was remarkable. There were* for example* four military
orders /
1 For Pulgar* s view see F. Cantera ourgos* 'Fernando de
Pulgar y los conversos * * Sefiv ( 1944), 308*9.
2 The south* it is argued* is" an area of 'cathollcismc
freaque sans pr&tres*. See ll.lUeard, 'La dualite doa civllI'sationhi spaniqu * * B.»H*, ccxvi (1936)* 1*17 j
F*Chaunu* 'Les Lspagnes peripheriques * * R.E.S.* xii
(1963), 163j reviews by Chaunu In &*B».ccxii (1954)*
363-9*
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orders theoretically dependent on the French monastery
of Moriiuond: Avis in Portugal, Alcantara and Calatrava
in Castile, and M'ontesa in the Crown of Aragon, The two
Cast!lian orders, moreover, conformed to & previous poll*
iticai pattern since the order of Alcantara was on the
whole a i-eonese order while Calatrava was Castilian, A
similar situation can be detected for soroe of the purely
monastic orders. The western frontier of old Castile,
for example, seems to have acted as a boundary between
the Cistercian houses dependent on Clairvaux and those
dependent on Moriiaond,*
Political and ecclesiastical frontiers were, however,
extremely vague. In many cases the two did not coincide.
In the first place there were the obvious cases of depend*
lence on places like Cluny, Citeaux, Clairvaux and
i«orixaond» As will be seen below, there was a tendency
in the fifteenth century for Castilian monasticism to
form a separate congregation free of foreign influence.^
The striking examples of fluctuating frontiers, however,
concern the Castilian dioceses.
There were three ecclesiastical provinces in Castile,
The most important province was undoubtedly that of Toledo
which contained one archbishopric and seven bishoprics.
The /
1 kaur Cocheril, ubi supra, p.246,
2 See below ^.^04-S"
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Hie province of Santiago contained one archbishopric and
twelve bishoprics. The province of Seville consisted
solely of the archbishopric itself and the bishopric of
Cadis. These three provinces were all within the poli¬
tical frontiers of the kingdom of Castile. The three
northern bishoprics of Qviedo, Leon, and Burgos, howevert
depended directly on the papacy. indeed the bishop of
Burgos was usually accorded the honours of an archbishop
at public assemblies* Moreover the bishopric of
Cartagena was theoretically in the ecclesiastical province
of Valencia and the bishopric of Calahorra was in the
Aragonese province of Zaragoaa. At a lower level the
problem was even more complex. Th© diocese of Cartagena,
for example, although mostly situated in Castilian terri¬
tory but dependent on the province of Valencia, included
2
the area of Orihuela which was, politically, in Valencia.
2. /
1 The ecclesiastical and political frontiers between
Portugal and Castile were clarified during the Schism.
In I3y3 Boniface IX transferred to Lisbon those bishop¬
ries in Portugal which had depended on Santiago, In
1394 Clement VII retaliated by granting to Santiago
those Gaiiclan bishoprics which had belonged to Braga,
Martin V tacitly accepted these changes, L,Mansilla,
'Disputas diocesanas eatre Toledo, Braga, y Compos tela*,
A,A., iii (1955), 89-143,
2 P,Tarsicio de Ascona, La eleccion y reforma del
epIscopado (Madrid, I960), pp.28-9,33-4,$1, "(Henceforth
cited as Tarsicio, hleccion).
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2. J3ia. 'eaith of the Church
It has been argued that the wealth of the nobility
cannot be simply related to a measurement of the land
they controlled* indeed* precisely because agrarian
and seigneurial income was insufficient the nobil ity
attempted to recoup their losses by securing royal privi¬
leges at court and controlling the land-based royal re-
-venues within their lordships* In general terms the
elements of this same crisis, resulting from rising prices
and inelastic income, faced the Church* How did the
Church in Castile fare in this crisis?*
i) Lordship and mortmain
The juridical lordships held by the Chureh (abadeagos ?
were in most essential features the same as those held by
the nobility (senortos) * The Crown retained the saiae
functions with regard to the ecclesiastical lordships as
it did with the noble lordships* Like the noble, the
abbot or bishop exercised the mero y auxto fwperio - that
is the ordinary administrative, judicial, ami executive
powers exercised by the ecclesiastical seigneurial offi-
icials*
Mortmain, however, made a great difference in the
case /
1 for papal income from Castile, which is not included
in the following discussion, see J* Fernandes Alonso,
•Los ©nviadas pontificios y la colectoria en Lspana*,
A,A** ii (1954), 51-122* This shows that inelastic
papal revenues declined sharply in the 1460s and 1470s
because the collectors failed to adjust their admini¬
stration in order to take into account the devaluations
of the maravedi.
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ease of the Church. It meant leia chance for the Crown
to recover land, it meant a steady process of growth and
consolidation for the ecclesiastical lordships, and it
meant that other methods had to be employed to protect
crown lands from the Church than those used against the
nobi 1 i ty «
Koya1 attempts to control the provision and selection
of the individuals who were to wield this power was one
obvious method which is discussed below* It has also
been noted that almost all royal grants of land to the
laity contained clauses prohibiting the recipient from
transferring the land to the Church without special royal
pereai ss ion.
More striking, however, is the fact that royal grants
to the Church in the later middle ages were few in number.
Thus, while the Crown showered gifts of land and revenues
on the nobility, the amount of wealth which the Church
derived from the Crown in the fifteenth century was neg¬
ligible.
This then was a striking difference. Tim nobility's
main source of revenue was the Crown. The Church obvi-
;ous1y derived some of its wealth from grants made by
the Crown in preceding centuries but, in the fifteenth
century, the Church, unlike the nobility, did not manage
to extract extra revenues and land from the Crown,
Iloya 1 /
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Royal grants of land to the Church were by now
rare* A glance# for example, at fif teenth-century
donations of land to monasteries shows that the Crown
rarely figured as the donor. It is true that there
were exceptions to this generalisation* Henry XI,
John I and Henry III, for example# helped the monastery
of Guadalupe to begin life with the proper attributions
of temporal lordship. Similarly, as far as bishoprics
are concerned, one can point to the donation in 1410 to
the bishop of Palencia and his successors of San Salvador
do Pernia and the title of count of Pernia for help pro*
2
tvided in the conquest of Anteouera. But these were
isolated examples* In general the striking feature
3
was the lack of royal munificence*
The sharp decline in royal alienation of lands to
the Church does not, however, imply that the land con*
^trolled by the Church was small. Mortmain protected
the massive alienations of former centuries. Moreover
the documentation confirms that the impulse of indivi*
xduals to donate land to the Church was still strong in
the /
1 For example, Henry III confirms Henry 11*8 original
grant of civil and criminal jurisdiction to Guadalupej
A.H.N., Cloro, Fergs, carp. 398, doc,8, 25 April 1391 *
Henry 111*8 orders the town of Truglllo to surrender
Val de Palacios and its area to the officials of the
monastery! ibid# doc#11, 9 Dec.1393.
2 An excellent study of the structure of this episcopal
lordship is R. Carandc, *E1 obiepo# el concejo y los
regidores de Palencia*, h*Madrid, ix (1932)
249-71.
3 Perea de Urbel, pp.cit *. ii. 528.
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the fifteenth century.* More surprisingly, perhaps,
monastic documents show that in mauy cases the monasteries
were buying and exchanging land in an attempt to rations*
2
ilise their holdings,
There was, therefore, throughout the fifteenth
century a continuing trend of donations to the Church,
It m&y well be doubted whether the volume of donations
was as groat as in previous centuries. Yet the main
point is that the Church retained its immense control
over land, A3 wit!) the nobility, St would be pointless
to establish an exhaustive catalogue of the geography of
these lordships. There is enough evidence to establish
3
the general point and to take the conclusion as read.
What is far more important is to establish the sources
of income. How much money did the Church derive from
its lordships by reason of its juridical power? Did
the Crown prove as lucrative a source of revenue for the
Church as it did for the nobility? Haw profitable were
spiritual /
1 Documentation on the Cistercian monastery of hioseco,
for example, contains a wide variety of private dona*
jtions including tierras de nan 1lever, vineyards,
and usufruct of mi list seethe documents dating from
1386*1457 in A.H.N., Clero, Pergs., carp.359, docs.2,
6i carp.360, docs,12,13; carp,361, docs,?,17j carp,
362, docs,1*4,9; carp,363, docs.5,9,13; carp,364,
doc,16,
2 Detailed references to documents are too numerous to
cite, A.K.N,, clero, Pergs, carps,360-364 contain more
purchases than donations as far as Rloseco is concerned,
lb id. carp.943, contains documents showing .1 at tonal is*
TatTon of holdings belonging to Santa Maria de Piasca.
Ibid. carps.400*408, contain documents illustrating the
consolidation of dehSsas by Guadalupe during the period
1412-78.
3 See Tareicio, Eleccion, pp.38*51; the same, Isabel la
Cat6lica (Madrid, 1964), pp.430*2; Peres de Urbel. op.
ell., il.532*3,
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spiritual sources of revenue? Did the monaster!es
make money from the agricultural exploitation of their
lands?
ii) The Crown ao a source of income
The parsimony of the Crown with respect to grants
of land is also to be snen in the lack of royal aliena*
s tions of revenues to the Church. Even if an obviously
weighted example is taken this point becomes clear, The
Libro de Aaientoo of 1447 contains data on revenues held
from the Crown by five members of the Castllian hier-
sarchy (Table XIII),* These five are the archbishop of
Toledo* the bishop of Paleneia, the bishop of Cuenca,
Bishop Fonseca (presumably bishop of Avila), and the
bishop of Calaborra. Quite obviously the revenues
alienated to these five were in some cases alienated to
them in their non-ecclesiastical role* Thus hope dc
Barrientos, bishop of Cuenca, who held the greatest amount
of rare (219,571 mrs), did so because he was extraordina¬
rily close to the king and was, in fact, his confessor*
Yet the total holdings of the five bishops did not even
amount to the sums held by one count of Alba, one count
of /
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of Benavsnte, one Mendoaa, one count of Castro, or one
count of Haro (Table XII),*
It may be objected the.t an incomplete Ljbro de
Aslentoe is hardly a satisfactory source of infortoation
on the wealth of the Church * it gives, after all, data
on a few bishops important at court and nothing else*
Moreover, if we look at the problem from the local level,
it is possible to build up an impressive picture of
apparently substantial privileges deriving both from the
Crown and other members of society.
In the first place there were many privileges grant*
sing immunities from taxation of various kinds, These
exemptions were very varied. In. same cases they might
be mere confirmations of older privileges which, by the
fifteenth century, had ceased to have any real economic
significance,^ More important were the royal privileges
granting a specific number of escugados or exempt peasants
to a monastery,* Finally, there were privileges of a
particularly favourable kind which provided exemptions
from /
1 Appendix L below ^
2 For e.cample Horary Ill's conf irma t ion, 15 Dec,1393,
exempting the monastery of Bujedo from providing for
the needs (raula, baso, yantar) of the royal merinos
mayorost ro, Pergs,, carp.172, doc,3,
With the decline of these officials such an immunity
was so irrelevant that th© king even granted it to
all monasteries: Ibid, carp.175, doc.13, 20 Feb.1392,
3 For example, the confI rata t i oris of escusado* to the
monasteries of Guadalupe and La Vlbi<j'.' carp.400,
docs.,12,14-16,16,19} carp,384, doc.5, Such privi-
jleges attracted population and labour and were given
in return for prayers.
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from heavy burdens of taxation, such as the alcabala,
or which facilitated the economic activities of a parti*
2
:cular monastery - for example sheep ranching# By
their very nature it is hard to assess, the importance
of these privileges in terms of actual figure® of income#
More important, perhaps, were the privileges which
provided extra income# The original grants of lordship,
for example, provided the possibility of income derived
from the exercise of temporal lordship. The bishop of
Siguenza, for example, was the temporal as well as the
spiritual lord of ciguonsa and it« landa. Moreover,
even although Alfonso XT in 1331 triad to put an and to
the entile 3 8 disputes between the Church and the town by
asserting royal overlordship and the right of the towns-
men to appeal against the sentences of the episcopal
adminis t ration, the bishop and chapter of Siguensa still
retained temporal lordship in the form of the castlesu,
towers, keep, municipal posts and justice# It should
also be remembered, of course, that lordship brought in
revenue /
1 For example the privileges exempting the Cistercians
end grangercms of ftieseco from al cabalas and moneda
forera; ibid, carp. 360, doc #'§>'# #"March 1408; carp#
cloc,15, 2 May 1426.
2 The monastery of Guadalupe uaa especially favoured#
The summary of all royal privilages relating to sheep
ranching on the dorso of ibid, carp.399, doc.22
accurately conveys the essence of the original privi¬
leges scattered throughout carps.398-403# Ibid,
carp.401, docs.12,13,15 and 18 Jan,1416, are similar
privileges but granted by the infante Enrique end the
queen of Arsgon for Guadalupe Tlocks using their lands#
224.
revenue from such taxes as the martlnlega. The amount
of Income provided by lordship varied with the geographi¬
cal extent of the lordships and also with the powers
included in the lordships. Not all bishops and monas¬
teries were in the same privileged position as the
bishop of Siguensa.* Indeed, the abbot of Silos even
sold the civil and criminal jurisdiction which he held
over the town of Silos to the constable of Castile in
2
the early fifteenth century# The existence of these
sources of income has, nevertheless, to be taken into
account.
As has been argued, however, the income granted in
the actual document setting up a lordship was nowhere as
important as the revenues which may have been alienated
by the Cramn subsequently - additional privileges which,
in fact, alienated what was theoretically reserved to
the Crown. Once again there is evidence that such privi¬
leges were granted to the Church. A few examples of
these extra sources of income - relating mainly to
monasteries - will prove the point.
The juridical grants of lordship usually retained
to /
1 Taraicio, adeccion. pp.38-51j Tareicio, Isabel la
Cat6lica. p.430, For a monastic example see J.Puyol
y Alongo, El abadengo de Saha&dn (Madrid, 1915). part
two, chaps.1-4.
2 Pdrea de Urbel, op.cit., ii.528-32 has a general dis-
tcussion on the decline in value of these lordships
and cites this example.
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to the Crown the taxes known as eacrlbanias. tercias,
and portazgos, There are plenty of examples which can
be cited showing that in fact these were often alienated.
The monastery of Ona certainly retained the proceeds of
the escribanias*. So too# probably, did the monastery
2
of Sahagun, As always# the monastery of Guadalupe was
in a more favourable position than the other monasteries*
In this case the monastery not only held the proceeds of
the escribanias. but also the portaggos» although with
3
some difficulty. The terelag of certain specified
areas were also alienated by the Crown to the monastery.
Although these examples relate only to mon&steri®s# the
same type of examples could be cited for the bishoprics
S
and collegiate churches.
Most monasteries also seem to have derived some
income from salt# though this was sometimes due not only
to royal privileges but to grants from individual nobles.
Thus the Benedictine house of OfSa received money or salt
from /
1 North 300 oars per yean A.H.N., Ciero, Papeles, lea.
1284# doc. dated 13 Sept.1403.
2 See the sentcncia in ibid# Pergs., carp.941# doc.14,
24 May 1409.
3 A.barrado '£1 monasterio de Guadalupe y las escribanias *,
R.E.S., Separata (1952) gives a summary of the revenue,;
and problems. Further data in A.H.N.# Clero# Pergs,,
carp.398, docs. 12*14 j carp.399# docs,18,20; carp.400,
doc.6; carp.402# doc.10; carp.404# docs.7,13.
4 These areas were Logrosan# Cahamero# Berzocana # and
Yaidepalacios: ibid., carp*406, doc.3# 12 June 1444.
5 For example Henry W*a confirmation# 23 Dec,1455, of
Alfonso XI*o privilege to the bishop and chapter of
Coria of 3,000 cars per year on the servicio and montaago:
B.N,, MS.# 130717"fos.l68A-171R,
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from the salines at Anana, Kusio and Posa,* the Cistercian
2
monastery of kioseco from the salines at kusio, the
3
monastery of Guadalupe from Tragillo, the Cistercian
4
house at Sobrado from La Coruna, the Premonstratensian
5
monastery at Bugedo from Anana, the convent of Santa
Maria Magdalena from the Medinaceli salines.^
More important were the juroa or perpetual assign*
imcnts of sums of money on specified royal taxes. In
effect the system of juros meant that the theoretical
reservation of taxes to the Crown was preserved while
the substance was alienated. The Cistercian monastery
7
of Bugedo had a juro from the Crown worth 3,000 mrs p.a.
The female house of Santa Clara de Allariz had 6,000 mrs
&
p.a. assigned on the Galician customs duties. The
Benedictine monastery of San Julian de Samos had 1,000
9
mrs p.a. assigned on local revenues. The convent of
Santo Domingo el Real in Madrid was given a juro of
20,000 /
1 Royal help to secure payment of privileges; A.H.N.,
Clero, Pergs•, carp.318, doc.8, Oct,1394} carp.319,
doc»3, 18 Dec.1398, A censo perpetuo assigned on
Anana and noble help to secure payment; ibid, carp.
331, docs.19-20, 1 Dec,1469.
2 Ibid, carp.365, doc.l, 23 April 1461*
3 Ibid, carp.408, doc.2, 20 Sept.1470.
4 Ibid, carp.650, doc.6, 28 April 1420.
5 Ibidi. carp.175, doc.14, 20 Feb.1392.
6 A.D.M., Med., leg,23, doc.28, 22 Sept,1441.
7 A.H.N,, Clero, Pergs,, carp.172, doc.15, 18 May 1452.
8 Ibid, carp.1430, doc.13, confirmation of fourteenth
ceiitury privilege in 1482.
9 Ibid, carp.1265, doc.l, 26 Aug.1399.
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20,000 mrs p.a. by Henry IV, assigned on the alcabaias
of Huete and its area,' The list could be extended,
especially when it is remembered that piety led to small
scale privileges,*
A list of privileges and lordships, however, does
not help in determining their value as a source of in*
:come. In some cases this value is impossible to assess
* for example, the value of privileges granting exemption
from taxation. On the whole, however, it is possible
to attempt such an evaluation and the results show that
in general these sources of income were worth relatively
little. For greater clarity the examples given below
refer mainly to the examples already given. In this
way the practical applications of privileges can be
worked ou t•
The first and most obvious difficulty concerns the
problems entailed in collecting the sums of money in*
svolved, The accounts of the monastery of Oha note that
the martlntega was not usually collected because of the
poverty of the vasallpa and that the juro. assigned on
the royal alcabalas, did not always * fit in1 with the
3
resources of the tax. The Incomes derived from
escribanias. tercias, and portaaaoa had to be defended
against /
1 A.D.M., Ad., leg,24, doc,21, 26 March 1474 contains
the original grant dated 20 Dec,1462,
2 The 1,000 mrs assigned to San Julian de i amos, for
example, was for a capellania.
3 Accounts of Oha in A.B.N., Clero, Papeles, leg,1297.
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against intruders and often the revenues were lost,*
The same problems of collection also affected the juros
and the revenues from salines* Qha had to obtain royal
backing in order to have its salt income at Anana protec¬
ted and. even then, the salt farmers created difficult-
2
:ies* The nuns at Santa Clara de All&ris had complained
bitterly about the usurpations of their juro by the noble¬
man Pero Ferrandes de Castro and it is doubtful whether
matters were much Improved by the royal re-assignment of
3
the privileges on the Galician ports. The monastery
of Samoa complained that it cost more than 1.000 mrs to
collect the privilege of 1.000 mrs assigned on the customs
at Vivero. In this case the Crown re-assigned the privi¬
lege to royal revenues in the neighbourhood of the monas-
Jtery.* Not all x-eligious houses were as lucky. The
convent of Santo Domingo el Real in Madrid had to sell its
juro of 20,000 mrs p.a.5within two years of receiving it,
5
because of the difficulties in collecting it.
The /
1 Hence the sentenclas and royal documents protecting the
privileges: see the documents cited above p.225, n.1-3.
2 The Jewish tax farmers treated the monastic officials
with contempt! see does# cited above p.226, n.l.
3 Document cited above p.226, n,8.
4 Document cited above p.226, n»9.
6 The juro was sold to Lope Vaaquea de Acuna in 1464 and
Is confirmed in the document cited above p.22?. n.l.
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The second point about these sources of income is
that the sums of money involved were small in comparison
with other sources of income. The martinleaas and Jure
on alcabalas held by the monastery of Gna were worth, if
collected, 3,000 and 5,000 mrit per annum respectively.
These were small sums of money when compared with the
total income in money of 53,475 mrs p«a, and an estimated
global income of 236,539 mrs p.a* The eacribanias of
Ona were only worth another 300 mra p.a. It is true
that these may be exceptions. Yet the same picture
emerges if a particularly favourable privilege is examined.
The portasgo was a tax on trade, Valladolid was an
important centre of communic at ions, It is not, there*
Sfore, surprising to find that at the end of the century
the farm of the gortasgo was providing the Church of
Santa Maria la Mayor with 14,650 aura p,a, This was a
large sum by any reckoning but it was still only a frac¬
tion of the total income of some 650,000 mrs. p.a,, the
2
bulk of which came from other sources,
The last point concerns the volume of privileges
granted by the Crown to the Church, It has been argued
that, because of static or even declining revenues
derived from lordship ami land, the nobility turned to
the i
1 Accounts of Ona, A.H.N,, Clero, Papeles, leg,1297, 1456,
2 A,C,V.t accounts for the years 1499 and 1500.
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the Crown for salvation. toes the Church in economic
difficulties and did the privileges which benefited the
nobility also benefit the Church? The answer is two-
;fold. The income derived from lordship also seems to
have remained static for the Church at a period when
prices roae. For example, the proceeds of the martiniega
tax from one vi llage in 1460 would be the same as it had
been in the 1390s.* Yet the Church, with a few except-
:ions, did not find an answer to the dilemma in royal
largesse.^ For what is really striking about royal
privileges is their numerical lack of balance between
those granted to the nobility and those granted to the
Church. Individual bishops may have been politically
powerful enough to participate in the noble onslaught on
royal revenues. The Church as a whole was not.
iii) /
1 See the enquiry, 18 Feb.1460, into the obligations of
the area of £iguenaa and the traslado of a document
of 139? in A.H.N,, Cle.ro, Pergs., carp*328, doc*6*
2 The outstanding exception was the monastery of
Guadalupe which was highly favoured by the Trastamaran
dynasty and the great nobility. A whole series of
juros must be added to the privileges already cited:
12,000 mrs p.a* ibid, carp,399, doc.15, 9 June 1408;
20,000 mra pa., carp.406, doc.8, 15 Oct,1446; 25,000
tars p.a., carp.408, doc.17, 20 Jan.1480; 30,000 mra
p.a., ibid, doc.18, 2? July 1480; 10,000 mra p.a.,
ibid, doc.19, 2 March 1481 ......
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iii) spiritual income
What other sources of income were available? The
revenues of benefices included income from such sources
as tithes and offerings which in fact derived from the
spiritual lordship of the Church, After all tithes and
oblations were not theoretically available to the other
estates of society* This 'spiritual* income should*
therefore, be distinguished from revenues such as the
rents and profits arising from agricultural exploitation
of land* Tet the very nature of surviving accounts
makes such a distinction impossible. Often tithes and
oblations were accounted for along with rents paid in
grain. The problem is further complicated by the pattern
of benefices. Figures may refer to greater or lesser
tithes depending on whether they refer to the income of
the rector or the vicar. Alternatively figures may
refer to pensions or portions or a general farm, depend¬
ing on the settlement of the problem of revenues after a
benefice had been appropriated. These problems are best
dealt with in a discussion of patterns of wealth within
the Church,* One or two general points may, however,
be made at this stage.
The tithe systern in Castile deserves special mention




England the tithes were generally subdivided into
greater arid lesser (menudos 1 tithes, with the obvious
difference that wine figured prominently among the
1
greater tithes* The peculiar aspect of the tithe
system in Castile was that the Crown received a fixed
share of the tithes* This royal share consisted of
two ninths of all the tithes paid to the Church and was
2
known as the t ercias, There were other important con*
«sequences arising from this fact*
The first general point is that because the Crown
had a vested interest in the tithes, the collection and
administration of the tithe system was probably made more
efficient* Certainly the Crown was willing to help the
Church in making sure that the payment of tithes was not
impeded in any way* more important still was the fact
that the royal administration played an important part at
the local level. For if archbishops, bishops, chapters
and other members of the Church farmed both the tithes
(dieziaos)and the tercias of their areas, the royal admini¬
stration farmed the tercias and alcabalas together, The
two systems of farming, however, did not often conflict*
The ecclesiastical farmers worked at a local level and
were accountable to the royal farmers for the t&rcias at
a /
1 The wine tithe was often paid in taosto or grapes
iBuvjcdlately after the harvest*
2 In practice the royal share often consisted of one
third since this was more easily and rapidly calculated*
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a more general level. It is? aieo remarkable that
Church and State • bound by common interest * see® to
have rarely conflicted in judicial disputes involving
the tithes and the terciae. lloyal conditions for the
farm of the tercias, at the beginning of the century,
envisaged disputes being referred either to archpriests,
'4
vicaripg, and other ecclesiastical judges or to secular
judges such ae the alcaldes» The only stipulation was
that the disputes should be determined according to
principles 2aid down in the royal farm,' In practice,
disputes about the tithes probably went before the
ecclesiastical courts and those concerning the t ercias
before the royal courts. In many cases, however, the
matter wag not so simple. In 1376, for example, a royal
official cited a certain Domingo Ferrandee de los Huerto#
before the royal alcaldes of Atlens* over a failure to
produce the royal frerc of Paredes. Ferrandea, in his
defence, alleged that he had only collected the tithes
of the cathedral chapter at Figuenea and had at no time
collected the tardus. At this point a racioneyo of the
cathedral chapter argued that this was an ecclesiastical
matter and should be referred to the bishop of Siguenaa
or his vicarlos, The judgment of the alcaldes bears
witness to the fine balance that existed in this aspect
of /
I A.G.S., D, do C.# leg.4, doc.95 contains the farm
conditions for 1412>13,
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of Church-State relaciona# They first of ail determined
that they were the competent authorities to deal with the
case since tne whole basis of the prosecution was that
the royal tercias had not been paid. Then, however, they
passed sentence against the royal official on the grounds
that the evidence he had produced was flimsy and did not
support his case.
ihe second general point concerns the part played
by the nobility in controlling tithes. Two ninths of the
tithes constituted the royal income of the t ere i as, It
has been argued, however, that the nobility in the fif-
iteenth century attempted to wrest control of royal taxa¬
tion, either by gaining the necessary privileges or by
replacing the Crown in the local administration. nogi-
teally, therefore, if is to be expected that the royal
tarciaa in the localities would often fall into the hands
of the great nobility. Indeed examples of noble control
of the terci&a in the localities have already been cited
and only one more example need be given. The royal
conditions for the farm of the terciag for the years
1412-13 were drawn up during the period when Ferdinand
of Antequera was in control of government. Indeed the
farm /
1 See Minguela y Arnedo, Historia de la diocesis de
Ciguensa (Madrid, 1910), doe.cxxxip.SSTV An example
of a long and involved tithe dispute, due not to friction
between Church and State but to the tenacity of Jewish
tax farmers, in F, Cantera Burgos, 'Las tercias reaies
del obispado de Gaiahorra', Se|,, xviii (1958), 291-313.
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farm conditions were signed by the infante himself. Is
it surprising, therefore, that the only areas exempted
from the application of the conditions were the lands of the
infante? It merely meant that the Infante wanted to be
in complete control of the tercias in his own lands.*
Thus, while the general levying of tithes was reinforced
by a royal interest in part of the proceeds, the Church
also found that the nobility could prove e powerful rival
In the localities. For, if the king was receiving the
tercias from the tithes produced throughout the kingdom,
the noble was often retaining a minor share of the
tithes produced on land under hi® control. Inevitably,
therefore, there are signs that the nobility tried to
impede this drain of resources from their lands.
Because accounts lumped together the income derived
from tithes and the income derived from rents and direct
agricultural exploitation, it is impossible to assess
the relative importance of the spiritual sources of
income. In the case of the revenues of Santa Maria la
Mayor, Valladolid, some evaluation is possible. In 1498
oblations were worth 1,829 mrs? in 1500 they were worth
l*i500 /
1 A.G.S., D.de C,# leg,4, doc,95, The document appears to
have been the chancery model for all the various copies
of the farm conditions. See also P,L.F«m&nde», *Aspectos
fiscales tie Villarramiel*, I.T.T.M.. Separata {1955) for
further examples of lo«s of control over
2 For example John II * s letter, 1? Jan.1454, to the great
nobility of Cordoba who had impeded episcopal and royal
officials in their collection of tiihest A.O.M,, Priego,
leg,84, doc,4.
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1,500 mrs, These are small sums* Far wore important
were the lesser tithes. The accounts are confusing at
this point. The lesser tithes (menudos) are entered
along with prestamos, In all probability the word
prestamos refers to some kind of fixed arrangement re*
slating to appropriated benefices. In 1498 the menudos
✓
y preetamos were worth ?1,375 mrs and in 1500, 82,230 mrs.
All these figures must be related to the total incomes of
these two years which were respectively 310,420 mrs and
329,318! mrs, The spiritual revenues, therefore, in
this case were approximately worth about 25% of total
i rc one , *
One final tempting approach should be noted so that
it can be dismissed. Assuming that figures for royal
Income from the tercias were roughly equivalent to one
third of the total value of the tithes, cannot the g1oba1
value of tithes for the whole of Castile be calculated?
Figures in royal accounts cannot be used for this purpose
for substantial reasons. Areas like Galieia escaped the
fiscality of the Crown, Moreover, the figures were for
taxes farmed out and cannot be used for en ad valorem
calculation.
iv /
1 See Appendix N below ^-^Z-3
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iv) Agrarian income: variations, the demesne
The l&st and most important source of income, as
far as the Church was concerned, was the revenue derived
from land. Under this heading are included profits
from demesne farming, rents from tenant farmers, and even
rents for houses. These revenues were clearly not de*
1 rived from the spiritual lordship of the Church, They
did derive from temporal lordship, but are to be dis-
• tinguished because they were paid in respect of land
and not because of any personal relationship between
vasallo and sehpr. In this discussion almost all the
information relates, unfortunately, to the monasteries.
Only one collegiate church is discussed and, alone, is
left to act as an example of non-monastic revenues from
land.
The first point to be discussed relates to the types
of exploitation of land. Clearly the siae of holdings,
and the type of agrarian exploitation varied widely.
Some of this variation may have been due to differences
of population density, climate, and soil, Equally,
variation may have been due to a difference of method of
exploitation - the Cistercians immediately spring to mind.
The documentation of the monastery of Guadalupe, for
example, inevitably throws up a picture made up almost
entirely /
238.
entirely of ranching activities over a large area.*
situated in the heart of the sheep belt of Castile the
monks of Guadalupe turned to the natural economic activity
of the region* The areas involved were vast. fthen
purchases were made they involved the dehesas or large
tracts of pasture land.2 In one sense this meant that
all land was demesne land. Moreover with the numbers
of Sheep involved, control of the sheep routes had to be
ensured. Sometimes this was guaranteed by both royal
3
and private privileges. At other times, even in an
area so sparsely populated, the monks found their grazing
rights disputed by the only possible entity that could
4
object * the town of Trugillo.
The ranching world of the Guadalupe monks contrasted
strongly with the economic activities of the monasteries
of Una and Sahagun which lay much further north. This
was a world in which land was carefully delineated when
it was bought, gifted, or sold. Thus, a vineyard pur*
:chased in 1410 was
in /
1 The Guadalupe documentation is so extensive that only
a few examples will be cited in the following footnotes.
2 Examples in A.H.N., Clero. Perga., carp.400, doc.11;
carp.404, docs.18,21j carp.405, doc.l. Unlike the
north, lands are large enough for detailed mo jonamientos
and dealindamientos to be avoided.
3 See above', -w. a..
4 Sentencia, 19 Dec.1394, over grazing rights disputed
by Trugillo: ibid, carp.398, doc.17. Sentencia, 5 Jan.
1418, over pasture land disputed by Tragi 1lo: ibid,
carp.401, doc.11. Concordia with Trugillo over sheep
routes : ibid, carp.405, doc.2, 15 Oct.1440. ...
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in rant Felises below the path which comes
from ^ayorga towards San Martin de Pineda,
bounded on one side by the newly planted
vineyard of the hut belonging to the priory,
on the second side by the vineyard of Juan
Alfonso, on the third side by the vineyard
of Llorente Gonzalez, tailor and inhabitant
of 'Vlayorga, and on the fourth side by the
said path, *
There was variety in the size of the land units exploited.
The monastery of Ona had some vineyards which required a
2
work force of over 100 labourers. The monastery of
/ 3
Sah&gun also seems to have controlled some large areas.
But the general pattern seems to have been one of mixed
farming and small holdings. In the lugar of Ciguenza,
for example, that there were at least thirtyseven holdings
and mixed farming is suggested by the payments of grain,
wine, and bacon which were paid to the monastery of Gna.*
Elsewhere on the Ona lands there were plenty of vine*yards
with a labour force as little as from three to ten labour*
5
5ers to counterbalance the larger units mentioned. The
same pattern was true for Sahagun. ^ands belonging to
the monastery in the village of Castro Bol, for example,
were small cereal farming units producing no more than
between /
1 This example in ibid, carp,941, doc,23, 3 Nov,1410,
The priory, attached to Fahagun, was San Felises of
Mayorga. ^
2 Survey of the Gna vineyards for the year 145?: ibid.
Papules, leg,1297.
3 F*or example, Ibid, leg,269l bis, lease dated 4 Dec, 1424,
4 Ibid. Pergs carp. 328, doc.6, 18 Feb, 1460 containing
tragiado of 10 Nov#1397,
5 Fee" above n.2.
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between hall a fanega and ten fanep.as of grain per year.*
The contrast which has been made between the monas¬
teries of <->na and Sahagun, on the one hand, and Guadalupe,
on the other, is not intended to suggest a simple differ*
:eace between the north and the south. Thus, to the
north, the Premonstratenaians of i-a Vid enjoyed tax
2
exemption on 5,000 sheep. Further north the Cistercians
at ilioseco also undertook a certain amount of sheep farm*
3
:ing. The Cistercians, moreover, still differed from
most of the other orders in their structure of granges
and lay brothers.* The broad contrast between north
and south must thus be qualified with innumerable excep*
:tions, the details of which are largely unknown.
The variations in economic activity may have been
important* Yet, as far as income was concerned, the
relationship between demesne farming and leases was pro*
sbably far more important* It has been argued that
demesne farming by the nobility was almost totally lack*
sing. Was the same true o! the Church? Descriptions
of the demesne or reserve are lacking. Yet there can
be no doubt that on some of the monastic lands demesne
farming /
1 Survey of 1404 of lands in Castro Bols ibid. Papeles,
leg.2659.
2 Above
3 A.H.N., Clero, Pergs., carp,361, doc.4, 11 June 1423,
is a sentencla in a dispute over pasture rights and
involving one of the granges.
4 The word granja is regularly used in the Bugedo and
k£os©co documents.
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farming existed. Documents sometimes list land, vine¬
yards, and pasturage which were held by no individual
and provided no rent or dues - yet the productive capacity
of these lands is indicated. These lands must, there-
;fore, have been elements of the demesne. There are,
however, more concrete details on demesne exploitation.
The monastery of Ona serves as a good example. For Ona,
the existence of demesne exploitation is quite clearly
indicated by the labour obligations which some of the
tenants had to perform. In T«mayo, for example, the
tenants on the units of land known as solares had to
provide three days work per year on the monastic demesne.
There was, indeed, an established formula of some sort
on this point. The lease of a house and half a solar.
for example, entailed the provision of one and a half
2
days work per year. Elsewhere on the -na lands, the
labour obligations were slightly different. In Ciguensa,
for example, thirteen holdings were obliged to provide
103 days work per year on the demesne. In this example,
however, there seems to have been no formula underlying
the /
1 The word solar lacks precision. The best description
of it is in J. Gautier-Dalche, 'Le domain© du monaster©
de Santo Toribio*. A.E.M., ii (1965), 63-117. In
Tamayo it referred to the house and land which together
formed the tenant holding.
2 For example the lease of one house and half a solar in
Tanayo to Juan Ruysi A.H.N,, Clero, Fergs., carp.317,
doc.9, 1 Oct.1391,
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the labour obligation. Thus, while two holdings had to
provide twenty four days work each per year, four holdings
i
only had to provide one day each per year.
Not all demesne work was carried out on the basis of
obligatory boon work. On the contrary, the vineyards of
una in the 1450s had a work force of 820 obreros or
workers. The work force at the • *ancua1 vineyards, for
example, was 100 and at £orroyo it was HO,2
The existence of demesne exploitation cannot, there¬
fore, be doubted. Yet both the efficiency and the ex-
• tent of this type of exploitation are clearly important
points to establish. If Gna is once again taken as an
example, then it seems clear that demesne farming was
neither extensive or flourishing. Indeed there are signs
that the demesne was declining in size. Generally labour
obligations were rarely stipulated. Moreover the extreme
leniency of these obligations - for example, three days a
year - implies either that demesne farming was not impor¬
tant or that a paid work force was used instead. Yet
evidence suggests that paid labour only existed for the
vineyards', and some of these were in bad shape. At La
Eiba /
1 Ibid, carp,328, doc,6, 18 Feb,1460 and traslado. 10 Nov,
1397,
2 £bld, Papeies, leg,1297, survey of vineyards, 145?
3 The™"survey of all 08a revenues and income for 1456, also
in leg,1297, only quotes labour costs for the vineyards.
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&iba, for example, there were only three paid labourers
and the 'vineyard* was described as uncultivated ground
(caaipo todo) * At La Puerta de Mapa and La Calcada there
were seventeen paid labourerst despite the work force
the results were negligible and were lamely blamed on the
fact that * the Jews and those who pass by eat the produce'.*
More important still is the evidence which points to a
deliberate commutation of labour obligations into payments
inJdnd, Several documents show that obligations of four
days work per year were replaced by payments of half a
fanega of grain per year,^
v) Agrarian income: leases
In the negotiations leading up to the constitutional
settlement of 1465, one of the complaints made by Henry
IV concerned the legal disputes arising from the fact that
*... the Church grants much of its wealth to the laity by
censes and emphyteusis In effect the overwhelming
impression given by the documentation is that the vast
bulk of ecclesiastical income derived from the payments
of f
1 Survey of vineyards, 145?
2 A.II.N., Clero, Pergs., carp.321, docs. 13-16. It should
be noted, however, that these documents all refer to
one area and that other due®, e.g., the yantar. were not
affected by commutation.
3 C.P.K.A.B.. 371 (cix, 1465).
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of those who leased Church lands. Indeed in some cases -
for example the collegiate church of Santa Maria in
Valladolid • there was no demesne exploitation at all
and landed income consisted entirely of payments from
1
the tenants (Table XIV), The strength of the income
of the Church, therefore, depended to a large extent on
the kind of leases which were drawn up and the payments
involved.
Leases in perpetuity seem to have been most common.
Since most payments were in kind this presumably is to
be explained in terms of administrative convenience.
Leases of this type ensured a steady source of income which
did not necessarily depreciate as prices rose. Sometimes,
but rarely, the leases also included the obligation to
perform boon work. Thus, for example, when the oonas*
stery of Ona drew up a perpetual lease with Juan buys
and his descendants for land in Tamayo the payments were
'according to what we receive from the other aolares in
Tamayo** that is, three days boon work, three chickens and
three f&negas of wheat per year from each Bsl*r.Z A
better example concerns the Cistercians at Bugedo, In
1478 /
1 Appendix N below
2 Example already cited: A.H.N,, Clero, Pergs., carp,
317, doc,9. More common were perpetual leases of the
kind granted by kioseco to Juan Dias de Argomedo in
which boon work was not stipulated and payments do not
appear to have conformed to a standardised system:
ibid, carp.362, doc.6, 23 Nov,1433.
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1473 they made a perpetual lease of one of their granges
to the council and omes buenos of Montuenga. This lease
in perpetuity meant that administrative problems were
shelved in return for a steady income • in this case the
counci 1 had to pay the Cistercians the substantial amount
°* ten cartas of gfrain per year.*
There is another reason which helps to explain the
predominance of leases in perpetuity. Often the docu-
intents indicate that the leases are of lands donated to
the Church and that the tenants are the donors themselves.
Thus a perpetual lease by the Cistercians of R^oseco in
1454 makes it clear that the land in question, a solar
/
in San Eateban, had been donated to the monastery earlier
in the same year by the prospective tenants.A Moreover,
It would seem that in almost all cases of this kind the
payments which were required were designated by the terra
Infurcion. The explanation for this probably has to be
sought in an earlier period. It may be that the infurcion
originally arose as a payment from the donor who donated
3
land in order to secure protection. Certainly by the fifteenth
century this explanation does not hold. At times the word
infurcion is used in & loose sense to cover several kinds of
payments. At una, for example, the infurcion. besides design
• nating payments of grain, wi ne and bacon, could also include
the remnants /
1 The grange was at Gogulillos and the cargas of grain
had to be half wheat and half barley: ibid, carp,172,
doc.14, 8 April 1478.
2 1bid. carp.364, doc.6, 9 -^arch 1454.
3 See Gautier-Dalche, ubi supra, pp,95-102,
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reiariAiit3 of the former obligation known as longadera.*
Equally, in other leasea,the Injureion was distinguished
from other obligations. Thus, when the monastery of
banta Maria de Piasca granted a perpetual lease to two
brothers who had donated land, the infurcion of one
sesto of wheat per year was distinguished from obi iga*
2
ttions involving the building of a house. Yet what*
sever the reason for dealing with donations in this way,
it seems probable that the problems of additions to the
demesne were avoided and amicable relations were main-
itained with the donors.
Not all leases, however, were made in perpetuity.
Nor indeed were all donations treated in the manner dee*
scribed above. Other leases may arbitrarily be divided
into two categories » those of varying lengths of tenure
and those based on a share cropping agreement,
bimila r to the perpetual leases were the leases for
several lives. It may well be suspected that in practice
these leases ended up as leases in perpetuity. The
similarity, however, is to be inferred in that these
leases also seem to have aimed at avoiding the problems
of direct farming and administration, A good example
is the lease made to Luis Ferrandes de Carrion by the
monastery /
1 The fonaadera had originally been a military obligation.
Of twenty two solares in Ciguenaa two at least included
elements of the foneadera in their payments of infur*
icranes I A.K.N,", ciero'i Pergs, carp,328, doc.6. ~
2 Lease to the Valverde brothers: ibid, carp,944, doc.5,
7 Jan.1468.
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monastery of Sahaguri in 1439. The lease was for the
life of the tenant, his wife, and all his children.
Ferrandes himself was not an ordinary peasant; on the
contrary, he was a notary (escribano del rev) in the town
of Carrion. The lease is interesting in that it shows
how far a monastery was willing to alienate its sources
of income in return for a payment which avoided admini-
jstrative problems. In this case the lease of the area
in question, San Andres del Aldea, included everything:
lands, pasturage, vineyards, houses, tithes, censes,
martiniegas. and infurciones. The terras of the lease
imply that Ferrandes was being given land already held
{at least in part) by other tenants who, henceforth,
would pay their dues to Ferrandes and not to the monas-
5 tcry. I'errandes himself was not expected to farm the
land. Indeed, the conditions of the lease obliged
Ferrandes to x'e*lease the land only to mere peasants
(labradores llanos), to build a house and to provide the
necessary equipment. The monastery in this case, there-
:fore, avoided the problem of collecting diverse revenues
from small holders and received in return 600 tars per
year.* The similarity with the leases in perpetuity,
however, does not end here, for donated land was sometimes
leased /
1 Ibid, carp.943, doc,6, 5 June 1439.
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1
leased back to donors for a period of several lives.
Shorter leases did exist. Yet on the whole these
were rare. Certainly examples of leases as short as
four years can be cited but anything below a ten year




The other fairly common form of lease was that based
on the share-cropping or metayage arrangement. Two
general points about the metayage are worth noting.
Almost all leases were in perpetuity and almost all
the leases affected vineyards only. Further than these
two points variations appear - especially with regard to
payments. The share cropping might take the simple
form of a straight division of the harvest produced*
A typical example is the perpetual lease granted by the
Benedictines of Sabagun to an inhabitant of Perroso,
The latter had to promise not to alienate the land to the
nobility or other ecclesiastical corporations. He also
promised to maintain the vineyard in good condition,^
Half the harvest each year was to go to the monastery
in perpetuity. Occasionally the shares varied. A
lease by the Premonstr?ttensians of Bujedo in 1435 shows
the unfavourable conditions that could be imposed on
the tenant. The land granted was stubble* The tenant
was /
1 Ibid, carp«363, doc.6, 15 Sept.1447, lease for two lives
a solar to its donor, Juan Pdres de Son Martin del Rojo.
2 For example the four year lease of a Corral to a group
°* vecinoa of Sahagun: ibid. Fapeles, leg,2691 s. doc*
dated 4 Dec.1424.
3 Pergs,, carp.943, doc.3, 25 Jan,1434, lease to
Alfonso Oria.
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was given five years in which he had to bring vineyards
into production at his own expense. At the end of the
five years the harvests were to be shared on the basis
of 6/ilthe to the monastery and 5/llths to the tenant.
Sometimes the share cropping took the form of a division
of land rather than a division of harvests. Thus,
Sahagim leased a vineyard on condition that at the end
of six years the land was to be divided in half between
the monastery and the tenant. The latter was to have
hi® half in perpetuity, but the monastery was to have
2
first option on any sale of the land.
How extensive was share cropping? As has been pointed u
out only vineyards seem to have been involved. Further
than this it is difficult to make any serviceable general*
iiaation. Certainly on the lands of Ona share cropping
seems to have been fairly extensive on the vineyards.
Tliis emerges from a survey that was made of the monastic
vineyards in the 1450s, The survey showed the areas
directly worked by the monastery itself and those vine-
:yards which were worked in metayage (a medlas). From
the figures given, a force of only 498 paid labourers
were working on the demesne as against 1,144 labourers
working on the vineyards held by share croppers.^
The /
1 Ibid,carp.176, doc.l, 3 Aug.1435, lease of two heredadea
to Juan Martiness,
2 Ibid, carp«941, doc.l, 1 Jan.1406, lease to Juaa Locano,
3 Ibid. Papeles, leg. 1279. survey of 145?
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The landed income of the monasteries was, on the
whole, derived from rents, While demesne exploitation
and short leases were not unknown the most common
pattern seems to have been one of leases in perpetuity.
Moreover payments were almost always in kind, Thus the
monastic income was subject to severe fluctuation from
climatical factors but did not necessarily lose value
with the sharp price rise apparent from 1440 onwards.
There were disadvantages, however, about this structure
of landed income. In the first place, it obviously did
not allow for any attempt to increase income either by
increased demesne farming or by the periodic revision
of payments from tenants, Secondly, much depended on
the reasons for the switch from demesne exploitation to
leases in perpetuity. It may well be that the change
over was forced on monasteries because demesne exploita¬
tion had become impossible at a particular period of
time. It was, however, impossible to return to demesne
farming once the situation had improved because perpetual
leases had been granted, Tims, although landed income
was highly important in comparison to other sources of
income, this does not mean to say that it was worth a
lot. This process appears to have been general and
affected Cistercian houses such aa Belmonte and Bujedo
as /
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as well a# the Benedictine monasteries. It may be
suspected also that the leases in perpetuity led in the
end to usurpations of monastic land. Such at least is
the picture with respect to the less powerful monasteries.
An important exception to the structure of landed
income which has been described is provided by the
collegiate church at Valladolid. Almost all the leasee
of the church entailed payments in cash. The only pay-
jaaents in kind - and they were insignificant • consisted
of chickens. Did these leases lose their value through
time? Unfortunately the accounts are not particularly
specific about the leases. Information is given, in
an indirect way, about the lengths of the leases for the
orchards and vineyards. The entries of the accounts,
in these cases, enter the date of the original contract
of a lease and furnish other details which help to round
off the picture of payments and obligations. Thus,
although the accounts date from the end of the century,
it is possible to find leases dating back to 1460 and
leases which are made for two lives. A detailed examin-
Jation of these few leases is not really worth while.
The bulk of the church's income came from property within
the town. Houses owned within the one quarter of the
collaciftn /
1 The few examples give the impression of carefiilly ex¬
ploited and small units of lands. An orchard donated
for obits, for example, included houses, two mechanical
wells, vines, fig and other fruit trees, and was
surrounded by thatched walls. The rent was 2,600 sirs
p.a. and the chapter had invested 3,410 mra in maintenance.
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CO*3Ucion de la Mayor brought in 72,799 mra from tenants.
Presumably these would be fairly short leases but no
information on this point is available.*
3. Patterns of Wealth within the Church
How was the wealth of the Church distributed? It
has been calculated that there were between ten and
fifteen thousand benefices in the kingdom of Castile in
2
the fifteenth century. For obvious reasons the value
of these benefices fluctuated. Moreover, the distri*
rbution of wealth within the Chttrch depended on the number
of benefices held by any one person or appropriated by any
ecclesiastical corporation, For example, Francisco
Ortiz, canon of Toledo and at one time papal nuncio, held
one canonry, one archdeaconry, nine benefices, two pres-
itamos, two chaplaincies, and one archpresbytery at the
3
time of his death. The problem seems easiest to tackle
by discussing the bishoprics, the cathedral and collegiate
churches /
1 Kenta from houses outwith the town were only worth 650
mra p.a. Many of the town houses were donated to the
church. In 1418, for example, an oidor of the royal
audiencia donated several houses in Santa Dial la 6treet
to the" church: A.C.V,, leg,4, doc,30, 26 Nov,1418,
2 Tarsicio, Isabel la fcatollea, p.407, Thie calculation
does not include the ' a'rchbishopric of Granada or the
beneficios abaciales of the monasteries.
3 TCIdT
churches, the parish churches, and the monasteries in
turn*
1) *>i shop ri eg
No adequate assessment can be made of the wealth
of the Cast!Han bishoprics* AH that can be attempted
here is to examine the few details known about the wealth-
: iest diocese, Toledo, and then relate this to the ap.rox-
I
:imate index of wealth provided by Eubel and lloberg*
Within the diocese of Toledo,the cathedral church
and the two collegiate churches at Alcala and Talavera
contained over 200 dignitaries, canonries, prebends and
chaplaincies. The diocese was also divided into twenty
arciprestasgos and four vic&riag which containedt-





All the clergy of these benefices were, to a greater or
lesser degree, subject to the control of the archbishop
and his visitor general. The archbishopric also contained
almost 20,000 veclnoa who wore vasalloa of the archbishop.
The /
1 Conveniently tabulated in Tarsicio, Lloccion. p.35,
;54.
The income of the archbishop was administered by
two racaptorcs mayorus (one in Toledo and the other in
Alcala), a cordador mayor who was in charge of the accounts, and
an official who supervised payments and assignment©.
Figures for income at the end of the fifteenth century
were:-
1 495 , . . . 30, 0CG duc&dos or 11,250 gQQjp mrs
1497 » « * • 38,500 dueados or 14,437 .,iQ0:Q mrs
1499 • * ♦ » 36,400 tiucados or 13,650,000 mrs
These revenues derived fron the properties of the mesa
and the duos paid by the villages and vasalloe of the
archbishopric* By any standards this was an extremely
large income. Email wonder that iiodrigo ue la Torre
wrote to Henry IV that the archbishop of Toledo
appears to be more like & pope than a prelatej
he maintain* an amy of 1,000 men, while the
master of Santiago only manages with 700 men
and the greatest counts of France only maintain
300 lances and even then not for all the year
round «
There can be little doubt that the archbishop of Toledo
was extremely powerful, even if fourteen other dioceses
in Europe carried a higher assessment for common services.
The military power of the archbishop, moreover, was not
3
exaggerated by Rodrigo de la Torre,
As /
1 Ibid, pp.38-9. I have converted the dueadpa into mra in
order to make the figures more meaningful.
2 Cited in j bid, p.42 and L» ferraao, Los reyea catolicos
y la ciudad de Burgos, p.24. **
3 See the figures for the military forces of archbishop
Cisneros in Tarsicio, Alcccion. p.40.
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As far as the other dioceses arc concerned, the
evidence of the assessments only underlines the obvious
point that there was a great disparity in wealth. The
three archbishoprics naturally carried the highest assess¬
ments : 8,000 florins for Toledo, 6,000 florins for
Santiago, and 5,000 florins for Seville. In contrast
the poorest bishoprics - Ciudad Kodrigo, Cartagena,
iiadajoz, and Cadis - were assessed at 450 florins and even
le as •
It must be remembered, however, that the cotton
services assessments varied little from the fourteenth
to the eighteenth centuries and that the fifteenth century
imposed its realities on the situation. It seems that the
Galician dioceses were not so highly valued as the assess¬
ments would suggest. In part this may have been due to
the economic, social, and even demographic shift of empha-
•sis to the south. but the most important factor here was
the degree to which the Galician dioceses were subject to
arbitrary usurpations by the nobility. The situation in
the bishopric of Tuy serves as a good example. The
•protector' (encomendeiro) of the bishopric and chapter,
Alvar ^e'rez de Fotomayor, quite openly controlled the
wealth of the bishopric and prevented the bishop, Luis de
Piinentel, from entering into possession, despite the fact
iha t /
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that he was supported by Henry IV a**d the counts of
Santa Mart a and dewavente, Nor was the bishopric of
i
Tuy an exception* All the dioceses of C&licia arid
Asturias suffered in some degree £rom the existence of
encomiendag which, in practice, detracted from their
2
value,'' In these circumstances it is not surprising
that, for example, the archbishopric of Seville was a
more valuable prize than that of Santiago. This can be
clearly aeer. in the curious episode which involved the
ionseca prelates. In 1460 don Alonso de Foneeca, arch*
'bishop of Seville, succeeded in obtaining the archbishop-
:ric of Santiago for his nephew, Galicia, at this time,
was in the middle of the profoundest anarchy. The
Foneeca uncle, therefore, decided to change sees tempor¬
arily with his nephew in order to secure stability in
Santiago. The bulls for the exchange were obtained,
Santiago was pacified, and in 1463 the uncle requested
his nephew to effect the re-exchange of archbishoprics.
The nephew, however, obviously found himself well placed
in Seville, He refused to be moved from this flotirishing
area to the see of Compos tela. In the end, after vigor-
ious royal and papal intervention and armed conflict in
Seville, the Fonseca uncle recovered the southern arch-
3
'bishopric. Significantly, even after peace had been
established /
1 See J, L. Santos D£ez, La en.com lenda de monas teri o» ^ en la
corona de Cast ilia (home-Hadrid, I9&1rTpp,IoS-7,128-9}
P,Oalindo Lomeo, Tuy en la baja edad media {Zaragoza,
1923), pp.64-67.
2 On encomlondas see below 3.
3 J.Palanco .Romero, OP.cit., pp.64-66,
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established in Santiago, both uncle and nephew had been
fighting to secure the archbishopric with the lower assess*
sment.
ii) Cathedral and collegiate churches
The cathedral and collegiate churches of the arch*
Jbishopric of Toledo have been mentioned in the foregoing
discussion* Vet the episcopate hardly controlled the
wealth of these churches in Castile* The bishops might
enjoy some patronage in the»e churches * for example,
the right of induction * but on the whole their power was
recognised only as an act of courtesy* Often a mutual
respect between cathedral chapters and bishops led to
j
the avoidance of friction* Yet the signs of tension
were not lacking and they could have important consequences
when collegiate churches were involved* Important towns
like Valladolid and Soria, for example, had their churches
controlled by 'outsiders* « in this case the bishops of
A
Palencia and Osraa respectively* The collegiate church
in Valladolid subsequently bought its exemption from
episcopal control and made itself directly dependent on
the papacy. Nevertheless the pressure could build up
into /
1 See below 2S).
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into a claim for the creation of a new bishopric#
Despite signs of conflict# however# the factor which
needs to be ©tressed is the unity of these churches ami
their bishops as far as wealth is concerned# for there
can be no doubt that# together# they formed the •greater
nobility* of the Church# Bishops and chapters controlled
the really wealthy benefices of the Church and were clearly
to be distinguished from the lower clergy. This broad
division of wealth was also reflected socially ami perhaps
culturally as well. The bishop often began his eccles¬
iastical career with a benefice in a cathedral chapter
or collegiate church# Upward mobility from the lower
levels into the world of canonries and prebends must have
been rare#
Briefly stated,the tenure of a canonry with prebend
entitled the holder to a share in the revenues of the
cathedral or collegiate chapter (the mesa capitular).
Table XIV shows the income and revenues of the collegiate
church of Santa Maria la Mayor, Valladolid, for the years
2
1498 ami 1500# The totals for these years were presum¬
ably shared out among the prebends after various adInst¬
ilments and expenses had been made# For example, the
account© make it clear that the entries for portaggo.
frucharas /
1 See the payments to the papacy in Table XIV, Appendix Nf
and the pressure for the creation of a bishopric discussed
in Tarsicio# U«cci6n, pp.31-2.
2 See Appendix N# below szz-i.
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cuch&jrae* medianedo and oblations ware regarded as being
specifically for the 1common fond* • that is, income which
was shared oat among the resident canons living in their
prebendal houses* Similarly* some revenue obviously had
to be set aside for such items as the fabrics and ornaments
of the church itself*
As far as the dignitaries of the chapters are con*
learned* however, the income of the mesa capitular only
reveals part of the complicated problem of revenues* Such
accounts only show the corporate income of the cathedral
or church involved*
Members of the cathedral chapters • especially the
dignitaries - drew substantial income from their partici*
jpation in diocesan administration** The development of
the cathedral chapters in this respect seems to show little
variation from the pattern in France and England* From
the eleventh and twelfth centuries onwards, the pattern
of canonries, prebends, archdeacons* archdeaconries, deans,
precentors and treasurers, emerges clearly* From the
twelfth to the sixteenth century the capitular dignitaries
played an important part not only in the chapter but also
in the diocese* They territorialised their functions and,
along with the bishop* exercised control over the churches
in /
1 For a discussion of their capitular functions see £•
Dura Pefia, 'Las antiguas dignidades de la cathedral
ds Orenoe*, A.E.M** i (1964), 306*12,
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in their area until the council of Trent**
Members of cathedral chapters could, therefore,
receive income which was not included in the mesa capitular
or indeed the mesa episcopal. The cathedral chapter of
Orense serves as an example* There were eleven dignit*
taries in the chapter * the dean, precentor, five arch*
tdeacons, the macstrescuela. the abadla de la Trinidad,
the treasurer, and the vicariato** These dignitaries
drew income from the mesa capitular which varied according
2
to the tenure and type of prebend involved In each case*
3
Yet all the dignitaries, apart from the treasurer, also
drew income from the areas which they controlled as admini*
sstrators within the diocese* From this point of view
they can be regarded as archdeacons even though only five
of them were designated as such*
The resources of the archdeacons, apart from the mesa
capitular, derived from the diocesan areas under their
control.4 /
1 There were twelve dignities if the bishop is included.
The archdeacons were those of Gas tela, Limia, Varoncelle,
Bbbat, and Celanova. The maestrescuela supervised the
estudio de gram^tiea* The"church of the Holy Trinity
and its hospital was made a dignity of the chapter by
bishop 2Enrique (1368*76). The vlcariato was one of
the diocesan areas attached to the mesa capitular and
managed by a vicario of the chapter".' '"""See ibid, pp.
289-90, 303, 310-11.
2 Participation in capitular income was based not on the
dignities themselves but on the canonries and prebends
attached to the dignities* At Orense the mesa capitular
was distributed between 32 prebends I 8 cardenaljas or
canonjCas presbiterates. 18 canonries, and 12 raciones.
The racion was held by a racionero or porcionero and was
equivalent to half a prebend. Ibid, pp.291,292,305.
3 The treasurer seems to have been poorly remunerated in
comparison to the other dignitaries. Both in Orense and
Compostela there was no jurisdictional area attached to
the dignity*
4 For the powers which such a control implied see Duro Pena,
ubi supra, pp.313*24*
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control* The archdeacon levied chanci1lorlas for each
collation to a benefice* This usually consisted of one
mark of silver* He levied luctuoeas at the death of
every rector or vicar within his area * usually the most
valuable item of non*landed wealth** He received pro*
tcurations which varied according to the churches within
his territory and were paid in cash. He had a share in
the income from the greater tithes of grain and wine and*
in one case* half of the greater tithes of the parishes
where the incumbents were not the rectors* Income from
the greater tithes was paid in kind* Hie shares held by
archdeacons in lesser tithes (escondoyte) were usually
paid in cash along with the procurations• Penas imposed
on the clergy also provided income* Finally, the right
of presentation in some areas also meant that the arch*
Jdeacon received a vantar. This latter might take the
form of a payment in kind but was often commuted into
money* These were the basic sources of income for the
archdeacons and the capitular dignitaries with archidia*
2
:conal functions*
Other revenues varied according to the specific
sources of income attached to each dignity* Landed rents
were /
1 Usually a mule or an ox* The bishop, of course* also
levied luctuosas on the death of the dignitaries*
2 On all these sources of income,Puro Pena, ubl supra*
pp* 325*330*
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were important: in some cases# The emoluments attached
to each dignity varied and the holder might also possess
canonries and dignities elsewhere# Finally# the appro*
Jpriation of a rectory to a dignity also made lor sub*
>etantial variation# Indeed appropriations could be
extremely important and were not always confined to parish
churches# The financial position of the maestrescuela
of Orense, for example# was greatly enhanced when the
archdeaconry of Galdelas virtually disappeared and was
annexed to the dignity in 1400#
The territorial arrangements of the diocese of Orense
show that diocesan administration was organized not only
to provide income for the bishop, but also for the dignit*
:&ries of the chapter. The gradations of wealth among
these spiritual lords of the Church are only of interest
in a limited way, In general terms these dignitaries
formed the great nobility of the Church. Usually of
noble or igi n and living sumptuously on the incomes attached





***) The Parish Clergy
It is difficult to assess the economic position of
the parochial clergy. Tithes were the main source of
income and were intended, theoretically, to provide for
the parson. It haa already been noted, however, that
the Crown received a share of the tithes in the form of
tercias and that tithes formed part of the income of the
archdeacons and other dignitaries of cathedral chapters.
The dispersal of tithes is made yet clearer when the
problem is considered in terms of one specific geographi¬
cal area. The tithes of La Molina, for example, were
shared by two monasteries, the bishop of Burgos, the
noble family who built the churches, and the clergy serv-
1
iing these churches, Clearly, as elsewhere In Europe,
tithes were not always payments in return for direct
spiritual services. They became a kind of rent, paid
to a remote recipient who performed the corresponding
spiritual functions by hired deputy.
The reasons for the dispersal of parochial revenues
into different pockets were broadly similar to those pre¬
vailing in England and France. The enjoyment of the
tithes and glebe by a rector, who had cure of souls and
resided in his parish, presents no problem. Yet Castile
was /
1 A.H.N,, Ciero, Pergs., carp.327, doc.3.
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was no exception in that rectors could appoint a vicar
who dealt with the cure of souhs on the basis of a stipend
or a share in the tithes. More important, and perhaps
more damaging to the parish clergy, was the number of
parishes appropriated to prefcendal stalls and monasteries/
Appropriations and the existence of vicars were not
features which distinguished the parochial structure of
Castile from the rest of Burope, But the degree of
power wielded by patrons in some areas of the kingdom of
2
Castile was unusually strong and deserves to be emphasised.
Benefices could be in the gift of anyone from the king
down to the parishioners themselves. On the whole, how-
•ever, advowsons were in the hands of the nobility and
higher ecclesiastics, such as bishops, abbots and cathed¬
ral dignitaries. Naturally the very possession of the
gift of a benefice was important. Yet noble patrons,
above all, seem to have had a fair degree of influence
over /
1 The division of revenue® between rectors and vicars
remains unstudied. Not ail arrangements followed the
pattern of a division into greater and leaser tithes.
Some incumbents paid a rent or cense to the rector.
Ibid, carp.941, doc.15, 10 Feb.1410, for example, is
the remission of such a rent for ten years granted by
the abbot of Bahagun to the priest of Ban Miguel de
Villardiga. In this case the monastery was rector
by virtue of an appropriation. For appropriations to
prebendal stalls and archidiaconal control over such
appropriations see Duro Pena, ubi supra. pp»330,319.
2 For the normal procedure in presentations and collations
to parishes, ibid, pp.318-9.
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over the parochial revenues. This power was very
marked in the Basque provinces. Indeed, so anomalous
was the situation in the Basque provinces that there were
definite variations from the European pattern.
In the Basque area the idea that churches were the
private property of the lay founders survived into the
late middle ages. It was a situation that underlined
the poverty of the parish clergy. Theoretically most
Basque parish churches were in the patronage of the Crown
or of the nobility. In reality, they were almost entirely
controlled by noble patrons since the Crown alienated its
2
right of patronage to the nobility. In practice also,
the advowson of parish churches was exercised without
3
any reference to the bishop. In terms of income the
parish priest must have been in & desperate position.
Complaints to the Crown, in the fourteenth century, re¬
sulted in a settlement which alleviated the position
of the clergy In the parishes theoretically in the gift
of /
1 Patronage was not always vested in one man or corpora*
:tion. For interesting examples » in one of which the
parishioners had a share in the patronage • see ibid.
pp.320, 330.
2 Such alienations were regarded as being similar to other
royal mcrcedes. Indeed the grant of the patronage of a
church could be linked to an obligation to perform
military service. Inheritance of patronage produced the
divigeros - that is, several members of a family all
sharing the same right of patronage. Garcia do Cortasar,
op. c i. t. , pp.262 f f .
3 The designation of the parish churches as atoasiterlos
seems partly to have been motivated by a desire to escape
episcopal control. Moreover, from the twelfth century,
the nobility built churches in their own areas or became
the 'protectors' of churches and ended by controlling
the revenues. Ibid, p.282.
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of the Crown, By this settlement parochial income was
to be equally shared between the de facto noble patron
and the priest. After investigation it was decided that
the revenues of the thirty-seven parishes involved were
worth 17,000 mra, The clergy, therefore, were left with
a derisory total of 8,500 tors per year. The share of
each priest, of course, varied according to the parish.
The priest at Diiaa, for example, would receive 2,000 tare
per year by the terms of the settlement while the priest
of the parish of Gamia was condemned to an income of 50 tars
per year,* Yet these priests were privileged, for in the
remaining churches of the Basque provinces the parish
tithes seem to have belonged entirely to the lay patrons.*"
Tithes could be sold, exchanged, and inherited. Indeed,
the same seems to have been true of the churches them¬
selves, Some twenty two churches, for example, remained
the 'property* of the same families throughout the fif¬
teenth century while fourteen others were virtually sold
or bartered. There was, moreover, a tendency for patron-
Jage to be concentrated in fewer hands. From a survey
carried out in 1487, it appeared that forty two parish
churches were in the hands of five patrons who disposed




1 On this settlement of 1383, ibid, pp.311,343-4,
2 Despite complaints by the bishops of Burgos, Calahorra,
Leon, and Pamplona, the Crown tended to maintain the
status quoi ibid, pp.311-2.
3 On these points and for a statistical presentation of
the 1487 figures: Ibid, pp.283,313,391-3.
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Clearly the Basque provinces, where the priest was
a member of the noble patron's household, showed the
parish clergy in their weakest position. Yet the little
evidence that there is, suggests that in other areas of
the kingdom matters were not much better. In the lands
of the military orders the parish clergy received none
of the tithes and had to subsist on oblations known as
'pie de altar'.* elsewhere, parishes seem to have failed
to provide a living for their incumbents. In 1445, for
example, a parishioner of San Miguel de Bangueses com-
iplained to the dean of Urease that the rector did not
reside in the parish and that church services were not
available despite the existence of a modest living. The
rector's defence against this allegation was simple : not
only was there no living in the parish but the indispens¬
able liturgical books and ornaments were lacking. His
was not an isolated case. In 1467 the archdeacon of
Limia found that some of the churches in his archdeaconry
2
were completely deserted and unserved by any clergy.
iv) The Monasteries
There can be no doubt that the monasteries of Castile
in /
1 For more details see below VV
2 Duro Peria, ubi supra, pp. 320,322.
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In the later middle ages controlled vast stretches of land.
Yet, too of ten, monastic wealth has been viewed only in
terms of land and rights. Thus* for example, the wealth
of the Benedictine monastery at tamo8 is indicated by
stating that it controlled twenty five dependent monaster*
lies, 200 villages, and 105 churches,^ These general
impressions are erroneous. To state that a monastery
•controlled* villages or land does not indicate what kind
of control was involved, Much also depended on the size
of the population in any given area, A map of the lands
and villages of the monastery of Ona might, therefore,
give a totally false impression. In the late fifteenth
century the population of some areas controlled by Ona
was extremely low, Bentrotea, for example, had a total
population of twenty; Castellanos, thirty six; Aguas,
twenty-five; the Gran.ja de hoyaies, twenty two* These
are figures for total population. In terms of tax or rent
paying units, the totals were much lower: Bentrotea a
possible maximum of five; Castellanos, nine; Aguas, six;
and the Granja de iloyalea, five,"
More reliable data would suggest that the monasteries
were undergoing a financial crisis. This was certainly
true in the fourteenth century. Figures for 1338, for
example, show that the great monastery of Santo Domingo de
Silos /
1 For this and other examples Tarsicio, Pieceion, pp.532,
541 and Tarsicio, Isabel la Cat6lica. pp.559*62,
2 See Tarsicio, Isabel la"Catdlica, VI561. I have used
a coefficient of four.
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was having problems in balancing income and expenditure
(Table XV).* Nor do the monasteries seem to have recovered
in the fifteenth century. If we concentrate on the two
extremes of wealth and poverty, and also take into account
reliable evidence of a general kind, the relative lack of
economic security becomes apparent.
The most general indication is provided by the fact
that, throughout the fifteenth century, the highest assess*
iment on any monastery in Castile for papal taxes failed to
pass above the level of 1.000 florinsObviously such
information cannot be used with any degree of precision,
it does, however, indicate that there were no monasteries
in Castile to compare with such great French houses as
Cluny. Fecamp, and Corvey* Moreover, the validity of
this general indication is confirmed by a detailed examina*
:tion of the wealthiest monastery in Castile * the monastery
of oha.~
4
The income of the monastery clearly demonstrates
some /
1 See Appendix O below
2 Tarsicio, Isabel la Catollea. p.56o.
^
3 Perez de TJrbe 1.'' op.clt* .' 11"'.' p»543 states that Ona was
the wealthiest monastery*
4 A.H.N.. Clero, Papelea, leg.1297 contains important
documents on OSa revenues in the fifteenth century:
1) A detailed and undated survey of all income in cash
by the taayordomo. fray Garcia de Valladoiid. 2) An
undated survey of all income in grain, arranged by
localities. 3) An account of all the monastic income,
drawn up in 1458 for the purposes of a subsidy assess*
'•went. This is summarised in Appendix P* 4) The
account of Juan Ferrandes de Vililla, ibid. leg.1329,
for income in grain in 1464.
270
some of the general points already made: 76.43& of all
Income was in kind, almost all income was derived from
land and agriculture, and hardly any income was derived
from the Crown (Table XVI).* It is of greater interest
to establish the relative wealth of the monastery. There
can be no doubt that the total income was a substantial
one. Yet it must be remembered that this was supposed
to be the wealthiest monastery in the kingdom. Bearing
this in mind, it is worth noting that the monastery's
income was, in fact, less than half the income which indivi¬
dual members of the great nobility received from the Crown
alone and only slightly higher than the seigneurial and
landed income of a man like Diego Perez Saraiento.'"
Monastic income also seurns to have been subject to
fairly heavy burdens of expenditure. On this point the
... y
^na assessment of 1458 only provides a general indication.
After making obvious points about deductions for repairs
and bad weather it ends;-
... from the said income which remains aiter
the said items have been deducted, the upkeep
of the monks and fami 1 fares has to be provided
- they usually pay sixty persons. tensions
for life also have to be provided for the monks
who belonged to the time of Abbot Pedro. Further¬
more the cost of working the vineyards usually
comes to over 80,000 mre per year.
The /
1 Appendix P below\-S8f
2 Tables V and XI in Appendices E and K, below ^ ~6, 5"43
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The statement is brief but it supports the general evidence
available for other monasteries# Lay servants • even in
Cistercian houses where the number of lay brothers had dec*
:lined * had to be paid,* Pensions and annuities drained
monastic income# Corrodies provided badly needed cash
but, in the long run, they only served to increase the
burden on monastic resources# Indeed, in Castile, the
individual benefiting from a corroby was designated by the
word racionero which was also used for the prebendary of a
cathedral or collegiate chapter# These racioneros lived
in the vicinity of the monastery and enjoyed the same
privileges as the monks as far as clothing and food were
concerned#2 In general terms the upkeep of all these
people involved considerable expense even if it is allowed
that monasteries like Sahagun, which provided for close
on 100 people, were exceptions#2
Many monasteries also found that touch of their wealth
was usurped by the nobility. Generally the usurpations
4
were given theoretical justification by the encomienria.
The encomjenda was an agreement between a monastery and a
noble by which the latter afforded protection in return
for /
1 Peres de Urbel, op.cit,# ii#546*7.
2 Ibidt pp.547*52 and 553*4 where the escusac'.os are also
d iscus sod *
3 Ibid, p.547. In Silos there were some 80 people only 30
of whom were monks#
4 The encomienda involving lay protectors, bore no relation
to benefices held in commendam.
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for some of the monastic revenues. Yet, in a great many
cases, this protection was illusory. The encomienda was
forced on the monastery by the power of the local magnate
and revenues and labour services were arbitrarily usurped.*
As might be expected, the encomiendas and the usurpa¬
tions were greatest when royal power was at its weakest
and where local warfare was persistent and endemic. In
general terms, the period of greatest abuse was the four¬
teenth century. In 1380, however, matters came to a
head and John 1 appointed a four man commission to deal
with the problem. The commission acted extremely swiftly
and efficiently and produced a whole series of mandatory
2
judgements in December of the same year. The situation
3
revealed by the commission in 1389 was alarming, Obvi-
iously a death grip bad been established by some of the
nobility on the monasteries, Even the king*# bastard
brother, Alfonso Enrique*, was implicated up to the hilt
in a 'protection system' covering the monasteries of
Corneliana, Ranon, Carvaj&l, and Sahagun. The count of
Haro, Pedro Fernandas, had usurped revenues of Qna, Silos,
Arlansa, Las Heulgas, and Rxoseco, The abbot of Una, in
fact, denounced the count for holding an encomienda.
against the monastery's will, over some of the most lucrat¬
ive /
1 See Santos Dies, op.cit, pp,76-8, 99-105,
2 For the membership and work of this commission, ibid,
pp,149»76,
3 See Appendix Q below -5
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lucrative lands in the lordships of the monastery. The
rigorous action taken by the Crown in 1380 did not, how-
:ever, put an end to encomleadas and usurpations. In
1394, Clement VII had to come to the aid of bahagun. In
1440, the Crown was again acting in defence of Silos
against usurpations by the count of Haro, Three years
later the same count of Haro managed to establish an
encomienda over the monastery and town council of
2
Covarrubias, These fragmentary pieces of evidence
indicate that the problems still existed, even if the
actions of 1380 had led to a decline in the total usurpa¬
tions of the nobility. Indeed, it is only to be
expected that some areas like Galicia and Asturias would
continue to feel the full weight of noble usurpations
during the fifteenth century anarchy. Even the reign
of the Catholic sovereigns saw a need for the revival of
3
the measures of 1380 against encomiendas ,
The encorniend&a helped to depress many monasteries into
a state of real and abject poverty. It has been seen that
the richest monastery, Una, did not enjoy an income which,
in relative terms, could bo termed wealthy. Other monas¬
teries /
1 All tho areas are listed in the sentencia of the cotamlss-
sionj A.H.N,, Clero, Papeles, leg.1282, doc. dated 22
Dec,1380. For political implications in the royal action
against the nobility see L. Suarez Fernandez, JnanJ,
rev de Casti 1 ia {Madrid, 1955), pp.22-4,
2 See Santos Dies, op.cit,, pp.39,200; Pnyol y Alonso,
op«cit.« pp.133-4.
3 Santos Diea, op,c1t., p.202,
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monasteries probably fared no better. The powerful
Benedictine monastery of San Millan de la Gogolla - said
to control llo dependent monastic houses - found itself
in serious debt to Jewish money lenders. Henry 11 had
to free the monastery from all its debts to Jews but,
even then, in 1389, the monastery once again had to
borrow 10,000 rar s froin a Jew in Logroao in order to pay
annates to Clement VII,* In the smaller monasteries the
evidence of visitations revealed a deplorable situation as
2
the following examples illustrate. At Salamanca it was
found that the monks had been forced to pawn a bell, a
silver cu&lice, and many of the ornaments (1345): several
years later no chalices or ecclesiastical vestments were
to be found at all. The priory of San Baudillo de Pinar
lost so much of its wealth that, by 1392, even the stone*
Jwork of the bell tower no longer belonged to the priory.
Many monasteries could only afford chalices made from lead
and visitations showed that buildings were falling apart
and that, in soma cases, the monks did not even enjoy
^equate board and lodging. Tire Benedictine monastery
at Budino had no roof and the only proper buildings were
huts of straw (1392), The buildings of Santa Agueda in
Giudad /
1 Perez de brbel, op.cit*. i1,542.
2 For what follows" ibid, ii.585-6.
275*
Giudad iiodrigo were in such a deplorable condition that
the visitors had to find lodgings in the town (1349)•
Jubia (1336), Kates (1349)# Duenas (1340) and Salamanca
(1460) were completely in ruins# Valverde had even
reached the stage of being used as a stable and was full
of dung (1335)# Doubtless there were important except
•tions, yet the general impression is one of utter deso-
:lation.
It is not surprising to find that some monasteries#
which had in former times been extremely rich and powerful#
had declined to a spiritual and economic subsistence level#
Majera# Carrion# Duenas, Camprodon# and San Vicente de
Balamanca# could hardly provide for twelve monks# Between
1380 and 1395 there were never more than ten monks at
Najera# Duenas had three monks in 1336 and only one monk
several years later.1 Hot all monasteries were affected
so gravely# Indeed, as will be seen below# there were
signs of some sort of monastic revival in the fifteenth
century. But generally there seems little doubt that the




4. Church and States control of episcopaI appointments
&B& qccU»taatlc»I taxes
It has been argued thai, at the local level, much of
the wealth of the Church was usurped by the nobility*
Many of the parish clergy failed to retain an adequate
share of the tithes and monastic income often ended up
in the pockets of the noble holders of encomlendaa* But
who controlled appointments to bishoprics and who benefited
from the ecclesiastical taxes which were levied on the
clergy?
The concordat of the Spanish nation* promulgated in
May 1418* theoretically restored free canonical elections
and dealt a severe blow at papal provisions«* In the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the papacy had attemp-
:ted* as elsewhere in Europe* to obtain greater control
over ecclesiastical appointments* The Schism* however*
ensured that no pope would ever again attempt to control
benefices on the same scale as John XXII or Urban V, It
was also clear that the Schism had added to the power of
2
the monarch* Yet there was one crucial point which re¬
strained far from clear in the concordat of 1418* Was it
likely /
1 This discussion Is confined to the period after the
Schism* For Castile and the Schism see L* Suares
Fernandas* Castilla* cl clama y la crisis, conclliar
(Madrid* 19%oH
2 The last pope wilfully to Ignore the royal wishes
completely was Benedict XIII* His attempt to secure
the archbishopric of Toledo for his nephew was success*
iful but called forth a violent reaction from Henry III*
This was to be the last papal success with Toledo*
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likely that the monarchy would entertain the claims of
cathedral chapters to free canonical elections?
In fact the concordat of 1418 was ignored almost as
soon as it was promulgated. Instead the basis of pro-
tcedure was laid down in the bull Sedis Apostolicae of
1421 which was later amplified by the bull Cum Tibi Deus
of 1456. The 'ancient customs1 governing appointments
to benefices in the kingdom of Castile were confirmed.
The formulation of these customs was essentially the work
of John II in a letter requesting papal approval. While
John 11 made no reference to the concordat he made it
clear that canonical election was theoretically the only
legal method of appointment. Yet canonical elections
were by ancient custom influenced by the king himself and
chapters elected those individuals 'pro quibus reges instarent'.
By accepting these 'ancient customs' in 1421. Martin V
virtually nullified the concordat of 1418. Indeed, it
is possible that in 1456 Calixtus III was going further
and suggesting that appointments be made by direct agree-
Jment between Crown and papacy. In practice, the papacy
had agreed to canonical elections under royal control,
although papal reservations were not in theory impossible.*
This /
1 A detailed discussion and the texts of the bulls in
Tarsicio, Eleccion, pp.63-7, 69-71, 313-5,
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This situation, outlined above, prevailed until 1460
and almost without exception major appointments were made
according to the modus vivendl reached in 1421, Juan
Martines de Contrerae, dean of Toledo, was elected arch*
:bishop by the chapter of Toledo in accordance with the
express wishes of the king,* On his death, in 1434, the
chapter again elected the nominee of the king. This time,
significantly, the king*s choice was Juan de Cerezuela,
1
brother of the royal favourite, Alvaro de Luna, A
similar situation prevailed in the other bishoprics if
the evidence of chroniclers is to be believed, Alfonso
de Madrigal, for example, owed his appointment to the see
of Avila directly to royal pressure,^ There was, however,
at least one bitter clash concerning the see of Coria in
1445, The details and outcome are obscure. It is fairly
clear that John II found difficulty in obtaining papal
approval for his candidate and he countered by putting
pressure on the chapter of Coria, In letters to the
chapter he argued that the see of Coria was peculiarly
important because of its strategic position on the front*
:ier. He reminded the chapter that any papal provision
would be
contrary /
1 Ibid. p,68« John II sent his camarero to convey bis
wishes to the chapter! B.N,, MS., 13104, fos.99K*V, 9 Nov.1422,
2 Tarsicio, Eleccion, p,69«
3 Claros Varones, p.137,
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contrary to the hulls which I have
received ... that no pope can make such
provisions ... save at my petition and
request
The king also placed an embargo on the revenues sede
vacante and ordered all papal bulls on the matter to be
sent directly to him for examination,* Apart from this
exception, however, it would appear that the system begun
in 1421 worked well until 1460.
Between 1460 and 1474 the situation changed owing to
an increasing tension between Crown and papacy and the
2
political anarchy in Castile. It is true that many
appointments continued to be made according to the arrange-
:ment reached in 1421. Elections to the sees of Cordoba
and Coria during this period, for example, were all subject
to royal intervention and all accepted by the papacy. Yet
there were a number of cases which seem to indicate that
the papacy was trying to retract papal concessions and
reserve the provision of all benefices worth more than
200 1ivres tournois. The provision of Cardinal Jacobo
de Veneris by Pius II to the see of Le&n, in 1460, was
straightforward since the see had fallen vacant in Rome*
In other cases, however, the papacy acted on the basis of
reservations /
1 This clash remains, strangely, unstudied. Details are
taken from three royal letters in B.N,, MS., 13078,
fos.160R-167R, dated 27 Oct., 20 May, and 10 Aug,1445.
2 For what follows see Tarsicio, E,lecci<Sn, pp.69,73*86;
J. Fernandez A Ionso, *Loe enviados pontificios en
Espafta de 1466 a 1475*, A.A., ii (1954), 67-70.
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reservations which were bitterly contested - in Siguenza
(1465), Tuy (1468), Palencia (1469)# and Cuenca (1469)*
*t is no accident that these cases occurred after the
opponents of Henry IV had met in Avila in 1465, dethroned
the effigy of the king, and elected Alfonso XII as king.
Consequently, in each case of disputed episcopal success-
:ion, it is extremely hard to discern a consistent royal
position. In almost all cases the opposition was express*
led by canonical election post et contra reserv&tionem.
But the opposition of the cathedral chapters did not
necessarily reflect royal interest. In Siguenza, in
1465, the chapter's candidate was supported, not by Henry
IV, but by such leaders of Alfonso XII•s party as Arch-
ibishop Carillo of Toledo and the marquis of Villena.
In Cuenca in 1469, on the other hand, the chapter was
simply acting on behalf of a powerful local noble, Juan de
Hurtado.
The decade immediately prior to the accession of the
Catholic sovereigns, therefore, witnessed a confused
situation during which the papacy attempted to reimpose
papal reservations. The events of this decade, however,
were an exception. When the Catholic sovereigns reimposed
royal control over the Church they did so precisely on the
basis of the bull Sedis Apostollcae which John II had
extracted /
2£1.
extracted from Martin V in 1421*
In many cases the king of Castile decisively inter*
•vened in the election of bishops* Yet cathedral chap*
:ters and the members of the great nobility also formed
powerful pressure groups*
By the fifteenth century cathedral chapters had
virtually gained independence from episcopal control* The
collegiate chapter at Valladolid considered itself totally
exempt from the control of the bishop of Palencia. In
the bishopric of Burgos the struggle between bishop and
chapter became really serious during the episcopacy of
Juan Garcia Kianrique (1381*92)* From the rnid-fifteenth
century Bishops Alfonso de Cartagena (1435*56) and Luis
de Acuna (1456*95) found that capitular resistance was
too powerful to be overcome. In Burgos* as in other
bishoprics, disputes were temporarily settled by agree-
: incuts between bishop and chapter* These agreements did
not solve the fundamental issues* however* and the disputes
continued down to the eighteenth century** It was a
situation similar to the loss of control by bishops over
2
some of the great monasteries*
The /
1 For Burgos see D.Mansilla* * iteaccion del cabildo de^
Burgos ante las visitas y otros actos de jurisdiccion
intentados por sua obispos** H*Sacra, x(1957),135*59*
For the text of one such agreement* between bishop Luis
de Acuna and the chapter of Segovia in 1456* and cover*
ling a wide range of disputes including control over
lands* appointments to benefices* enjoyment of tithes*
and the granting of leases* M.Quintanilla* *Concordia
entre el obispo y el cabildo1* E.S.* vi(1954), 320*7.
2 For a detailed example* pre*dating this period* s^e the
intx-oduction in L.Serrano* Cartulario de San Millan de
la Cogolla (Madrid* 1930)* For"general remarks^ Perez
de Arbeitop.cit*. ii,532*5,
282
The independence defended by the cathedral chapters
accorded well with the power which they in fact represented.
The dignitaries were often members of the powerful noble
families of Castile. Preferment to a capitular dignity
could mean the opening of a path to a bishopric. It was
not at all certsin# therefore, that chapters would always
accept intervention in elections. In most cases, no
doubt, they accepted the king's candidate gracefully,*
Yet in figuenssa in 1465, the chapter caine out in open
revolt. It is true that, at the beginning, their elec¬
tion of the dean, Diego Lopez de Madrid was taken as a
defence against a papal reservation. But the revolt of
the chapter gained momentum. As against papal bulls
and excommunications, Diego Lopes appealed to a future
council. Moreover, in 146?, the see again became vacant
and the chapter continued their resistance - but this time
against the king's man, Bishop Pedro Gonzales de Mendoza.
In the end the dean and his followers were captured and
imprisoned. The example of Figuenza shows the extent
to which cathedral chapters could still resist the power
2
of the papacy and the monarchy. But, although the
chapters could and did put up resistance, they were in-
svariably /
1 In 1422, for example, if there had been a free election
at Toledo the maestrescuela of the chapter would have
been elected instead of Martinez de Contreras.
2 Siguenaa is only the most striking of a fair number of
examples. fee Palanco homero, op.clt.. pp.64-5j
Tarsicio, Eleccion, pp.9-10? Fernandez Alonso, ubi
supra, pp.66-?!».
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invariably defeated in the end* They were not powerful
enough to succeed in imposing their candidates.
How successful were the great nobility in securing
appointments to bishoprics and in controlling episcopal
wealth? In some cases - especially in Galicia » the
great nobility resorted to the same use of force at a
local level which enabled them to usurp monastic wealth.
In 1460, for example, don Luis tie Gsorio attempted to
usurp the wealth of the archbishopric of Santiago by force
of arms,' Indeed, the situation in Galicia was critical
as the constitutional settlement of 1465 shows. The
bishop of Lugo had been dispossessed and his bishopric
taken over by the counts of Trastamara and Lemos, A
similar situation prevailed in the bishopric of Tuy which
was occupied by Alv&r Perez de Sotomayor#2 Outside
Galicia, the use of force by the nobility at a local level
was rare but not unknown. On the death of Archbishop
Fonseca of Seville, for example, the chapter, under pres-
i
isure from the powerful Guzman family, elected Fadrique
de Guzman, brother of the duke of Uedina Sidonia, Henry
IV, however, had written to Sixtus IV in favour of Pedro
Gonzalez de Mendoaa, bishop of Siguenza, The pope re*
tacted by rejecting both candidates and putting forward
his /
1 Palaneo Komero, op.cit., pp.62*4.
2 C.O.L.A.H.. 360-9 (cix.1465): ibid. 147-8 (11,22 Feb.
1456).
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his nephew, Pedro Iliario. In the end ^endoza's cause
triumphed, but only after a bitter struggle between the
Mendoza and Guzman families,
Ihe use of force by the nobility, however, was on
the whole exceptional. Control over appointments to
bishoprics was seen as being vested in the king. Hence
the nobility viewed the problem as one of establ ishing
political control at court and using the royal power in
their own interests. The nobility even attempted to
argue a constitutional case on this point in 1465* They
demanded that Henry IV
should remember to petition on behalf of
capable, worthy, and learned individuals,
nobles, sons of the great nobility of the
kingdom, and the many good and learned men
in the schools of Salamanca and Valladolid
who do not have benefices, as well as peti*
:tioning for his chaplains and servants.
The point was driven home by a demand that all appointments
to benefices should be decided by the king in agreement
2
with the aiajority of his council.
The power of the monarchy over appointments to
bishoprics could, therefore, be wielded by others than the
king. Indeed, this was precisely one of John 11*8 accu*
isations against Alvaro de Luna* Luna, he maintained, had
used the royal power to his own benefit by interfering in
the /
1 Tax-sic io, Cleccion, p.83,
2 C,P,R.A.H,T 36S(cix, 1465),
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the elections of bishops and abbots and by establishing
his own representative at the papal court* There can
be little doubt that* during Luna's period as royal favour*
site, John II had fully agreed with such interventions in
elections, Yet it is also true that royal control over
appointments was highly susceptible to pressure from the
great nobility* In February 1450, for example, the count
of Haro managed to obtain a written agreement from John II
which, among other matters, stipulated that the king should
2
use his power over benefices in the count's interests!
Furthermore it pleases the king to petition
our Holy Father for the second bishopric
falling vacant in favour of the person desi¬
gnated by the said count to the king, and
he will petition and insist on his candida¬
ture until success is attained* Hence-
;forth the king will also take into account the
wishes of the count, as far as is possible, in
those benefices which fall vacant*
Such an agreement not only secured the official backing
of the Crown, but also avoided the necessity of mounting
political pressure on a cathedral chapter and fighting a
losing battle in support of canonical elections*
Attention was focussed on the monarchy because effect¬
ive control over appointments to the ecclesiastical hier¬
archy lay with the king* In addition, however, the
Castilian monarchy probably extracted more financial bene¬
fits from the papacy than any other monarchy in Europe.
The /
* Ibid. 84-5(xli,18 June 1453).
2 B.kT, LS•, 638, fol»57K.
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The w«sftkn«sa of the papacy after the Schism and the
justification of the war against Granada strengthened the
claims of the monarchy. The tercias, ae has been seen,
were virtually a permanent and regular source of income
for the Crown. Ostensibly the tercias were used in the
holy war against Granada and the papacy attempted, with
little succesa, to ensure that they were used for this
purpose. Larti n V, for example, stipulated that the
terciaa should be used against Granada, should not be
alienated to individuals and that every twenty years some
of the proceeds should be given to the papal camera and
2
to the churches of Castile. There -,vas however, no
3
effective way of enforcing these conditions.
The papacy afforded further income to the monarchy
4
from the cruaada and the subsidies or d^clmas . Cruaada
revenues /
1 At Constance John II*# ambassadors asked Martin V to
grant the monarchy 150,000 florins. This exorbitant
demand was clearly related to John II*s support of
Martin V and the restoration of papal fiscality in
Castile. In the end the sum, payable by the^astllian
clergy, was reduced to 60,000 florins, L.Snares
Fernandas, Castilla. el cisma y la crisis conciliar.p.103.
2 J.Gohi uastamhide, Historja dela bulade la crusada
(Vitoria, 1958), pp.342-i.
3 An exception must be made for the logical but undiploma-
itlc actions of Benedict XI11 who, at one stage, even
refused to extend the concession of the tercias to the
regent, Catherine of Lancaster! L.Shutres Fernandas,
Castilla. el cisma y la crisis conciliar, pp.74*5. Sub-
:sequent references to conditi^s"relating to this
tercias were nothing more than the expression of pious
hopes or political Intrigue, For example, John 11*8
accusation that Alvaro de Luna had misapplied revenues
from the tercias was pure cant and hypocrisy, C.D.R.A.H.
85(xli,18 June US3).
4 See Gdni Gaastambide, op.clt., chaps,xii and xiv for a
detailed treatment of these taxes in the fifteenth century.
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revenues were raised by the sale of indulgences and the
subaidioa or decimas were direct taxes on the Castilian
clergy. These were not regular revenues and they were
not granted by the papacy on a permanent basis* In theory
the/ were granted to promote particular crusades against
the infidel. Both John 11 and Henry IV were adept at
obtaining the ae concessions by requesting papal support
for ru&i or imaginary campaigns against Granada.* Further
income v.as provided for the Crown, from the mid-fifteenth
century onwards, when the papacy attempted to raise money
for the war against the Turks and had to share the pro*
2
:ceeds with the Crown.
The fifteenth century, therefore, witnessed a colla*
sboration between monarchy and papacy which worked to
their mutual advantage. Only occasionally was real
friction discernible during the pontificates of Pius 11
and Sixtus IV"*, The result was that the first estate,
although exempt from direct royal taxation, paid consider*
^able sums of money to the monarchy which were levied at
the command of the papacy. These were taxes which were
bitterly resented by the clergy and their collection
proved increasingly difficult. In 1465 the clergy de-
imanded /
1 See, especially, ibid, pp.342-?, 350-70,
2 In 1456, for example, Cal ixtus III imposed a dec jam, for
the crusade against the Turks. This was reduced in
Castile to a sum of 100,000 florins, half of which was
to go to the Crown. #
3 See Tarsicio, ^1seeion, pp.492-8.
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demanded a total and permanent abolition of subsidies and
decimas, Significantly, this demand was addressed to
the monarchy and not to Rome, It was a demand that was
doomed to failure. Indeed, after 1478, the monarchy
benefited from a further papal concession when Sixtus 1Y
virtually handed over complete control of the Inquisition
and its profits to the Crown,
5), The Quality of Religious Life: abuses, reform, autonomy
The quality of religious life in Castile was in most
2
essentials similar to the rest of western Europe, In
Castile, as elsewhere, the clergy are condemned and held
up to contempt in the literature of the period. The
entire Lib go de Buen Amor by Juan Ruiz, archpriest of Hita,
is a magnificent testament of re iig ious life in fourteenth-
century Castile.* Pero Lopez de Ayala, in his Rjmado de
alacio. wrote a blistering section on the clergy in which
he described their ignorance, simony, complete lack of
interest in religion, concubines, and illegitimate child-
:rea,4 Towards the end of the fifteenth century matters
had I
1 The demand of 1465 in C«D, R.A.H,, 36?-8(cix,1465), For
the resentment and resistance of the clergy see details
in J,Fernandez Alonso, ubi supra, pp.51*122,
2 bee i>. Hay, op,cit.. chap,atif, pp,299*332#
3 See, for example, the reception of don Amor by the
clergy; Juan Ruiz, Libro de Buen Amor (Austral edition,
1962), pp,122-4,
4 L6pea de Ayala, iljmado de Falaelo (B.A.E,) lvil.431-2,
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had not improved much if the evidence of the Celes tina
is to ba believed,*
Evidence, in fact, exists for all the old familiar
2 3
abuses - pluralism, absenteeism, abuse of powers to
impose ecclesiastical penalties,* iiaiorality, and vagrant
5
priests and monies. There was the same lack of regular
machinery to reform the worst of these abuses. The
same Obsession with the need to die well' provided a
ready market for indulgences, and lad to the same invest*
anent in perpetual masses, confraternities, and chapels.
Mariology /
1 For example, Celtstina's description in Act nine of her
arrangements of the love affairs of the clergy.
2 For example, Rodrigo Ranches de Arevalo, author of De
remedius afflictae ecclesiae, was himself a pluralist;
&,nffiramcl'kodrlgo C^ncHea de"*Arevalo (Washington, 1958),
pp.92*3,201-3, ^
3 For example, the bishop of Mondonedo, Fadrique de
Guzman, spent, the years 1466-90 in Seville where the
bishop of Jaen also kept hie town houses; A.Gonzalez
Palencia, *Nuevoa datos biograf icos*, Bol,)f,y P., xi
(1929),22-39.
4 See the extreme actions by the abbot of Sahagun, in
1406, against the town, the council, and the corregidor;
A.H.H,, Clerc, Pergs, carp,940, docs,8,15; carp,$41j'
docs,2,4,5,
5 Sec, for example, the evidence for the bishopric of
Caiahorra in Tarsieio, Isabel laCat<$llca. p.474,
6 See J.Eunzunegui, *Concilios y sinodos espanoles
medievales*, H.Sacr*. 1(1948), 127-33; P4 res de Urbel,
op,cit.. ii.570-4, The diocese of Burgos, for example,
exempt from all metropolitan authority and visitation,
only witnessed eight diocesan synods between 1382-1474,
2<>0.
Mariology, pilgrimages, ant! the cult of saints ail appear
to hsve increased in importance in the fifteenth century#*
One point perhaps deserves special attention# Apart
from problems related to the Jews and Moors,* it is a
remarkable fact that in Castile in the fifteenth century#
there is hardly any evidence for the existence of heresy
or mysticism. In the late 1440'e a popular movement
existed for a brief period in Durango. The chief feat*
!ures seem to have been communal wealth# the denial of
• %
the real presence, and a refusal to hold the cross in
reverence. The movement, led by the Franciscan Alonsb'dp Mel
brother of the bishop of 7,amora, found its greatest support
among peasants and artisans, Some of the heretics were
3
burnt but Alonso de Mel la managed to escape to Granada#
This small movement was the only popular one of its kind#
Earl i er, r?ome supporters of Benedict XIII had resisted for
some time in the area of BurgosThere were also those
who opposed the sale of indulgences# Indeed Pedro do
Osma, profeasor at Salamanca, alarmed the ecclesiastical
authorities to such an extent by his attacks on indulgences
5
that he was tried for heresy# Yet these were the isolated
protests /
1 Bee especially Bancho, Historla, ii,chap#1, For an
astonishing centre of pTTgrTmage, attracting moors from
Granada as well as christians, see J.Torres Pontes, El
roonasterio de San Gjnes de la Jara (Murcia,1963)•
2 for"*He conversos* and '"ilews see below
3 See Alonso de Cartagena, HelensorIran Unitatls Christiana#,
ed« P,Manuel Alonso 'Madrid#1943J#"pp#4Q»i#
4 L#Suares Fernandes, Cast!11a. el cisma y la crisis conciliar,
5 JfGoni Gastambide, op.citchap#**.
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protests of individuals and not of movements.
What kind of men were the bishops? Alvarez de
Toledo, Guzman, Figueroa, Acuna, htuniga, Mendoza,
Manrique, Silva, Velasco, Sotomayor, Pimento! * all these
names appear in the list of fifteenth*century Castilian
bishops. These were men born into the episcopate and
connected on all sides to the elite network of the great*
jest social and political figures of the age. Arch*
•bishop Carriilo of Toledo, for example, was the son of
Lope Vazquez de Acuna and nephew of Cardinal Carriilo de
Albornoz who in turn had been closely related to Pedro
de Luna, archbishop of Toledo, and also to Benedict XIII•
He was also the brother of Pedro de Acuna, count of Buendfa,
and the uncle of Luis de Acuna, bishop of Segovia and
Burgos, and of Pedro Gir<Sn, master of the order of
Calotrava. Such examples could be repeated endlessly.
Many of these men al o conformed to the pattern of
what might be regarded as the typical Castilian bishop
of the later middle ages. These were bishops who were
aristocratic, politically minded, not very well grounded
in ecclesiastical matters, lovers of luxury, and forraid*
:able opponents on the battlefield. Puigar, for example,
describes Archbishop Carriilo in the following terms**
He /
1 Claroa Varones, pp.i16*9.
292.
He was a belicose man and. in accordance with
this disposition, he liked always to have
with him men at arms, and to be involved in
wars and assemblies ol armies. He was
obstinate in his opinions and would pursue
them, even though the obstacles involved
were pointed out to him ... which in his
time resulted in some wars in the kingdom
with campaigns, battles, skirmishes and other
feats of arms.
He was a tireless worker in matters
related to war and, just as he was loved by
some for being frank so he was disliked by
many for this bellicosity in a man of relig-
:ion He always tried to have great
wealthf not in order to amass treasure but
to be able to give and distribute largesse,
and this desire led him to study the art of
alchemy for auiny years ...
Carillo was an outstanding example of the aristocratic
and warrior prelate. Other noble prelates, however, were
stamped with the same qualities. Gutierre Alvarez de
Toledo, bishop of Palencia, archbishop of Seville, and
archbishop of Toledo 'appeared in his speech and manners
to be more like a knight than a prelate1.* Juan Garcia
Manrique, archbishop of Santiago, 'was not a letrado but
he was a very frank man of great estate and had many great
2
relatives'. That such bishops should have existed is
scarcely surprising, given the pressure that the nobility





3 ThU was especially true when pressure led to the
election of a minor as in the case of Bishop Gonzalo
de Zuniga: Gonzalez Palencia, ubi supra, pp.22-39.
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It would be misleading, however, to assume that
these warrior prelates were characteristic of the epis-
:copate. Inevitably the warrior prelates seem to dornin-
Jate the Church and ecclesiastical politics, Yet this
impression is derived from chroniclers whose primary
purpose was to describe political issues and events,
A rigid classification of the Castilian hierarchy is,
of course, impossible since any categories inevitably
overlap with each other. Nevertheless, a discussion of
the academic background of prelates and their work in
royal administration will serve to produce a more balanced
picture.
The link between ecclesiastics and royal adminis¬
tration was strong. Indeed the interplay was so marked
that it is impossible to ascertain exactly how many royal
1
servants were rewarded for their services by bishoprics.
It is, for example, extremely difficult to assess the
reasons for the promotion to a bishopric of a man who was
both an archdeacon and a royal judge. The number of
cases of promotions to the episcopacy which can definitely
be ascribed to service in the royal administration seems
small - probably less than half a dozen bishops from 1390
to /
1 The same applies to those belcw episcopal status. The
archdeacons of Salves and Calatrava and the dean of
Santiago, for example, are to be found as oldores in the
audienciaj K.A.H., S,y C., 9/838 (M-31), fols,^8V-84K»
Cortes, ill.12(1.1419).
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to 1474, To this number must be added bishoprics given
to anembers oi families of civil servants. Two examples
of this kind are outs landing • Diego Arias de Avi la,
contador mayor to Henry IV, managed to obtain the bishopric
2
of Avila for his son, Ju0n Arias, This, beyond all doubt,
reflected the political dominance which the father had
created for himself in all branches of the royal aJininis-
:tration. The other case of promotion was probably even
more significant, One of the administrative dynasties which
established themselves in royal government throughout the
fifteenth century was the Ulloa family. At the beginning
of the century Pero Yanez de Ulloa was one of the key
officials of Henry 111*6 administration. At the end of
the century Aodrigo de Ulloa was to be the chief financial
official of the Catholic sovereigns. By mid century one
of t he family had been given the bishopric of Avila and
later became archbishop at Seville, although as a prelate
3
he assumed the more noble maternal name of Fonseca,
Civil /
1 Martin Fernandez de V i lches, canon of Toledo and aen,
was Henry IV*s secretary and chancellor before gaining
the see of Avila, Vicente Arias, archdeacon of Toledo, worked
in the audiencia before becoming bishop of Plasencia.
Gonzalo de 11lescas, prior of Guadalupe and royal confessor,
clearly owed his see to his service under John II, Fortun
Velasquez de Cuellar was awarded a bishopric after years
of work in the royal administration. See A.H.N.,Clero,
Pergs,carp.1153,doc,20; A.D.M.,Fant.,leg.5,doc.23; R.A.H.,
S.yC,,9/838(M-31),fols.78V-84R; B.N.,MS. 13031,fols.55V,57V;
Ceneraciones«p.581 Cortes,ii1.12(1.14191 I C.D.ft.A.H.,
129(xlviii,i455) . #
2 Garci Sanchez,p.44; Tarsicio, Kleccfon,p,220.
3 In Claros Varones,pp,12l«»B it is stated that he was the
son of the letrado Juan Alfonso de Ulloa, This conforms
to the family relationships given in A«G,S,,E«M,R,, leg.11,
fol,270R where he appears as the uncle of Rodrigo de Ulloa,
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Civil service prelates were not. therefore, unknown
in Castile, Yet, so far, the discussion has been limited
to civil servants who became prelates. If the general
interplay between the royal service and the bishops is
looked at,the connection becomes even stronger. Indeed
it was the exception if a bishop did not play some part in
royal government service.
In many cases it was no doubt conventional to regard
prelates as being honorary roe fibers of royal government.
The signatures of solemn diplomas, for example, clearly
reveal the honorary nature of some administrative posts
Sometimes the convention became firmly established tradit-
:ion. The archbishop of Toledo, for example, invariably
held the title of chanciller mayor of Castile,
The king's council presents the greatest difficulties
in identifying episcopal royal servants since some were
councillors because of their political importance and some
merely held the title as an honour. Yet even with the
council the civil service prelates can be discerned, as
when the bishops of Giudad Kodrigo and Lugo, along with
one doc tor and one clerk, formed a council to deal with
routine administrative matters,^
It /
1 For example, B.N.,MS.,13029, fols.10V.12V, 16 Feb,1420,
gives the bishop of Burgos as chanciller mayor de la
a.ina. and the archbishop of Toledo as chanci IIer" mayor
of Castile.
2 £ee C.O.K.A.M., 78«9 (xxxix,1453).
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It is easier to identify the judicial work of the
Castilian prelates. Throughout the fifteenth century
the supreme civil and criminal court of Castile was run
largely by prelates.* A rough count reveals at least
fifteen bishops who were judges in this court or audiencia.
Of these fifteen bishops at least five were presidents of
the audiencia. Doubtless some of these prelates delegated
the work to others. Nevertheless there is sufficient
document a tion to show that cases were actually tried before
prelates acting as royal judges*
The other branch of royal service where prelates
played an outstanding role was diplomacy. Little needs
to be said here on this point. Their participation in
the church councils was supplemented by ambassadorial work
for both papacy and monarchy. Don Francisco* bishop of
Coria, for example, was a papal ambassador in France,
Aragon, and Bohemia, as well as representing Henry IV at
Rome.* These men who entered the international scene
contrasted sharply with the prelates who were intimate
royal /
1 See F. Mendisabal, * Investigaciones acerca «•* de la real
chanci lleria* , Il.A.B.M.. xxx(19l4) *61-72.243-64.437-52.
2 Vicente Arias, Alonso de Paradinas, Garcia tie fiahamonde,
Gonzalo de Yivero, Gonzalo of Segovia, Pedro de Miranda,
Alvaro de I soma, Fernando de Lujan, Alonso de Cartagena,
Lope de Barrientos, Alfonso de Fonseca, Pedro de Castiila,
Sancho de Aojaa.of Cordoba, Gutierre Alvarez de Toledo,
Forttin Velasquez de Cu^llar.
3 For examples of cases actually tried before episcopal
oldores: B.N.,MS13031,fols.43R-75j R.A.H.,S.y C.,
9/838 (M-31) ,fols.78V«84i\; A.D.M.,Priego, leg.84,doc.4;
jybjtd ® an t., leg,5 ,doc«23.
4 Claros Carones, pp.125-33.
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royal confidants at coxirt. Alonso de Palenzuela, bis hop
of Ciudad Rodrigo, who was Henry IV1 s ambassador to the
fcjag lish court in 1471, never seems to have been a member
of the royal council or to have held any job in the royal
administration** Indeed, as far as the papal court is
concerned, the royal representative often seems merely to
have been chosen from the Castilians residing permanently
2
in Rome. This was in vivid contrast to men like Gonzalo
de Illescas and Cope de Barrientos who were important in
the royal administration because of their influence as
royal confessors*
It was no accident that bishops played such an
important role in royal justice and diplomacy, and not,
for example, in finance* These activities called, not ,
for bishops as such, but for jurists. This in itself
reflects something of the educational standards of the
episcopacy.
It is easy to match examples of warrior prelates
with others who enjoyed an international reputation for
their brilliance and learning. Cardinals Juan de
Carvajal and Juan de Torquesada, and Bishops Pablo de
Santa /
1 Mem,MYBjjazs., p.199. Countless other examples in
political histories of the period*
2 From the congress of Siena in 1460 until his death in
1470, Rodrigo Sanchez de Arevalo settled in Koine and acted




Santa Mar(a, Alfonso de Cartagena, and Kodrigo Sanchez
de Arevalo are outstanding examples.* Nevertheless it
is more significant to look not at the outstanding
exceptions but at the episcopacy as a whole. Although
all the matriculation records of Salamanca university
are lacking for the fifteenth century,^ it is still
wv
possible to draw up a rough list of the number of acade-
naics in the episcopate, Such a count reveals that over
twenty bishops were university men. The majority of
these bishops were jiroducts of Salamanca, some held
degrees but cannot be identified with any particular
university, and a few, like dan Francisco, bishop of
Coria, had studied at foreign universities. At least
3
three professors are included in this group.
The /
1 There are lengthy studies on the Santa Marias which
throw a flood of light on Castilian history; L,Serrano,
Los conversos don Pablo de Santa Mar^a y don Alfonso de
Cartagena (Madrid", 1952); F,Can t era Burgos , Alvar Garc{a
de Santa Mar/a y su familla de conversos (Madrid,1952), *
2 L,<j&nez''Canedo. Don' iuan~de ' Carve .ial (Madrid. 1947), p,34
note 13, ,
3 Products of Salamanca: Juan Arias Davila, Gutierre
Alvarez de Toledo, Lope de Barrientos (professor of the*
jology), Tello de Buendfa, Alonso de Cartagena, Juan de
Carvajal, Alonso de Madrigal (professor of theology and
philosophy), Juan de Mel la, Alonso de Paradinas, Conaalo
de Santa Maria (professor), Juan de Torquemada, Hodrigo
de Vergara, Products of other or unknown universities:
Francisco of Coria, Vicente Arias, Juan Diaz de Coca,
Diego Fernandez de lllescas, Juan Gonzalez, Gonzalo
Gonzalez de Rustamantc, Juan df lllescas. Lope de Mendoza,
Alonso de Palenzuela, Fernan Lopes del Orden, Pedro
Tenorio, Since the list is certainly incomplete the wide
range of references to these men and their degrees is not
given.
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The number of academics and administrators may seem
surprisingly high when related to the grim picture usually
given of the Castilian Church in the later middle ages.
In fact a substantial change in the character of the
episcopacy did take place in the fifteenth century, due,
primarily, to changes in educational opportunities* There
can be no doubt that many academics were men of law but some
were theologians * The group of over twenty prelates can-
: trasts strongly with the argument that 'not a single doctor
of theology is heard of from halamanca until 1355*. Until
the late fourteenth century Salamanca was a complete back-
iwater and it was precisely for this reason that Cardinal
Gil de Albornoz founded the Spanish college at Bologna in
1365.1
The turning point came in the late fourteenth and
early fifteenth century* Theology became fully estafo¬
il ished at Salamanca by the last decade of the fourteenth
century and, although Clement VI had expressly excluded
theology when he approved the foundation of Valladolid
University in 1346, Henry III founded a chair in theology
in 1404 which was confirmed by Martin V in 1418. These
developments were accompanied by the foundation of
colleges /
1 Trame, op.cit *. p.9. But see also F.Martin Hernandez,
La formaci^iT*clerical en log colegios universltarlos
espaffoles Tvi tor ia, 195IT, pp.4-23.
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colleges which were open to poor students* The most
famous of these colleges* the Colegio Mayor de San
Bartoipme, was founded by Diego de Anaya y Maldonado,
subsequently archbishop of Seville* in the early fifteenth
century* It was a college which was to prove a veritable
power house in producing able prelates. These develop*
:meats were late in appearing in Castile* Yet they proved
to be a turning point leading to further foundations of
colleges and providing the Castilian monarchs* including
the Catholic sovereigns* with the letrados who were to
1
improve the calibre of the episcopate*
Nor were these changes purely accidental* The pap*
sacy, it has been argued* deliberately encouraged theolo*
:gical studies in Castile to counteract the conciliarism
of Paris and it is certainly true that Castilians pro*
2
tvided much of the support for the papal position* It
would also seem that the period of the Schism and the
councils had an effect by throwing together the inter*
(national intelligentsia* It was on his return from
Constance* for example* that Archbishop Anaya decided
definitively /
1 The Cplegio de Pan y Carbon* founded in 1386* predated
the Colegio de San Bartolome'* The latter was begun by
Anaya in 1401 and confirmed by Benedict XIII in 1414
and ^artin V in 1418* Martin Hernandez, op.cit.*
pp,xxi"lxx and 4*23; Tarsicio* hieccion. pp.225-6J
J.Goni Gas tambide, *hecompensaa de -Martin V a aus
eiectores espanoies** H«Sacra* a i {1958)* 273*6,288*91*
2 Trame, op.cit,, p*9.
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definitively to set up the college of San Bartolorae.
But the Crown played the decisive role Ly promoting
academics to bishoprics. It has already been argued
that the nobility were inf luerxed by the fact that the
2
royal court became a centre of learning. The court
als-o influenced the Church. Alfonso de Madrigal, pro-
:fessor at Salamanca, for example, was brought to court
by John II, made a member o£ the royal council, and re¬
garded with the bishopric of Avila. Similarly it was
another professor and bishop, originally drafted to court
as tutor to f'rince Henry, who virtually took charge of
royal government after the execution of Alvaro de Luna.^
4
lloyal interest had practical results.
The efl ect of these troads was to increase the
number of ac&deaac prelates. There was also a subse¬
quent decline in some of the worst abuses. Bishops
like /
1 See Goni Gaztambide, ubi supra, pp.259-97 which shows
the extent to which the Caatilian eaJaasay at Constance
was preoccupied with improving centres of learning*
It was this embassy which obtaiiied -«*rtin V's blessing
for a faculty of theology at Valladolid, previously
denied by Clement VI, The first dean, Luis de Valladolid,
was himself one of the ambassadors. The importance of
such developments can be guagsd by noting the parochial
atmosphere in Salamanca in the late fourteenth century:
Goni Gaatambide, * Tras rotulos de la universidad*, A.A.,
xi(1963), 227-317; the same, 'Un rotulo de la univerai-
{dad'» £*£•* xii(1964), 283-92.
2 See above ij>. 2o^-t,.
3 A useful portrait of Alfonso de Madrigal in Claroe
V a rones, pp. 134-7. On Sarriant as see Car r iazo'l In t ro-
sduction to Hef.Halconero* pp.cxxxiii-clv.
4 The practical results have been deliberately stressed.
John 1I*b general interest in religious learning and in
Greek and *-*atin texts is well attested. See, for example,
Claros Varones, p.137 and Cantera Burgos, op.cit., pp.
458-9.
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like Alfonso de Madrigal, Tello de Luendia, and the
observant Franciscan, AIoriso da P&lenssuela, were exeeap—
I
Jlary prelates. It is not surprising to find that
Alfonso de Madrigal's rathar puritanical ideas on the
characteristics needed in bishops gained considerable
2
acceptance towards the end of the period.
Changes in the quality of the episcopate were accom¬
panied to a certain extent by a revival in monastic life.
Two important aspects about this revival merit brief treat¬
ment «
The first aspect concerns the nature of this revival.
As far as the old orders were concerned reform took the
nature of observance. The lieneciictine observant movement
began in 1390 when monies from Lahagun under Antonio de
Ceynos moved to Valladolid. from 1420 onwards the V&lla-
idolid observants began to make important conquests in the
older foundations of Castile - San Claudio in Leon (1420).
Fahagun (1427), and Ona (1454) were important stages in
3
this process of assimilation. A similar observant move¬
ment in the Cistercian order, directed by Martin de
4
Vargas, began to take effect from 1427 onwards* The
movement /
1 See CI arcs Va rones, pp.134-40 and ^ga»fc|3jhr» .Hazs. p. 52.
2 Tar3icio. ClecciOn. pp.230-3.
3 Tarsicio, Isabe.1, pp♦ 567-St Perez de Urbel, op.cit«.
i^,600-601; - antoB £>fes, op.cit.. pp. 173-4.
4 Peres de Urbel, oo.cit.. ii.p.6ol.
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movemeat of observance among the Dominicans had antecedents
in the early fifteenth century • for example, in the work
of Alvaro de Cordoba in Cordoba - but received its main
impulse from the activity of Cardinal Torquemada who
succeeded from 1460 onwards in establishing the centre of
the observant movement in the convent of San Pablo in
Yalladolid. * Finally, the Franciscans, as might be
expected, were subject to more than one movement of obser¬
vance* For a long time splinter moves>>ents, deriving
from the work of men like Pedro de Villacreces and Lope
de balazar, refused to identify themselves with the main
bod/ of observants but, by 1466, the movements had fused
2
into one general movement. These movements towards
observance no doubt helped to improve standards among
monks and friars.
At the same time the Carthusians and Jerohlmites were
responsible for a new, if minor, wave of monasticisia from
the late fourteenth century onwards. The first Carthusian
monastery to be founded in Castile was that of El Paular
and, by the end of the fifteenth century, there were still
less than half a dozen foundations in Castile. The
Jeronimltes started earlier and enjoyed greater success,
probably due to a greater backing from the Crown and the
nobility /
1 Tarsicio, Isabel. pp.566-9*
2 Ibid, pp.569-71.
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nobility* Guadalupe, for example, was especially
1
favoured with donations by the Crown and nobility.
The second aspect to be mentioned concerns the nature
of the reorganization that took place. There seems little
doubt that the result was to free Castilian religious
orders from foreign control and create a large measure
of centralisation vithin the kingdom. Such a result seems
to have been actively encouraged by the monarchy. It is
not improbable that John II desired an autonomous organi*
ization of the Castilian orders. Not only did the Crown
support any activity designed to end dependence abroad but
it also actively intervened to prevent disintegration of
the new movements, as when, in 145?, the king's council
stepped in to help the main body of Franciscan observants
2
against Lope da Salazar* By the late fifteenth century
the Benedictine monasteries load been centralized into a
dependence /
1 Perez de Urbel, op.cit,, ii.59?*8*
2 For the action of the royal council ace Taraicio, Isabel,
p.570, The Crown's interest in the new movements was
apparent from the very start. The future centre of
Benedictine monasticism in Castile, the monastery of San
Benito, was begun by John I in 1388 by converting the
royal palace in Valladolid into a monastery. Subsequently
both Henry III and John II supported the movement to
centralisation of dependence on this monastery* See, in
general, P,Schmits, Hit;toire de 1'ordre de Saint-Benoft
(Liege, 1948) , iii# chap.v and the deTa i ied escampIe in
which the monastery of San Juan of Burgos had its depend*
Jence on the French house of Cassa Dei replaced by San
Benitojin Cantera Burgos, op.cit.» pp,127-32,
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dependence on Yalladolid and similar developments had
taken place with the Cistercians, Dominicans, and Francis-
Scans. The general chapter of the Cistercians saw in
this independence the making s of a schism.* In fact a
further step was being taken towards a national Church,
1 Fliche and Martin, Ciatoire de 1 * eg 1 ise. xiv.lQhO,
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THE MILITARY ORDERS
It has been noted that, juridically, the military orders
1
formed a part of the first estate. In the fifteenth cen«
: tury, the same formulae of a religious nature continued to
be applied to the orders as in previous centuries. The
acts of the general chapter of Santiago of 1440, for example,
are full of detailed regulations on the religious obligate
2
Hons of the members of the order. Procedure, ceremony,
and elections were still theoretically governed by canon
law. The abbots of clteaux and Moristond continued to con*
3
5 firm elections to the mastership of Calatrava, uccas-
sionally, mainly for political reasons, it was useful to
4
stress the religious character of the orders.
The reality differed sharply from the theory. While
the military orders jealous ly refused to allow other reli-
igious orders into the areas which they controlled, they
tiieruselves /
1 See above V '2-c>^-
2 The acts of the general chapter are in B.N.,MS,,833.
Folios 8R,12R« 16V,27V-28V,33V•35V,38R-45R,49K or V,53V-
57R,65V-106R contain regulations on such matters as
religious ceremonies, confession, communion, fasting,
marriage and concubinage, dress, non-residence, visita¬
tions, and spiritual duties affecting the general popu-
slati on on the order's lands.
3 F.R.de Uhagon, Qrdenea mi11tares (Madrid,1898), pp.53-5,
62-3 gives data on such confirmations,
4 It is clear, for example, that the true purpose of the
chapter meeting of Santiago in 1440 was to prepare an
offensive against Alvaro de Luna. The meeting allowed
the master, the Infante *u*rique, to dwell at length on
Luna's uncanonical interventions in the affairs of the
ordert B.N.,MS,833,fols.18V-24V.
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themselves completely failed to fill the monastic vacuum.*
The one rule that was destined to be of great importance
was the one that reserved membership of the orders to men
2
hidalgo status.
1) The Wealth of the Military °rders
The military orders have rightly been regarded as
powerful and wealthy groupings within Spanish society,
ihere was this wealth derived from? Fortunately some
detailed accounts of the income of the order of Santiago
3
survive in the archive of Simancas, The accounts only
refer to income from the ; rovincia of Leon • an area
mainly situated in the region of Lxtremadura and bounded
by the kingdom of Portugal and the modern provinces of
Cordoba and Seville* The figures from these accounts
have been reduced to a small and comprehensible pattern
which is presented in Tables XVII » XIX,* This informa*
stion refers to the income and expenditure of the mesa
roaestral. Again, fortunately, the only good study on
the /
1 Ibid. fol.feOii and V: *(iue de aqui adelante non aya
utonesterio nin hermjtario tie freyres"~en nuestra orden
nin de otra re 1 i >; ionaTquna salvo la niiestra', ""
2 TbiltL fol .50^ ? 'Cue el maestre non pueda recebir nin
dar el habito de nuestra orden a ninguno salvo que sea
fijodalgo e primeramente cabalTero' * See sx'Ho L.P,
Wright, •The military orders in sixteenth and seventeenth
century Spanish society*, P.P.. no.43 (¥**»34-70.
3 A.G.S.,E«M«R.,leg. 13 (antiguo legajo 18 ) contains
some 200 folios of accounts and tax farms which are not
arranged in any logical order.
4 Appendices K, S, and T, below 5"? 1 z..
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the military orders in the fifteenth century deals with
the same province, uses other sources of documentation,
and bases its approach not from the point of view of the
mesa maestral. but of the encomiendas and town councils.*
It is. therefore, possible to generalise on the basis of
detailed evidence on almost all aspects of one of the pro*
Winces of the military orders* whenever possible these
generalisations are supplemented by examples from other
areas which tend to strengthen the assumption that the
generalisations will prove valid for the other provinces
when more studies are available*
I) Formal lordship
By the fifteenth century it is difficult to identify
even the formal lordship of the mi1 hary orders* Techni¬
cally the military orders as corporate bodies held lordship
and jurisdiction over the lands under their control*
Comendadoreg and castellans (alcaides) were bound to the
masters of the orders by homage, and military service to
the Crown depended on permission being granted by the
masters* The formulae of formal lordships also still
continued /
1 M.Gongora, * Regimen senorial y rural en la Extremadura
de la orden de Santiago en el momento de la emigr&cion
a Indies*. Jb*f*G*Latelnamerlkas. ii(1965),1-29. This
article coversthe period 1480-1520 and hence provides
a certain degree of continuity to the Simancas accounts.
The study is based on the acts of chapters and record#
of visitations* See also the very general article. H*
Mota Arlvalo, **-a orden de Santiago en tterras de
Extremadura*. R.S.E., xviii(1962). 5-76,
2 Uhagln, op.clt.* pp.79*80 prints the homage of the
alcaide of Blimes to the master of Calatrava* The nece-
sssity for oermi ssion to obey a royal summons! act as
of 1440, B.N,,&S.,833,fols.41V-42R.
309.
continued to be used. John II, for example, approved
the exchange of ^alarilla (belonging to Aodrigo de Guzman)
with the Calatrava area of La Iliguera de Andujar con su
torre e cast i 1 lo e vagal log e terminos e juredlcclon cevll
e criminal alta e baxa e mero e lulxto inperio.*
Yet in reality there was a complicated pattern of
lordships all over the lands of the orders* The formal
lordship of the corporate mesa macstral shared power with
the individual lordships of cotaendadores and alcaides
which, after 1310, were held for life, enjoyed seigneurial
2
rights, and owed military service of lanaas to the order.
The pattern of lordships and the relationships between
masters and cotnendadores did indeed bear striking reseat-
:blances to the relationship between the royal supreme
lordship and the lordships granted by the Crown to the
nobi11ty.
Detailed evidence on the value of juridical lordship
as a source of wealth once again shows that it was of little
value. In the ::rovincla of ^mon in 1466, for example,
income deriving from taxes inherent in lordship * mart in*
iegas. 1 ievas and yarttares. pedidos • only accounted for
4.66% of total income. Even if such revenues as the
escribania /
1 A.H.N*, Cal«, Sec.dip., reales, leg.4,doc.244, 3 June 1434*
2 iw, Congora, ubl supra. p#4.
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escriban{a, nortaago. and taxes on Jews and ^oors are
regarded as being inherent to lordship, the total still
only comes to 10,26% (Table XVI!!),*
As with the lordships of the nobility the evidence
shows that formal lordship over land was not profitable unless
supplemented by income from other sources. Once again
a mere catalogue of lands included in the lordship is in
itself insufficient evidence of great wealth. Indeed
contemporary evidence shows that the military orders, as
well as the nobility, had begun to disregard the juridical
formulae of lordship and concentrate on careful assessments
of cash value,^
if) Agrarian income
There is no evidence of any demesne farming by the
military orders. In all probability labour services had
been commuted into cash payments during the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, A document of 1428, for example,
shows that peasantry on some of the Galatrava lands had to
ssake annual payments in cash in lieu of labour services
from /
1 Append ix S, below |>
2 See, for example, the transaction, involving lordships
and assignments, between the order of Alcantara and
Alfonso i"erea de Vivero which is contained in John II's
confirmation in A,D.M,,Vill.,leg.l,doc.l2,20 Nov,1449*
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from peasantry *who wore in former times obliged to go
arid harvest the grain of the caaapo of Calatrava'.*
The lack of demesne exploitation is not surprising*
On the other hand it is surprising to note how low the
income from rents and censes was in the provincla of Leon.
Lents and censes accounted for a mere 0.145 of total
income in 1466, To this mus t be added the rents from
the dehcsas or pasture grounds which provided 11.8614 of
total income (Table XVI11}*^ By any standards the
figures are low, -specially the non-pastoral rents and
censes, and the reasons for thi3 should be briefly dis-
jcussed.
The extremely low sums derived from censes and rents
may be partly explained by the small number of leases en-
itailed for such a wide area as the provincia of Leon.
Land being held by the comendadores. the censes and rents
3
went to them rather than to the mesa maestral. Neverthe-
:less the documentation also shows that the annual payments
by tenants was in many casas extremely low, as can be seen
by giving a breakdown of the leases in Llerena. Here some
vineyards rendered as much as 500 mrs per year but of the
total of twenty leases as many as sixteen each brought in
as /
1 A.H.N.,Cai. fSec.dip. , parts.,leg.3,doc.307, 10 i*iay 1428.
By this agreement the village of 1liana had to pay 1,640
mrs per year in lieu of labour services.
2 Appendix S, below
3 In the accounts for 1464, for example, less than fifty
leases (not including dehasas) are given for the whole
rovincia; A.G.S.,£•M.K., leg. 13,fols•151V-152U.
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as little as 100 mra or less per year. The low sums
involved can in turn be explained by the emphyteut ical
leases granted to the tenants* In effect this meant the
perpetual alienation of the usufruct of land by the order.
The tenant enjoyed tenure as long as he continued to pay
the original yearly payment stipulated. Confirmation of
terms of leases only occurred when the tenant died or when
he sold the land. It is true that quo warranto investi¬
gations into leases were carried out during the visitations
but these aimed not at substituting short term leases in
place of the existing leases but rap rely to ensure that the
ultimate lordship of the order was recognised* Hence
although rent payments rose - on the death of a tenant*
the sale of the land, failure to produce proper documents
during the visitations • the rise was gradual and the real
1
value of the leases fell sharply*
The large pasture grounds or dehesas do not appear to
have been directly exploited by the order in the provincia
of Leon* The fact that they accounted for almost 12% of
total income in 1466 is explained by two important reasons*
In the first place the documentation clearly shows the
importance of the dehesas in the general ranching activit¬
ies of the region. It seems probable that throughout
the /
1 ibid and &*Uongora, ubi supra* pp.17-18.
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the fifteenth century an enclosure movement was gathering
strength on ail the lands controlled by the military
orders and the dehesas became increasingly important*
This tendency was not necessarily due to increased activity on
the part of the Utesta. although the signs are not altogether
lacking* As early as 141?, for example, the order of
Calatrava was setting up sheep walks in its lands in re*
J turn for Siesta subsidies and trying to break down the
resistance of the villages affected* More important than
the was the great increase in local ranching and
enclosures** The second point explaining the profitability
of the dehesas concerns the nature of their exploitation
by the orders. There is no evidence of dehesas being
leased by emphyteusis. On the contrary they were treated
as another form of taxation resource and were farmed out for
short periods of time to the highest bidder* Short term
stability in dehesa income was, therefore, open to increases
according to the demand of the ranching interest. In 1466,
for example, the most profitable grasing grounds were
Covillana (150,000 airs per year), and Campo (100,000 mrs
per year)* By the end of the century both these deheaag
were /
1 A.H*N*,Cal*,bec*dip.,parta«,leg*3,doc*29?, 20 Dec.1417,
shows that the order had agreed to a sheep walk through
the £orita area, in return for ♦cierto tributo anual*
from the Mas la, and was now attempting to alleviate
fiacality "in Fuentelencina in order to break down local
resistance. For general comments on the Mesta in
Extremadura see M,Congora, ubi supra* pp.8-10*
2 A.G.S., leg.13, passim.
3 Ibid, fols.33k*35V*
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were each producing 260,000 tore per year,* In general
terms the elasticity oi this income can best be noted by
the fact that, whereas in the 1460s tithes provided more
income than the debases (Tables XV11»XVIII), by the end
of the fifteenth century the situation had been reversed
and the dehesas obviously constituted, after the alcabalas.
2
the main source of income,
Despite future developments it roust, however, again
be stressed that income accruing from agricultural exploits*
stion was extremely low. Given the complete lack of
demesne exploitation and the nature of the leases, it is
not surprising that encroachments and usurpations of lands
were revealed during visitations. In Jeres de los
Caballeros the dehesas of the master of Santiago were
found to be occupied by inhabitants and strangers with the
tacit consent of the town council (149&), In 1494 the
visitors found that a substantial area of the dehesa of
Pisarral had been colonised and cultivated to the detriment
3
of the order's revenues from the farmer. To a certain
extent such examples can be explained in terms of a clash
over enclosures. Neglect and lack of direct interest by
the /
1 11 .Gongora, ubi supra, p»9, G<Sngora's view of the stabil*
jity of dehesa income is probably valid for the period
when price inflation was halted, .
2 M, Congora, ubi supra, p.6 and Appendices K and S, belowH-58^'
3 M, Gingora, ubi 'supra, p. 14,
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the military order are more convincing reason*• As early
as 1440 the general chapter of the order of Santiago was
trying to prevent these losses by ordering the centralisa*
»tion of all rcslevant documentation in the convent of
Ucles, Only effective visitations, however, could hope
to improve matters,*
iii) Spiritual income
The tables and map clearly demonstrate the importance
of tithes as a source of revenue# In 1466 cash payments
of tithes in the provincta of Leon accounted for 15,22%
of total income. To this must be added almost all the
37,679 fanegaa of grain (Table XVIII),^ Apart from the
alcabalas# tithes were the greatest revenue raiser. How
did this situation arise? The military orders were
theoretically justified in receiving the proceeds of the
tithes and, in addition, the levying of tithes seems to
have been particularly efficient#
Papal privileges exempted the military orders from
paying tithes to bishops. Furthermore both in Castile
and Aragon, from the twelfth century onwards, the tithes
3
of reconquered areas were granted to the orders. To a
certain /
1 Actas of 1449, B.N,, MS,,833, fols.45V-46&.
2 Appendix S, below
3 to, Gongora, ubl supra, pp»6-7.
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certain extent the payment of tithes to the military orders
was still justified on religious grounds in the fifteenth
century. Tithes were theoretically destined for the re-
:pair and upkeep of the churches throughout the lands of
the orders. Thus, for example, letters of the master of
Calatrava in 1416 and 1424 reminded comendadores and
alcaides of their obligation to pay tithes to the sacristan
of the convent of Galatrava in order to provide for vest-
iments, ornaments, and building repairs,* Hie accounts
for the prpvjncia of ^eon, however, show that income from
tithes was paid to the order along with the other sources
of income and was not specifically set aside for expenditure
of a religious nature. In the accounts of expenditure
some sums were set aside for the repair of specific churches
• but they were small sums of money and came nowhere near
2
to balancing the income from tithes. (Table XIX),
Tithes seemed to have been levied on everything.
Predial, personal, mixed, and small tithes covered all
3
items from grain down to slates and bricks. Invariably
the tithes were farmed out so that, although apparently
tithing was fairly accurate at a local level, the general
figures available are not useful indices of production,
Nevertheless the general importance of the various activit¬
ies /
1 A.H.N,,Cal,,Sec,dip,, parts,,leg,3,docs,291 and 301, dated
17 June 1416 and 9 Nov,1424,
2 Assignments to churches and charity only amounted to 0,59%
in 1467s see Appendix T, below V S3z.
3 Since many of the accounts are presented area by area
examples occur throughout.
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activities in the provincie of Leon emerges clearly*
Ti thes on livestock brought in large sums of money. If
the area of Montemolin is taken as an example, the accounts
of the years 1460, 1464, and 1467, show that almost 75% of
the income from tithes (not including grain tithes paid in
kind) was derived from livestock and wool.* The import-
lance of tithes in the fiscal structure of the provinela
of ^-eon does not appear to have been exceptional. An
account surviving for the village of Lietor in the provincia
of Castile (1458) shows the local financial official
accounting for tithes on honey, wax, wool, lambs, cheese,
and chickens, along with other revenues such as the
2
portaego, and revenues from the local mill,
iv) The Crown as a source of wealth
The accounts of the orovincia of Leon show the over-
lwhelming importance of the Crown as a source of income.
Even if the one tax which was indubitably a royal tax •
the alcabala - is considered, it appears that the Crown
provided roughly half the total income. In 1462 alcabalas
provided over 50% of the income from the provincia and in
1466 /
1 A.G.S.,E«M.K.,leg.l3,fols. 148R, 17IV-172k, 15811* An
exact calculation is impossible since allowance has
to be made for compound tithe farms • wool, for example,
was sometimes farmed with cheese. t
2 A.D.Vi,,Led,,leg.309,doc.35, accounts of Juan Sanchez de
hibera for the year ending 20 May 1458.
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1466 they produced 52»23ff/» of the total (Tables XVII and
XVIII).1
There is no evidence to show that the aIcabalas were
granted to the order by royal privilege. Moreover, a
royal privilege alienating this 'inalienable* tax to such
a massive extent would certainly not escape detection,
it is therefore, valid to assume that this royal income
was usurped. Clearly such a usurpation would be aided
by political events in Castile. In 1465 the puppet king,
Alfonso XI1, v/as put forward as a pretender to the throne
after the mock deposition of Henry IV at Avila. The
order of Santiago at this point was controlled by Iiodrigo
de Pimentel who was also one of the group of nobles who
governed in the name of the boy-king,Alfonso. Hence, from
1465, Pimentel was in fact controlling both the Crown and
the order of £ antit go and the usurpation of the abcabalas,
perhaps, provided no real clash of interests. Yet poli¬
tical events only partly help to explain the situation.
The accounts clearly show that the aIcabalas were being
usurped in the early 1460s,^ It did not take a civil war
to make the nobility realise that income could be doubled
by /
1 So important were the a1cabalsa that the contribution
of other major taxes could not have been depicted on
the snap without deliberately using a scale which exag¬
gerates their importance. For the tables see
Appendices R and S below
2 A.C.&.,leg .13 contains accounts from 1460 onwards.
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by gaining control of the alcabalas,*
Many other small taxes provided revenues for the order
of Santiago from the provincia of Leon. Some of these were
too insignificant to merit discussion. One group of taxes,
however, deserves attention - those designated as mixed
customs taxes in Table XVIII and providing 5,58fo of total
income in 1466, In some cases these were taxes which
would almost certainly be peculiar to this particular
provincia and would not necessarily be found in other
areas under the control of military orders. The customs
post at Jerez, for example, cl arlv owed its existence to
the proximity of Portugal, as perhaps did the control of
grain movements at Fuente del Maestro, The other point
worth underlining is that only five taxes were involved
and that consequently the figures in each case were sub¬
stantial, The customs post at Jerez, for example, was
worth 40,000 mrs per year. It need hardly be stressed
that ibis latter tax was not included in the juridical frame-
:work of lordship but was a tax which technically belonged
to the Crown and could only be alienated by special privi-
tlege.
2) /
1 As early as 1409, for example, the Crown placed an
embargo on the inheritance of the master of Santiago
because of usurpations of royal revenues in Santiago
lands: A.D.M,,Feria, 1 eg,55,doc.22, 8 Oct,1409.
2 A.G.S•,£.M»R,,leg.13,pa83im,
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2) Patterns of Wealth
The accounts of the expenditure of the order of
Santiago in 146? serve as a useful guide to incotae distri¬
bution within the order. A brief analysis of these coia-
:piicated accounts presents a fairly clear picture of the
various headings of expenditure which can be deduced from
the documentation (Table XIX)It must be stressed,
however, that such an analysis only serves as a rough
guide and that the following discussion will cut across
the lines of the statistical analysis.
The most striking feature is the wealth and power of
don Rodrigo de Pimentel, who controlled the order during
this period. Control of a military order in this case
r,leant thrt t,he provlncla of Leon provided Piment el with
2,500,000 mrs (41,46% of the total). This money was paid
tc him in cash, was not accounted for in detail, and was
used to finance his political and military power,^ These
sums of money, paid directly to Pimentel, did not, however,
constitute his only source of power. All the remaining
expenditure was in his control since assignments were only
is sited on his authorisation. Thus all expenditure on
charity, gifts, privileges, and salaries was no doubt
generally /
1 Appendix T below ^
2 Apart from the 1,V00,000 mrs used for troops and officials
Pimentel could also dispose of the military service owed
by .all comondadores to the order and the assignments paid
out for lanssas.
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generally seen to issue trout his power and largesse. The
wealth belonged to the order but the control of the rnachin*
:ery o£ patronage was in Piraentel's hands. Two illustra*
itions will serve to indicate this power of control*
In the first place there were the disbursements made
por el rev - on behalf of the king, Don Gabriel taanrique,
count of Osorno, for example, was given 261,000 mrs • for
the other 261,000 mrs which the king assigned to him on
the alcabalas of certain places in the provincia*,
Apparently, therefore, it would seem that royal control of
fc*ie alc&balaa still existed and this is supported by the
fact that 9,78% of the total income was spent in this way.
The reality was completely different. Quite apart from
the fact that alcabalas provided over 60% of total income
and assignments por el rev only accounted for 9,76%, the
documentation shows that royal control was entirely fictional.
Each royal assignment had to be conf irmed and authorised by
2
Pimentel, Indeed the facade of royal intervention is
open to even store damning interpretation®. It is not
conceivable that any real royal will can be discerned in
this intervention since the king, Alfonso XIi, was a boy.
Two f
1 A.G.S,,E.M.Il,,leg.l3,foU132R,
2 The count of Osorno's 1ibramiento in fact was cancelled
later by Pimentel. See the kelacion delas persona®
que 1 seanor cunde a-ande -.;ue noti se paga3e las me reed as
que de su sennoria tenian, ibid" fo 1 s . 12 2. iwTiW,
322*
Two explanations are likely - Pimentel desired to maintain
a facade of royal approval for usurpation of the alcabalas,
or he say well have cloaked some of his actions in this way
because Alfonso XII had been designated master of Santiago
by John IX and Pimentel was merely the ad»inlstrador«*
The other example of Pimentel*s control of the assign*
Jmo»t s of the mesa macatral concerns the nature of some
of the mercedos in the accounts. Over mercedes granted
for life Piiientel would have little control, and some of
the holders of these clearly pre»dated Piraentel's advent
to power. Yet, another group of roercedes was entirely
dependent on Pimentel*a yearly approval - the mercedes en
c&da arto en quanto su voluntad fuerc. In 1467 many of
At
these mercedes were, in fact, cancelled by^specific order
of Piraentel,
The power and wealth of Pimentel emerges clearly but
that of the other members of the military order emerges
less clearly. The accounts often name the recipients of
assignments but in many cases the social status of the
recipient cannot be assessed. Broadly speaking the
following categories of recipient appear in the accounts »
comendadores, alcaides, cabalieros, towns and townsmen,
lawyers, and priests, Clearly not all these people were
members /
1 See Tarsicio, Isabel, p.81 and C,D,. 339(ci, 1464),
341(cii,1464), ———
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members of the order and in many cases the assignments are
for amounts so low in value that they can be Ignored* As
far as the order itself is concerned* discussion can us«*
Jfully be limited to the first three categories mentioned*
The lands of the military orders were shared by the
master, cornealadores* churches, and councils of villages
and towns * * The accounts of the mesa maestral do not,
therefore, indicate the sources of wealth of the encof*
tiendas which were lordships within the general lordship
of the order. Alcaldes and comcndadoreg thus received
two general types of revenue - income from lordship,
details of which are not given in the accounts of the mesa,
and additional income derived from the mesa taaestral itself*
It is probable that income derived from lordship and
land was more important in the case of the encomlendas
than was the case with the income of the mesa maestral.
Indeed the unimportance of these sources of revenue in
the account a of the mesa is almost certainly to be explained
in terms of control at the local level by the comendadores»
There is, however, no evidence for the existence of demesne
exploitation in the encotniendas* All income from agri»
.-cultural exploitation came from rents and censes from
ephyteutical leases of land* There is no evidence on the
type of farms applying in the dehesas controlled by the
comendadores /
1 M, Gongora, ubl supra, pp*5-7.
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«oinendadoreg , *
The value of the encomlenda was increased by revenues
held by the contendador which normally went to the order#
Thus accounts of income in 1460, for example, give entries
such as 'half the wine revenue of Guadalcanal, the other
half belonging to the comendador, 40,000 aars.' Clearly
the full value of the revenue was B0,000 mrs and the
accounts do not enter the full amount under income and
consequently do not account for the full amount under
expenditure,^ More of ten, however, the full amounts in-
svolved are dealt with in the accounts and appear as
mercedes under expenditure. Occasionally assessments
were made which covered all the alienations which officials
could discover and rough summaries were drawn up. These
three different methods of assessment present serious
problems in trying to determine the value of the encom-
:iendas, Clearly the value of these latter varied from
one encomienda to another and also from the point of view
of the order and the comendador« The analysis of expen¬
diture (Table XIX), therefore, is not a good indication
of the comenriadores' wealth, both because it does not take
1 n to /
* *k*d. pp,5,13-14. Widespread leases of lands granted
by the contend adores may have become generalised during
the second half of the fourteenth century. In 1395
the master and order of Calatrava gave complete freedom
to all the couortdadorcs to lease the lands of their
encomiendaa as they wished: A.Ti,N.,Cal *,nee,dip,,
parts, lTTeg,2,doc ,2?5, 6 June 1395.
2 A.G.S. rE.M.R. , leg, 13, fol . 171K,
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into account all the revenues of the encomiendag ami
because mercedes held by the comendadores could derive
from the 41 ,46% of the revenues directly controlled by
Piwentel, the 9,78% granted por el rey, and the 22.16%
of grants designated as mcrcedes in the accounts of
assignments. In effect when officials worked out the
problem from the point of view of the holders of mercedea.
the figures were much higher. In 1466 mercedea totalled
3.478,250 mrs and in 1467, 3,369,000 mrst although in the
latter year TH/nentel cancelled mereedes worth 1,151,000 mrs.
The bulk of these mereedas went to the convnendadorea
of the order. It would be tedious to list these valuable
privileges in detail. Instead a rough estimate of the
value of enconiendas can be deduced for those cases where
global figures are given because all revenues had been
consolidated in the hands of the coxaendadorThe
accounts show that the encomienda of Osagre was worth at
least 70,000 mrs per year, the encomlenda of keina,
150,000 mrs. the encomienda of taontija 20,000 rare, the
encomienda of Fuente de Cantos, 400,000 mrs. and the
encomienda of Montanches, 400,000 mrs. In short the
comendadoroe /
1 Calculations of mercedes for 1466 and 1467, ibid, fols*
31R»32V, 121 123V. fnese figures cannot be compared to
totals of income and expenditure since the accounts often
failed to include permanent or s«u>i«para*&nent mercedes.
2 Ther e v ere the encorajendps where the comendador held
(a) the income oT "the encomienda and fb) all the income
derived by the mesa from his encomienda and regranted
to him by mercedes.
326.
comendadores of the order enjoyed very substantial incomes.
Not all me reed eg ware granted to contendadore a and
alcaides. All recipients of mercedcs in the accounts are
given the generic name of caballeroa. It is clear, however,
that they were not all noblemen or even caballeros de hablto
of the order of Santiago. These latter were knights of the
order who held no land. They could, however, receive fief
rents for military service and a substantial amount of
Plmentel*s 1,900,000 mrs must have been used for such pay-
jments,2 Paid or. the basis of 2,000 mrs per lance per
year these assignments proved valuable additional income
to members of the lesser nobility who had found a place on
3
the pay roll of the order.
3} Control and uuality
The elections of masters were generally influenced by
the same factors affecting the elections of bishops. When
Martin V recognised the validity of royal intervention in
canonical /
1 These figures clearly include revenues normally held by
the comendador and not regarded as mesa income. Montinches,
for example, produced a total of 353,540 mrs in the meea's
accounts in 1466 of which 100,000 cane from alcabalas.
The calculations of mercedes included the same figure for
the a1 cabalas but added new figures which were presumably
those kefd'Tjy the alcalde on a permanent basis.
2 Such payments would be in aidition to the 9.07% already
set aside for fief rents: see Appendix T, below ^ 512
3 Details of such payments in fols«131R-142V. The payments
were made by area and to groups of men with no indication
being «iven of social status.
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canonical elections in the bull Fedin Apo&tolicae this
papal concession included the elections of masters.
However, in the cape of the military orders, re 1 igious
and academic qualities were irrelevant. Control over the
election of a master was a purely political problem. The
chief political figures of Castilian fifteenth century
history (or their immediate dependents) are all represented
in the list of masters - Alvaro de Luna, the Infantes
Enrique and .Alfonso (brother and son of John 11 of Aragoa
and son and grandson of Ferdinand of Antequera), the
infante don Alfonso (brother of Henry IV and pretender to
the throne), Beltran de la Cueva, and Juan Pacheco. Control,
therefore, is best seen in tortus of political history and
only two general points need be made here.
To be master of a military order meant the control
of a formidable machine of patronage which could provide
for younger sons and lesser nobility, and could also be
used to build up a political party. Hence the attempts
to pass military orders i roas father to son. The most
striking case is probably that of Pedro de Giron, master
of Calatrava. Towards the end of his career he not only
almost '
1 Tarsicio, oleccion. p«283. The royal argument on this
point is sxiccinctly expressed in C,D.R,A,H,, 84-5 (xli,
1453), intervention could, of course, mtan armed force
as in the election of the infante Alfonso to tne master-
:ship of Calatzava: thagon, op,cit.. pp,14-15.
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almost gained the hand of the future Queen, Isabella, but
also managed to have his son elected master of C&latrava.
The latter, don Jodrigo Telle® Giron, was only eight years
old and a bastard. Both the Crown and the papacy granted
the appropriate dispensations. Indeed the pope went
further and provided for tho reversion of the order to the
father in the eventuality of the premature death of the
new master. Clearly the possibilities of this type of
situation posed a grave threat to the Crown.*
It is not surprising, therefore, that royal iater-
tveutiou in the affairs of the military orders was stepped
up during the century. Royal intervention in elections,
recognised by the bull • ed i a Apostolicae, was further
strengthened by papal concessions granting the aiminis tra-
:tion of orders to the Crown for considerable periods of
time. Nicholas Y, for example, granted the adiainis tra t ion
of Santiago to John II in 1453 for a period of seven years
and ..alixtus III granted the administration of both Santiago
and Alcantara to Henry IV for periods of ten years,^ These
concessions were obviously part of a royal campaign to
Impose /
1 Pedro de Giron had at least three bastard children who
were legitimised by 1 iue II and given caayoraggos with
royal permission. After his son's election as""mastev
Pedro de Girin died almost i tamed lately and the marriage
arranged for Isabella fell through. iee Ibid, pp.22,
30-1,62-3. ;
2 T&rsicio, ..leccion, p,283j Palunco Romero, on.cit
p.49} C.h.R.A.n,,113(xlvi.1454).
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impose effective control - a fact clearly illustrated by
the administrative reforms subjecting the affairs of
Santiago and Alcantara to select councillors drawn from
the council of justice,* These admini strative reforms,
though shortlived, anticipated the work of the Catholic
sovereigns by creating what was in effect a council of
the military orders. It was the beginning of a process
which was completed by Adrian VI*s bull of 1523, granting
to Charles V the permanent incorporation of the masterships
to the Crown, It should be remembered, however, that the
absorption and control of the masterships only affected
part of the problem. The power and wealth of the nobility
within the orders remained right down until the nineteenth
4
century.
1 Escorial, x,11,14.,fol•106H, The document Is undated
but clearly belongs to the 1450s* ,
2 Henry |V only held on to the administration of Alcantara
for the first two and a half years of his reign and then
granted it to Gomes de Caceres: Pa lanea .Romero, op ,c it , ,
p.49.
3 Elliott, Impertal ipsm, p.7?•





Caatilian towns forced separate juridical entities
in society by virtue ol their charters and privileges.
Terminology distinguished between towns (vlllas) and
cities (cludades)« Both these labels were juridical
titles bestowed by the Crown. Cities were regarded as
the most important towns and were invariably addressed
in royal letters as 'very noble and very loyal*• The
use of this highly prised form of address in itself
indicates that the title could be granted for purely
political reasons. In 1465. for example, Henry tV
rewarded the town of Jeres for its political support
with the privilege of being entitled *muy noble v amy leal*.*
The terminology on the whole corresponded to the
socio*economic realities of the urban world. Cities
tended to have large jurisdictions which included towns
and villages. There were, of course, exceptions where
the juridical labels did not correspond to social reali*
ities, I n the Basque area, for example, there was one
city and twenty towns; the city, however, was Orduna and
Bilbao /
1 Sancho. Hjstoria. i.19.
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Bilbao was a mere town.* Logically, moreover, the title
of city or town could be abolished by the Crown, Henry
IV quite clearly intended, in 1472, to deprive the town
of Sepulveda of its privilege and title of 'town* and to
bestow the title on an area the name of which was left
2
blank in the royal letter* Despite such anomalies,
however, the terminology corresponded fairly well with
the social, economic, and demographic importance of the
urban entities involved. Most of the important Castilian
towns were included in the fifteen cities and two towns
3
which had a right to be represented in the cortes.
Originally municipal charters or fueros. granted
between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, had recog-
:nised the establishment and existence of urban entities
within society. During this period several fueroa of
specific towns served as models for the general granting
of fueros. The fucro of Logrono served as the model for
fueros granted to towns in the Basque provinces. After
the recenquest of the south, the towns of Andalusia, such
as Seville, Cordoba, and Murcia, were given fueros based
on the Toledo model. The differences involved in the
grants of the various fueros were no doubt originally
important*4 /
1 Garcia de Cortasar, Viacaya en el aialo xv. p.58 and map
facing p,66. ,
2 Juridically Sepulveda would have ceased to exist as a
C«P»R,A*H* * 667-72 {cxci i , 1472) ,
3 J*H.Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, trans,
and ed, B.Keen (Few Jersey,1961), p,282.
4 The best study of the emergence of the towns is L.Garcia
de Valdeavellano, Sobrelos burgos y log burgueses de la
Cspana medieval (Madrid,Bio),
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important. By the fifteenth century, however, these
differences had become blurred. Indeed the increasing
importance of some towns made nonsense of the original
dependent relationships on specific fuero models. Seville,
which originally derived its fuero from the Toledan model,
serves as a good example* For, by the fifteenth century,
municipal government in Seville served as the practical
nodel for other urban governments, not only in Andalusia
but even in Toledo itself. Throughout the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries the development of the town
government of Jerez, for example, was modelled on that of
I
Seville. In all matters, from the imposition of new
taxes to the administration of justice, reference was made
2
to the practice in Seville. In Toledo the reform of
town government followed the pattern of Seville with a
town official being sent, in 1422, from Toledo to Seville
in order to collect transcripts of documents and privi¬
leges which forated the basis of municipal government
3
there. In the 1440s Toledo was again modelling its
government on that of Seville - this time with respect
4
to its financial administration. Indeed the form of
government /
1 Sancho, His toria. i.6-7.
2 See the royal licence acceding to the request by Jerea
for municipal taxes modelled on Seville: A.M.J.,Actas
Caps., 1410, fol,8111,20 April 1410. The oligarchs of
Jerez also appealed to practices in Seville in their
dispute over jurisdiction with the adelantado mayor:
ibid. C.12, no.6, V.l, 17 Jan,1421.
3 See A.Sierra Corel la, 'Libro cartulario de jurados de
Toledo1, B.k.A.H.. xciv(1929),193-213.
4 See A.M,S.,caja 1445-6, which contains a copy of the
irsiormation on Seville's financial administration which
the contadores sent to Toledo.
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government in Seville was io serve as a model for many
of the towns in the new world
A detailed examination of Imroi. therefore, would
give a misleading picture of the juridical framework of
the towns* The fueros were radically altered and en-
slarged by successive confirrigations and additional privi-
2
ileges* By the fifteenth century, in fact, fueros. pre¬
rogatives, and privileges, had all fused to produce a
juridical structure remarkably similar to the lordships
granted to the nobility. In practice the great towns
held lordships which, from the juridical point of view,
were in all essential aspects the same as those of the
nobility* In 1435, for example, John II granted the
lordship of the town of Arcos de la Frontera to Seville*
The grant included the land, meadows, pastures, waters,
justice, jurisdiccion civil v criminal* alta y baja y taero
y mlxto imperio, and ail rights, taxes and revenues belong¬
ing to the senorio or lordship* Seville was empowered
to appoint the municipal officials of Arcos but, as with
almost all grants of lordship, the Crown retained alcabalas,
moncdas. tercias. and the raayorla de la justicia, From
the /
1 A.Muro Qrejon, 'El ayuntamiento de Seville modelo de los
municiploa americanos*, A*U*H., xxi(1960},69*65*
2 Urban privileges were often confirmed during meetings of
the cortes although such confirmations were not inserted
in the cuaderno. See, for example, the confirmation of
Toledo's privileges in B.N,,MS,13103,fols.174R-175R, 15
Bee.1393*
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the juridical point of view, therefore, Areas had been
added to the existing lordship of Seville,* The opposite
process can be illustrated from the occasion, already
cited, when Henry IV decided to abolish the juridical
/ 2
existence of Sepulveda as a town. The crucial point was
not the deprivation of the title of •town* but the dis-
:mantling of the lordship. All the attributes of lord*
ir.hip were listed in the document and the letter was
specifically addressed to all those areas and persons
previously within the lordship. Both processes * the
dismantling and creation of urban lordships * can also
be illustrated by those highly fantastic but completely
logical documents where lordships were created so that
they could almost immediately be alienated to the nobility.
Thus, in one document, John II separated Caeas Buenae from
the lordship of Toledo, gave it judicial and financial
autonomy, and then granted the lordship to Alfonso Alvares
de Toledo, In an even more extreme example, 300 vasallos
of Vinuesa were given their own lordship in order to
separate them from the lordship of the town of Sorias the
remaining population of Vinuesa remained subject to Soria
but the 300 vasallos immediately lost their autonomy by
be i ng /
1 A»M.S,,privi1egios, carp,2,no,56,9 July 1435,
2 See above
3 A.G„S«,C,y J,de Mac,,leg,1,no,20,21 and 28 April 1445,
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being granted in lordship to Pero Lopes de Padilla,
adelantado mayor of Castile.1
The juridical view of towns which has been brie fly
stated clearly does not take into account the funadmental
2
variations in the sises and types of towns. In many
cases town and country were often inseparable. This was
true not only of the smaller towns but even of larger
ones such as Bilbao. Many towns were not independent
and did not hold lordships. Towns within a municipal
lordship had their governing groups controlled by the
towns holding the lordship. Burgos, for example, appoin¬
ted directly to the chief offices of towns under its
control and exercised a right of confirmation with respect
to the minor posts.* In seigneurial towns the urban
officials tended to be the direct representatives of their
noble's interests, as at Villalon with the Fimcmtel or in
Puerto de Santa Maria with the Medinaceli.^ In these
towns the growth of an urban patrician class could be
seriously impeded. Whether the town was taken over
directly /
1 A.O.M,,Ad.,1 eg•3?,doc.42,14 Sept.1471.
2 See the excellent study of the physical aspects of medi-
ieval Spanish towns by L.Torres Balbas in L.Torres Balbas,
L.Cervera, F.Chueca, P.Bidagor, Resumen historico del
urbanismo en Espana (Madrid,19541,ppJ1-167•
3 Garcia de Gortaear, op.cit..pp.58-62.
4 A.Salva, 'El primer 1 ibro''de actas municipales *, It.A.B.M..
viii(1903),260-7,
5 R.C.V.,Actas de Vill&lon, passim? A.D.M.,Cog.,1 eg.2,
doc.38 and leg.3,doc.79.
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directly by the lord or caine into his control by a series
of rapid royal grants alienating key positions, the result
was in many cases to turn the town into a family possession*
2) The wealth of the towns
i) The control of urban wealth
How powerful and wealthy were the towns? It will
be seen that the wealth and the power of some towns com*
•'pared favourably with that of the greater nobility* Yet
it would be a mistake to assume that the towns acted as
separate groupings within society with their own political
programmes. There were, of course, occasions when towns
appeared to present a corporate front against the Crown
or the nobility. Examples can be given of towns buying
2
their independence fro:a noble control, of urban resistance
3
to royal taxation, and of the fleeting but impressive
4
leagues or hermandades of towns* Yet urban revenues
and militias were controlled not by towns but by ruling
groups within the towns. Many towns were subject to in*
icessant /
1 Medeliin, for example, was practically surrendered by the
Prince of Asturias to hodrigo Portocarrero in a series of
privileges which granted him the fortress, the offices of
alcalde mayor and alguacil. and the royal taxes (1449):
A. D. hi, ,Hed. , leg *l,doc*2l leg,3 ,doc*19| leg.5,doc*4j
leg ,6,docs * 13,14 *
2 The towns of Dueftas and Utiel, for example, bought their
freedom from noble lordships and incorporated themselves
into the crown lands on condition that the Crown would
never again alienate them: A.D.M*,Ad,,leg*28,doc»27,
16 Nov*1419j B.N.MS,,13110,fols.89h*91k,9 July 1390.
3 See the example cited in A.ialva, ubl supra. 260*7,
4 L*Su^.rez Fernandas, 'Evoiuci^n his t6rica de las herman-
jdades', C.H.K., xvi(1951),43-5*
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incessant faction fights and anarchy. Clearly touch
depended on the balance of power within the towns and care
must be taken not to categorise all movements as express*
sions of collective urban programmes. Several types of
urban political action can be distinguished. In the
first place there were the popular urban uprisings. Some
of these were caused by sharp economic depressions. Many
found expression as anti•semitic movements. Such uprisings
could affect independent towns like Toledo in 1449, or
towns within noble lordships, such as Jaen.* Secondly
there were movements and policies which were inspired by
the patrician ruling groups of the great towns* Many of
these policies were directed against the nobility. In
Seville, for example, an attempt was made to enforce the
principle that all the laity, including the greatest
nobility, should contribute to municipal and royal taxa-
2
:tion. Moreover up to the 1450s at least, the patrician
ruling groups of many of the Castilian towns fought a
stubborn struggle against the encroachments of the nobility,
Seville was involved in interminable disputes with the
3
Andalusian nobility over land and jurisdiction. As early
as /
1 See below ScA
2 See, for example, A,ii.S.,caja 1407*8,no.220, which in-
sstructs officials to collect pedlrio payments from all
the nobility and their dependents, #
3 Disputes with the Ponce de LecSn over Alcala de Guadaira,
with the adelantado over Carmona, with the constable
over the soap 'industry ».,: A.M.S,,cajas de mayordomazgo,
pass iia.
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as 1421 Cordoba was resisting royal grants to Alvaro de
Luna which encroached on the municipal revenues.* Indeed
the towns managed to exert pressure on the Crown through
the cortea and a whole series of quo warranto proceedings
were put into motion by the Crown in order to restore to
the towns* the lands* revenues* and jurisdiction usurped
by the nobility. Nor were these quo warranto proceedings
a mere sham as the cases of Badajoe* Leon and Salamanca
show.4" By the 1460s, however* the ability of the patric-
: ian ruling groups to resist noble encroachments had
largely collapsed. The members of the patriciate did
not disappear. Yet the chief offices in urban government
were now held by the great landed aristocracy and the
3
patricians tended to be the clients of noble patrons.
Urban movements and policies were now those of the great
nobility, Uhen* in 146?* Burgos* Valladolid* Avila*
Palencia* Lamora, Seville* Cordoba* and Cadiz backed
Alfonso XII against Henry IV* this was due to the control
of /
1 The revenues were those of the tahurer^as: A.M.C,* sec•19,
jurados*nos.9*l2* petition and letters o'i 20 Nov.* 1 and
16 Dec.1421, and 12 Lay 1422*
2 The best detailed study of noble usurpations and the
quo warranto investigations is N.Cabriliana, * Salamanca
en el sigjo xv: nobles y caroposinos'* Hjsp. (cuadernos
anexos)* iii (1969)*255-95, E.Rodriguez Amaya, ' 'La'
tierra en Badajoz* * R.E.K.. viii{1952),5»1Q7 deals with
the investigations in the Badajoz area. It is clear that
similar action was taken by the Crown with respect to
other towns, A.M.L.,doc.758* 15 Lay « 25 Oct,1434* for
example* contains a whole series of sentencias by a royal
letrado against the nobility who usurped the lands of
£-e*!fn.
3 See below £2o, £2.b-1$-
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of the great nobility and was not due to any independent
political programme of the townsLastly, one should
mention the hermandades. As will be seen below, the
most impressive hermandad was that involving the towns
of the north coast. Motivated by and for economic reas-
ions, this Castilian Hansa of northern towns managed to
run its own trading policies and even formulate its own
foreign policy. This was clearly a unique feature and
was in no way duplicated in the rest of the kingdom.^
It is necessary, therefore, to bear in mind the fact
that the wealth and the power of the towns were not impor¬
tant in themselves. What mattered was the control of
this wealth and power, and from this point of view the
'town', as a corporate institution, was a fiction. A
glance at any of the accounts of the town of Seville
makes this point clear. In 1444, for example, Seville
defended itself against an attack by the Aragonese party
led by the Infante Enrique. The defence was successful
and subsequently the accounts show that the patrician
oligarchs were paying a certain Juan Guillen to write a
chronicle about the town's resistance to the Infante
3




3 A.M,S,,caja 1443-6, order of payment, 4 Aug.1445. A
similar order in ibid. caja 1447-8, bundle 1.
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unaided. The master of Alcantara had sent forces to
help in the town's defence. The town, however, while
paying for a chronicle celebrating the urban glory refused
to pay anything towards the expenses of the Alcantara for*
:ces and three years later the matter was still being argued
out in the king's council.* This position of patrician
independence was soon to change. By 1471 the duke of
Medina Sidonia could make the town of Seville pay for an
enormous account of 1.619.749 mrs for his own naval war
against the marquis of Cadi a.2 Bearing the whole problem
of control of town government in mind, it is now possible
to look at the sources of urban wealth.
ii) The sources of corporate income
Urban corporate wealth presents problems which make
a satisfactory analysis impossible. Yet an analysis must
be attempted if only to avoid the alternative of a long
3
and detailed presentation of a list of urban taxes.
Discussion on the sources of wealth of the nobility,
the Church, and the military orders centred on revenues
deriving from formal lordship, agricultural exploitation,
and /
1 A.G.S.. Exp .Mac., 1 eg . 2 .no.168. submission of Seville to
the council. 2 March 1447.
2 A.M,S..caja 1471-2, accounts of naval expenditure sub¬
mitted by the duke, 11 Nov.1471#
3 For detailed notes on some of these taxes see Appendix
V below
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and the Crown, It is difficult to distinguish between
urban revenues in thie way. It is true that, by the
fifteenth century, urban immunities and privileges resemb*
:led seigneurial lordships. But this was a resemblance
in juridical formulae and did not apply in practice. In
the north, urban immunities were the result of a slow and
complicated process. Consequently there are no series
of lordship grants to serve as a basis for distinguishing
between revenues inherent in lordship and subsequent
additions. In the south, urban lordships were created
after reconquest and a basic framework is available. Yet
if the moat prominent example of such a lordship •
Seville * is studied in detail, it is still impossible to
make the relevant distinctions. For, in the south, the
major revenue of the towns was provided by the almojarlf-
tasgo * a generic term which covered a wide variety of
taxes, AImpjarif&ggo income could, therefore, include
taxes inherent in the original grant of lordship, all ena-
:ted royal revenues, and income from agricultural exploi*
:tation. During the first half of the century the
almojarifazgo revenues provided Seville with at least 30%
of its income (Table XX1I)* and any attempt to analyse
urban revenues therefore becomes difficult since the exact
revenues /
i Appendix Vt below p-boo.
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revenues included in the aImpjarlfazgo cannot be dis¬
tinguished from each other.*
The large sums raised by the alroojarlfaggo revenues,
however, underline some important points. In the first
Piace they serve to emphasise the importance of the lands
included in a town* a lordship. In Seville the aimojart-
ifaggo revenues were all derived from the areas dependent
on the town and not from the town itself. Thus the huge
extent of Seville's lordship is revealed in the importance
2
of these dependent areas as sources of revenue. The
decline in the proportional importance of the almoiarifaago.
from 43,7% in 1406-7 to 29*74% in 1452-3, almost certainly
reflects the demographic change in the balance between the
3
town and its count ryside (Table XXII).
The almojarifaago revenues also underline the impor¬
tance of royal privileges to urban wealth, No direct
relationship can be made between royal privileges and the
various revenues contained in the almojarifisgo save in
wow—■im, nSniniimi » i—ii'm—
the limited sense that everything, even formal lordship,
can ultimately be regarded as having once belonged to the
Crown. Yet there can be no doubt that in general the
towns of Andalusia gained the greatest benefit in the
process /
1 See the notes on the alraojarifaago in Appendix V below
2 Bee the map of Seville and its dependent areas. The
original lordship granted to Seville was geographically
larger than the kingdom of Valencia annexed by Jaime 1:
Vicons, Klstoria. ii,13.
3 Appendix W below .
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process of accumulating royal privileges. These privi¬
leges were granted by the Crown for several reasons.^
The Moorish frontier presented dangers which the Crown
tried to solve by the grant of massive lordships to the
towns, the Church and the nobility. Towns were expected
to organize the defence of these areas granted to them.
It is possible also that, in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, there was a deliberate policy by the Crown
which aimed at strengthening the southern towns in order
to counter noble power. Certainly royal privileges
were sometimes granted as a direct result of urban
support for royal policies. For these reasons lucrative
revenues, such as taxes on salt and taxes subsequently
incorporated into the urban alrao jar ifaggo. were alienated
and proved valuable sources of income for towns such as
Cordoba, 5"eville, Murcia, and even towns as far north as
2
Toledo. However by the fifteenth century the towns,
like the Church, ceased to be the recipients of royal
privileges granting extra sources of income. Moreover
towns, unlike the nobility, did not augment their corporate
wealth j
1 See generally 1,Alvarez de Cienfuegos, 'Notas para ...
las haciendas municipales', in Homenaje a don ftaroJn
Carande (Madrid, 1963), ii• 3— 19f il.Carande, 'Seville,
fortaieza y mercado', A.H.D.g.,ii(1925).233-401: J.
Torres Fontes, *La hacienda concejil de Murcia', A.H.D.E,.
xxvi(1956),741-56.
2 It should also be remembered that the southern towns
benefited from royal frontier subsidies and from tax
exemptions designed to stimulate military defences. See,
for example, the statement of royal policy with respect




wealth by usurping royal taxation*
A» far as income from agriculture exploitation is
concerned little can be deduced, even from the detailed
accounts of Seville, Censes and rents in the area of
the town itself provided less than 2% of the town's cor-
2
iporute income (Table XXII) , but it must be remembered
that revenues of this kind were almost certainly included
in the ^liaojarifaajao revenues of the dependent regions.
Contemporaries used the term bienes proprloa to
designate the corporate wealth of a town. It was a term
which they clearly understood as including all sources of
revenues belonging to the town as a corporation. Within
this general term they only distinguished between the
different individual taxes or between the different areas
3
of ta!x farms, historians have subsequently attempted to
arrange these taxes into categories. The term bienes
proprios. for example, has been taken to refer to the
restricted group of revenues derived from such things as
common pasture land (ejidos), woods, orchards, and houses,*
Detailed note<s on the taxes and the grouping of taxes into
such categories may be found in the statistical tables
5
(Tables XXI-XXII), Once again, however, the analysis is
arbitrary /
1 See below
2 Appendix W below \ tcro
3 A.M,S,,annual conditions and registers of farms, passim.
4 For example, L,Garcia de Valdeuvellano. Historia die 'las
instituciones, p.554#
5 Appendices V and W below U. s%-too •
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arbitrary since the a linojarifaago revenues certainly
included taxes, like the portazgo, which could be grouped
in other categories*
The analysis of Ceviilian revenue by categories needs
{graphic importance of Seville is underlined by the impor¬
tance of tolls on trade, control of markets, and taxes on
consumption and production which accounted for between 35f» and
SC/s of urban income. The fact that the percentage was not
higher is to be explained by a fiscal structure in which
the main taxes deriving from Seville's trade - customs
duties and ajcabalas - were retained by the Crown.A This
also served to underline the value of the common property
which remained the greatest source of income in many of
the smaller urban communities of the Castilian meseta.
iii) The overall picture of urban wealth
koya1 generosity did not necessarily lead to a
healthy surplus in municipal finances. Indeed the royal
privileges to the southern towns were intended to heip the
towns fulfil an administrative and defensive task which
the Crown itself could not perform. The regular incomes
of /
1 Appendix W below ^
2 These taxes were included in the alino jarl faago mayor {
see the notes on the almojarifasgo In Appendix V below
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of the large townst in fact, do not seem to have been in
a healthy condition. The finances of the town of Murcia
were in a state of constant deficit,* and the finances of
1.evi lie were in a similarly precarious condition. The
statistical data on Seville serve to illustrate the salient
2
points (Table XX), In the first place total regular
income was not high when it is remembered that the town
controlled a vast lordship and was without doubt the
richest town in the kingdom. The highest figure for
income given in Table XX was for the year 1447-8; a
convenient fact since it allows for direct comparison with
the libro de Asientos of 1447, In this year the town's
gross income stood at 1,077,488 mrs and 1 dlnero » a
figure only slightly higher than the sums which a count
of Alba held from the Crown alone at the same date (Tables
XII and XX), Moreover the net balance of the town's
accounts in 1447-8 was a deficit of over 60,000 mrs * The
figures for the other years confirm the same points - a
fairly insubstantial income, given the siae and importance
of the town, and difficulties in covering expenditure.
The explanation for this precarious position does
not lie in any lack of an efficient administration. On
the /
1 Torres Fontes, ubi supra, pp,751-2; Torres Fontes, Los
judlos murcianos en el relnado de Juan II (Murcia,1965),
pp, 18-191 jr.Valdedn Baruque, ^Una citidaci castellana »,,
el ejenaplo de Murcia*, Hisp, (cuadernos anexos), iii
(1969), 211-54. ~ ~
2. Appendix "0 below ?s<n
3 Appendices L and U below
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the contrary the accounts of Seville show an extremely
efficient and sophisticated administration at work* The
main explanation is to be found in the differences between
noble and municipal finances. Throughout the century
there is hardly a trace of any usurpation of royal taxes
by the town. The royal towns, indeed, were liable to
strict control by the Crown over their finances, Re¬
organisation of existing resources could be carried out
unilaterally, but the imposition of new taxes was subject
to royal approval and this approval was not normally
2
given except during periods of extreme economic crisis.
For this reason alone the usurpations of royal revenues,
which provided the great nobility and military orders
with such vast sums of money, hardly figure throughout a
whole century of accounts for a town such as Seville,*
Another explanation for the precarious state of
municipal finances is to be found in the pattern of expendi-
:ture* /
1 See, for example, the documents on the reorganisation
of the common property and the tax farms in A.M,S,,caja
1433-5, docs, for the financial year 1435-6,
2 Both the duration and amounts of the new taxes were fixed
by the Crown. For an example see A,M,S«,caja 1468-70,
royal letter dated 20 Sept.147© and the farm conditions
of the temporary taxes for one year from 1 Dec.1470 to
16 July 1471* Royal permission In this case was granted
in order to help the town pay for grain imports during
the crisis of 1468-9* Such royal aid did not represent
additional income since crises gravely affected the
normal sources of urban income! see, for example, ibid,
cajs 1412-13,nos.171-9*
3 Thus although the alcabala could be partially alienated
to a town, as at Durcia,"It is difficult to find examples
of usurpations. During a crisis Seville sometimes arran¬
ged for the suspension of a1cabalas on imported grain in
return for a promise to pay the royal officials at a
later date. Alternatively Seville itself farmed the royal
alcabala and shifted the weight of taxation on to other
municipal taxes. But in both cases the Crown did not lose
revenue. Examples in A.M,S,,caja 1414-15,no.49i caja
1421-3,27 Sept.1423j caja 1424-5,19 June 1424.
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expenditure. There can be no doubt that the patrician
oligarchies manipulated urban finances to their own
benefit. Yet such benefits were, in a sense, part of
the normal pattern and an analysis of the expenditure of
the richest town of the kingdom shows that income was
burdened by hefty items of expenditure and that even a
slight crisis could plunge the town accounts into the
red.
The greatest single burden of a recurrent kind was
the expenditure on salaries and castles. Zn 1416*17 this
accounted for 43.46% of expenditure and had risen to
66.34% by 1452*3 (Tables XXIII-XXIV).1 This high percen¬
tage was not necessarily the result of corruption.
Officials, after all. had to be paid and the salary of
the patrician veinticuatro. 3,000 mra per year, was low.
The salaries of the patricians were supplemented by pay*
tmenta for their positions as castellans * a payment
clearly open to abuse, although it only added 6,000 mrs
to their salaries and it must be remembered that the fifty
or so castles listed in the accounts were not fictitious*^
The /
1 Appendices X and Y below
2 See F.Collantes da Teran, 'Los castillos del roino de
Seville*. A.Hlap*. xviii(1953),117*85 and Appendix Z
below ^]p. t>ou-tU
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The remaining income could be seriously affected in
several ways. Probably the crucial point in almost any
year was the extent to which revenues failed to material*
:ise. Figures for income were based on the farms made at
the beginning of the fiscal year# A collapse in these
farms obviously depended on the economic and political
situation* Entered as expenditure they accounted in
1452-3 for 5#99% of the total - a sum almost sufficient
by itself to have achieved a proper balance,* Further
problems were created by crises which are best understood
in terms of a specific example.
In 1416-17 a back-log of salaries and debts and the
activities of the royal corregidor accounted for 26,91%
of expenditure (7able XXIII)Clearly this extraordin-
sary expenditure was responsible for the year's deficit,
otherwise the balance would have shown a healthy surplus
of 157,735 ^r£. What had happened?
In the first place the town council was still paying
for the effects of the economic crisis of 1412-14# The
income side of the accounts had already been affected by
economic and demographic dislocation - the town council,
for example, had been forced to suspend all taxes in the
Burguillos /
1 See examples in Table XXV*C, Appendix 2. below Vk tU-t.
2 Table XXIV, Appendix Y below • tos.
3 Appendix X below \
4 For a brief description of this crisis see above
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Burguillos area for four years.* On top of this the
council had tried to alleviate the grain crisis by sus¬
pending the alcabalas and dipping into crunada revenues -
these royal revenues had to be repaid. In 1415-16 the
2
council managed to repay the borrowed cruzada revenues.
In 1416-17 they paid back a further 20,000 mra to the royal
officials for the alcabalas suspended in 1412*13.~ But
the crisis had also meant that the payment of some regular
expenses had been postponed. By 1416-17 the council was
at last beginning to catch up with these expenses which
included a back-log of salaries and the cost of a previous
Corpus Christi celebration. Finally two royal orders,
unrelated to the crisis, raised the total expenditure under
this heading by another 41,109 cars.*
On the 18th April 1416, John II wrote to the town
council from Valladalid. lie underlined the gravity of
the political disturbances in Seville caused by the warring
Niebla and btuniga factions. He recalled the activities
of a corregidor whom his father had sent to Seville, and
/ /
appointed Doctor Fortun Velasquez de Cuellar as cor ret; idor
for /
1 A.M.S.,caja 1411*12,no. 1741 exemption from taxation for
four years granted to Burguillos because of serious de¬
population resulting from the military operations of
Ferdinand of Antequera.
2 Ibid, caja 1415-16,no.67 J receipt acknowledging repayment.
3 A.M.S..caja 1416-17,no.20i order to pay 20,000 mrs as the
last sum in settlement of suspended alcabalas.
4 One order was for the payment of 32,000 era to Gonzalo
Ochoa, an alcaldede la justicia. who had been suspended
by the Crown in~T415 and now had his salary paid and back¬
dated to his suspension. The remaining 9,109 mrs were
awarded to a jurado by a royal sentenda. A.M.S.,caja
1416-17,nos.100,103. '
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for a j>eriod of six months. To make his mission effective
he empowered the cprregidor to eject any one from the town,
gave hira complete control in justice and politics, and sus¬
pended all those officials having judicial power and control
over the urban police and guards.
The royal corregidores were powerful and ideal agents
for dealing with urban anarchy. Usually they were appoin¬
ted on a temporary basis and were sent to deal with a
specific problem. Two factors affected the town finances
as a result. The first was that towns had to foot the
bill for the correaldores* activities. The mere presence
of Fortun Vela'sques de Cuellar in Seville cost the town
7,500 mrs per month in salary alone - that is a monthly
it em of expenditure which was two and a half times the
2
yearly salary of a patrician (Table XXIII), The second
factor brings the discussion back to its starting point.
Clearly the activities of the corregidor and the back-log
of salaries and debts which so adversely affected Seville's
finances in 1416-17 cannot be regarded as items of recurrent
expenditure. Yet crises in some shape or form were never
long absent. In Seville economic crises affected the town
during /
1 The letter, sent by Catherine of Lancaster, is in A,M»S.,
caja 1416-17,no.16, The mission was a tricky one owing
to the struggle at court between the queen mother and the
Aragonese party. The con egidor, however, was a skilled
man who ended his days as bishop "of Leo'nj see above
2 In this case the corregidor also received the salary of
an alnuacil mayor. Data on his salary in A.M.S..caja
Hisrff , noa~*75,106. See also Appendix X below
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during every decade up to 1475** A corregidor. appointed
temporarily, could remain a burden on the town's finances
for a period of several years* In fact For tun Velasquez
de Cue liar had already been in Seville as corregidor
before 1416-17 and he and his direct successors were to
2
remain there for at least another four years*
iv) lite towns and royal taxes and military power
The finances which have been discussed constituted
the regular yearly income of the towns supplemented* during
periods of crisis, by tetoporary impositions and loans. But
although this corporate wealth attracted the attention of
patricians and nobility, other aspects of urban taxation
were probably more important* Towns acted as royal agents
in the collection of the royal taxes of the monedaa ami
pedidpa granted by the cortes. Towns were also expected
to /
1 See Appendix A below 5*4-
2 The fact that Catherine of Lancaster's letter appears to
ignore the previous missions of the corregidor is due to
Velasquez having acted as corregidor"for the other regent,
Ferninand of Antequera* As late as Oct.1414 his reports
were sent to the Aragonese - not the Castilian • court:
A.M*S*,caja 1414-15, no.73* It was precisely during the
years 1415-17 that Aragonese control of southern Castilian
affairs crumbled* The existence of conegidores - Fortun
Velasquez de Cuellar, Ruy Garcia de Villalpando, Juan
Alfonso, Luis Alvarez de Paz, and Pedro Garcia de Burgos -
down to at least 1421 is attested by documents too numerous
to cite. For part of the political background see
Anacdotario Sevillano, pp.57-82.
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to contribute urban militias for military campaigns and
in some cases manpower for the royal navy* Normally the
raising of such sums of money was instigated by the Crown*
and the request was for specific sums of money granted by
*ke cortes or specific numbers of troops for a specific
purpose* The revenues, therefore* were not urban reven¬
ues and they were not levied by the towns as a matter of
course. Yet in a very real sense administrative control
remained with the towns* For the total costs were assess-
:ed by the town, the total was distributed over the dis¬
tricts of the town and the dependent municipalities* and the
collection of these sums was in the hands of town officials**
Furthermore* as far as urban militias were concerned* it
was the town officials who actually spent the money thus
raised*
In general terms* therefore* the assessments or
repartlmientos for troops or taxes voted by the cortes.
were most easily usurped or controlled at town level even
though in both cases the towns were acting on behalf of
the Crown* Since vast sums of money could be involved
the temptation to usurp such wealth was great* In the
case of the urban militias the attraction was not so much
the money Itself as the opportunity of controlling an
efficient fighting force which cost nothing* The attraction
of /
1 With the pedidoa and monedas. however, the Crown desig-
inated the total amount—money to be raised.
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of the royal monedaa and edidos was simpler - effective
domination of a town ensured that the Crown could be per*
isuaded to share the proceeds. These were the opportuni¬
ties which tempted the great nobility to impose their
control over the towns of Castile.
3) Patrician Oligarchies
i) The framework of urban government
The larger Castilian towns were dominated by patri-
• cian oligarchies and it is necessary to examine very
briefly the framework of urban government which allowed
the patricians to retain power.*
The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries witnessed a
royal intervention in urban government which created a
restrictive pattern of town government in place of the
previous 'open* town councils. The reign of Alfonso XI
(1312-1350)was. in this respect, decisive. Town govern-
Sment was now essentially based on a body of regldores
who were to be appointed by the Crown. In 1345. for example,
bodies of royal regldores were set up in Burgos. Leon,
Segovia /
1 In general see L.Garcia de Valdeavellano, Hlatoria de
las instituciones. pp.529*50. For specific towns see
J.Garcia rain*""<3'e Bar&nda, La ciudacl de Burgos (Burgos,
1967), ii•chaps.xxxii-xxxix; J.Torres Fontea, 'El
concejo murciano en el reinado de Pedro I', C.H.E..
xxv-xxvi(1957), 251-78; J.Valdedn E&ruque, ubi supra,
passim; A.Muro Orejdn. ubi supra, passim; XTATvares
Jusu?7 'Ordenaci<£n juridica dada a SevTiTa*, A.Hlsp..
xvi(1952),177-206; the same, 'La justicia seviliana',
A,Hisp., xix(1953),17-50.
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begovia, and Jerez.^ The regidoras appointed by the
Crown were, in their turn, empowered to appoint those
urban officials who had previously been elected by the
assemblies of inhabitants. By the end of the fourteenth
century almost all the Castilian towns were, with varia-
:lions, organized in a similar fashion.2
A desire for centralisation had prompted the Crown
to reorganize the towns. Yet already by the end of the
fourteenth century, given the mechanics of the system of
appointments, the effective control of town government
was vested in the oligarchies of the regidores and not in
the ^rovn. Municipal officials were not appointed by
the Crown but by the regidorcs subject to royal approval.
The regidorez were theoretically appointed by the Crown
but the royal appointment tended merely to confirm the
wishes of the regidores, In this way the office of
regidor {regionento) came to be regarded as part of the
property of its holder • an office which could be passed
on to other members of the family or to friends. Legally
the Crown still retained control. On occasion the Crown
used Its power to reward deserving royal officials with a
regimiento /
1 For Jerez see bancho, His torla. i.5-7 and A.M.J.,V.l,
C.9.,no.40, which includes Alfonso XI1s letter, 1 Jan.
era 1383.
2 J.Torres Pontes, ubl supra, passim makes a detailed
study of the viciasitudes of this "transition in Idurcia.
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region en to. But the general tendency was for the
regimientos to regain as the property of the families
controlling them*
The number of regidores in any town council varied*
In Madrid there were twelve regidores, Jeres had thirteen
down to the reign of Henry IV, and Seville had twenty four*
The number of regidores theoretically appointed often led
to the number being used as the description of the official.
Thus in Seville the regidor was known as a veinticuatro
(twenty four) and in Jeres as a trece. An examination of
any list of town officials, however, immediately confirms
that the theory did not conform with the practice. In
Seville, for example, there were thirty-five * twenty fours*
in 1452-3 (Table XXV-A).* The reason for this expansion
in numbers will emerge below - office holding was in great
demand.
regAdores' ability to form oligarchies was the
fundamental feature of town government. Yet theoretically
regidores did not appoint all urban officials. In
Jeres, for example, there were eight jurados as well as the
thirteen regidores and the two alcaldes mayores chosen from
among the thirteen.2 Moreover, there did In theory exist
elements /
1 Appendix Z below V^.feoit-V
2 Sancho, Historia.1.5-7*
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elements of representation in urban government. In many
cases the regidores themselves were meant to represent
both caballeros and hombree buenos pecheroa (non noble tax
2
payers)." The officials known as jurados were supposed
to represent the inhabitants of the parish or district in
which they lived, especially in matters of taxation and
3
accounts. Other regulations, varying from place to place,
carried the principle of representation to considerable
lengths. In t eville, for example, one of the mayordomos
(the .iiayordoiBo hidalgo) had to be chosen from among the
veinticuatros while the other (the mayordorao ciudadano)
had to be chosen from among the jurados,^ The same
5
applied in the case of the contadores, the officials known
6
&e the fief eeecutores, and the procuradores or represen-
: tat ives sent to the cortea. liven messengers were inc¬
luded in these regulations, livery time that Toledo and
Seville sent messengers or representatives to court half
of them had to be juradoa,7
These /
1 F,Marques Vi1lanueva, 'Converges y cargos concejiles en
el siglo XV', h,A,B,M, . lx i i i (I >57) , 52 3.
2 A document of 1449, for example* makes this distinction
between the regidores of Segovia: »UOuintaniIla, • Con-
scordia de loa cabiIdas aobre obras', h»S«, vi(1954),
295-319, For Seville, A,Muro Orejon, up'i' supra, p,70.
3 Muro Orejon, ubi snpra. pp.70-71, In THe~central Casti¬
ll ian towns the"" a exmero had more or 1 ess the same functions.
4 See the royal eo'ru irmations of these yearly appointments -
for example, A.M.S.,caja,1412-13,no.9,
5 Sec A,&4,S,,ce ja 1406-7,no,110, which contains the original
decision on this point (1371) and subsequent orders on
equal salaries,
6 See the data on representation in the royal meread to the
jurado. Anton Gonailesj ibid.caja 1445-6,20 July 1446,
7 A,Sierra Corel la, ubi supra, passim, is a mine of infor¬
mation on these aspects of" the procuradorca and jurados.
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These regulations providing for the representation
of different interests were ineffective in practice unless
backed up by considerable political pressure.* The office
of jurado, like the regjtnjento, was either controlled by
the regidores or became appropriated to particular families.
In Seville the same family could at different times provide
2
a mayordomo hidalgo and a mayordoroo ciudadano.
ii) The existence and continuity of patrician families
The fact that great landed nobility infiltrated into
a few key posts and in many cases gained political control
of the towns did not impede the patrician families from
monopo 1 i z i ng the vast majority of urban offices.
A convenient list of most of the great patrician
families of Seville is provided by tho salary roll of
1452-3 (Table XXV-A).^ If the few members of the great
nobility are eliminated, the remaining names are mainly
those which occur with monotonous regularity throughout
a century of vast documentation « Melgarejo, Ceron, Medina,
dentillan, Cabeaa de Vaca, M&rmolejo, Bahamon, Qrttfa,
U'exia., Darba, . uadros, Bsquivel, Monsalve, Torres, Va'aques
de f
1 As in Kegovia where, however, the struggle was between
the oligarchs and the excluded nobility rather than
between nbbles and omes buenos: M.Quintani1la, * fenten-
xcia ai-bitral sobre las oficios de ia ciudad', E.g.,
iv(1952),175-83,
2 See bel ow 111,
3 Appendix Z below^.feov*-^.
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de Mascoso, Pineda, Las Casae, In 1384, for example,
Kuy Perez de Esquivel was? mayordomo ciudadano of Seville#
Exactly a century later,in 1484, another Esquivel was a
veinticuatro and during this century the family provided
a succession of vainticuatros, mayordor.os hidalgos.
iu radon. and castellans. The Barba family provide a
less complex example. huy Barba held various offices
from 1399*1407 * mayordomo, velnticuatro, and procurador
tflayor of Seville. In 1407-8 his son, Juan Barba, succee¬
ded as veint icua tro and the name Juan Barba appears each
year as veint icua. tro from 1407 down to the list of 1452-3.*
The situation in Seville was duplicated in other
towns. The minutes of the town council meetings in
Jerez show that such families as the VI1 J.avicencio,
Cabesa de Vacs, Yaldespino, Vargas, Torres, hatera,
Gal legos, lie 1 gare jo, Ortiz, and Mexfa, controlled the
offices of jtarados and re,r ictorcs» In Cadi2, the
I j\f 0
Viilavicencio, Bocanegra, Bernal, Negxon, Estopinan,
Sopranir, and other families who formed the oligarchy
from the late fifteenth century onwards,had probably
controlled offices during the preceding period as well.^
In Burgos, offices were controlled by a tightly knit and
related /
1 A.M.S..passim. The Juan Barba throughout the documenta¬
tion is not, of course, the same nan, He renounced his
office to his son, Juan Barba, in 1444: Ibid, caja 1445-
6, royal confirmation, 6 April 1444.
2 A.m.J.,Actas Cape..passim where the officials attending
each council meeting are recorded. Sancho.Hj storia. i„
88, gives a list of the oligarchy families for the late
fifteenth century, f
3 !rancho, Los Genoveses, passim: Marques Vi 1 lanueva.ubl
supra. pTsoTT
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related group of families «• the Banta '-*arfa, Cartagena,
Fri&s, and Maluenda, In Murcia in 1464 the patrician
regidorcs refused to accept a royal corregidor precisely
because they feared that he intended changing the heri-
jditary nature of office.* With other towns the infor*
Sraation is not so abundant. It would seem however that
in Bilbao, Medina del Catnpo, Segovia, and Cordoba offices
were controlled In the same way.
Not all families, of course, managed to retain their
position. In Seville the vetntleuatria held by Juan
Rodriguea de Hoyos from at least 1407 to 1413 passed, on
his death, to Mlger Solugrus Bocanegra and the Bocanegras
also failed to establish a patrician dynasty. Inevitably
many families became involved dangerously in the £)olitics
of the period. The Yanegas family of Cordoba were im-
:prisoned by John II in 1431 and the alcalde mayor,
Garcia Fernindea de Cordoba, was thrown out of office in
4
1448 for supporting the Aragonese faction in Castile.
Yet the resilience of patrician families was remarkable
and, despite sus ens ions, Imprisonment, and banishment,
they retained their positions. In Seville, for example,
qu i t e /
1 A mine of badly organised information in Cantera Burgos,
op.clt.. passim.
2 Torres Pontes, Pajardp, pp.93,215*6} they accused the
correaidor of having introduced shoemakers and other
artisans into the reglmientos of i-eon.
f
3 Garcia de Cortaaar. op,clt. ,'pp. 320*1 ; «Garquea Vi 1 lanueva,
ubi supra,pp,520,526 j A#il,C,,Sec,19, jurados,no.40, which
contains "a useful list of officials in 1432 which can be
compared with scattered references in other sources,
4 Pedro Vanegas had been alcalde mayor in the 1390s: A.O.M.,
Priego,leg.79,doc,1 and Teg,38,doc•36, For the royal
action in 1431: Halconero»pp,92*3. For the expulsion
of Garcia Fern&ndea: A,0,M,,Priego,leg,24,doc.64, 4 Jan,
144E.
quite a number of officials - Cer^n, Vasquez de Woscoso,
Marmolejo, Esquivel, Medina, Ortiz and others » fell foul
of the Crown as a result of the corregidor1 s work** in 14cl6-17
Yet despite the fact that they were sent to court, impri¬
soned, and subsequently banished from Seville for jseriods
varying from five months to one and a half years, the
positions of these families remained unshaken. Throughout
the whole of this period one of the alcaldlas mayores of
Seville was held by the Cer^n family,^
Given the resilience of these families over long
periods of time, it Is not surprising to find the same
family names in different towns. Often this was caused by
the Crown granting, municipal offices as rewards to royal
officials. The royal nmyordofflo Andres da Cabrera, for
example, controlled posts as regidor in Segovia, Cuenca,
3
and Seville. This type of central grant to a royal
official must bo clearly differentiated from the control
of a locally or regionally powerful family. Given the
administrative, ecclesiastical, and economic interdependence
between Seville, Jerez, and Cadiz, it is inevitable that the
names of Ortiz, Villavicencio, Mexla, and Me1garejo are to
be found in the lists of regidores. It is also inevitable
tha t /
1 Details in Anecdotario Sevillano, pp.73-82,
2 A.S2.S,, passim.
3 Jerquez YiIIanueva, ubl supra, p.507•
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that the families which survived in power during the
following centuries fused together* The castellan of
Santa Olalla del Cala at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, don Pedro dc Psquivel Medina Barba, for example,
carried the names of three of the important fifteenth
century patrician families of Seville#*
4) The economic benefits of officchoidlnR
i) Salaries
s.hat benefits did the patrician families derive
from their monopoly of office? The normal salary recei-
tved by the remdor of a fairly important Gastilian town
Seville, Cordoba, Ladajos, Toledo • was 3,000 mra per
2
year. This was not a high salary and it tended to re-
imain constant in most towns, even into the sixteenth
3
century, despite a drastic rise in nominal prices. But,
as car. be seer, in the Seville nomine of salaries for 1452
(Table XXV), the basic salary was augmented by additional
salaries for other offices or tasks performed by the
regidores. In Seville, for example, it was established
custom that the commands of castles were reserved to the
town /
1 This specific example in Collantes, ubi supra, p.177,
2 A,M.S., yearly aominas of salaries, passion Marques,
ubi supra, pp,526-7,
3 h.Pike, .jrxterprise and adventure (New York, 1967),p. 163.
3$3.
town officials with the result that almost all alcalcles
ft 1 <3or eg received an additional 6,000 mrs per year,*
Other regldoreg received extra payment s as . rocurtdor
mayor (6,000 mrs), contador mayor (3,000 airs) f leles
(2,000 mrs), alcalde de la justicla (20,000 mrs) and so on.
Juradop as such did not receive salaries but were often
2
pa id for additional offices which they held.
The total income, therefore, which a regidor could
derive from office wag quite oubstantial. It is not
surprising that the patricians regarded their salaries as
being the item of greatest importance as far as urban
expenditure was concerned. In Seville, for example, when
the Crown appointed a royal official as the perpetual
aiayordotao in 1447, the first condition that the town im»
Jposed on the new i-ayorioaio was that all salaries should
be paid in cash during the first and second financial
3
periods of each year,
ii) Urban offices as rewards for royal officials
Many royal officials were rewarded by the Crown with
urban offices, Much is obscure about the interplay
between /
1 This practice was approved by the Crown! A.M»S„,ca
1447-8, royal letter of 30 Aug,1447,
2 See Appendix Z be 1 ow^.tou-V
3 The new nvyordomo was the royal contador mayor, Alfonso
Perez de Vlvero, For his appointment and its conditions!
A.M»S.,caja 1449-50, letter dated Tordesi1 las, 29 April
1446,
3t4,
between the world of the court and town officials but
some points are clear. In the first place many of these
royal officials were based on the court and their urban,
posts were merely additional perquisites. The salaries
attached to these offices obviously constituted useful
income. Contadores mayores and judges of the audiencia,
such as Alfonso Perez de Vivero, Andres de la Cadena,
and Fernando Gomes de Herrera, were office holders in
Seville, Segovia, and Toledo, although they spent most
of their lives at court.
It is also clear that the variety of such appoint-
tments was great, A tesorero mayor of the Basque area
could be a reg idor in Tamora, and a raero chamber lain
could be a regidor in Cordoba,.in—i»ni«*»lfci mi «!;—■mil*
The problems begin to arise when trying to determine
the ability of theoe royal officials to find a errtanent
place In the locally established na tr ic i&n o lj.garchde s ,
Some, 1 ihe Tirol as ^artines, royal con tador mayor de
cnentas and repidor of Feville, managed to maintain their
positions and their relatives are to be found gaining office
and inter-marrying with the other patrician families,^ Yet
the /
1 For Andres de la Cadena and Gomez de Herrera see C,D,h,A,H..
66 and 75 {xxv,xxxvi i i , 14 53). Such royal officials, of
course, had to arrange for substitutes. Thus the Seville
accounts for 144ft name Alfonso Perez de Vivero as mayor-
;doit'.o per -a ttio and 1 alfonso f errancies del peso eacribano
de caaiara^del rey en gu nombre' : A, hi*£, ,ca ja 1447-8,
bundle~T»
t
2 See the cases of Pedro Gomez de Sevilla, later to become
a lieutenant cont&dor mayor, and Francisco, re&idor of
Cordoba in Gonzalea. Col.Cedulae.i,35-40; A,M,C,,S*ec,19,
jurat!os, no.40, I July 1432.~~
3 See below -J?- 3^1.
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the inability of a royal official to secure a permanent
position In one town, did not necessarily imply a total
failure, although this must have happened. It is clear,
indeed, that established families of royal officials
collected offices in different towns. This was an in¬
evitable tendency since the hereditary nature of offices
and the limit to the creation of new offices forced
officials to accept vacancies wherever they occurred#
Diego Arias de Avila, for example, was made a regidor
of Toledo, although the local basis of this fain ily's
power was to be in Segovia* His predecessor at Toledo
was Alfonso Alvarea de Toledo, contador mayor and royal
councillor, who might have been expected to transmit the
office to one of his sons. Instead one of his sons is
to be found as a regidor in Cuenca. The beat example
of such a family of royal officials is provided by the
Diaz of Toledo who hold offices in towns as far apart as
Guadalajara, Toledo, and Seville, The failure of a
family of royal officials to establish a permanent posi¬
tion in the patrician olIgarchy of one town does not,
therefore, preclude a deliberate consolidation of local
power /
1 Diego Fernandez de Molina is a case in point. 1h© docu-
smentation of Seville and Jerez attests to his importance
in royal naval and military matters in the south. Given
a veinticuatria in Seville in 1445, he lost it to Alfonso
de Ayora in 1448 and then disappears from view: A.M.S.,
Caja 1449-50, 16 Aug#1448#
2 B#N.,MS#,13032,fol»39h, 9 Aug,1456.
3 Cortes, iii#456(1445).
4 See ibidi Marques, ubl supra,p,508: A»M#S#,caja 1457*8,




iii) Xhe Batrlcio.ua and the municipal finances
Inevitably urban officials were suspected of lining
thoir own pockets from the town's revenues. Attention
cone ant ra t ed not so touch on urban expend! ture, which was
theoretically covered by accounting procedures, but on
the system of farming the revenues* The royal ordinance
of Guadalajara of 1436, for example, stipulated
thafc the alcaldes* alguacil* reaidorcs.
laayordoiao, escribanos of the council, and
others on their behalf cannot farm and will
not farm, either by themselves or by means
of other people, the revenues and common
property of the cities and towns and places
where they hold office* xior must they play
a part in the farms or be able to act or act
as guarantors or sureties for those who are
farmers on pain of losing their offices for
such action.'
Similar provisions were stipulated at a more local level*
In Seville, for example, the conditions of the tax farm®
lai C down that refcidores and juraoos were not to farm the
3
revenues ,
Despite the ordinances, however, corruption in muni-
scijji&l finances seems to have beer, fairly prevalent. In
aa&ny /
1 There are also many cases • buy B&rba, ftuy Lopes - where
men divided their time equally between the court and the
town. ii-et, for example* A.M.S., caja 1402-3, nos * 58, 591
caja 1404-5,nos•34,7? *
2 B.N.,MS,,13259, fols*161V-186V, 14 Dec.1436*
3 for example A,M,S.,caja 1416-17,no,2, fol «IK,
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cases • especially with items of expenditure * corruption,
though suspected, cannot be proved, In Madrid and B&dajos
common property was usurped by the officials.* In Seville
not all expenditure was aecounted for in a satisfactory
manner. Indeed in some cases • minor ones • little
attempt was made to disguise unjustified expenditure*
Payments of 'alms* to relatives of patrician office holders.
2
for example, were occasionally not disguised. Not sur¬
prisingly the Crown sometimes intervened * as in Leon and
Seville * to examine accounts or fulminate against the
general state of corruption.^
The real opportunity for corruption, however, was in
the farming of revenues. For, as the urocuradores of the
cortes pointed out in 1433, despite the ordinances
*h« SSMi&MM &nd and
some cities and towns ... farm ... the revenues
... for sums well below their real value, and
because they hold the said offices nobody dares
to outbid them in these revenues} moreover,
in order to gain them for even lower sums, they
farm the revenues without publicising the day on
which the bids are to take place ••• sometimes
they arrange to gain the farms themselves with an
outward show of very small bids, and sometimes
they arrange matters so t£at others gain the
farms on their behalf ...
How /
1 Marques, ubi supyft, p.527.
2 For example, Alvar Marlines, brother of the tesorero and
regidor, Nicolas Marlines, was given 1,000 mrs in 1421 and
1>0C mrs in alms was given to Constansa Goeselea de Fsquivel:
A.M.S.,caja 1412-3,no.18j caja 1421-3,docs.for 1421-2,
payment to Marlines.
3 A.M.S.,caja 1402-3,no.68 shows that accounts were sent to
the royal court for auditing as a result of the suspension
of certain officials. Ibid, caja 1426-7, royal letter,
20 March 1426, contains charges of general corruption in
Seville. The finances of were more than once subjec¬




How much substance was there in these allegations? Even
in Seville, where the procedure lor farming was fairly
rigidly controlled and apparently open to competition,
the registers of farms reveal that the ordinances ware
contravened. In many cases, of course, 'frcnt* men
were put up as farmers of revenues and the connection
between them and the officials is impossible to prcvc in
a satisfactory tanner. But even if only clear cut cases
are listed the result is definitive enough. An examina¬
tion of the farm register for the year 1406-7, for
example, reveals the following cases of officials defini¬
tely involved in the farm of revenuesf-*
nam: or tax
farmer OFFICE revenue











Juan GonzAl e« Jurado, " Aimojariias&o of
liuevar
Esteban Peres Alcalde. Aroche AlmoJarifazao of
Aroche
Miguel Fernandez A1suaeil.Seville Tavema ou t s id e
the city
Pedro /
1 A.M.S,,caja 1406-7, no.3, register of the farms, 16 fols.
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El marco de la
Guarda del Corral
de los Alcaldes
iv) .Royal taxes, financiers, and patricians
The profits which officeholders derived from town
revenues must have appeared inconsiderable when compared
to the opportunities presented by the world of finance
and royal tax farms. The documentation reveals a truly
complicated relationship between finance and urban office
ana the number of individuals involved was fairly signifi»
scarjt. It seems probable that most of these individuals
originated as financiers and invested their profits in
urban office, although some may have been patricians first
and utilised their position to become farmers of royal
revenues /
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revenues. Certainly those financiers who invested in
urban office did not ironediately cease to operate as tax
faruiers and financiers. The farming and collection of
royal taxes was held to be incotapatible with nobility,
but many patricians either ignored this point or solved
the problem by acting more discreetly as guarantors of
I
farming enterprises or by using third persons. A few
concrete examples, followed by a more general analysis,
will help to throw some light on this relationship.
The best examples to start with are those involving
•lews. Before he stood a chance of infiltrating into a
patrician oligarchy, the Jewish financier had first of
ail to make his profits and then become a Christian and
change his name. The opposite sequence of events was
impossible. An example of such a family was that of
the patrician .'.lax-molejos of Seville. The power and
status of this converso family, as John IPs secretary
pointed out, clearly derived from the success of Francisco
Fernandez de Marmolejo who had been financier and contador
mayor to John I (1379-90).^ Already by 1387 the family
was well entrenched in Seville for, in that year, the
contador /
1 Thus, from at least 1457*9, a servant of Diego Lopes,
rcgidor of Seville, was involved in the royal farms of
the Seville area. See A,G.S.,E.i4.R., leg, 1, fcl .317V
and leg*6,no.8,foi.9K| Ibid. Exp.Mac,,leg.2,no,34,
For tax farming and derogeancei O.K., Lib.Iv,tit,ii,
leyes iv,v. / " * "
2 See the Instruccion del relator in Defensorium unitatia
christianae. ed. Manuel Alonso. p.352.
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contador mayor succeeded in using his influence to secure
a valuable financial profit for one of his relatives who
was a ret;idor and a contador of Seville as well as being
chief treasurer of the royal mint in Seville.* Already,
too, both these Marmolejos were royal tax farmers,** Then
at the beginning of the fifteenth century the Marmolejo
family was joined in Seville by another converso financier
• the z*oyal treasurer and contador mayor de eventas,
Nicolas ^artlnez de Medina. From 1408 to 1411 a close
relationship as royal tax collectors developed between
Nicolas Martinez and the young regidor. Luis Fernandez
de Marmolejo, who by 1410 had become the former's son-in-
3
law. The Marmolejo descendents had not, therefore,
cut off their contacts with their financial background.
Yet, as their position became more secure, the Marmolejos
could afford to be more discreet. By the 1440s the
family /
1 In 1387 John I empowered Marmolejo and the archbishop
of Seville to sell juroa worth 100,000 mrs assigned on
the alirojarifazgo mayor. One jure of 5,000 arc was sold
to Juan de Soto, lurado of Seville," for 56,333 rors. Three
years later, the latter made a written declaration that
he had bought the juro on behalf of Alfonso Fernandez de
Marmolejo, regidor and contador of Seville. On this and
further transactions of the same iuro: A.D.M,,Feria,
leg.27,doc«76| leg.29.doc.9* ,
2 See A.M.J.,c.12,30 June 1403 where Francisco Fernandez
de Marmolejo is cited as regidor of Seville and ore cf
the arreadadores mavores of the albaqulas. Alfonso
Fernandez de Marmotejo and his descendant® are cited as
farmers of other taxes.
3 Nicolas Martinez, contador mayor de cuentag and tesorero
mayor of the pedidos"and monedas. empowers Diego Ortiz
and Luis Fernandez del Marmolejo, regidores of Seville,
to collect these revenues in the dioceses of Seville and
C&diz! A,M.S.,caja 1407*8,no.216. Writ from thP same to
his son-in-law and regidor of Seville, Luis Fernandez del
Marmolejo, to collect pedidos and monada is of 1410: ibid,
caja 1410-11,no,210.
372.
family acted as guarantors of tax farmers rather than as
direct tax farmers or collectors,4
The example of the Marino 1 ejo family - and also of
Nicolas Martinez de Medina » is perhaps exceptional in
that important royal offices were involved. The example
of Pedro Gonzales de Bahamon is one of a tax farmer whose
activities were completely professional and complicated.
From at least 1439 onwards^he is to be found farming royal
revenues of all kinds and in all areas - royal taxes on
wood and oil in Seville, alcabalas and tercias in the
Jeres area, royal revenues in the bishopric of Cordoba
and in the region round Niebla, royal revenues still owed
from previous years throughout the kingdom, the alcabalas
of the archbishopric of 1 antiago and bishopric of Tuy,
and the customs and salt revenues of the kingdom of
Galicia.^ Operating throughout the length and breadth
of the kingdom his entry,into the Seville oligarchy seems,
however, not to have been as quickly achieved as that of
others. A jurado at first, it was some time before he
gained the coveted office of regidor of Seville and even
then, as late as 1467, he was described simply as 'an
honourable /
1 For the Marmolejos as guarantors see, for example,
A.G* £» , leg.2 , Libro de kent&s of 1440 (hereafter
cited as A.G.S.,Libro de Kentas,1440), fol.&OV.
2 Sec A.G.5, , leg.l, Libro de nentas of 1439 (here-
safter cited as A.G.S.,Libro de hentas,1439), fol.177;
ibid. Libro d# Keutas, 1440, fol.62V; ibid, leg.11,
fois.2211-23V, 32B.J ibid, len.6.no.6.fol .loT" Ibid, leg.7,
no.5 j ibid. Lxp.Hac., leg. 1,no, 127.
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honourable man who makes his living from tax collecting*.
A less complicated example is that of F'edro de Villacla
wnof as a collector of Inquisition revenues in Seville,
settled i n the toon towards the end of the fifteenth
century, invested hia money in buying valuable property
in La Plata street from an alcalde mayor, and gained the
2
office of regidor.
These examples help to illustrate how financiers and
tax farmers penetrated into the urban oligarchies* It
now rerna ins to give some idea of the scope and intensity
of this relationship between financiers and oligarchies.
There can be no doubt that the vast majority of
patricians who participated in the farming of royal iev*
tenues confined their activities to their own towns or
regions. The year i440 may serve as an example. In
that year three jurados and one regldor of Toledo were
involved as tax farmers or guarantors of royal taxes
3
collected in the archdeaconry of Toledo.' in Burgos a
regidor, Simon Garcia the Rich* was the chief tax
collector for the merixulad of Santo Domingo de Silos.*
Two jurados. one regidor. and one cscri'bano of Soria were
involved in the farming and collection of revenues in
the t
1 He was still a jurado in 1446 but had become
by 1452* For the description of him see below sgg-<i(
2 See Claudio Guillen, *Un padr<Sn de conversos sevillanos
B.Hiep*,lxv(1963),58.
3 Juan Alvares, rcgidor and farmer of the moneda forera;
Gutierre Fernandez, jurado and farmer with another
jurado as ftador| Fern^n"Gonza1ea de la Fuente, jurado




the bishopric of Osma,* A regidor of Guadalajara was
one of the guarantors for the chief farmer of revenues
in the archdeaconries of Madrid and Guadalajara.2 A
reg idor of Leem and two regidors of Mans ilia acted in a
similar capacity for the area of the bishopric of Leon.^
Two of the guarantors of the pedido of the bishopric of
Segovia were regidores of that town.4 Diego Rodriguez
of Seville, who was chief tax farmer in the bishopric of
Valencia and in the area of Palencia and Campos, counted
5
two regjdores of Palencia among his financial backers.
Several office holders in Santiago de Compos tela acted
as guarantors to the chief tax farmer of the archbishopric
/
of Santiago and bishopric of Tuy. Finally in Seville in
1440 at least nine juradoa and two regidores were involved
in the collection and farming of royal revenues in the
7
Seville region.
The fact that a patrician office holder merely acted
as a guarantor and not directly as a tax farmer did not
mean that he had no interest in the farming venture* To
stand /
1 Vol asco de Barrio Nuevo, rest idor and f iador} Fernan
Sanehas. jurado and collector of the pedIdoi another
Jujrado and an escrl banp as fladorns to the farmer of
thVlaoneda foreral ibid. fols.31R,87V,97R.
? Juan Fernandez de Itoa. regidor and f iadort ibid, to 1.50.
3 But as fiadorea for difTerent farmers t ibid, tola.35.92R.
4 Ibid. fol.Wv.
5 Luis de Buete and Garcia Alvarez de Toledo, regidores :
ibid, fols.27,28ft.
6 tbTcf, fols.42V-43R.
7 tKo jurados were Bartolome Podriguea, Juan Ruys de Parras.
FranciscoXtipez, Alfonso L<£pea, Gonzalo Ximenes, Andres
Ximenes, Alfonso Ximdnes, Diego Ortiz, Pedro GoneAlea de
bahamdn. The regidores were Pedro Ortfx, Pedro Fernandez
de Marmolejo. ibid. Tola.60V.61,62V,73R,10IV.
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To stand as surety was in itself an investment in a
financial enterprise, the sain work of which was done by
somebody else. It was an investment which ran the risk
of a confiscation of the guarantor's wealth if the farm
failed.* The direct interest of the guarantors was even
more involved when the farm was a family affair. In
1461, for example, Gonsalo Runes de la Mnela, regidor of
CSuenca, Jtten NufJes do la V.uela, citizen of Cuenca, and
Diego de la "iue la, regidor of Molina, acted as financial
backers for iouis de la -<<uela, citizen of Cuenca, when
the latter made a bid to secure the farm of the royal
2
salines of Cuenca.
The financial power of the officeholders naturally
varied from town to town and from region to region. In
the large towns there was no lack of men of substance who
could act both as tax farmers and guarantors. The patri*
*cian oligarchy of Seville, for example, could easily
provide individuals to put forward sureties of at least
150,000 mrs and two or three guarantors were usua lly
3
sufficient to cover the commitments of one fame.*. The
same was true of towns like Cordoba, Toledo, Burgos, and
4
Boria. /
1 7T*e totals of th© farm were paid to the Crown in instal¬
lments and sureties: were required to guarantee future
payments. The farmer and his guarantors, therefore,
constituted a finance company with capital assets.
2 A.G.S. tK.W.U., leg. 11,fol.265XL,
3 Indeed the sureties of the guarantors were often well
below their true limits. In 1465, for example, Fernando
de las Casas doublet! the surety of one of his backers
with no apparent difficulty! ibid. £xp.Hac,,leg*l,no.156.
4 For example two fiadorce were suf ficient to back the
iurado of Soria, FerniTn ranches, in his farm of the
moneda forera of the diocese of Osmat ibid, E»M,R,,
leg .3,no,ld",l'ol ,4V ,
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Soria« But regions like Galicia and Asturias, for
example, lacked towns with a powerful and resourceful
uroan aristocracy and local financiers were not apparently
rich enough to underwrite farming ventures in small
numbers. In 1440, for example, Fernan Rodriguez de
Sevilla had to provide thirty three guarantors for the
customs duties of Galicia and Asturias and the salt re-
:venues of Galicia. Incredibly, although there were ten
'•merchants* and one jurado of La Coruna among these
guarantors, there wore also two peasants (labradorea).*
While the majority of financier patricians tended
to involve themselves in the royal iinancee of their own
area, there were, of course, those who worked further
afield* A regidor of C.uenca not only collected customs
duties in the bishopric of Cuenca but also in the bishop*
Jric of Cartagena. Leaidores of Baeza and Guadalajara
3
collected royal revenues in Seville* Finally there
I /
were those like Pedro Gonzalez de Bahamon or Juan Alvarez
de Toledo, rep, idor of Toledo, who acted as tax farmers on
4
a national scale. Such men drew upon the resources of
financiers /
1 Ibid, Libro de Rentaa,,1440, fols.69V-71V,
2 Tuan Gonzalez de A lealas ibid, E.k.R.,leg.3 ,no.5, 1440*5.
3 Juan Alfonso do Plus, regidor of Baezas A.M.S,,caja 1436-
6, libro del pedido of 1436, poder of 1 Larch 1437•
ITervkn Garcia de Toledo, reg idor of Guadalajara: A.G,S.,
£*aI,R, , leg . 1, fol * 334R, 1444*
4 Juan Alvarez de Toledo was one of the arrendadores and
recaudaoores of the servicio and montazao in the 1460s:
fbla. lsg.n. f o 1.7 BfthaoXngeeabove f|>. 3=^-3.
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below# constant contact with court circles must have led to
contacts which proved useful even in the farms of more
:odest revenues* On the 12th December 1450, for example,
a regidor of Seville# Diego Lopes de Seville, could write
a letter in Illeacas which empowered a re« idor of Toledo#
Alfonso Gonzalez de Herran, to put forward his name as a
guarantor for a financier of Madrid who was attempting to
win a six year farm of two ninths of one of the xoyal
2
revenues in Seville# Without a doubt many members of
the urban aristocracy not only originated as financiers
but continued to draw considerable profits from financial
enterprise#
5) Officeholding and Social Status
1) Privileges and contacts with the court and the
nobility
What social benefits pertained to office holding?
It has been seen that, in theory, provision had been made
'¥•a-
for a representation of nobles and pecheros in many urban
governments /
1 Two jurados of Toledo and one jurado of Seville, for
example, were among the fiadores of the chief tax far¬
mers of all the alcabalas and terctas of the kingdom:
.. £oTs7K"-§h.
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governments* fa practice, however, an aura of nobility
was attached to the important urban posts. By the six*
steenth century, indeed, the identification between office
holding and nobility was in many cases complete* To be
a regidor in Seville, for example, one legally *had to be
a denizen of the city, noble, and named to this honour
by the king4** In the fifteenth century the iuradee and
even the mounted constables were, like the nobility and
Z
reaid ores* exempt from royal and municipal taxation. On
the few occasions when urban officials did pay taxes this
was because the nobility also were being made to pay for
3
a specific reason* In short the iurados and regldores
were fiscally exempt in the same way as the nobility,
the regjdores as a whole acquired an air of nobility, and
the patricians also enjoyed the prestige of being the
representatives of the Crown,
In practice, of course, many of the patriciana were
of non-noble origins* The financiers, conversos* and
merchants who gained entry into regimientos were seeking
to acquire nobility, but nobility was not automatically
acquired by entry into the urban oligarchy* Contempor¬
aries realized that these office holders were not all
noblemen /
1 R.Pike, 2£.cit*, p.163, note 73,
and A.mTI., cajo 1409-10, no*135*
3 A.ii.S., ca la 1447-8, document entitled 'Kr. sabado cinoo
de agosto (1447) ge ayantaron en la casa delas"cuentas,*,1
3?9.
noblemen. The example of Pedro Gonsales de Bahamon
proves the point. When, in 1467, he was described as
*an honourable roan who makes his living from tax collec*
:ting', this in effect meant that he was a man who was
not a noble and did not live nobly because his occupation
prevented him from doing so. Yet^by 1467, Pedro Gonzalez
de Bahamon had been a regldor of Seville for at least
f if teen years. office holding provided the opportunities
for rising in the social scale but this did not mean that
success was either inevitable or quick in coming* What
were these opportunities?
Office holding provided contacts with court and noble
circles. The documentation of Seville provides so many
examples on this point as to make analysis almost super*
:fluous. Considerable sums of money were spent on court
officials in order to facilitate the entry of patricians
into the political and social citadel of power and in
I
order to protect the town's interests* An endless
stream of patrician officials spent money and time at
court * officials bearing the names of all the great pat*
2
Jrician families of Seville. The granting of .5,000,000
are /
1 During the first decade of the century Seville paid the
royal chancellor of the secret seal an annual sum of
3,000 tors; A.M.S,, yearly payments till caja 1409-10,
no.21, wttich was cancelled. 3l»© nearer tne court the
greater the expend!ture: see the agitated shower of
payments to royal porters, guards, constables, and
secretaries in ibid, caja 1407*8,nos.23,26*6,42,56,97*8,
101,122 and caja 1410*11,nos,53*6,59,61,65,101, f
2 Pee, for example, the court expenses of rtln Fernandez
Ceron, Buy oiaa de Cuadros, Juan Fernanda* del liarmoiejo,
Pedro Rodriguez de EsquIvei •»«: A.M.S,,caja 1400*1,no,21 j
caja 1416*17,no,19{ caja 1408*9,no,83j caja 1410*11,no,27,..•
380#
tops to the thrown or 12,000 mra to the constable, in
gratitude for honours and services to Seville and its
officials, ensured a favourable familiarity of contact at
all times* The tegidores spent time at court, royal
officials were rewarded with the occasional r; giaaiento
that fell vacant, arid a few powerful nobles held urban
office alongside the reuidores and jurados* The identi¬
fication of the patricians with court and noble circles
was not a total one but it certainly added to their social
prestige*
liability and advantageous marriage alliances were
the great benefits to be derived from such a situation#
Yet the other benefits should not be ignored as the example
of the lawyers shows# The lawyers, of course, did not
always form part of the closed patrician oligarchies*
^erit and ability were necessary in order to gain office
as the lawyer of a town, although there may well have been
2
cases of patrician sons entering law* Indispensable to
both the Crown an.: towns, these lawyers reaped the benefits
in several ways* Involved in interminable lawsuits,
Castilian towns had to have lawyers permanently at their
disposal /
1 John II granted arcos <J« la Frontera to Seville 'nor que
la dicha cibdat o goacato de cuadros mi veiaticuatro comp
procurador del la ae ofrescio de me seryir con tres cuentos
de mrs #*,': A.M*s7, Privilcgios, carp,i,no.5b, 9 July
1435, The payment to the constable In ibid, caja 1400-1,
no•2 3 »
t
2 This may have been the case with the bantiilan family of
Seville but, although letrado members appear on the
tnauinas, the point cannot be proved*
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disposal * every nomina of Seville salaries, for example,
carried the names of the letradoa of the city#* But on
top of this the acquisition of legal qualifications was
positively stimulated hy subsidies from urban income which
dL
helped pay for 'expenses iu obtaining a doctorate1# In
the last resort these subsidies often worked in the royal
interest, for many of these lawyer's entered royal service
and quickly acquired high poets in the royal administration#
Ruy Garcia do Villalpando, for example, appears in the
Seville accounts in 1412 as letrado of Seville, bachi 1 ler
en leyes. and lieutenant to the alcalde mayor. In 1414
a royal writ ordered the town officials to pay 5,000 org
towards the expenses of his doctorate# To this sum the
grateful officials added another 100 doblas morlscag. By
the 1420s iluy Garcia de Villalpando was a royal judge in
the audiencia. Subsequently, he became a member of the
royal council and held an important post in Toledo, before
3
coming to grief in the political disturbances of 1453.
For the patrician officials, coxxtact with the court
might also mean the acquisition of a prestige post at
4
court such as that of taacatresala del rev# oometimes
officials /
1 Sec, for example, Table XXV-A, below V"
2 For example, the payments of the doctoral expenses of
Luis ranches, bachijler en lcyes. and Martin I dacha,
1 icenciado exi levee: A,M#S,, ca ja 1400-1, nos # 19, 52,
3 fee A.m# S '# , ca ja 1412-13,nos.93, 107 ; caja 1414-15, no.2 3 J
C.D.P-.A»H.. 55-6 (xxx. 1453) j Benito kuano, Tole do,pp.
30-1# Two of his conteaporaries at fevilie - Luis
benches arsd Velasco G<5iae» - also did well and gained
high office in the royal andiencia.
4 The number of roaestresalas who were also rep, i do rag is
striking but in no case have T evidence for which poet
was acquired first#
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officials were given merceries of royal revenues. In
Seville, for example, the wife of a deceased regidor was
given the royal profits of justice in Seville,* In
Cordoba, a regidor and his brother gained the royal share
/ 2
in the salines of Cordoba* The Zurita family of Jerez,
some of whose members spent a great deal of time at court,
were given a grant of royal revenue in "lores which remained
3
in their family for more than four centuries*
i i) Land, imevJaj&Siu, and nobility. Living nobly,
Once in office the ability to gain nobility in a truly
successful way depended on a variety of complex factors which
are not easily defined. Identification with the military
characteristics of nobility, ownership of land, marriage,
and the ability to * 1ive nobly1 all played a part in this
complex process. Not all these factors were necessary
for successi equally no one factor by itself was suffici*
tent to guarantee it.
The simplest way of acquiring quasi noble status was
by entering the ranks of the c&balleras de cuantia. VVi th»
:out actually possessing noble status these commoner knights
enjoyed /
1 A.Kl.S,,caja 1410-1i,no*178 * These * ere only worth 8,000
xr.re* per year*
2 FernAn Paez de Castillejo, maestresala del rey and /
veinticuatro of Cordoba, and his brother Juan Fernandez;
A,M.C«»F>ee#&,Salinas, no, 1,20 Aug,1401.
3 ancho, Historia, i«89•
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enjoyed the privileges of nobility in return for maintain-
Jing a horse and weapons for the performance of military
service,* The selection of these knights was controlled
by the town councils and tho process could prove extremely
useful to the patricians aa the following royal letter
2
i1lus trates,
Don Juan etc ««« Be it known that the juradoe
of this said city CJerecj umtk their
petitions to me and, among other things, they
informed me about the old ordinance issued
by the kings from whom I am descended In
effect any citieen or inhabitant whose wealth
is worth six thousand rars of moneda vioia can
be a cabal!ere de cuant'ia and is to maintain
continually weapons an^ a horse for my service
and defence of the land. From the day on
which he is assessed as a cabal1ero he is to
en Joy, from that day on, alt the privileges
which the other caballeros de cuantia of this
city enjoy* This assessment of the caballeros
was always carried out by the jurados of "This
city ,,, and a caballero assessed in this way
was presented in your council house by the
jurados of the district in which ha lives. But
now recently some of you fi,e# regjdoreg
alcaldes, etc,) interfere in this proceas
and present your relatives, dependents, and
allies in your council house it caba)teres de
cuantia ... men who are not assessed to have
the said horses and (who you present) in order that
they may enjoy and share out the offices which
belong to the caba11arcs de cuentia • Yet when
the time comes for them to perform military service
they say that they are not obliged to do this
service because they say that they do not have
the necessary wealth *•« And I deemed this petition
to be good and it is my wish that the said ordi-
:nance be observed ,,,
In /
1 Fee above
2. A,K.J,# Actas Caps,, fol#14K, 1426, 15 Sept, 1420,
\
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In short this process allowed an individual to gai n
office by the technical qualification of being a cabaliero
de cuantia. Yet such a caballero was not a true noble
and* once in office* an attempt was made to retain the
status without the obligations which revealed non-noble
origins. Instead of being a means to nobility this pro¬
teose was rather a means of controlling the patronage
machine of town government.
The individuals who claimed they were not rich
enough to maintain a horse would not. however, have
objected to performing military service in return for
royal tierra - that is. the Caatiiian version of the money
fief.* On the whole these money fiefs were held by
nobles. Yet there were exceptions to this generalisation.
a jurado of Cordoba, for example, could receive tierra
payments although technically he was an elected represent
2
:tative of the hombres buenos pecheros of his district.
Hence some reaidorea nanaged to obtain these money fiefs.
Probably this was a result of contact with the court
since, in some cases. tierra and mercedes were paid
3
together. The amounts of the money fiefs varied. A
reaIdor of Ubeda, for example, received only 3,000 rors
per /
1 See above H> \S1-lt
2 The example is taken from A.D.M.,Priego,leg.38.doc.38,
accounts of 1390. .
3 Order to pay tierra and mercedes to Diego Kodriguess de
Cuadros, ragidors A«M,S.,caja 1400-1,no.22» Data on
tierra and mercedes held by officials of Seville: A.G.S.,
liibro de kenXas, 1440* fols .73V-74K.
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per year for two lances while Alfonso Fernandes do
Melgarejo, regidor of Seville, received 19,500 mr« per
year for thirteen lances** But in either case the social
benefits were clear* The possession of tierra identified
the regidor with the real nobility and allowed him to
acquire the characteristic which to a certain extent
still divided 'those who fought1 from the rest of society*
The ownership of real land, however, still seems to
have been one of the key factors in the social success of
patricians throughout the kingdom. In the extreme north,
in Bilbao, the mercantile patrician oligarchy seems to
have invested considerable money in landed property for,
if they continued to invest primarily in shipping, they
were also the owners of sizeable properties in the hinter*
%
/
Hand. In the extreme south, round Cadis, Jerez, Puerto
de Santa %rf», and Seville, patrician families such as
the D&vilas, Spinolas, and Adornos also acquired extensive
3
rural possessions* This was an essential part of the art
of 'living nobly', as well as being a safe investment* In
the south, as in the north, it allowed the patrician to
acquire respectability* Thus, in 1440, Pedro Fernandez
de /
1 A*G*S *,D.de C.,leg*6 ,no*167, 2 Feb*1444 and ibid* Exp*
Hac., leg. 1,no. 132,14 May 1465* Both the;-e are poderes
by the regidores acknowledging payment from third parties
and empowering thein to collect the necessary assignments
at court*
2 Garcia de <. ortazar, op.cit.. p.320,
3 See Sancho, Hjstoria, 1*66 and Sancho, Los Genoveses en
C^diz.p.ll* " It" is also significant that, during the
crisis of 1473, many of Seville's officials could promise
delivery of substantial amounts of grain: A.M*S.,caja
1473*4, 'helacion del pan •••*, 20 Aug*1473*
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de Marmolejo's part in the farm of the alhondiga revenues
of Seville was not that of a tax farmer; instead, as
1Scnor1 of Alcala de Juana de Horta and as regidor of
Seville, he acted as guarantor,*
The example of the converso and financier family of
the Marmolejos helps to illustrate the possibilities
presented by marriage. It has already been noted that
by 1410 the descendants of John l*s financier had made a
marriage alliance with the family of the converso financier
Nicolas Martines* The advantages of such an alliance
are neatly symbolised by the fact that within two years
the two mayordomos of Seville (one hidai&2 and the other
ciudadano) were to be drawn from the Martines and Marmolejo
3
families respectively. Yet this was only a beginning
for, by the 1440s, Pedro Fernandes de Marmolejo, reaidor,
had married a noblewoman • dona Maria de Mendoaa, sister
of the archbishop of Santiago de Compostela.* Furthermore
one of the daughters by this marriage later married don
/ ^ j
Pedro Nunes de Gusman, one of the great landed nobility
5
who also held the office of alguaci1 mayor of Seville.
Clearly, by entry into the patrician oligarchy, acquisi¬
tion /
1 A.C.S.,Libro de aantas,1440,fol,60V,
2 See above 3
3 A.M.S.,caja 1412-13,no.9*royal letter, 8 July 1412,
confirming the appointments. The fact that Marlines wag
the noble mavordomo and Marmolejo the citisen mayordomo
had no real social significance.
4 This marr iage is at tested by the papers relating to the
inheritance of the archbishop's shares in the soap mono*
poly; A.O.M,,Alc,0uc.,leg,5,docs,30-33, 7 Oct,1447-12
July 1448,
5 See the sales of the ^armolejo soap shares ibid..lee,56.
doc,10, transactions dated 8 Jan, and 2 "-arch 1466.
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acquisition of land, and favourable marriages, the example
of the iviaz'molejus was one of complete success.*
Not all patrician families could be as successful
as the Martxtolejos• Marriages between patrician families
were, of course, frequent. Moreover many a family whose
economic position was shaky found it neceesary to marry
into a rich family of lower status, thus infusing the
urban oligarchy with fresh blood and wealth. This was
particularly true of the Jerez and Ca'diz areas where the
indigenous patrician families tended to be relatively
poor in comparison with the rich Genoese families. Since
the former controlled the patronage of urban offices and
the latter were wealthy, such marriages were mutually
advantageous. In ^erez, for example, the Villavicencio
family married into the wealthy Z&car&as family and, as
will be seen, the number of such marriages in Cadiz was
quite considerable.2
The final factor of importance was the ability to
live nobly. It is difficult to give a precise definition
on this point and a detailed example will give a better
impression. For this purpose evidence given to royal
financial /
1 Further data on the Marmolejo fastily connections in the
InstrucciJn del Relator, ed. Manuel Alonso, p.352.
2 For the Viliavicencio * Zacar£as marriage, fancho,
Historia. i.88. For cidia see below
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financial officials as to the general reliability of
guarantors of tax farms is admirable. The example chosen
deals with two members of the bantillin family who acted
as guarantors for Pedro Gonzalez de Bahamon. Members of
the Santillan family * a converso family • are to be
found as reaidores and jurados of Seville throughout the
fifteenth century.* They were also involved, as this
example shows, in the farms of the royal revenues
Inf orom tion.
t Transcript of the infor-
:mation of Pedro Gonzalez de Bahamon, collec¬
tor of the three quarter parts of the area of
Jerez for this year of our lord of one thousand
four hundred and sixty seven.
In the town of ^cana [30/12/1476} before
Alfonso de Quintan!11a and Francisco Fernandez
de Sevilla, contadores of the king ... there
appeared Anton Sanc6es, citizen of the city of
Seville, on behalf of Pedro Gonzalez de Bahamon,
veinticuatro and citizen of the said city. He
sTta ted • tha t since the said ^edro Gonzalez
was named as collector ... for this year
he did give and gave the sureties contained
below. Therefore he said to the said contadores
that he asked them and required them to issue the
appropriate letter} ...... and he presented as
witnesses for information of the sureties ...
Alfonso Alvares de Alcala and Francisco Fernandez,
veinticuatro, and Fedro Lopez, jurado. citizen
of the said city. Oaths were taken from these
witnesses according to the correct procedure
P.Diego de 3antillan citizen
of the said city of Seville
to the amount of ... 150,000 turs
P.Gomes de Santillan, citizen
of the said city to the amount of 60,000 rars
1 From, for example, Alfonso Fernandez de Santi1lan, jurado
in 1416-17 to Fernando de Santillan. reg idor in the n&nina
of 1452-3 in Table XXV-A. " ~ ~~
2 See above ^
3 This is the Quintanilla who later became one of the chief
administrators of the Catholic sovereigns,
^ A converso who later became contador mayor and whose con-
:nections and finances were exceedingly complicated. His
brother, Diego de Susan, had been mayordotno of Seville
two years previous iy.
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The aaid Alfonso Alvares de Alcala,
witness on oath. Asked on his oath if he
knows the said Pedro Consoles de Daham<£n
and the said ... guarantors replied that
he did know them. Asked how he knew them
he replied because he has seen them and
talked with them many times and because
they are citiaens of the said city of
Eeville. Asked ... if he knows that the
said guarantors are good men of good
reputation, and possessors of wealth to the
totals for which each one is standing as
surety ... be fthe witness] replied ... that
they are men who live likeescuderos and
hidaluos. Their business is that of
escuderos and they own horses and weapons
and harness and silver on which they eat.
Asked if he knows what properties each one
of them possesses he replied that he knows
that the said Gomes de SantillsCn owns houses
and an hacienda of olive trees, grain land,
and oil mills in ban Ldcar la ^ayor, a town
of the said city of Seville, which could be
worth 500,000 cars. He said he knows this
and knows that it is his property because he
inherited it from his father, Doctor Diego
hodriguea de Santillin, Moreover he is not
a man who has it mortgaged for debts owing to
the king or any other person, and he bears
witness that he possesses it peacefully as his
own property.
As for the said Diego de Santillan fthe
witness gave this evidence 1, He said ...
that coneerning the properties which he
("Diego de Santilla'n] now possesses in the said
city of Seville and its land, he has heard it
said and indeed knows it to be true that his
mother and two sisters own some houses in
Seville and two hundred arangadas of olive
plantations with a house and mill in Salterns,
a place in the territory ami lands of the said
city, and grain land capable of producing twenty
cahices of grain per year (so it is said and he
believes it to be so) in the Vega of Triana.
All this may be worth,moreor less,900,000 arc
but it is not shared out ... but belongs to the
said /
1 He appears on most of the n&nlnas of Seville salaries
for the 1440s.
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said Diego de Santill an, his mother and
sisters all together and they own it jointly.
Over and above this the said ego de
Senti1Ian receives the revenues of the
encoaiienda of Usagre which is in the pro*
:vincia~"oir Le6nt is part of the order of
Santiago, and may be worth 60,000 mrg per
year* ^He [the witness] regards Kim
[Santillan] as living like a man of sub-
•stance with escuderpg. horses, mules, and
a black slave continually at his spurs, and
that this is what he knows by the oath which
the said .Alfonso Alvarez swore.
The said Pedro L^pez, jurado. witness
on oath • *, he said that he knows all the
persons aientioned. He knows that the said
Pedro Gonzalez de Dahamdn is an honourable
man who makes his living by tax co 11 ect ing ,
and he has been known all his life to be in
this situation. And the said Diego de
Bantillan and Gonsalo de Santill^n are hon¬
ourable men who live by the business of
cseuderos and caballeros, having others who
accompany them in their houses [households]
and each one of them seen on horseback •
sometimes on mules arid sometimes on horses
• and accompanied like men of substance.
(This witness confesses that he can
only give vague evidence as to the properties
involved] »
Hie said Francisco Fernandez de Sevi 1 la,
veinticuatro, witness on oath He said
thet he knows the said ^edro Gonzalez, who is
a good man and lives by tax collecting, and
the said &iego de Santilldn and Gomes de
Santilllin, who live cleanly like cabal Iaros
and escuderos and with horses, weapons, and
other men who accompany them.
Concerning Diego de Bantillan ,., he said
that he knows that his father, Doctor Ruy
Garcfa** /
1 This bears witness to the accuracy of such evidence for,
as has been noted, the accounts of fantiago for this
same year show the income of this encomienda at 70,000
mrs per year. See above SxT
2 He appears on most of the nominas of Seville salaries
for the 1440s as alcalde de la justicia.
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Garc/a, left a property of olive plantations
and houses, and some other houses in Salteras,
a place of Seville, which is worth more than
200,000 airs. But that this property is not
only his feut also belongs to his brothers and
mother. Furthermore there are some houses
in Seville in the district of Santa Gruz in
which the mother lives which are worth 300,000
mrs.or more. The mother, the said Diego de
hantillan, and another sister of his, also own
grain land in the Vega of Triana but he -does
not know what share of this falls to the said
Diego tie Fantillan, si though he believes that
more than 100,000 mrs of its value could be
his portion; and from his personal effects
and other belongings more than 100,000 mrs.
As far as the said de Santillan
is concerned, he said that he knows that he
inherited property from his father, Doctor
Diego Rodrfguas, which is worth more than
10,000 of the current doblas ... Furthermore
that his properties are worth more than
200,000 tars in personal effects, lands, and
houses and that these properties consist of
olive plantations, houses, and grain land in
Seville; but he does not know^the places
where they are situated
This passage needs little comment• At no point is
it categorically stated that the guarantors are definitely
nobles. Yet the whole impression - horses, arras, land,
silver plate, a black slave in attendance - is one of men
who live nobly and whose living is made in the manner of
nobles. Not all patricians involved in finance were, of
course, so flatteringly described by witnesses. Alvaro
Garanito, reridor of Deon, for example, had characteristics
in common with the Santillan guarantors. The evidence of
witnesses /
1 A.G.,E.M.R.,leg.ll,fols »22R*2 3V.
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witnesses showed that he was the owner of some valuable
houses in the plaaa of San Isidore in Leon worth roughly
150,000 mrs, He also had 'vassals and lands' outside
the town, in Vega de Camera, worth some 300,000 tnrs.
V«t the witnesses at no point said that he lived nobly.
He was merely a regidor with vassals and lands. In hie
case, moreover, there was a peculiar insistence on the
fact that the lands he inherited from his father did not
constitute a mayoraago. Since mayoraagos were usually
the preserve of the nobility the implication was clear •
this regidor had still not managed to acquire the ethos
of nobility.* In the case of the danti1lan guarantors,
however, the point about .aayaragfcos was not even mentioned.
The study of the oligarchies shows that in the towns
patrician families could hope through time to be accepted
into the ranks of the nobility. Financial success,
accompanied by investment in land, could be translated
into acquisitions of hereditary offices, contact with
the court and the nobility, successful marriage alliances,
and even nobility.
Once again, however, it must be stressed that these
patrician families entered the nobility surreptitiously.
Many /
1 See ibid, fols.13K-14V, informscion fcaldana, 6 March
1467. ,
2 Despite the fact that in the case of Diego de Santillan
it was abundantly clear that the lands did not constitute
a mayoraago.
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M&ny of these families had to enter into litigation over
their hidalguia in the sixteenth century. The case of
TjtjucjUnes is interesting* This family belonged to
the patrician oligarchy of <3ere«, founded a sumptuous
private chapel in the church of San Mateo, and owned one
of the finest Jerez houses in the plaza del .hercado.
Forced to pay some taxes by discerning tax officials,
the family had to fight their case in the ^yal audiencia
until they finally gained the necessary judgement, in
1570, which legally backed up their claims to nobility.
The case of the Rjquelmea was not exceptional* Many
families were to find their noble status investigated
both by financial officials and officials of the Inquisi-
:tion *
As a result of pressures from the Crown and j>atri-
:cians, the problems of office and office holding also
began to assume serious proportions. The vast majority
of urban offices passed from father to son along with
other family possessions, even if royal confirma.tion was
2
necessary. Indeed, at the end of the century, when the
officials of the Inquisition confiscated the wealth of
town /
1 ancho, Blstoria. 1,92 cites several families of Jerez
who, like the Kiquelmee, suffered the same indignities,
2 For examples involving the patrician families of
Seville - Medina, Mendoza, helgarejo, Barba • see A,M,S,,
caja 1414-15,no,102; caja 1418-19, 9 Dec,1418; Ibid,
folder 23, doc.4; caja 1445-6, 6 April 1444, Seville
was no exception: see Col»Dip.Carmona.p.31.14 Oct.1471,
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town officials they also claimed to dispose of the office
as well, since they regarded it as part of the accused*6
private patrimony,* The supply of offices, however,
could not keep pace with demand* The hereditary links
of officeholding only broke down occasionally. There
were too few offices available to supply the rewards
which the Crown granted to officials and to meet the
demands of wealthy families excluded from office* The
Crown solved its problem by the simple expedient of
creating new offices * a situation approximating to the
creation and sale of offices, since the reward of an
office can clearly be regarded as a part of the Crown*s
hidden revenue. As a result contemporaries referred to
offices del numero antiguo and the new offices del nomero
2
acrecentado. Royal promises to reduce the number of
3
offices were often taa.de but never carried out. On the
other hand wealthy families could not create offices for
themselves and hence it is not surprising that there are
clear signs that the sale of offices was not uncommon.*
A /
1 Marques, m fim* pp.524*5*
2 See, for example, the royal privilege to Luis de Monsaive
granting him a velntleuatria over and above those already
In existence! A.M.S*,caja l445*6, 28 Feb*1466*
3 The problem was further aggravated when rival factions at
court appointed their own candidates. See, for example,
ibid, caja 1420*1, latter by John II, 31 May 1420, con*
"Firming all officeholders in the royal council, audiencia.
and towns who had gained office cither from Catherine of
Lancaster, or Ferdinand of Antequera, or the royal council.
4 For an example see Mirquex, ubi supra, p.525, note 96.
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A final factor of the fcysten; was the tendency of urban
officials to fona political alliances with the great noble
families of their regions.* All these aspects of the
patronage system of officeholding were appreciated by
the Crown, In the ordinances of Guadalajara of 1436,
for example, John II referred to these problems:-
I order ... that wharever offices of town
government fall vacant through renunciation,
death, or any other cause, they are to re-
:main vacant until the number of offices is
reduced to the number existing at the time
when King Henry my father ... died. Those
who acquire urban offices ... are not to be
accepted into these offices until they swear
... in the council ... to which they are
appointed ... that they did not give, promise,
or intend to give anything for these offices.
Furthermore I order ... that renunciations
of offices are not to be accepted or issued ...
save from father to son and only when it is
according to my pleasure ... the son being fit
for office and this office not exceeding the
old number of offices.
Item. That no regidor live with another
reflidor of the city, town, or place where he
regidori nor is he to hold land, privileges,
or money from him, for if he doer, ho will looe
his office ipso facto.
6)/
1 See below H ir24-^ .
2. B.N, , MS., 13259, fol,186R
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6) The Merchants
i) The Burgos merchants
Burgos provides the best example of a CastilIan town
with a powerful native merchant class. It is true that
in other towns native merchants formed more or less power-
:ful groupings. In Andalusia, especially, the Caatiliana
provided bankers, financiers, and merchants of substance
who played a vital role in international trade.* Indeed,
even the duke of Medina Sidonia and the count of Niebla
had ships trading in regions as far apart as the Canary
Islands and London. Nor should the role of the Jews as
smrchants and financiers be forgotten, as the famous
example of Luis de an tangel and Christopher Columbus
3
illustrates. Yet, however,important In the south, the
native merchants were overshadowed by the Genoese and a
good many of the merchants in the other towns of Castile
were linked to the Burgos merchant class. The bursaleses
moreover, were to be found operating in most of the
important economic centres from Fevi11e to Flanders,
The reasons for the economic predominance of Burgos
are well known. The town was situated on the Santiago
pilgrim /
1 See, for example, the involvement of the Sevillian
Gonzalo Diaz de Rota in trade to Southampton and the
Canary islands: AP.S., i i i .Franc isco ."'inches, fola.5,
18 (Jan.,Feb.,1472).
2 See above % . i5o .
3 Santangel, secretary to Ferdinand, and the Genoese
Francisco Pinelo helped to finance Columbus* first voyage.
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pilgrim route, was tha political 1 capital* of the kingdom,
was at tha centre of comiTiunications to the ports of the
north coast, and was the controlling centre of the wool
export trade. This latter factor was the most important
and led to the rise of native merchants who soon replaced
the foreign merchants who had been attracted to Burgos,
In a very real sense the wool trade was the trad® of
Burgos. FVary year the wool clipped in the bIerra was
collected and exported by the Burgos merchants and their
associates to Flanders, As long as there was a sustained
demand for wool in Flanders, the Burgos merchant* prosper*
Jed,1
By the fif teenth c entury, however, the Burgos mer*
JC'nanta had developed interests in other activities and
they are to be found dealing In all kinds of business from
2
Andalusian olive oil to the royal minting houses. In
Seville, for example, the Burgos men formed the largest
colony of native merchants and, by the second half of the
century, the more powerful Burgos merchants probably had
resident factors there,* In 1489, for example, a Burgos
merchant /
1 M.Basaa Fernanda*, El consulado da Burgos, pp.29*30,85,155*6,
2 See, for example, tha 'transaction involving two Burgos
merchants in A,P.S.,iii, Pedro Garcia, fol.TV (26 March
1489) and the offar, mada by Burgos merchants in the
1440s, to farm the royal mints and produce twice as much
coinage at fixed prices over ten years, ifa A.G.S,,D,de C,,
leg.4,no,56.
3va.
merchant, Juan de ha jera, was acting as lac tor for the
powerful family of the Pardoa and his activity covered
substantial bulk purchases and sales of Andalusian leather,
Malaga almonds, and dye for the cloth Indus try,^ It is
possible that there even existed a conscious rivalry with
the Genoese*
The organisation of the Burgos merchants during the
late middle ages still remains far from clear. After the
union of Aragon and aastiie a consulado was set up in
Burgos, in 1494, on tne pattern of the already existing
consulaaos of ijarcelona and Valencia, Yet the conaulado
created in 1494 was obviously the confirmation, in a new
form, of a merchant guild whicn nad clearly existed for
soum time#"
According to one author the merchant guild of Burgos
may have existed as early as the fourteenth century since
CastiIian merchants, based on Burgos, possensed a guild
3
in £ landers by at least 1336, This attempt to prove
the existence of the Burgos guild by reference to Flemish
documentation has also led to an over conservative estimate
which dates the Burgos guild from 1455,* it is certain
that /
1 See A.P,S,,iii.Anton Ruiz de Torres, fol*7l (16 May 1489),
fol.210 (21 Oct.1489), fol.275 (24 Nov.1489),




that an association of merchants with a prior and consuls
existed in 1447* The religious coalraternity oi mer-
;chant*, wnich later bucaa.e a guild, probably existed at
the beginning oi the century*
The very terminology applied to the association of
Burgos merchants • aremio, ieoublica* hermaadad* col"radia
• showed the strong mixture of merchant guild and religious
confraternity* Its power, however, marked it off from
other artisan ana merchant guilds. in the first place
it was not restricted to ourgoe merchants. in 1455,
following a dispute in I lancers between ourgos and Basque
merchants, henry IV created two 'national' associations of
merchants* The Burgos association covered towns south of
the kbro river and hence merchants from Toledo, tegovia,
boria, u-.etiina del Caapo, Bogrono and other towns could
belong to the Burgos guild* It was understood, of course,
that the term 'merchant* did not include a simple artisan
or retailing merchant but only those dealing in imports and
exports* The relationship of the other towns to Burgos
was not a uiere formality. The activities of the wool
trade ensured that tue relationship was kept in. existence*
Moreover Burgos attracted merchants from other towns since
it also seems to have acted as an economic clearing house
when /
1 Ibid, p.51 where a letter of John II is cited which refers
to the prior and consuls* The names of some of the priors
and consuls, prior to the official creation in 1494, are
known for the years 1453-4,1483,and 1405,
2 Ibid, pp.50,186*
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when the fair of Medina del Campo was not in being.
1
Fro® at least 1447 onwards a prior and two console
existed. No detailed information has been found which
throws light on their powers and jurisdiction, but they
were probably the sane as those established at the end
at the century since reference was then made to pre-exist*
2
sing custom and practice. Certainly these officials had
some powers of mediation and arbitration. In 14E3, for
example, a dispute between two merchants, aver the accounts
of the company which they had formed, was referred to the
%
prior and consuls of the guild for their determination.
From the economic point of view the guild organised
the wool exports. The ordinances of 14')4 clearly stated
that they confirmed the existing practice whereby the
prior and consuls arranged for shipping contracts and
insurance on the north coast and notified the merchants
4
of all the towns concerned of the dates of sailing.
Indeed the very problem of the sailing dates of the nacr-
schant f1 ets necessitated the existence, at an early date,
of an organisation inland which would ensure that the
arrival of wool at the port3 coincided with fleet depar-
slures,
1 Ibid, pp.50-1 and A.C-.S. ,Exp,IIac., leg.2 ,no,96, which
records a wide variety of transactions and bills of ex-
:change, all of which were drawn up in Burgos,
9 R.010 r.4* p,51»
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ii) The Baaque shipper*
The merchants of Burgos and their associates used
the north coast ports for exporting their goods, yet the
northern shippers and merchants never allowed themselves
to be dominated by their hinterland*
Above all the men ol the north coast were shippers
rather than merchants* Society in these northern areas
of the kingdom lived perpetually at subsistence level
and this both had special effects on social structure
and also made this society dependent on trade* Thus
foodstuffs had to be imported from central Castile and
from abroad, and the very dependence on these imports
made it seem natural that the nobility should play a
part in trade.* In return the men of the north coast
could offer fish and iron* Yet trade remained a secon¬
dary activity for the prosperous shippers* Indeed
conditions in the northern areas, from Galicia to
Fuenterrabia, were not conducive to the rise of a mer¬
chant class, There was a lack of a strong urban frame*
swork* Bilbao, the most important commercial centre of
the north, with only some 5,700 inhabltants,could hardly
compare with Toledo or Salamanca* Lack of a market
demand led the northerners to become transporters of
goods rather than merchants whose activities were based
on their awn regions*2
The /
1 Garcia de Cortazar, op.cit..PP.151*3.
2 Ibid. pp*72-3,186* See also above ^
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The shipping tradition was strongest among the
Basques* From an early date shipbuilding and navigation
were stimulated by Bilbao's advantage of possessing a
sheltered port* It was Basque ships which carried Burgos
wool to Flanders and returned with cloth to supply the
Castilian demand at the fairs of Medina del Campo.*
Burgos merchants in effect were using a Basque carrying
trade. From this stage it was perhaps natural that the
Basques, like the By©tons, should become shippers between
areas unconnected with the north coast of Castile, Their
carrying trade is said to have extended from Alexandria
to the North Sea, but the bulk of their carrying trade
was confined to the Atlantic and the western Mediterranean,*
In the Atlantic,the Basques were greatly helped by
the naval predominance which they established as part of
the Castilian contribution to the French alliance during
the Hundred Years War* By the mid-fourteenth century
they were masters of the sea route to Flanders and had
eliminated the Hansa from the Bay of Biscay and the western
4
coast of France* Moreover, despite piracy and naval
warfare, they managed to control a good deal of the Gascon
wine /
1 Garcia de Cortaaar, op,cit,.pp.168-94a Vicens, Manual,
pp,293-4j Smith, op.cit..chap,v.
2 Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit..pp.153,258.
3 A detailed study#of political, diplomatic, and naval
strategy in L.Suarea Fernandez, Navegacion y Comercio
(Madrid,1959).
4 Ibid, chap.viii passim; Garcia de Cortaaar, op.cit..
pp.212-3; Konetzke~*op,cit..PP. 38-9; the text of the
treaty of 1443 in P.Dollinger, La Hanse (Paris,1964).
pp.479*81.
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Gascon wine trade with England and, after diplomatic
blunders by Louis XI in 1463, Basque activity in English
ports increased substantially during the latter half of
the century,1
The Basque carrying trade in the i*editerranean,
though not so well established as in the Atlantic, seems
2
to have gained momentum towards mid-century." As early
as 1403, for example, the Albertini of Florence used a
fleet matriculated in Bilbao for trade with Flanders and
in Seville the Basque presence can be documented through-
3
out the period. Their carrying trade covered Sicily,
Sardinia, Barcelona, Marseilles, and Genoa. For at
least twenty years (1445-65), for example, Basque ships
supplied Genoa with salt from Ibiza and Tortosa, and with
e
wheat from Sicily. The Basques, however, never supp¬
liant ed the Italians on the Mediterranean - Atlantic route
and their appearance in the M«diterranean was partly due
to exceptional circumstances such as the schism, Alfonso
V*s attack on Marseilles, and the economic decline of
Catalonia, By the beginning of the reign of the Catholic
sovereigns, Basque activity in the Mediterranean had de¬
clined /
1 Garcia de Cortazar, op,cit,,pp,188-90.256-9#
2 See J.Heers, *Le commerce des basques en Mediterran^e',
B.IIisp,. Ivi 1(1955)^292-324#
3 See, for example, A#M.S.,caja 1400-1,no,25,requisition
of a Basque ship by the Castilian admiralty, and caja
1471-2,accounts presented by Medina Bidonia,11 Nov,1471,
showing the requisition of Basque ships for war against
the marquis of Cadiz,
4 Garcia de Cortazar, op.cit..PP.104-5.
5 Ibid.,pp.263-4t Heera. G§nas,pp.282.354-6.
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declined and was mainly restricted to Catalonia*
The organisation of the north coast maritime interests
was curious in that it contained widely divergent elements.
Originally confraternities had been organised which in*
'eluded all those who mad© a living from the sea (marean*
{tes)* Thus these cofradlac or hermandadea included
both simple fishermen and sailors as well as the rich
shipbuilders and owners some of whom were also merchants.
At first there was one hermandad in each port which existed
separately from the town council.^ From the late thir*
iteenth century, however, these hermandades began to fuse
together until finally there was one hermandad which
covered the whole north coast from Fuenterrabia to Bayona
3
in Calicia. This hermandad has aptly been compared
with the Hansa, Control naturally fell to the powerful
Basque shippers and, at times, this Castilian Hansa, like
the German Hanea, virtually acted as an independent poll*
Jtical power* This independence, and the identification
of naval power with the carrying trade, can be seen, for
example, in the treaty between Edward HI and the north
coast hermandad in which the Castilian monarchy played no
part.*
1 Heers, ubi supra, passim? Suarea, Navegacion.p.75?
Garcia de dortazar, op.cit..p.264. "
2 Ibid.p. 117? Vicens. inatoria.il. 190*1.
3 The document* of the archivo de protocolos in Seville
do, in fact, show that merchants and shippers came from
places like Fuenterrabia, Castropol, and Motrico as well
as from Bilbao.
4 See Su£rea, Navecacion.pp.14*15j Jf.Maaa Solano, 'Mani¬
festaci ones de la economia montanesa*, in Aportaci<Sn al
estudio ... de la roontaKa. ed. Banco de Santander
Tsantander,19oVJ, pp.180*201•
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The role of the Basques as international shippers
and the existence of a powerful herciandad provided the
means to resist a threat of total domination by the
Burgos merchants* This tension between the merchant
interest of central Castile and the shippers of the north
coast was mainly a struggle between Burgos and Bilbao,
The nature of the problem is best illustrated by reference
to the organisation of Castilian merchants abroad and to
the clash of interests within the kingdom itself.
In several foreign ports Castilian merchants, inc¬
luding Basques, enjoyed special privileges which helped
to differentiate their colonies from those of other
countries,* In hardly any of these ports,however, did
the»e colonies constitute a truly autonosuaus group organi¬
sed as a 'nation*, The groat exception was Bruges which
was the terminal point of Castilian exports of wool. As
early as 1348 the Castilians at Bruges received a statute
which gave them equivalent standing with the K&nsa* By
the fifteenth century the colony at Bruges formed a * nation'
with its own conaulado,^ From the middle of the century,
however /
1 This was true for Nantes, La Rochelle, Rouen, Dieppe,
Marseilles, For these and other ports see Garcia de
Cortaaar, op*cit,,PP,241-4 and relevant references given
there to the studies of Gudrez and Mollat,
2 Suire*, Navegaci6n. pp,15-16j Garcia de Cortasar, op,
cit«.P,2l$« The consulado was legally recognised by
Philip the Good in 1428,
4.06.
however, it was clear that the Castilian •nation* at
Bruges was seriously divided by clashes between Casti1ians
and Basques. In 1455, following a quarrel over the use
of the nation*s chapel and other facilities, Henry IV tried
to solve this problem by forming two distinct communities
at Bruges, Each community was to have four consuls -
representing the * Spanish nation* and *the coast of Spain
and Bjscay' respectively. This division, which in effect
formalized the clash between Burgos and Bilbao, was to
last to the end of the century despite the fact that in
146? the two * nations* were once more theoretically
unified.
The clash at Bruges reflected a similar struggle in
Castile. Prior to 1494 the Bilbao shippers tried to
ensure that all exports from the north coast were carried
in ships belonging to their organisation. As shippers
they also demanded payment of harbour duties (aver{a) and
tried to regulate freight charges. The Burgos merchants
and their associates, on the other hand, wanted to have
control over their own shipping arrangements and tried
to negotiate independently with shippers without reference
to the shipping association. In 1453, for example, the
Burgos /
1 buarea, Havegacion,pp. 120-1 i Gar^a de Cortazar. on.cit..
pp.212-229; Basas, ogi^cU. ,pp,3?, 15 5-61.
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Burgos guild tried to contract separately with the port
of Santander in an attempt to outflank the Bilbao control
over the wool carrying trade to 1 landers* This tension
between shipping and merchant interests continued well
into the sixteenth century* During the reign of the
Catholic sovereigns it became apparent that only a deter*
Jmined effort by the Burgos merchants would prevent a
slow but steady rise in the migration of capital to Bilbao.
It was this and other similar factors which led to the
request in 1494 for the creation of the consulado in
Burgos* This* along with royal irritation with the
north coast Bansa, was the beginning of the end for the
north coast hermandau. although inevitably Bilbao too
2
gained its conaulado shortly niter,in 1515*
iii) The Genoese and the south
As well as the Genoese a wide variety of other
foreign merchants were to be found involved in the economy
of fifteenth century Andalusia* References to individual
merchants from places like Milan* Marseilles* or Piedmont
are scattered over the century* Some 'nations* formed
small /
1 Smith* op.cit*,chap,vj Bases* op.cit.,pp.201-2*
2 See especially Smith op.clt*.pp.41*3 and Garcia de
Cortasar* op.cit.*pp. it;7-87215,
3 See* for example* A.P.S*, iii* i rancisco •' anches* fols.
26,31 (2 and 3 April 1472) J ibid* iv. Pedro Aivarnss*
fol,31QV (18 June 1480).
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Sfoall colonies* Venetians and Florentines are to be
found in Seville,* English and Breton merchants, on
the other hand, were to be found in the seaports of
Sanlucar de Barrameda and Cadiz rather than in economic
centres such as Seville and Jerez* Though suml1 in
numbers, the importance of such groups could be substantial
as the example of the - edici factor, Amerigo Vespucci, was
to show after Columbus* first voyage. The Bretons, too,
played a vital part in the carrying trade of the south
along with the Basques.
Despite the activities of these small groups of
merchants, however, Andalusia in fact tended to be an
economic 'colony* of the Genoese seaborne 'empire*,
Genoese activity in Castile dated from at least the twelfth
century, but did not become really important till the later
middle ages. Towards the end of the thirteenth century
the Genoese helped the Crown to open the straights of
Gibraltar* The * transport revolution' which ensued,
along with Genoa's loss of eastern colonies to the Turks,
led the Genoese to concentrate part of their activities on
Seville, which served as a stage on the route to England
and /
1 The Florentines, however, seem to have preferred working
through intermediaries* See, for example, Heers, Genes,
p.491, which shows the Centurion! acting on behalf of
Florentines, and A*P,S*,iv* Pedro Alvarez, foI,219 (7
Oct,1475) in which Francisco Bonagnise, Florentine mer-
:chant, has his interests represented by the Venetian,
Pedro de Keconte,
2 On the Bretons see M,BatailIon, ubi auura. passim. For
the English see A*P,S,,iv, Pedro Alvarez," fols*364,369 (22
and 25 Aug,1480) and ill* Antdn Kuiz de Forras, fol.l29V
(16 July 1489) which all deal with English merchants
eatantes en la villa de Sanlticar*
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and the Low Countries and also linked up the Genoese to
the Anda1usian economy#*
The centre of Genoese activity in Andalusia, and
indeed the whole of Castile, was Seville where fro® the
reconquest there existed a special Genoese quarter or
barrio de Genova.^ It seems probable that the number
of Genoese in Seville increased substantially during the
3
fifteenth century. Other important centres of Genoese
activity were Cadiz, Puerto de Santa and towns in
the kingdom of Granada.* No accurate assessment of the
numbers of Genoese in Andalusia is at present possible.
Lists of Genoese merchants supplying grain during agrarian
crises, or paying forced loans imposed by the Catholic
sovereigns, give some idea of the numbers of Genoese and
also of the Genoese families concerned, of who® the most
important seem to have been the Spiaola, Centurions,
Usodiraare, 'alvago, Nigro, Pinelll, Crlmaldi, Lomellini,
and Marinls,* Some idea of the strength of the Genoese
colony in fevilie may be obtained by noting that, in the
negotiations for importing grain in 1473, only two Floren¬
tine, two Venetian, and four English merchants were in¬
volved /
1 See J. Heers, 'Let Italians et l'Qrient kediterraneen',
yi.Cong.Hist.Aragon. pp.l65-73j R.Pike,op.clt..pp.1-2;
Y.i enouard, 'Ltimieres nouvallee our les hommes d'affaires
Italians', A.S.S.C.. x(1955),63-78.
2 K.Pjke.op.clt..p.146. note 4j HCers, Genet, p.487.
3 Pike, op.cit.. p.l, estimates that the Genoese population
doubled between 1450-1500.
4 See Keers, G^nes, p.477 and Pancho, Lps Genoveses. passim.
5 Hie selection of these as the most important families is
based purely on the impression given by the documents of
the notarial and municipal archives. For lists of
Genoese see Appendix AA below
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involved compared with thirty-eight Genoese.*
Baaed on Seville and Andalusia, the Genoese never¬
theless maintained contact with the centre of the kingdom.
Their activity in Castile proper remains largely unknown,
yet such evidence as there is suggests that their activity
was not insignificant. Genoese companies certainly
existed in Toledo and Valladolid since bills of exchange
were assigned on them from Seville and even a place like
Coca or Alm&den could attract Genoese interest if the
2
profits were large enough.
The economic activity of the Genoese was wide ranging.
Almost all the trade of the south was largely in their con-
!trol. Thus the imports and exports • cochineal and
orchil, wine, fruit, sugar, grain, olive oil, tunny, soap,
leather, mercury, cloth, slaves, gold and silver - were
part of the Genoese control over the Castilian share of
international trade. The Centurione provide a good
example to illustrate the wide range of interests of the
Genoese merchants. Based principally on Genoa, the
Centurione also had a second base in Seville where the
family saw not only to their own affairs but also under-
i took /
1 Although not contracting to import grain, a further
three Venetians subsequently unloaded cargoes in Seville.
For the list of the Genoese and reference to the source
material see Appendix AA below
2 See, for exan$>ler «eers, Genes, p.491 and A«P.S,,iv.
Pedro Alvarea, fols.244,2*50 127 Nov. and 1 Dec.1475).
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undertook commercial transactions on behalf of Florentines.
North of Seville, the Centurion© were the principal members
of the company which held the monopoly of the mercury at
A1mad en - reflecting a similar position which they held
with respect to the Tolfa alum mines.* They arranged
exports of iron from the Basque provinces, signed commercial
contracts which involved trading in Toledo, Medina del
Campo, and Granada, and had extensive dealings in Cartagena
2
and Valencia. Indeed, trading 1inks like these seem
almost to have generated further ramifications in the
Mediterranean, Africa, and the Atlantic. Christopher
Columbus, after all, worked for the Centurion© in Lisbon
in 1478, and was sent by the Centurion© to purchase sugar
in Madeira where other powerful families, such as the
Lomellini, had helped to revolutionise the island's
3
economy by switching from grain to sugar production.
Vet despite the widely separated areas concerned • the
Canary islands, Cartagena, Malaga, Jeres, A1maden • the
centre /
1 After a period of exploitation by Catalans and by the
Crown itself, the mines at Almaden were farmed out in
1387 to a Genoese consortium, based in Seville and made
up of Simon Doria, Lario Darner, Napoleon Salvago, and
Francisco de la Cheretia, The farm was only for a
period of six years but the Genoese subsequently retained
control throughout this period. See A.Mati1la Tascon,
Hjstoria ... de Almad^n, i . 5-29; rieers, C8nes, p.490.
2 See ibid, pp.49l»4, for the activities of Giovanni
Batista in Seville and the Centurioni ramifications in
tpai n and xiorth Africa.
3 See S.E.Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea (bo®ton,1942),
i.49; fleers, Gjfenes, p.494.
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centre of operations was still located in Seville, Thus,
although Seville was not an important seaport, the Genoese
firms established themselves in Seville and maintained
factors in seaports like Cadia In order to take charge
of their shipments.
The fact that Seville was the centre of Genoese
commercial interests also made it a financial centre of
considerable importance, The banking, exchange, and
trading negotiations all centred round the cathedral in
the Santa Maria district. It was here, in the caile de
las gradas. that the lonja was situated. In many res-
:pec is the lonja - the exchange or meeting place of
merchants * was like the liinlto of Venice, £ach day-
merchants assembled and on completion of a transaction,
instead of money changing hands, reference was made to
the money changers or bankers who were situated near the
lonja. many of them keeping bank in the adjoining street
2
siguificantly known as the calle de Genova.
The proximity of merchants, bankers, and money
changers /
* *bld. P.490,
2 The municipal financial officials used the Calle de
Genova exchange rates for their calculations throughout
The periods A.U.S,,caja 1403*4, no.37, for example,
contains the Calls de Geneva exchange rate for doblas
moriscas. As far as I know there exists no fifteenth
century description of Gradas such as those in six*
j teenth century literature for which see k.Pike, op.cit..
p,29, and Caraude, Carlos V. 1,316*9. "™"
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changers was not merely a matter of convenience for it
seems that the Genoese often indulged in both trade and
banking. The Centurione, for example, owned the largest
bank in Genoa as well as running a vast trading enterprise*
The creation of a private bank, based on a system of
guarantors similar to that used for the farm of roy&l
finances, consequently tended to be an additional enter*
jprise undertaken by the successful merchants,* Trade,
however, in many cases remained the jar imary interest of
the Genoese merchant. But the complications involved in
commercial transactions were often avoided in Seville by
the two contracting parties making a mere oral declaration
of transfer to one of the bankers in the calle de Genova,
On a national and internatiunal level the deposit and
transfer banks of Seville liquidated commercial debts by
written bills of exchange, drawn on corresponding private
banks in other towns or on the fairs of kedina del Carnpo,
In addition to these straightforward commercial trans-
tactions there existed the more sophisticated, but less
important, speculative dealings in bills of exchange which
2
were in themselves profitable commodities, ft would,
of /
1 See especially Heers, Genes. pp.91-3 where the lack of
distinction between trade and banking is emphatically
underlined,
2 See R.Pike, op.cit,«pp.84-5; Beers, Genes. p.491J
Carande, Carlos V. i.316-9. It should be stressed that
very little is known about the r&miiications of this
seemingly simple structure. Virtually nothing, for
example, is known about the corredores de lonja despite
the fact that the corredores figure prominently in the
docuioe n t a 11 on ,
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of course, be wrong to imply that all banking activities
took place in Seville and that the Genoese controlled a
monopoly. Yet it seems to be the case that, from the
fourteenth century onwards, the Genoese gradually took
over the main role in banking from the Jews, owing to
their vast commercial network and their ability to trans¬
fer capital fairly rapidly.* Their activities were not
confined to Seville, yet this city was the centre of their
activities and they continued to play a vital part in the
Spanish expansion of the late fifteenth and sixteenth
2
centuries*
How were the Genoese organised and what privileges
did they enjoy? The answer to these problems is almost
certainly contained in a register in the archive of
Simancas which includes all the privileges granted by
the Castilian kings to the Genoese. Without the data
contained in this register only a fragmentary picture can
3
be pieced together.
The evidence certainly suggests that, from the re-
:conquest of Seville, the Genoese were organised as a
nation /
1 See Carande, *SeviI la, fortales* y mercado*, A.H,P*B..
i1(1925), 293; Sancho, Hlstoria. i*69-?l#
2 R.Pike, op*eft., passim.
3 During my stay at Simancas the register was apparently
unavailable for consultation.
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nation with their own consul eg * At the reconquest they
obtained their own barrio or district, the organization
of which was entrusted to Si or Sey Gallardo, the first
Genoese consul in Seville. Among the privileges given
to them in 1251 were the grant of their own church, the
right of presenting their chaplain to the Archbishop, and
the right to elect two consuls to judga all their own
disputes apart from criminal cases, For the hearing of
these disputes they were given a moaque which remained
the property of Genoa down to the nineteenth century.*
These sane privileges, granted in the thirteenth
century, probably still applied during the fifteenth
2
century. There is certainly no doubt as to the exis¬
tence of Genoese consuls and they probably still dealt
with disputes among the Genoese themselves, as well as
3
representing their interests generally. There is also
evidence /
1 Carle, 'Mercaderes en Castilla*, C.H.B,.xxi-xxii(1954).
p,231; J.Conaalea, he-artjniento do sevilla Uiadrid,
1951), 1,337-41,
2 Hoya 1 statements on these matter© tended to be extre¬
mely vague. However there must have been a need to
confirm privileges at intervals since grants of safe
conduct and protection • see, for example, A.G.S.,
D.de C., leg,4, no,102 - were limited in time,
3 See, for example, A,M»S,,caja 1412-13, no.189 which inc-
: 1udes a payment to mlcer antonio ytaiian consol deloa
Henoveses desta clbria t . '1 The representative nature
of the consuls is well "TTTus trated in thoir resistance
to arbitrary farced loans in 1489 and in their attempt
to share the burden of these loans, once it became clear
that they would have to be paid. Generally, the consuls
are referred to as consuls of the Genoese or consuls of
the Ionja,but not as consuls of the Genoese nation. See
A ,P.S". Ji'i i .Antdn Ruis de Porras, fols.251V-252V, and 283.
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evidence, however, that the Genoese enjoyed special
privileges with respect to all legal disputes falling
outside the competence of the consuls. So, at least,
it appeared to the smaller tax farmers of the archbishop-
:ric of Seville, for they complained about the Genoese
privileges to the Crown. According to them,the Crown
had granted the Genoese the privilege of having all
their cases heard by the royal as is t ente of _ evi11e.
This privilege, as the tax farmers pointed out, had the
effect of lifting all cases involving the Genoese out of
the ordinary courts and into the court of the asis tcnte
who, it was implied, was more than prejudicied in favour
of the Genoese,
The point of the tax farmer's complaint was inevit-
tably about tax avoidance, for
when they [the Genoese] are called before the
ordinary judges on Blatters relating to the
a1cabalas. the said asis tente issues an in*
ihibition on the grounds tint ho has been
entrusted with the cognisance of all their
cases •••
Yet as far as fiscal privileges are concerned, the enjoy*
intent of certain exemptions did not necessarily benefit
the foreign merchant. The Genoese and other foreign mer¬
chants /
1 The complaint is only one of several made by the tax far-
inters: A.G.S,,Exp,Hac.,leg,?., no.207,
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merchants were certainly not normally exempt from the
alcabala tax, which was the one tax which affected them
most as merchants. If they were not naturalised the
Genoese and others were exempt from taxes such as the
2
pedidos and monetias but, as against this privilege, it
must be remembered that the Genoese living in the south
of the kingdom were the obvious choice for demands for
forced loans. In 1489, for example, the Genoese in
Seville alone were faced ri th a demand for a forced loan
3
of 1,000,000 tnrs to help with the Beige of Baza,
iv) The merchant in society and urban government
It is usually accepted that C&atilian. merchants did
not enter the patrician oligarchies and did not exercise
any significant political control over their urban environ-
Jment, Carande makes the point succinctly
He who studies the medieval towns of
Castile to* is surprised by the fact that
the citizens who were enriched by mercantile
and industrial activitiee « the buretteses in
the real sense of the word ~ carried very
little weight in urban government.
The same view is equally applicable to the merchants and the
royal court#
It /
1 See, for example, A,P.S.,iv. Juan Garcia, fol.l39V (14
Jan.1461), receipt by the farmer of alcabalas acknow*
Ilodging full payment of alcabalas by Fellgohalvago,
Genoese merchant,in gold, silver, and precious stones,
2 See, for example, the order of urban officials enforcing
such an exemption in the case of a Piadmontese merchant:
A.M.S,,caj» 1409-10, no,130*
3 See Appendix AA below
4 Carande, Carlos V, i.154.
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It is certainly true that it is hard to find
examples of realdores who were at the same time important
merchants* There are* of course* examples of such men*
Diego de Soria* a powerful Burgos merchant and the man who
presented the petition to the Crown requesting the creation
of a consulado in Burgos* was also a rcgjdor of the town**
In Seville* in the early fifteenth century, the town
council appointed a cloth merchant* Juan Martinez, to the
2
key financial office* Moreover a hard pressed monarchy
did on occasion turn to the merchants for loans and con*
3
J tact with the court was not unknown* Yet the surprising
fact is that such examples are hard to find * even for
economic centres of the importance of Burgos and Seville*
despite the obvious architectural evidence of merchant
prosperity In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*4
Nevertheless the view has been too simply stated and
the problem needs to be examined with greater care* In
the first place there were outstanding exceptions • towns
in which me reliant e did control the oligarchies. In
Bilbao and the other towns of the north coast there seems
to be no doubt that the oligarchies were made up of power*
Jful /
1 Bases, op*cit»*PP.33*107.
2 A*M*S.*caja 1401*2, no.74, order for all accounts to be
submitted to Juan Martina*, appointed mayordomo de lot
propria*.
3 The Crown usually turned to financiers involved in the
royal tax farms rather than to merchants* But see* for
example* A.M*S«,caja 1452*3, royal order of 27 Sept*1444
to Seville to pay 105,000 mrs from Pfdido revenu es to
Tanas* mereadaro florentyn. towards 1,000 doblas qnele
yo devo ei me el presto ... et por clertas joyas que
compre de ciertas pereonas *,* .
3 See* for example. Carande on Burgos in Carlos Vr i.271.
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powerful merchant and shipping families.* In the extreme
south, as Sancho de Sopranis shows, Cadis was to be domin-
Jated by Genoese merchant dynasties who married into the
families of the local oligarchy and ended up in control of
town government as well ae economic life. In both cases,
Bilbao and c£dU, oligarchies existed which were markedly
different from the situation prevailing inland where a
lack of merchant power was the key feature. The expla-
*n&tion of these differences is to be found in the geo¬
graphical location of Bilbao and Cadis and in the pre¬
vailing set of values to which rich merchants aspired.
In Bilbao and other north coast towns,an impoverished rural
nobility aspired to merchant wealth and consequently moved
to the towns to join the ranks of the merchants and ship-
Jpers.^ In Cadis,an impoverished local complex of oli-
:garchical families were suddenly connected to the possi¬
bilities presented by Genoese merchants with international
contactsj throughout the fifteenth century Genoese money
married into local urban office. But elsewhere in the
kingdom,merchants, financiers, and converses aspired to
urban offices which they could only gain by betraying
their background. This was true even of great economic
centres /
1 Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit..p.320.
2 Sancho, Los Genoveses. passim.
3 Garcia de Cortasar, op.cit..p.320.
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centres such as Burgos and Seville, For these towns were
primarily political, administrative, and ecclesiastical
capitals rather than economic capitals. Not unnaturally,
therefore, examples of regjdores who were also merchants
are hard to find. But it is relatively easy to quote
examples of patrician families with distant merchant
backgrounds. In Burgos, for example, both the patrician
families of the Frlas and the Bantamaria were cases of
merchant families who had succeeded in gaining access to
the patrician oligarchy but who had shed their background
in the process,^ The Bantamarla family, indeed, ade¬
quately reflected the status of Burgos as a political and
ecclesiastical capital by not only entering the oligarchy
but also providing some of the most illustrious royal civil
2
servants and ecclesiastics of Castile,
Two further points serve to qualify the view of the
merchants' complete lack of influence in town government.
In the first place,the position could be totally different
as far as some of the lesser urban offices were concerned,
Secondly, it must be remembered that merchants often
became involved in other activities. Thus, at a lower
level /
1 L.Huidobro y Serna, 'La noble familia de las Frias',
. cxxiii(19481,5481 Vic ens, Historla . ii,190,
2 Cant era Burgos, op,cit , , passim,
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level, there could exist an almost total lack of
definition. !f it was rare for a r eg idor to be a <uer-
:ehant, the same was not true of the lower reaches of
public office. Two examples will illustrate this point.
The first example concerns a substantial merchant of
Burgos, £*edro Garcia de Medina, whose position in 1468
displayed a wide variety of activities. His property
and houses in the calle de armas were worth between
70,000 and 100,000 mra, He was a member of the Burgos
guild or cofradfa by virtue of his local and international
dealings in wool and cloth, and had formed a company with
his father-in*law, Pedro Garcia Salon, and others. As
well as being a merchant, however, he was also an
eacrlbano publico del numero in Burgos • that is, one of
the official public notaries, an appointment almost cer*>
•tainly at the disposal of the Burgos oligarchy. In the
past he had been a minor official of urban taxes and had
farmed some of the town's revenues. In 1468 he also
became involved in royal finances as a tax farmer of the
alcabalas and terclas.*
In the same year another inhabitant of Burgos, Pedro
Gonaalea del Castillo, was involved in an equally bewilde-
:ring /
1 All this data in A.G.S,,E.M,R.,leg.ll, fols.117R-118V
which is an enquiry into Garcta's wealth.
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bewildering series of activities. His houses in the fan
lloroan district were estimated to be worth about 120*000
mrs. He owned land in Bunlel* an area south west of
Burgos, for which he received a yearly rent from the
council of Buxiiel of thirty to forty cartas of grain,
estimated to be worth about 90,000 tars. To the east of
the town, in Villayuda, he owned a mill worth about
40,000 mrs ani providing an annual rent of sixty fanenaa
of flour and 1,000 mrs. Within the town, he owned a
tile kiln worth between 40,000 and 50,000 tars.* He had
also invested capital in companies along with other
merchants and was, in 1468, tax farmer of royal revenues
2
in the merlndad of Burgos.
Office holding, tax farming, and landowning were not
3
therefore incompatible with the activities of a merchant.
Indeed it was this very diversity which allowed for social
mobility of an intricate nature. If, for example, the
family connections of Pedro Garcia de Medina are examined,
some curious changes in occupational role emerge. As has
been noted, Pedro Garcia de Medina was in partnership with
his /
1 1 assume that it was a tile kilm 1tiene una tejera donde
fasen vidrlado en bus cagas donde suelen morar quatro o
cinco bascos'*'."
2 Ail this data in A.C.S. , leg. 11, fa!s. 1 m-12GV »
3 Although the two examples quoted refer to Burgos, the
same applied to other towns. Bee, for example, Ibid, fols.
749R-750V for similar data on Gabriel kodriguez and his
son*in*law, Pero Uonzales mellenque, merchants, landowners,
and tax farmers in Seville.
4 The diversity of occupations made it difficult for con*
:temporaries to describe how a man made his living. Pedro
Garcia de Medina, for example, was described as follows!
'blbe ... por traiio de mercaderias et escribano publico
•Jesta dicha cibdad ... et que algunas voces lo ve tcner
cargo de rrentas enla dieha cIbdad aay por fiel queTo
ponen del las coiao por quelos arrlonda*.
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his father-in-law, Pedro Garcia '<alon, who was also a
merchant• The latter*■ brother, however, entered the
royal civil service, made a brilliant career for himself,
and ended hie days as a royal judge in the audiencia of
Valladolid, The Sal4n family, therefore, remained in*
svolved in trade while one of its members entered the
civil service. The ramifications later became even more
complicated. The oidor married into the *civil servant*
family of the Miranda and subsequently links were also
established with the Burgos patrician families of the
^luenda and the Santa Maria, Despite these marriages,
however, some of the descendents of the oidor were still
engaged in large scale trade in the early sixteenth
century,* The very complexity of such relationships
would seem to suggest a high degree of social mobility.
Yet, as far as the transition from merchant, to oligarch,
and finally to nobility is concerned, the process was
2
similar to that for the financiers and the obstacles may
have been greater.
In the first place land was important, Even in
Bilbao /
1 See A#G.S,,E.M,R,,leg,ll,fol*,ll?&-118V and M.Basas, 'Los
Miranda, caercaderes* , B, 1,F,G,. xxxix( I960) ,30-43, Basas
traces the Miranda connections back to Goitaalo Garcia de
Pas talon whose first son was the royal oidor and whose
second son was Pedro Garcia .l a 1 <£n, Since"" the document
and the article both locate the residence of their res-
tpective Pedro Garcias Salon in the calle de armas, 1
have assumed they are one and the same person, ~~~
2 See above |fj>. 3 H—Is"-
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Bilbao the merchant oligarchy retained a double identity
as merchants (or shippers) and landowners. A dispute,in
1501.between Bilbao and its hinterland.over boundaries
and jurisdiction,showed the results of this process. One
of the allegations was that much of the land in dispute
was being claimed by Bilbao precisely because 'rich mer-
:chants' had bought the land from impoverished rural
hidalgos - land which subsequently entered the admini¬
strative area controlled by the Bilbao oligarchy. It
was also subsequently alleged that the Bilbao merchants
had bought the lands and entered them into the adminis«
Jtiative area of Bilbao so that the produce could be im-
(ported into the town without hindrance. As will be
seen, this process of merchant investment in land also
occurred in the south and also, doubtless, in other areas
such as Burgos and Toledo*
There was also, as Sobreques has pointed out, an
almost natural law which attracted the successful mer*
'chant into the world of financiers - those who farmed
the royal and urban revenues and lent money to the Crown
2
and the towns. From this point, the pattern of social
mobility • entry into the urban oligarchy, marriage,
nobility /
1 See Garcia de Cortazar, op.cit.. p*?9» note 130, and
p•320*
2 Vicens, Kistoria. il.190.
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nobility - wui the same at has been indicated for the
financier*#* It seems probable, for example, that
Diego de Soria managed to combine his role a* a merchant
with that of reaidor in Burgos precisely because he had
2
married into the patrician family of the Maluendaa.
There was, however, a difference between the position of
the merchant and the financier# To succeed,the merchant
on the whole had to opt out of trade unless he lived in
an area like Bilbao or Cddis# This was not necessarily
true of the financier# Indeed precisely because this
difference existed it seems probable that merchants
turned to tax farming as a socially acceptable alter*
:native to trade# Ibis process is best illustrated with
reference to the Genoese*
There seems to have been a radical difference between
those Genoese families which settled in Castile and those
which remained strongly linked to Genoa and returned there
after winding up their affairs in Castile* The Franchy
typify the latter kind of Genoese family# They came to
Cadis, stayed several years, built up a network in the
south and in the Canary Islands and then retired to
Genoa* It was a pattern common to many Genoeee families#
These /
1 See above 379-1 "
2 His wife was Catalina de Maluenda# See Bases, op,cit *,
p«33, note 58, and Cantera Burgee, op,ctt..pp.403*4*
The latter work has considerable data on the **aluenda
family#
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These families did not invest their money in land, did
not try to enter urban oligarchies, were content to marry
into other Genoese families, and played no part at all in
urban or royal finances* They remained strictly merchant
families**
Almost the exact opposite seems to have been the
2
case for those Genoese families which settled in Castile*
In the case of Cadis,it was perhaps possible to combine
merchant activity with public office, as happened in the
3
case of the Negro family* Elsewhere the Genoese fami*
:lies turned from trade completely, made suitable marriages,
acquired public offices and land, and at times participated
in the royal financial administration** Some of the
Spinola /
1 See Sancho, Los Genoveses, p.15.
2 Almost all the successful examples concern the Genoese
but the exceptional cases are also interesting. The
Florentine Fantoni, for example, married into the
Vi1lavicencios of Cadiz and the mother of the celebrated
Mateo Alem&n, author of Guaa&n do Ajfarache. was a
Florentine, married to a cowverso*
3 The Negro for long enjoyed the favour of tho Medinaceli
whom they served as factors and alcaides in Puerto de
Santa Maria, Subsequently they marriecT into the Spinola
family, invested in land, but were nevertheless active
in the sugar trade during the late fifteenth century.
Sancho. Los Genevoses, p.12; A.D.fct..Cog,* leg.14,doc.52.
account s~for 1^5-87"
4 Pike1s assertion, op.cit..p*19. that the Genoese steered
clear from the roya1 f1nances must be qualified with
respect to those Genoese who were in the process of
settling in Castile* From Gaspar Cibon, Seviilian tax
collector in 1381, to Benito Castell6n, treasurer of
cabalas in 1501, the documents bear witness to
occ asi ana 1 (Genoese involvement in financial administra-
:tion. For these examples see A.M.S,,caja 1381*2, no.3j
A,P.S.,xv. Bernal Gonzales, fol,267*
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Spinola family settled in Castile and provide a good
example* Ague tin de Spinola was a regidor of Jerez,
held office at court, and entered the military order of
Santiago where he was given the encoaalenda of Almendralejo.
He and his family owned considerable land round Jerez and
even inanaged to found a mayoraago, In other cases, such
as that of the Jaccaria in Jerez, the male line died out
and the social and economic power, gained originally
through trade, passed to an indigenous oligarchical
family with no merchant background,*
The contrast between the Genoese merchant and the
Genoese settled in Castile can best be seen in terms of
entry into the urban oligarchy. As has been noted,
Seville was the centre of Genoese commercial operations
in the south of the kingdoms yet not one Genoese merchant
seems to have gained a place in the Seville oligarchy
during the century. On the other hand.it is possible
to find examples of Genoese in the oligarchy who had
completely ceased to participate in trade. Micer Solagrus
Bocanegra, for example, was a rea idor of Seville and also
held high royal office being at different times, tesorero
utayojc /
1 For the Spinola see bancho, Los Genoveses. pp.11-12,
Nobility was clearly implied by holding the post of
regie!or, founding a mayorazgo, and gaining an encomienda.
For further examples see ibid and &,Pike, op.cit,,pp.3-4,
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mayor del rev, tesorero mayor da la came.ra, and teeorero
mayor de la guerra.* He wa« only one member of a family
other members of which were also to be found holding public
office, money fiefs (tierra) and royal mereodea.4*
7) Jews and Converses
In this section an attempt will be made to focus on
those aspects of Jewish and ccmverso life which had far-
reaching effects on the political and social disruptions
of the kingdom during the fifteenth century. The aspects
to be studied are the degree of social mobility achieved
by conversos, and the degree to which Jews and conversoa
participated in royal and urban financial administration.
It must be noted, however, that the stressing of these
particular aspects tends to distort the general aspects
of Jewish and converso problems and,consequently, some
discussion of these general aspects is necessary in order
to provide a relevant framework.
I) The growth of converses in the towns
It has been calculated that at the expulsion there
were some 30.000 Jewish families in Castile forming about
1-H-f. /
1 See A.M.S.,caja 1404-5. no.93, 28 Oct.l403| caja 1414-15,
no.101j A.M.J,.Actae Caps, year 1410,fols.73V-74V,96V,103Vj
B.N.,MS,,13031,fol.41,16 Feb,1407.
2 See, for example, A.M.5.,caja 1400-1,nos.14,15,72,74 which
show that Luis Bocanegra was a ragidor of Seville, held the
office of mayprdoiao hidalgo, and received payments of
lierra from the Crown.
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of the total population,* A careful use of tax
assessments makes possible an analysis of the areas of
settlement (Table XXVI J,*1 The main qualification to the
use of these assessments is that calculations based on
them do not relate directly to the else of the Jewish
aljama s but refer, instead, to the variable and connected
fac tors of aixe and wealth. The number of Jewish settle*
Jments listed in these tax assessments is quite astonishing.
Even on a large scale map it is impossible to make a full
entry of all the relevant areas.
The main features of the pattern of Jewish settle*
Jments can be seen by comparing the data in Table XXVI
with the corresponding map* There can be no doubt that
the greatest density of population and wealth was in the
northern areas of the kingdom. The Jewish tax assessors
grouped the various Jewish communities into broad areas
3
which more or less corresponded to diocesan boundaries.
Bearing in mind the variation in the sises of these areas,
it is quite clear that the bishopric of Palencia was the
most densely settled area. In 1464, for example, 14,03f«
of /
1 Y.Baer, A history of the Jews in Ghrlstlan Spain (Phi 1ad•
jelphia 1966), i,520*11, note 13 and ii,246. (Hereafter
cited as Baer, History).
2 See Appendix BB below .p. t, z3 and map fe> .
3 There were obvious exceptions. For example, the tax
assessors included the archbishopric of Santiago within
the area which they designated as the bishopric of Leon
and Astorga,
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of the total assessment for the whole kingdom corresponded
to the bishopric of Valencia, compared to 13,46ft lor the
huge archdiocese of Toledo and only 11* 9ft Ior the Extre-
imadura and Andalusia regions which were easily eight
times the siae of the Valencia diocese. The areas of
least wealth and numbers also emerge clearly. The Basque
provinces hardly contained any Jewish population. Only
Vitoria and Valuta soda had Jewish communities, There are
signs of Jewish activity in Bilbao during the fifteenth
century but there are no signs of a settlement there. The
north western part of the kingdom also had a meagre Jewish
population. Leon had never been an important Jewish
centre and Compos tela was not even listed in the tax assess*
:merits, although there is evidence that a few Jewish fami¬
lies appeared there in the fifteenth century.^
Of greater importance, however, are the results which
emerge from examining the proportional importance of the
assessments for each individual Jewish aljama. There can
be no doubt that the size and wealth of the Jewish coawrai-
{nities in the most important towns of the kingdom had
suffered a drastic decline by the fifteenth century. In
the /
1 See Garcia de Cortaaar, op.clt.«p.298l A, Rodriguez
Herrero. Valuta seda en al siiilo xv (Bilbao, 1947). passl
Baer, History. 1.1911 documents cited in Appendix BB^ \>4z3
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the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the great centres
of C&stilian Jewry were to be found in the large towns »
Seville, Toledo, Burgos, Segovia, and Valladolid,* The
fifteenth century tax assessments clearly show a sharp
decline in the importance of some of these areas. In
1464, for example, the assessment on the Jews living in
Burgos only formed 0,11% of the total assessment for the
kingdom, Palencia's assessment stood at 0,33%, Toledo
at 0,79%, Seville 0,56%, and Cordoba at 0,22%, Only
Segovia and Avila retained part of their former importance
with assessments of 2,44% and 1,22% respectively. On the
other hand, small towns and even villages obviously con-
•'tained Jewish com unities of substantial size and wealth
- Herrera and Osorno at 1,07%, i'tayorga 1*22%, Ponferrada
1,16%, Maqueda 1,11%, Guadalajara 1,79%, Bejar and Hervas
2,22%, Medellfn 1,69%, Cacores 1,27%^ Segura de Leon
2
1,74%, and Jeres de los Caballeros at 2,07%, As per*
:cent ages, the variations between the large towns like
Toledo and the sm&l 1 communitias like Segura de Le<Sn do
not appear very significant* But it must be remembered
that the «*ew8 in Burgos and Toledo now formed a very small
minority /
1 Baer, Ljgtory.i,192.
2 These percentages are calculated from the detailed
reuartimieato for 1464 in A.G.S..R.M.R.,1 es .13 (Anticuo
ieg.^'^rrrToi ios ,
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minority in relation to the total urban population, whereas
in the small towns the Jewish communities could form as
much as a third or even a half of the total population.
Why had this change in demographic era,-ha a is happened?
The main reason is to be found in the effects of
successive waves of violent anti-Jewish movements which
swept the large Castilian towns from the late fourteenth
century onwards. These had the effect of either expelling
Jewish families into the smaller towns and villages of the
2
kingdom or making them turn to conversion. The violent
outbursts all over the kingdom in 1391 were in this res-
Jpect a turning point - especially in the large towns.
The demographic evidence which has been cited is,in fact,
merely a confirmation of evidence to be gleaned from
other documentation. In ' evil 1e,the synagogues were con*
Jverted into churches and the Jewish quarter as such vir¬
tually disappeared,^ In Toledo and Burgos,the Jewish
communities suffered catastrophically from the anti-Jewish
outbursts t
1 Most Jewish communities probably did not surpass fifty
families. The evidence supports the assumption that Jews
received better protection in the lordshipe of the Church
and the nobility. In general the assessments, referred
to in Appendix BR, show that Jewish coramunitie« were
stronger in the lands of the nobility, Cee also Baer,
History, i,I99 and ii,246-7,
2 r",Cantera, 'La juderia do Calahorra*, Sef , ,xv{ 1955),
365-6, suggests that warfare may alao have played an
important role. Contemporaries, of course, were aware of
the more startling demographic changes, bee, for example,
F.Daer, Die Juden im christlichen Spanlent Urkunden nnd
ilexes ten iBeriin, *936)«11,260, (Cerealter'cited 'as 'Baer.
Die Judon,)
3 History. i i, 96-71 Amador de los Hlos, Hi storia
gg£AgJU^S?j[I*.£? E-giAAla£»jS«JgS-.J**4*.<>* tMadrid,1960),
PP»461,477,478; Baer, Die Juden.li.234-5.
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outbursts* Even in Segovia the Jewish population in
1
1460 was only half the sise it had been in 1390*
The events of 1391 made their greatest impression on
the large towns. In many cases, however, the drop in the
Jewish population was accompanied by a corresponding in-
icrease in the number of converses.whose numbers by the
second half of the fifteenth century ran into tens of
thousands* Thus, although the flourishing Jewish centre
in Seville virtually disappeared in 1391# fiscal data from
the beginssing of the sixteenth century shows that devil le
contained the largest community of con.arsos in the king-
idom.
it was in fact the large towns which on the whole pro*
Jvided the scene for the explosive events during the cen-
itury. The anti-Jewish movements of 1391 had been moti*
!vat eel by hatred of Jewish worldly success as well as by
religion. It will be seen in the following discussion that
conversion, which seemed temporarily to solve the religious
tension, only opened more opportunities to the converted
Jew in terms of finance, tax administration, and office
holding /
1 Daer, History, 1*420,note 5, ii,97-8,486,note 4j Baer,
Die Julian,"1i.272. Avila's Jewish population may have
retained its strong position by escaping the excesses
of 1391i P.Leon Tello, 'La juderia de Aviia*, Sof.xxiii
(1963),37-8.
2 C.Guill&n, ' Un padr^n de converses sevillanos'# B.njgp*.
lxv(1963)# 61j baer, History.ii. 98,246,271.
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holding. While the great numbers of Jews existing in
the small townships and villages of the kingdom should
not be totally disregarded, attention will be focussed
on analysing those aspects of Jewish and converso life
in the large towns which so often fused together into
social and political explosions*
ii) The Jews and the law* iioyal protection
The Jew did not belong to any one of the three
estates of society as envisaged by the law. Instead,
the Jew • whether he was rich or poor, rabbi or artisan
• formed part of a community which was distinct from the
rest of society. To a large extent the Jewish community
or al jaraa in any particular city, town, or village was
distinctive and separately located because the Jewish
style of life required a considerable degree of communal
organisation in order to provide for synagogues, kosher
food, and Jewish courts and education**
On the whole the laws of Castile did not attempt to
govern the internal life and organisation of the Jewish
2
a1 jamas* Instead the laws attempted to regulate the
problematical /
1 H,3einart, 'Hispano-Jewish society', J.W,H,.xi(1968).
221,226-7,
2 See Baer, Jie Juden.ii.249-51 for an example of royal
intervention to protect Jewish autonomy a^inst
Christian encroachment*
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problematicai relationships between Christian and Jews
by placing restrictions on the latter, These laws were
frequently ignored, altered, and renewed,depending on
the circumstances at any given period of time. The
essential restrictions, however, remained in theory un«
sal tared and enforceable. The main points in the laws
drawn up in 1412 under the influence of Vincent Ferrer,
for example, appeared in much the same form in the
1
Sentonela of medina del Campo in 1465, The "Jews were
confined to separate quarters or districts in all towns
and villages. The law required that at all times they
should wear special signs of idcntification on their
clothes and that their dress should be modest, hot only
were Jews supposed to live in their own quarters but the
laws attempted to prevent social intercourse as much as
possible. The laws attempted to prevent Christians from
working for Jews, Restrictions on the economic activi¬
ties and careers open to Jews were carefully laid down
by the laws, Jews were barred from careers in royal and
urban government. They were not allowed by law to farm
taxes. In theory they could not practice medicine and
Christians /
1 The severe restrictions of 1412 were later relaxed. For
the text of the laws and notes on them see Raer, Die
Juden.11,263-72, For a general discussion of the laws,
B&er, history,ii,167*9; Amador de los Bios, op.cit..
pp,533-7, Relevant sections of the sentencla of 146S
in C.D.R.A.H..431-40 (cix,1465).
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Christians were forbidden to seek treatment from Jewish
physicians. Inevitably, also, the laws dealt at length
with the problems of usury and sexual relationships
between Jews and Christians,
The Jewish communities inC&stile were regarded as
being under royal protection and there can be no doubt
that, for most of the century, the monarchy attempted
not on ly to afford this protection but also to relax the
rigours of the legal restrictions on Jews as far as
practical day to day matters were concerned. The con-
teem of the monarchy roay have been partly prompted by a
fear that persecution of Jews would lead to a decline in
royal income a .id a lack of financial technocrats, Henry
III, for example, levied stiff financial penalties on the
towns, after the violent anti-Jewish movements of 1391. in
order to make up for lasses to royal revenues as well as
£
to prevent furttusr violence, Yet many other measures
seem to have been pr crap ted by a real desire to promote
harmony between the two corwriunities. The co-operation
between the influential. Abraham Bienvonis t&, Alvaro de Luna,
and /
1 See, for example, the brief but excellent study by J,
Torres loot eg, Log Judios murcianos (Murcia,1965), passim,
2 The accounts of Seville, for exarapl®, contain much docu¬
mentation down to the fiscal year 1410-11 concerning the
fine of 135,500 doblas ahich Henry III imposed on the
town as a penalty for the massacres of 1391, In the
end a royal pardon was obtained through the offices of
Nicolas liar tines, re a idor and contactor mayor de cuentag.
See, for example, A.M.£,,caja 1401 -2,no",ii>j '" caja 1402-3,
nos,2,3; caja 1403-4,no,5j caja 1404-5,nos,5,30,32,37,9?J
caja 1409-10,no,67j caja 1410-11,no,129,
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ana John 11, for example, resulted in measures which, for
a coiisiderable period of time, seemed to promise a resto¬
ration of the Jewish communities to their former position
before the violent ciestructi job of 1391. Almost immediately
after the end of John ii's minority audi Catherine of
Lancaster's death, the royal council, in September 1418,
suspended the severe laws of 141s and in effect decided
that only one of the restrictions on Jews should be
observed in practice - namely the requirement that Jews
1
should wear special signs of identification, Thun in
2
14 32 Abraham iiienveniate, as court rabbi and with the
support of the monarchy, attempted to link the Jewish
aj jamas into one organisation for the whole kingdom, A
meeting of the representatives of the Jewish communities
met in Yalladolid and drew up statutes dealing with the
internal life of the aljamas of Castile, Civil and
criminal cases involving Jews, for example, were not only
to be tried under Jewish law a*td in local, autonomous
courts, but appeals were to lie to Abraham 3ieavaniste and
any judges he might appoint. This protection and aa-
;couragement on the part of tee monarchy helped to mitigate
tins /
1 Torres Fontes, Los Judios murci&noa, pp.7,28-9. In
1437 John II reaffirmed the decisions of 1418 and in
1443 he vitiated a papal attempt to reintroduce the
full force of the laws of 1412. Baer, Die Juden.ii.
302-3j Amador de ioa aIos, op*cit.,pp,57&-9.992-5,
2 On the court rabbi see below y>n.
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the worst effects of the persecutions of 1391** It is
also clear that for considerable periods of time conditions
at the local level also reflected a spirit of toleration.
The Jewish aljama did tend to be a separate quarter within
the town, yet this did not prevent some Jews living in
other districts of the town or Christians from living
2
within the Jewish quarters. Outside the towns the
dif ferences between Jews and Christians were even less
marked. Shortly after the waves of urban anti-semitisra
in 1391. for example, documents from the lands of the
aonastery of San Salvador de Ofta applied the courtesy
title of 'don* to Jews and described them as escuderos.
thus in practice assigning them a status equivalent to
that section of Christian society which was clearly a cut
3
above the majority of the third estate. Yet, despite
the fact that Henry IV attempted to continue a policy of
protection and toleration, the great increase in popular
anti-semi tic persecution during the second half of the
fifteenth century nullified the benefits to be derived
from the monarchy*s policies.
iii) /
1 For a detailed discussion see Baer, History, ii.259*70.
2 Baer, Die Juden.il.303.
3 A.lJ.N.7STero>Perg8,,carp.317,doc8.l5 and 17, 6 April 1392,
4 See below " and 1 WaY 1392.
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iii) Occupations of the Jews. The Jews and finance
The majority of Jews in the towns were artisans,
shopkeepers, or small scale merchants, * Many Jews in
the big towns like Toledo and <*eres also worked lands on
the outskirts of the town* In some areas of the country*
iiide and in some of the smaller towns, the Jews worked
and owned a considerable number of vineyards and arable
and pasture lands* In Hits and Buitrago* for example,
there were some fifty or sixty Jewish house and land*
:owners at the time of the expulsion. In Haro, in 1453,
the Jews had apparently established themselves so well
as landowners that they not only leased lands to Christian
or Moslem tenants but also aroused the jealousy of the
Christian authorities who decided to forbid further sales
2
of lands to Jews or Moslems.
No Jews gained offices in the urban oligarchies of
fifteenth century Castile and hardly any gained royal
offices. Yet, despite legal limitations on their acti*
Jvities, some Jews gained positions of great influence
in society because of their learning and skills. The
expertise which Jews displayed in medicine, for example,
resulted in their being granted an almost official status
as /
1 See in general Baer, His torv. i.197*8.ii,247; Beinart,
ubi supra, pp.224*5; Amador de los Kios, op.cit..p.478;
Baer, Die Judan.ii.247*6.304.
2 Baer, History, 1,197,200*1,ii.247; ancho, Historia,
iii.58*91 Baer, Die Juden. ii.247*8,256,278*9,32^-7.
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as surgeons and physicians, despite the more stringent
laws which prohibited Jews from practicing medicine
among the Christians. Many towns, such as Burgos and
Villalon, retained the services of Jewish physicians who
were paid an annual salary by the town council.* Indeed,
the council of a large town like Murcia not only paid
salaries to such physicians but also granted medical
licences to Jewish candidates who applied for and success*
2
tfully passed a 'public* examination. Not surprisingly
the nobility and monarchy also made use of the services
of Jewish physicians* The archbishop of Toledo. Pedro
Tenorio. entrusted his health to Jewish physicians as
did at various times the duke of Arjona. the Countess
dona Juana Pimentel. the marquis of Santiliana, the duke
of Cu4llar. and the count of Alba. All the kings of
Castile during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
had their own personal Jewish physicians, from Abraham
Aben tarsal in John X*s reign down to .Rabbi Yuje Aben
.Santo and his son. Rabbi Abraham Lubel, in Henry IV*s
reign.4
It /
1 Santera, Alva.r Garcia, pp.37*9; R.C.V*.Actas de Vilialo'n.
B, fols.l6R*22V.
2 Torres Pontes, Los Judios ciurcianos* pp. 19*21,32-3.
3 These examples from Baerloie Juden,i1*242*3.251.309.325.
329$ Baor, History*li*1161Amador de los Rios, QP.cit**
pp.457*8.
4 See examples in Baer, Die Juden.i1*309*321*2i Baer.
History* ii,118,250; Amador de los R(os, op.clt,.PP.458.
49$, ' "'Not all the royal physicians were, of course, Jews.
A good many, some of them converses, are listed in A.G.S.,
Q.de C,, leg. l.nos. 12,80,93,H0t 36^328,333,338, 340, 367.
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It was in finance, however, that the Jews made
their real mark in society* Viewed from the local or
regional level it is clear that the Jewish financiers
involved themselves in all the fiscal ramifications of
the urban, seigneurial, and royal financial administra¬
tions* In Seville, during the late fourteenth century,
Jews were prominent in the farming of the urban revenues
and in Jerez, in the late fifteenth century, the town
council even attempted to protect the Jewish tax farmers
from the Inquisition. In Murcia, Jews were prominent
amongst those tax collectors appointed by the town council
to take charge of royal revenues within the town until
royal tax farms had been properly established,^ The
nobility also found the Jews useful as tax farmers and
collectors. In 1433, for example, the tax collector of
the lands of the ^edinaceli region was don Samuel Abenxuxen
and* over fifty years later, the same area was being farmed
out by the duke of Medinaceli to Rabista Carri 1 lo of
Aliaaean and Rabbi Mosen Aben Simon of Siguenxa,3 Sirai-
:larly it was a Jew, Mosseh Garfati, who was the chief
financial official of the duke of Bejar during the period
1455-1462 and Jews were prominent in farming the alcabalas
and. /
1 Baer, Die Juden,ii,235-6} Sancho.Bis toria.i.44-5*
2 Tor res Font es, Los Judjos murcianos^pp. 16-17, gives
data for 1427-9, 1437^9? and 1443^52.
3 A,D*M*,Med«,leg*40,doc*57,accounts of 1433 and ibid,
leg*50, doc.7, farm conditions for 1489. "
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and other taxes of the town of Fl&sencla which lay in
the duke's lordship,*
A useful and general view of the activities of the
Jewish financiers and tax farmers is provided by surviving
registers of royal revenues. The register for 1440, for
example, gives data on the royal taxes, the tax farmers,
the tax collectors, and the guarantors who supported the
successful bids for the tax farms. This evidence makes
it possible to make a complete list of the Jews involved
in the royal finances in this particular year,"" The list
contains the names of families which, without exaggeration,
may be described as dynasties of tax farmers and collect*
:ors * the Abenamias, Abenxuxen, Abudaran, Baquex,
Bienveniste, c^abaco, Levi, Leyva, and Nasji, The Levis,
for example, are to be found involved in the royal
finances from don Yu^af el Levi, tax farmer of the
albaqufaa in Henry Ill's reign, down to Yu^af Levi, tax
3
collector In the bishopric of Osrna in 1470, By at least
1429 the t^abacos of Herrera became involved with the
royal finances and, in 1447*8, Salamon Cabaco was still
4
acting as a guarantor for other tax farmers. Indeed
it /
1 Baer, Die Juden,ii.323-4 and Amador de loe Kjfos, op.cit.,
p,625,note 1, where other examples are given,
2 See Appendix CC below8 .
3 The examples cited in A.M.J.,caja 12,no.2, de orden 33,
1403 r.nd A„G.S.,Exp,Hac,,leg.l,no,195»1470.
4 These examples in A.C.S,,leg,1,fols,196K*2l4V
and fa Is.329K-330R.
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It is tempting to argue, on the evidence of the royal
financial accounts, that there was an oligarchy of
extended families of Jewish farmers and financiers. Such
an argument is convincing when, for example, the various
family relationships of the Bienveniste emerge from the
documentation,^ In other cases, however, some of the
surnames, such as Cohen, were so common that it is iia-
ipossible to assume that ties of kinship operated to any
significant degree, Moreover there were particular in-
."dividual s, like don Abraham Senear and .Rabbi Yu^e Aben
Santo, who did not spring from families with an apparent
tax farming tradition and yet played an extremely impor»
:tant role in royal finances. The involvement of parti-
scular families in the royal finances could also be of
short duration or could vary in intensity. The register
of 1440, therefore, does not contain the names of such
individuals or of other important Jewish families. The
Aben Arroyos, for example, although not mentioned in the
register of 1440, were at various times involved in the
royal finances from the reign of Henry 111 right through
to the reign of Henry IY.* The members of the Timon
family /
1 The documentation on the guarantors of the tax farms
usually gives the family ties, if any, between Jews
with the same surname. Cantera, Alvar Garc/a,p,54,
note 48, argues that the Bienveniste were also related
to the kevi of Burgos, A detailed study of these
connections would throw much light on the Jewish finan-
: ciers,
2 See, for example, A.G.S.,leg.1,fol,76 for £uieman
Aben Arroyo, tax collector in Calicia for Henry 111 and
ibid. leg,11,fols,6V,105K-107R, for Syeiuel Aben Arroyo
and"his son, Yu§uf, tax farmers of the alcabalas of
Allendebro and Guiptfacoa for Henry IV,
444.
family, on the other hand, only seem to have intervened
in the royal finances during the 1450s.*
How important were the Jews to the royal finances? In
Baer's view the Jews controlled *about two*thirds of the
indirect taxes and customs within the country, on the
frontier and at the ports'. Moreover a 'network of
Jewish tax-farmers and collectors was spread over the
entire kingdom' and there was 'a Jewish tax-farmer general',
don Abraliara Dienveniste, who also held the post of king's
2 ,
treasurer. Certain aspects of Baer's view need to be
modified* The importance of don Abraham Bienvenis te' s
position in the royal financial administration has been
exaggerated. It is certainly true that he was one of
the two tax farmers general of the alcabalas and tercias
in 1440. Tax farmer®, however, competed for the tax
farms and it would be wrong to assume that Jewish tax
farmers always succeeded in gaining control of the general
3
or global farms. Moreover, the ;e general or global
farms were, according to the administrative practice of
the period, sub-farmed into smaller units which were
acquired by Christians as well as Jews. These points
also throw doubt on the view that the Jews controlled two
thirds /
1 For their activities as tax farmers during the years
1447-50 see A.G.S,,leg,1,fol.319R* ibid leg.7,
no.5,fol,2Rj ibid, leg.6,no.8,fole.5V-6V,
2 Baer, History,il.250-1.
3 Abraham Bienveniste's exceptional position in 1440
may be guaged by comparing it with other periods in
which he was a tax farmer general. In 1431, for
example, he was only one of fourteen tax farmers general
of the global farm of the alcabalas and tercias and in
1434 only one of seven in a similar global farm, A.G.S.,
leg.l,fol.262R,265R,
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thirds of the taxes mentioned, since the evidence for
this view ia too limited in time to make the generalisation
valid for the period a® a whole. In fact, the evidence
1
still has to bo subjected to a statistical survey.
Finally the statement that Abraham Bienveniste was John II*s
treasurer is misleading. The documents show that Abraham
Bienveniste was, for a time, the treasurer of the albaqu/as.
This was a minor post and cannot be equated to that of
the royal treasurer or extended to apply to the whole of
2
John II's reign. There is, in short, a tendency to
exaggerate the success of the Jews, In fact the finane*
»lal acumen of the Jews has to be balanced by their re¬
lative failure to win acceptance into the worlds of the
urban oligarchies and the royal court*
The vast majority of the Jewish financiers and tax
farmers lived in the towns. In this sense the evidence
certainly supports Baer's emphasis on the network of
Jewish tax farmers and collectors which spread over the
kingdom. Indeed, the very number of these men may well
explain the lack of a Jewish merchant class of the same
calibre as the Burgos or Genoese merchants. Rarely do
the /
1 Daer based his view mainly on the evidence of the 1439
register. My impression of the registers of 1439 and
1440 is that the Jews may have controlled just under
half the tax farms. In general the documentation
suggests that the late 1420s and the late 1430e were
partic\tJarly successful periods for the Jewish tax
farmers - an impression which coincides with political
event s,
2 There were many tesoreros in the financial administra-
:tion none of whom were regarded as being as important
as the chief officials of the contadur(as.
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the documents provide evidence of Jewish merchanta who
rose above the level of the urban retailer** un this
point, indeed, the evidence given to royal financial
officials as to the general reliability of the guarantors
and tax farmers was surprisingly meagre. In March 1463,
for example, a witness gave evidence about three guarantors
one of whom was don Yu^uf Cre^iente, inhabitant of
Aguilar. Apart from stating that don Yu^uf made hie
living by farming revenues, the witness merely added that
he has some large houses of residence in
Aguilar and two other pairs of houses which
provide him with income, all these houses
being worth more than 70,000 tors.*
The meagre information provided by such evidence may
reflect the fact that the Jewish financiers did not diver*
Jsify their activities or that royal officials were will*
:ing to accept a minimum of evidence for financiers whose
expertise was in itself a substantial guarantee. It
seems more probable, however, that the role of the Jews
as money changers, money lenders, and tax farmers neces¬
sitated the accumulation of liquid capital and that this
tendency was reinforced by the desire to possess wealth in
a form which could be easily hidden or transported during
periods /
1 A fact which is reflected in the almost complete absense
of a discussion on this subject in the otherwise detailed
works of Amador de los Rios, Baer, and Cantera.
2 A,G,5,,Exp,Hac,,leg,2,no,188, evidence presented to the
contadores taavores. 29 March 1463*
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periods of pe rsedition.* Within the towns, the Jewish
financiers were indispensable to the efficient running
of urban and royal finances. Town councils* indeed* had
causa to be grateful for the loans which Jews provided at
2
times when hard cash was desperately needed* Yet there
are no examples of Jews gaining access to urban offices
or to the urban oligarchies* Indeed* because of his
identification with loans and taxes* the Jewish financier
lived within a society many of whose members hated him.
There were several factors which helped the richest
Jewish financiers to gain access to court circles* The
very extent to which the Jews farmed the royal revenues
made the richer tax farmers acceptable at the royal court,
Moreover these individuals displayed remarkable admini-
istr&tive talents and the monarchy relied on them to a
surprising extent. In 1429 and 1430, for example* the
naval and military supplies and payments necessary for
the Castilian resistance of an Invasion from Aragon were
organized largely by Jewish financiers, such as don Yupaf
el N&s$i and don Abraham Bienveniste, who were outstanding
for their administrative ability. The fact was that
these /
1 fancho* Historia.iij*61-2i Torres Fontas* Los Judlos
laurcianos .p.18. """
2 TKT3ews of Hircia, for example* siade loans of 10*000
mrs three times to the town during the period 1445-53 and,
in !4cP} the Jews of Villaldn lent the town 20*000 Bars,
Torres Fontes, Los Judioa inureianos. pp. 16-19i ii.C.V.'*
Acta® de Vi 11 a 16n^B.fo 1 s.zSk,32V*
3 The accounts for these operations in A.G.S**L,M.R.*
leg. 1, fols . 10311-10611,196R-214V*
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these Jews could link financial techniques and capital
to a thorough grasp of the workings of the royal finances.
They could not only use bills of exchange like the Genoese
merchant but could also appreciate the weaknesses of the
royal administration and suggest remarkable reforms«*
The Jewish financier could advance money and recoup by
farming the royal revenues. In 1429# for example# don
Abraham Bienveniste lent John II 150,000 mrs which were
urgently needed to pay the troops stationed on the Aragon-
2
ieae frontier* Similarly, in 1466,don Abraham Senear
advanced badly needed cash to Henry IV and recouped his
loan from the farm of the servjcio and montazgo revenues.
In a very real sense the learned and rich Jews who
gained access to the royal court were regarded by both
the Jev/E and the Christians as being the representatives
of the Jewish communities. In many ways the internal
life of the 3.1 jamas was autonomous, but it was obviously
in the interest of the monarchy to ensure that the Jewish
leaders were subject to royal influence. For this reason
the Castilian monarchy appointed a court rabbi who acted
as a judge in appeals involving Jews and as a spokesman
and /
1 Sec# for example# the recorded bills of exchange in
A.G«S*,Lxp.Hac,,leg,2,no,96 and the far reaching reforms
of the financial administration proposed by Frofet el
Kasci to the royal council in B,N.,MS,#19698 ,
2 A »G,S. - C.il,R.,leg.l,fol. 105V,
3 Ibid, leg,11* fols,457Pv-458R,747h-748V,
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and leader for the Jewish comrnunit les. The court rabbi
was not necessarily en ordained rabbi, but he was a
public figure of great wealth or learning who enjoyed
the trust of the king, He was also Important from the
fiscal point of view In that it was he who apportioned
the annual tax burden which the Jewish com;.unities had to
pay to the king. The ajonarchy, therefore, not only
encouraged the centralisation of the life of Castilian
Jewry under royal influence, but also ensured that the
Jewish leaders wouId themselves see to the administration
asid collection of the royal taxes on Jews, The indivi¬
duals who held the post of court rabbi were men who re-
spreaented the two traditions of learning and finance,
Don Mayr Alguacex, court rabbi in Henry Ill's reign, and
hlaestre Shem&ya, court rabbi in Henry IV*• reign, were
both royal physicians, Don Abraham Bienveniste, court
rabbi in John Il'e reign, and don Abraham Seneor, court
rabbi towards the end of Henry IV* s reign, were both men
who were outstanding as financiers and tax farmers,* Even
when the post of court rabbi lapsed for a short time after
don /
1 See Baer, History,ii,259*70,314-6, For examples of
Abraham Seneor's involvement in the most diverse tax
farms during the period 1466-74 see A.G.S.,leg,
11, fols,7V, 457H-458V and Exp.Hac.,leg.1,no.213.
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don Abraham Bienvonis te* r death in 1450, the eonanittee
of five Jews which apportioned the taxation among the
Jewish communities reflected the same unique blend of
learning, financial skill, and royal favour# In effect
the cored t tee was made up of Rabbi Yu^uf Aben Santo,
philosopher and physician to the king, Yu^uf Bienveniste,
son of don Abraham, and three other distinguished finan*
: ciers and tax farmers, ^ag i^apanton, Frayme Abenxuxen,
i 1
and Macs tre Tiiaon#
iv) Conversion
^ome Jews became Christiana because of a genuine
religious conversion. The conversion of Solomon Halevi
of Burgos and his family serves as an example, for the
members of this family, under their Christian name of
Santa Maria, were to produce outstanding churchmen of
2
great learning and religious conviction# Many Jews,
however, became Christians under duress. Fear of per-
isecution led to a tide of conversions in which religious
conviction hardly played a part# After the violent out¬
bursts against Jews in 1391, the large towns of Castile
witnessed /
1 For the repart jmiento of 1450 see Ibjd, l-.M.R#, leg# 1,
fols.3m*320?7 Baer, Die Juden,il#320. note 1, con¬
ic! udes that Rabbi Yucuf Aben i anto was none other than
the philosopher Joseph Ibn Shemtob#
2 Cantera Burgos, op.cit.# passim; baer, History#il#
139-41.
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witnessed a decline in the numbers of the Jewish popular
;tion and a sharp rise in the numbers of the converaos.
A desire to escape persecution, however, was not
the only motive behind the large number of conversions.
Legally the Jew was barred from almost all offices and
professions in Church and state. The same was not true
for the converso. The impediments and limitations im-
:posed on the Jew by law were based on religious and not
racial grounds. Hence, as John II* s secretary pointed
out. all honours and dignities were open to the converso
since sacred baptism and its efficacy makes the
baptized a new man. cleanses him. cancels any
obligation of at tenement, and eliminates blame
and sin ... To maintain the contrary would be
obvious heresy •.•'
John II's secretary, Fernan Diaz de Toledo, himself a
converso. was only expressing the view that was contained
in the laws. Conversion to Christianity opened the
doors to public office. Many Jews availed themselves of
the opportunities provided by conversion while retaining
their beliefs in their former faith.
Inevitably the religious sincerity of the converses
2
came to be doubted. Words ascribed to Pedro de la
Gavalleria illuminate the suspicions and motives that
surrounded /
1 See the Instruccion del Itelator printed by P.Manuel
Alonso in his edition of'the Defensorlum Unitatls
Christianae. p.345.
2 Baer. HjstSrv. ii.155,274-5.
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surrounded the conversions of Jews to Christianity:*
Could I, as a Jew, ever have risen higher
than a r&bbinacal post? But now, see, I
am one oI the chief councillors (jurado)
of the city* For the sake of the little
man who was hanged (Jesus), I am accorded
every honor, and I issue orders and decrees
to the whole city of Saragossa* Who
hinders me • if 1 choose • from fasting on
Tom Kippur and.keeping your festivals and
all the rest?
The success of the converses: the qonverao In
urban government, roval government, and the
Chu££h
The converses were remarkably successful in carving
out careers for themselves in spheres prohibited to Jews*
The extent of converso success is hard to measure precisely
because conversion and success tended to obscure Jewish
origins, Yet,even if the discussion is restricted to
definite examples^ a convincing picture emerges of converso
entry into key public offices*
The success of the conversos in gaining entry into
the urban oligarchies was so marked that contemporaries
were inclined to believe in widespread corruption and
2
deliberate and concerted conspiracies. The examples of
the /
1 Cited, ibid*i1.276*7*
2 See the excellent article by F*Marques Villanueva,
*Conversos y cargos concejiles en el siglo xv", R«A*B*M..
lxili(1957),503-40*
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the converse families of the Marmolejos and the Martinez,
who gained access to the patrician oligarchy in Seville,
have already been considered in detail** These were not
exceptional cases* In Seville there were at least a good
half doaen converse families in the patriciate • the
Roelas, Ceron, Las Casas, Ortiz, and Vaequez de Moscoso,
as well as the !viarmol e jos and Martfnez. The same
pattern of converse Infiltration and • in some cases -
predominance, applied to other major towns of the king-
:dom. Burgos was controlled by a converso family network
which included the Santa Maria, the Maluendas, and the
3
Cartagenas, For a long period of time, Segovia was con-
strolled by the converso family of the Arias whose success
was largely due to the influence of Diego Arias de Avila,
Henary IV1 s contador mayor, secretary, and favourite*
Subsequently, when the political fortunes of the Arias
declined, Segovia passed into the control of the converso
mavordoiao. Andres de Cabrera, and his converso allies*
In Toledo and Cordoba the conversoa were so successful
that their expulsion fro® office became one of the chief
aims of revolutionary movements within the towns* In
Cordoba /
1 See above ~%-
2 Other convcreo families on the edges of the oligarchy
were Baez, Fusa'n, Aleman, Bernal, Franco, Sisbon,
3 M&rquez, ubi supra, p.510,
4 Ibid, pp.419-20.
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Cordoba they were credited with having ail public offices
at their disposal,* In Toledo, in 1449, Pedro Farmiento
specifically named all the converse officeholders who were
2
to be expelled from office. Zn 1467, however, the
converses again counted powerful officeholders in their
ranks when trouble once more reached the point of explo-
ision.^ Not until the Inquisition began a systematic
purge of urban oligarchies did the conversos fall from
power in the Castilian towns.
It has already been noted that many regidores were
involved in the farms of the royal revenues.* Not sur*
tprisingly many of such regidores were conversos. Yet the
conversos played a much more significant role in the
royal financial administration by gaining offices at
court* If the Jew could not apply his financial skills
directly at court the converso could,and the period saw
conversos firmly entrenched in chief financial offices.
From Juan Sanchez do Sevilla in Henry 111*6 reign down to
Diego Arias de Avila in Henry IV*s reign, conversos are
5
to be found holding office as contadores mayores. The
contadores /
1 Ibid, p.518.
2 See the list of fourteen conver>Q£Officeholders in
r arraiento* s Sentencla printed itn Defensorjum Unltatis
Christianas. ed. Manuel Alonso, p.3<>3.
3 Baer. History. ii,303*4.
4 See the disastrous effects on the municipal finances of
Seville caused by the first attack by the Inquisition on
converses in J.de Mat a Carriaso, 'La Inquire icion y las
rentes de Sevilla*, in Hpmena je a Don itamon Carande,
ii.95*112 j see also above'Vp^'tvV?"**
5 For data on two other converso contadores mayorea •
Diego Conz&lez de Toledo and fernin Lo'pez de aldana •
see below^.WS"?-4i,i"Z4In general see C9 Espejo, * El leones
Fernand Alfon de Robres*, B.S.E.C..iii( 13)7*8). 170*5.
177-84; Baer, Hi story.il.282*3.
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contadorea mavores were the most important financial
officials and they wielded considerable administrative
and political power. Yet the royal secretaries were
more powerful and here too the converses were remarkably
successful, Coaversos such as Ferndn Diaz de Toledo.
Juan Gonzalez Pintado, Alvar Gomez, Diego Romero and
Diego Arias de Avila were, as secretaries, the most im¬
portant civil servants in the royal bureaucracy. Often
their importance was such that they held various offices
as well as being the close confidants of the king. Both
Fernan Diaz de Toledo and Diego Arias de Avila, for
example, were members of the royal council and held im¬
portant offices in thejudiciary and in financial admini-
* stration.
Some conversos made brilliant careers for themselves
in the Church. The conyergo families who controlled the
town of Burgos, for example, also produced bishops and
administrators of the calibre of Pablo de Santa Maria,
bishop of Burgos, Alfonso de Cartagena, bishop of Burgos,
Juan Ortega de ^aluenda, bishop of Coria, and Gonzalo
Garcia de Santa ^arla, bishop of Plasencia, Diego Arias
de Avila's son, Juan Arias, was made bishop of Segovia and
thus /
1 A detailed study of the careers of these secretaries
would show that they wielded power and influence to an
extent usually ascribed only to sixteenth century sec-
ire taries «
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thus confirmed his family's control in Segovia and his
father'® influence at court.* At a lower level the
influence of the conversos was just as pronounced. Un-
:like Diego Arias de Avila, Feman Diaz de Toledo did not
have a bishop in his family, Yet;when he wrote his
*nstruccion in defence of the conversos he could address
■ - ■
it to his friend, the bishop of Cuenca, and he could end
his missive by offering the services of his cousin, the
2
archdeacon of Niebla.
It is clear that many conversos were conspicuously
successful in their chosen careers. More important,
however, was the degree of assimilation into Christian
society which made it difficult to determine who was
descended from Jewish or converso families, Zt was
this successful assimilation of the converao that Fernan
Diaz de Toledo presented so cogently in his Ins truce ion;*
For who knows who are descended from them
Cthe Jews and conversos]? In our own times
there was the reverend father don Pablo,
bishop of Durgos, of beloved memory, the
king's chief chancellor and a member of his
council. His grandchildren, great grand*
.'children, nephews, and other descendants
are to be found today in the lineages of
the Manriques, Mendozas, hojas, Saravias,
Pestines, Luxanes, Solis, Mirandas,
Osorios, Salcedos, and other lineages and
families. Indeed some of these descendants
are /
1 For these and other examples see Tarsicio, &1eccion.
p.218; Claros Varones, pp.125*33; Garci i anchea.
pp.43-4,
2 lnstrucci<5n del relator, ubi supra, p.356.
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are great grandchildren of Juan Hurtado de
Mendoza, the king's mayordomo mayor, and of
the marshal, Diego Fernandez de Cordoba,
nephew of the greatest in the kingdom*
Similarly there is the example of Juan
synches de Sevilla who was of this race
(i.e. a converso) and was the king's
contador**iiaayor* Today his grandsons and
great grandsons belong to the Aravjo,
Porras, Valdes, Anaya, Gcampo, onroy,
Soils de Sosaf Vi1laquiran, Bobadilla,
and other lineages* Nor will it be any
easier to trace such distinctions among
those who will be aliye a hundred years from
now. Does Juan *%nuel de Lando worry because
he is the grandson of Francisco Fernandas
Mamolejo who was a converso and contador
mayor of the king and whose descendants today
provide many of the r» gidores and cabal leros
and officials of the town of""Seville?" The"*
same applies to the grandsons and great
grandchildren of Diego Ranches de Valladolid,
the king's contador mayor de cuentas; some
of them belong to the Santisteban* Motipon,
Bernaldez, and other lineages and families*
Similarly the grandchildren of my cousin and
lord* Alfonso Alvares* belong to the Sandoval*
Carrillos, Cervantes* Alarcon* Viello* and
other lineages and families* Moreover what
about the grandchildren of Doc tor Franco?
Some of them are in the Avellaneda family
and others belong to the Cueilar and Fenaloza*
Some of my grandchildren belong to the
Barrionuevo* Sotomayor* and Mendosa* and are
descended from Juan Hurt&do de Mendoza the
elder* the king's mayordomo mayor, who was
their great great grandfather. I could fill
up many pages with more examples.** *
8) The Change of Atmospheret Intolerance and Racialism.
The picture presented by Fernan dI&z de Toledo is




all the nobility had converao relatives and ancestors.*
Two problems seem to arise from such a picture of swift
and sure assimilation, In the first place how was this
assimilation effected and, secondly, was the assimilation
as successful as John II*s secretary suggests?
An answer to these questions may be obtained by
looking at a detailed example such as that of the converso.
Diego Gonzales de Toledo, contador mayor de cuentas to
John II. This was the maii! whom Feraan Diaz de Toledo
calls Doctor Franco and whose descendants, according to
the royal secretary, belonged to the *Avellaneda family
/ 2
and others belong to the Cuellar and ^onaloaa', The
example of Diego Gonzalez and his family reveals that
Fernan Dxaz de T>ledo*s arguments are accurate but that
they represent something considerably less than a corn*
tplete picture. In fact, as far as social status is
concerned, an examination of the evidence concerning
this family produces the impression of a social kaleidos-
tcope in which the indications of status change constantly.
In the first place it is clear that the family re¬
gained some of the characteristics of the Jewish tax
farmer. Diego Gonzalez de Toledo was never himself a
tax /
1 He does, in fact, go on to prove this point at consider-
table length.
2 See the passage just quoted.
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tax farmer but his brother, Pero Franco, remained an
1
important tax farmer down to 1437. It is true that
Pero Franco, with Alvaro de Luna's favour, became trea-
2
{surer of the royal mint at Toledo, Yet the back-
{ground of tax farming remained - and tax farming was
incompatible with nobility and also, perhaps, served as
a reminder of a Jewish background.
On the whole, however, Diego Gonzales de Toledo him-
sself emerges as a royal bureaucrat of the first calibre.
He was one of Alvaro de Luna's j;en, rose to the top of
the civil service after a purge in 1429 in which he
played an active part, and was an extremely able admini-
3
Sstrator, He was, for example, one of the few officials
who were responsible for an important reform of the
contadurfa mayor de cuantas, was a member of the king's
council, an oidor and was entrusted at various times with
4
diplomatic negotiations. He was, in short, absolutely
at home in the world of the upper bureaucracy. When,
for example, he emancipated his two sons from paternal
control /
1 In 1431 he was one of the tax farmers of the global
farm of the alcabalas and tercias. in 1435 of the
monedas, and in 1434*7 of the alcabalas and tercias:
A.C.S.,L.m.A,,leg.1,f ola,241V ,262k,265R,
2 He is referred to as teaorero as early as 1429t ibid,
fol,101h. The Kef,Balconero, p,167 attributes the
appointment to Luna,
3 See ibid, p.96.
4 For the reforms of the contadurfa see D,N,,MS,13259,
fols,365V-369V, 2 July 1437j for examples of his work
in the royal council, A,G,S, , leg, 1, fol ,265ii and
leg,2,no,17,fol,3Kj for examples of his diplomatic
work, Puares, Los Trastataar&s.pp, 107,126 and Suarez
Fernandez, helaciones entre Portugal y Gas tilla (Madrid,
1960),pp.l87720?U
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control, he did so in the presence of his friends who,
as oidores of the audiencia. were the chief judges of
the kingdom. Not surprisingly one of his daughters,
»iaria de Toledo, was married off to Juan Velasquez de
Cueliar, oidor of the audiencia and alcalde mayor of the
prineess.* The Cu6llar family, to whom Fenian o/aa de
Toledo refers, may subsequently have acquired noble
status but this marriage was clearly an alliance between
two civil service families.
Diego Gonzalez de Toledo, however, was successful
in acquiring some of the characteristics of nobility for
his family. Faithfulyservice to the Crown was rewarded
by a royal licence granting Diego Gonzalez the rather
2
aristocratic privilege of founding mayorazgos» Moreover,
when the contador mayor de cuentas did proceed to found
mayorazgos for hie sons, it is clear that he disposed of
considerable landed wealth - sufficient in any case to
bestow lordships on his eons.^ A family with land,
mayoraaaos and lordships was respectable enough to marry
into genuine nobility. In fact,at the time when Diego
Gonzalez founded his tuayoraznos ;ono of his daughters,
Teresa, was already married to the nobleman, Diego de
Avellaneda.* /
1 Data on the emancipat ion of his sons in 1441 and 1442
and on his daughter's marriage are contained in a docu¬
ment of thirty folios which also irecords the foundation
of mayorazgOSi A.G.S.,D,de C,,leg.38,doc•16.
2 Ibid. The licence was granted on the 2 June 1441.
3 Ibid. The mayorazgoa were nettled in Toledo on 28 Feb.
1441. Though the younger son received lordships, the
document make® it clear that his inheritance would be
primarily urban property in Toledo.
4 Ibid. She was to receive 3,500 gold florins and 275,000
mrs.
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Avell&neda, The latter, though not a member of the
great nobility, was one of the young r.obles in the house-
ihold of Alvaro de Luna.* Vdien Luna became master of
Santiago, Avellaneda was given one of the encomiendaa of
the order. Both the contador mayor de cuentag and the
cocaendador of Santiago were, therefore, the clients of
Alvaro de Luna and the marriage was one based on common
interests and attitudes, Yet, from another point of
view, the marriage was between the daughter of a converso
2
and a Christian knight who was a persona de buen linaje.
The successful career of the father and the advantageous
marriages of the children may have done much to obscure
the Jewish origins of the contador mayor's family. Years
later, however, the converso and urban aspects of the
family background were to reassert themselves with a
vengeance. In 1443 Diego Gonzalez founded mayorazgos
for his sons and, as has been seen, these mayoraggos
included lordships, Also included, however, were the
town houses belonging to the family - casas mayores in
the Santa ^ar£a and banto Tome' districts of Toledo and
3
in the San Salvador district of Val1adolid, Not aur-
:prisingly /
1 See, for example. Kef.Hale,,pp.65-6,
2 Gion,Lima, p.410: «£jl'qual. nor jpierto. era un noblecabalI'ero de la: Orde'n de Santiago, e tenTa ueft buena
encomlenda" que "el Tta.ee tre su aegor le"avla dado, g era
persona de bu'en linaje*,
3 A.G.S.,D,de C,,leg,36,doc•16,
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surprisingly, therefore, the younger son • el llcenciado
Alfonso Franco «• became a re p. idor of Toledo. Hereofhen,
was another successful case of a convcrso entering the
ranks of the oligarchy. This success, however, was paid
for dearly. In 1467 Alfonso Franco, 1icenciado and
regidor, joined his fellow conversos in the street fight-
ting which took place in Toledo* He was captured. The
count of Cifuentes and the alcalde mayor of Toledo, Fero
L'opea de Ayaia, tried to protect him, even if only by
putting him in prison. The mobs, however, demanded his
person, dragged him out of prison and butchered him*
He was killed because he was identified as a converse
and, more especially, as a successful converao.
The death of Alfonso Franco at the hands of the
Toledo mob is a reminder that Fernan Diaz de Toledo's
view of the assimilation of the conversos was too opti.nis
stic# The impediments and limitations imposed on the
Jew by law may have been based purely on religious ground
legally conversion may have removed all these limitations
In fact, the hatred of the conversos and their success
grew into racial hatred. As early as 1449 the idea was
being /
1 On these events see Benito Kuano, Toledo,pp.96-100 and
C.P.ft.A.H.. 545-51(cxlv,17 Aug.l467TI The mobs had
already butchered the brothers La Torre, coavorso
regidores.
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being propagated that the pure blood of the old Castilian
j
Christians was being defiieci by those of the Jewish race.
This anti-semitic propaganda did not fail to receive an
enthusiastic reception among the urban populations of
2
Castile for reasons which will be examined later. For
the moment it is enough to note the hatred of the converso
and his success. The following satire, written at the
time of jJero Sarraiento's revolutioii in Toledo, depicts a
society in which the hated cuoverao has become so success*
:ful that Christians petition John II in order to be made
conversos
King John by the grace of God Because
you, John, told us and complained bitterly
that you were born into the race of the stale
and rancid - that is to any, the old and
genteel Christians; moreover because you
were born an old Christian and have not been
able to prosper or practise artful, subtle,
swindling and wicked tricks M« such as are
practised by those who are legitimately of
the Hebrew race • that is to say* marranos "*
who have multiplied because of our sinsj
for these reasons you have asked and petitioned
us to use our clemency and pity and order that
you be legitimised and given permission to be
a marrano so that you can use the tricks, arts,
deceits, and frauds which the marranos use •••
We understand that this petition is just
since, otherwise, you would not be able to
live among them without being continually
cheated by them. Moreover other subjects of
our /
1 See the quotation which follows.
2 See below VfkIT-foV
3 This ugly term may, perhaps, be best translated as
•Jewish swine'.
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our kingdoms have petitioned ue and requested
this satne favour* Therefore we agree and
condescend to grant your petition and request*
Accordingly by this present letter we
legitimise you and hold you to be legitimised
so that* from now on and for all your life*
you will be a taarrano and in your works and
activities you will appear to have been born
to the out rranos and brought up by them* We
give you licence and authority and empower
you ... to use any subtleties* tricks* fawning
devices* swindles and other similar arts of
the kind that all those of the marrano race
practise ••• Moreover* if In the'future you
should live with some lord or lords* we
authorise you to cheat them fearlessly and
shamelessly and lead them to understand that
money is worth a lot so that they become
avaricious ano are thrown into confusion and
the workers and those who manage to make a
meagre living will be lost and will not earn
their subsistence** Furthermore these lords
will pay no heed - because of their avarice •
to legal sanctions or to the advice which a
former king gave to his eons* This king
advised his sons to remember that they should
never make any of the pharisees treasurers of
their treasures* aayordomos of their finances*
or councillors of their councils* The reason
for this was that those of the Hebrew race*
Biarrauoa. pharisees* and sadducees, were ami
are people who beguiled their masters with
unnatural and pernicious desires* Moreover
they were and are people who helped themselves
from the wealth of their lords to whatever
was necessary for their malpractices and arts*
All these things would be the cause of making
noble lords fall into the disgrace of poverty
and into the hatred of their peoples* It
would not be strange that those of this race
should do these and other similar things since
they arranged the death of our Lord and Re¬
deemer* Jesus Christ* their true creator -
and this without any reason and despite the
many /
1 The economic ruin of the nobility and people was increase
:in&ly blamed on Jews and conversos« Tor a discussion
of the importance of the economic background see below
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many blessings and privileges which he had
bestowed on them , Furthermore it is our
pleasure and wish that from now on the de-
tvlce of your arms shall be an altar to
Santa "'aria and the fleur-de-lis. We also
authorise you to practise usury and lend
money at interest without any fear of legal
sanctions. We authorise you to prepare the
house of the Torah, worship images, marry
your relatives, and hold the opinions and
malicious intentions which are held by the
marranos. For they do not believe in what
Holy 'Mother Church believes and preaches.
They do not believe the contents of the
credo which we sing and which is truly our
faith• Instead the said marranog hold and
affirm - against the truth -that there.is
no after-life but only birth and death,1
We also authorise you to keep the Sabbath
and work on bunday and on the other feast
days which the Church orders to be observed.
You can keep the Saturday Sabbaths to such
an extent that you cannot be obliged to do
any work on any of them. The night before
the Sabbath you are to leave the candles and
their holders clean and prepared, the house
swept, the dishes and knives washed, ail
other necessary items prepared, and stew
cooked on the Friday for consumption on the
Saturday - just as is the custom of all those
of the race of the marranoe. Moreover by
this present letter we order all the Said
marranos or any one of them to receive you
'in their councils, meetings, and assemblies.
You are to attain and gain, by means of any
kind of deception, flattery, and trick, any
royal office such as an alcaldia or regjroleato
or juraderia or eacribanla ptfbTTca 30 that,
by virtue of the "caid offices", you can enjoy
the wealth and revenues of the city, town,
or place where you have gained office,
cheating the old genteel Christians with
subtle and deceiving words and setting them
to murdering one another. also authorize
you and your offspring to become priests with
cure /
1 This attack on the converses' lack of religious conviction
was particularly relevant to the blase conversos at court.
See Baer, Hjstory. ii.274,
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cure of souls by fraud and cunning so that,
by listening to the confessions of the old
and genteel Christians, you can learn their
secret sins* H© also authorize you and
your offspring to become chemists, physicians,
and surgeons. Thus, by pretext of curing
and attending to the illnesses of any old
Christian, you will be able to work for and
procure the death of the old Christians and
lessen their numbers. This you will do in
the manner of the aarranos. who do this be-
:cause of hatred and enmity and also because
they wish to marry the wives of the old
Christians, whom they kill in order to acquire
their goods and wealth and in order to defile
am dirty their pure blood. Moreover you can
attempt to acquire the offices of those who
pass on from this life as a result of your
diligent ministrations - all this so that those
of the Hebrew race and marranos can attain
office ... Furthermore you and your offspring
can learn Hebrew knowledge in the synagogue
of the Jews or in any other place where they
teach or read this wisdom. You can also
arrange your funeral according to Jewish
custom and can accompany the bodies of
Jews to their burials and there demonstrate
your grief according to their custom. After
demonstrating your sorrow and participating
in J cwish ceremonies, you can eat those foods
which the Jews and roarranos eat, sitting down
with them on the floor as is their custom.
He authorize you to attend the feast days of
the Jews and iiarranos and drink the wine of
the benediction. Furthermore you can enter
into churches and other sacred places without
any devotion and, instead of a book, of de-
svofcions or a psalter, you can carry a tax
register of the alcabalas which you have farmed,
pretending as is the custom of the marranog
that you are praying the penitent ial "'psalms ,
By this present letter we a1:o wish to use in
this case our own will, certain knowledge and
absolute royal power in order to dispense you
from any penalty in this world relating, to
false oaths, lies, and falsehoods • all of
which you may use in order to cheat the old
Christians and advance your own interests and
those /
467
those of your relatives , *• *»e also authorize
you to assume the surname of any lineage which
you may choose. In this way you will escape
the name of your marrano forebears and, by
using an accepted Christian name, you can
defraud people while still using your Jewish^
name in secret, as the other rorraaos do » *,
This satirical letter dated from the same year as
Pero Sarmiento's Sentencia which attempted to deprive
*iie conversos from holding public office in Toledo* The
Sentuncia did not attempt to deal with the problem on
religious grounds. The solution envisaged by the beaten-
*cia was brutally simple - the converso remained a Jew
despite his conversion and should therefore be barred
2
from holding any public office. The solution put for¬
ward in 1449 by *ero Larmiento was, therefore* a racial
solution and as such became the precedent for a whole
3
series of later measures. The tolerance of the first
half of the fifteenth century was giving way to an in¬
creasingly bitter racialism in the large towns.
1 I have made this translation from my notes of a Castilian
version in the biblioteca nacional, Apparently the docu¬
ment has, however* been printed by H»Pflaum in kevua dea
Etudes Juives, lxxxvi (1928)
2 See £,Benito Ruano, 'La "Sentencia-Estatuto" de Pero





THE KING AND HIS SUBJECTS
The pttrpoti of this chapter is to analyse the
structure of politics in terms of the social and economic
problems which have been examined in previous chapters*
It is not my purpose to argue that fifteenth century
Gastiliana saw political problems in terms of rising
prices and declining or fixed incomes. The political
issues were seen in political or constitutional terms
and men fashioned their arguments with a vocabulary which
included few economic concepts* Yet political issues
and clashes were indirectly conditioned by social and
economic problems and the chief protagonists were well
aware of their own problems of income*
1) Constitutional Issues
Constitutional issues still await a detailed examina-
:tion,but historians have naturally chosen the conflict
between Crown and nobility to provide the principal
element of continuity in their chronological accounts of
2
the period* Accordingly,the political history of the
period /
1 Learned men were recruited to fashion political arguments*
&ee, for example, Mem*Pivs.Hags.. pp.114-5.
2 For a chronological summary see below Appendix GG,p,£j1.
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period Is explained in terms of a growth in royal power
which provoked a noble reaction aiming to restrict this
power* A brief examination of the •royalist* view of
kingship and the programmes of the nobility will help to
clarify the nature of the constitutional issues*
i) Royal abaolutiem
Jn fifteenth century Castile there were certain
prevalent and widely accepted ideas about kingship* In
the first place the laws* from the gjete Partidaa onwards,
emphasised the king*a position as the head of the corpus
2
myaticum. The sacerdotal nature of kingship was also
stressed by the laws and by the monarchs* Both John XI
and Henry IV continued to remind recalcitrant subjects
that justice was entrusted to the king by Cod and that
3
the king was Cod * s vicar on earth* Both kings often
acted *as king and sovereign lord not recognising a
superior in temporal matters*** Even the opponents and
critics /
1 Benito huano, Toledo* p.147 hesitates to use the word
•absolutism* on the jgrounds that it is usually applied
to different historical periods* This seems to me an
odd argument in the light of some of the literature on
absolutism* See* for example* K.H.Jones* The royal
policy of Richard II* Absolutism in the later mjLddle
ages (Oxford*1968)"*and F.Hartung and iUMousnier* *Quel-
sques problames concernant la monarchie absolue** X*Cona.
Int.di Scienae Storlche (dome*1955),iv,3-55,
2 See* for example* the acts of the cortes of Olmedo in
1445 which are discussed belowtyv^-^.
3 See, for example, John II's comments to Alvaro de Luna's
widow* C»0»K*A*!i. * 70-1 (xxxvi i ,22 May 1453).
4 See, for example* A,0*M**Vill*,leg*4* doc.19, John II's
confirmation of a taavorasgo. 22 April 1422* Henry IV'b
letter to Taul II in C.D.R.A.H.,498 (cxxiv*14 July 1465)
suggests that at one time he may have considered recog-
:nixing the superiority of the pope*
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critics of the monarchy accepted the views concerning the
divine origin of royal power and the king's position as
God's lieutenant on earth.*
From the second decade of the fifteenth century,
however, the monarchy clearly attempted to establish
2
absolute royal power* The king not only acted 'as
king and sovereign lord not recognising a superior in
temporal matters* but also by virtue *of my own wish,
certain knowledge and absolute royal power* (de mi propio
motu e elerta clencia e poderio real absoluto)• The
frequent and constant use of the ppderfo real absoluto
only serves to emphasise that there was a continuity of
purpose and a deliberate royal policy* The sources for
the ideas involved in the use of the absolute royal power
still remain to be studied*^
What did the absolute royal power entail? Maravall
has given a definition of it based on the testament of
Isabel la.
It is a power which is essentially above human
or positive law and thus carries with it the
power to make laws, to accord exemption from
all or a part of them, and to revise them
"aunoue en si contengan que no se pueden
revocar" ("even though they'"'contain a p'roviiion
that they may not be repealed")*'4
Thie /
1 See below Appendix FF., V\>'f>Ws*3
2 Isolated examples of the use of the absolute royal power
certainly pre-dated 1420 • see, for example, Garcia de
Valdeavellano, is toria de las Instituciones, p.427 and
A.D.M,,Feria, leg*55,doc,22,8 Oct,1409* The emergence
of a consistent use and policy, however, coincided with
John II's emergence from his minority and provoked the
first complaints} Cortes,ill«30*2(1,14201,
3 See below Appendix FT,
4 J.A.Maraval 1, 'The origins of the ;oodern s tate*,
vi(196l),801*
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This definition is one that can equally be applied to
the use of absolute royal power by John II and Henry IV.
The frequent use of the royal dispensing power is
not particularly remarkable since the use of such a pre-
rog&tive by most monarchies in western Europe was usual#*
In Castile the dispensing power seems to have been most
frequently used in royal grants of privileges. Inevit¬
ably, therefore, the use of the absolute royal power in
such cases was linked to one of the chief political issues
•
- the control and distribution of rewards and favours.
Doth John II and Henry IV used their absolute royal power to
remove all obstacles to their arbitrary confiscations of
opponents* lands and wealth,and the distribution of these
to faithful royal supporters,* This was a power which
the Crown found extremely useful in times of crisis. In
1453, for example, when John 11 decided to rid himself of
Alvaro de Luna he declared his decisions to be binding
and dispensed with all obstacles by virtue *of my own wish,
certain knowledge and plenary absolute royal power',*
This and other similar actions fell outside the normal
legal processes and were justified by the wielding of
absolute power by God*s vicar on earth.
Did /
1 Further details on the dispensing power in Castile,
below Appendix FF, .53
2 For examples of grants of wealth to supporters from such
confiscations see A.D.M,,Ale.Duc.,le0,55,doc»17,l Sept.
1423; ibid, doc.30,10 June 1447; B.N,,MS,,6388,fols.
419K-42W725 Sept,1453.
3 C.D.ii.A.H.,49-SS(xxix, 14 April 1453).
472
Did the absolute royal power mean that the king was
* essentially above human or positive law* and that he had
'the power to make laws'?* There can be no doubt that the
monarchy consciously attempted to establish this position.
The traditional view was that the king was not above the
law and could not by himself make laws. The making, re*
{vising, and annulment of laws was a matter for the king
and the cortes. During the fourteenth century this point
was on the whole confirmed* In 1351 Pedro I agreed to a
cortes petition that individuals, who obtained royal letters
contrary to the laws made by the king and cortes,should be
2
fined* In 1379 John I accepted the point that such
letters should not be obeyed and that changes or revisions
of the laws could only be carried out in the cortes.® In
1387, at the cortes of Bribiesca, he also agreed and ordered
that royal letters dispensing with laws were Invalid.
The fifteenth century cortes rarely managed to
extract similar concessions® and both John II and H«nry IT
were largely successful in breaking through these restri¬
ctions* uncc again it was the formula of the poder real
absolute which was used to make laws which were to be as
valid as if they had been made In the cortes* John II,
for /
1 For a discussion of the limitations on absolute royal
power see below Appendix FF, - s 3





for example, could cite one of hi® own laws to the corteg
which clearly showed how the royal absolutism worked:*
Therefore I, wishing to provide a convenient
remedy on this matter, by the present prag-
:matic sanction, which 1 wish and order and
it is my pleasure and will that it should
have the force and vigour of law and should
be observed as law Just as if it had been
ordered and established and published in
the cortee, order and command and wish and
determine by nay own wish, certain knowledge,
and absolute royal power • • •
The king, therefore, could make laws asl como si
fuera fecha en cortesThe royal will could be imposed
without restriction and the cumbersome machinery involved
in holding a eortes could be avoided. In this respect the
chronicle of Alvaro de Luna gives an interesting account of
how the laws of Guadalajara in 1436 were determined and then
promulgated. John II and his immediate advisers decided
to reform government.
And without waiting to hold a cortes. the king
drew up the ordinances ... And then the king
ordered that the said laws should be published
and observed in his court on pain of great
punishments} and he ordered his letters to be
isued so that the same khould be done in the
cities and towns of bis kingdoms, all of which
was done as ordered.'
The king, therefore, could use his absolute royal
power to dispense with legal obstacles and even to legislate
unilaterally /
1 Cortes.111.109(19.1431).
2 See, 'lor example, the laws on finance and justice in
Lscorial,X.lI.19,,fols.9V-1IV and 21V-22V,25 May 1427 and
25 Jan.1432.
3 Cron.Luna, pp. 148-9# The text of the ordinances in fact
state* that they are to be laws *concno si por mi fuesen
fechae e ordenadas e promulgadas en'cortes B.
MS.,i3259,fol•186V.
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unilaterally, Y«t this Is not sufficient to substantiate
a deliberate and systematic royal policy aiming at absolu*
:tism and it is this point which must now be examined*
In 1445 John II and Alvaro de Luna won the decisive
battle of Olraedo, With the opposition shattered, a strong
assertion of the theory of royal power would not have been
surprising. Yet it was on the eve of battle that the king
and Luna decided to make a full assertion of the royal
power. The cortec had already been summoned and, meeting
in the royal camp, the procuradores themselves were made
to act as the mouthpiece of the king,^
The procuradores first of all recalled the existence
of the rebellion against the Crown and then condemned it
as being contrary to the polity and to the king's majesty:*
*.• some of your subjects and people joined in
rebellion, forgetting the natural law by which
even the bees have a prince and the cranes follow
a leader whom they revere and obey. They also
forget the divine law which expressly prohibits
and forbids that anyone should dare to touch his
king and prince as he is anointed by Cod; nor
should anyone detract or say anything evil about
him or even think it in his mind; instead he
should be held to be Cod's vicar and honoured
as being excellent; no one should dare to resist
him because those who resist the king are seen to
wish to resist the ordinance of God to which
everyone is bound and tied, not only fearing
the wrath of CQd and the evil and punishment
which can affect them as a result of such an
action /
1 For the acts of this Cortes and the Quotations which
follow see Cortes.iii.456*494 (1445).
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action, but also for the tranquility of their
consciences; those who do the opposite, re*
:fusing to obey their princes and kings, are
because of this accused and guilty of murder.
They also despise the sacred canon law and the
royal and imperial laws which with great effi*
;cacy order that the king and his lordship,
obedience, and pre*eminence be guarded and
revered above all other things in this world
and that he be served and honoured. All of
this being set aside, these people have per-
:severed in their stubbornness saying and
pretending that they did so on account of a
law of your kingdom which is in the second
PartIda •..
The law to which the orocuradores referred, seemed
to imply that the king should be protected against his own
misguided policies and that it was his subjects1 duty to
afford such protection,^ After citing the law,the pro*
}curadorea attacked the rebels and accused them of deli*
aberately misinterpreting the law. All laws * natural,
divine, canon, and civil • they alleged, clearly prohibited
such a rebellion. Moreover, the particular law in question
was only one of a whole series of laws which condemned re¬
bellion, A selection of such laws was then cited in
order to stress the wickedness of rebellion and to provide
a weighty refutation of the pretensions of the rebels. In
^
the context of these laws, the procuradores argued}*
... it /
1 See S,P,_, Pt.ii, tit »xii i, leg.xxv.
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• •« it would bo abominable, sacrilegious
«m contrary to God and divine and human
law fM if the king, whose heart is in the
hands of uod who guides him and inclines
hi ui to his wish, the king being his vicar
and his lieutenant on earth, , •» the king
having all laws and rights under him (so
fi) since he holds his power not frost menut from God whose place he holds in all
temporal matters »,, should be made subject
to his vassals and subjects *•• especially
since he does not recognise a superior in
temporal matters save God alone M»
ilie i rocuradores had now reviewed the whole situation and
had virtually stated the divine right theory of kingship.
Since the king was above the law and held his power directly
from God, the concluding petition of the cortes was logical.
Therefore we very humbly petition your
highness that *•• interpreting and declar*
;ing the said law of the Partioa and any
others which might in this way be mi sunder*
:stood, you revoke them by virtue of your
certain knowledge and your own will and
absolute royal power *«•
At the cortes of Glsusdo in 1445 it was the procuradores
who were ostensibly responsible for demanding an assertion
of royal absolutism. In fact the procuradores were merely
repeating assertions which John II himself had expressed
and propagated years earlier. In 1439, for example, the
king had bluntly expressed the u&too views to the great
nobility and,fourteen years after the cortes of Olmedo#
Alvaro de Luna fell victim to the arbitrary absolute royal
power /
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power which he himself had helped to build up.* Carlyle's
comments on the proceedings of the cortea of Olmedo can in
fact be taken to apply to a consistent royal policy:
It would be difficult to find a. more emphatic
assertion of the doctrine of the 'Divine Light"
of the King, and of his absolute authority as
above the Law.* 2
ii) The iuatificationa for revolt
The success of the Castilian kings in aspiring to an
absolutism based on divine right may be guaged by the fact
that the monarchy's opponents did not on the whole effect*
:ively contradict the royal claims. They accepted that
the king could wield absolute power, but distinguished
3
between the use of this power and tyranny. They accep-
i ted that they were obliged to obey the king, but they also
argued that they had a duty to advise him and to protect
4
him from his own actions. They accepted that the king
did not recognise a superior in temporal matters,but they
advised him to study the histories of kings who had made
similar claims and yet lost their crowns because of their
misguided /
1 See appendix F* below i^-z-3
2 K.W. and A.J.Carlyle, A history of medieval political
theory in the West (Ldinburgh(l93^)>vi.l8S.
3 Such a distinction is made in the preamble of a letter
by the Aragonese party in 1440: Cron.Juan II,pp.560-1.
4 «iosen Diego de Valera began a letter to Henry IV with
such an argument: **em .Diva .Hags. ,p.72>
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misguided actions,*
Those arguments ware not consistently or effectively
used. More cogently and frequently.it was argued that
the royal powers were not in dispute but that they had been
usurped by a favourite. Often,the word 'favourite* was
us ed me rely to designate those who were the king's trusted
advisers. The argument, however, justified open opposi-
ition and revolt since the king and kingdom needed protec¬
tion against the usurpations of royal power by incompetent
2
and evil favourites. In 1440, for example, a long and
bitter account of Alvaro de Luna's shortcomings served to
justify the opposition of the great nobility
because you,sire,have wished to submit your
royal power, both your absolute power and
ordinary power, to your constable,
Line years later the rebellion of the town of Toledo was
similarly justified on the grounds that
your majesty knows very well that for the
last thirty years and more don Alvaro de
Luna,your cons table,has tyrannically die-
isipated, devested, and daily usurps and
devastates your kingdoms and lordships,
usurping to himself the government and
rule, and glory and powers of your Crown,




2 The argument is well expressed in to uua.no, Tol edo.
p,147 ,
3 See Crotuiuan lit pp.560-2,
4 Halconero. p,52i and benito iiuano, Toledo, pp»38-43,155,
1 See C«iJ. .A •H,,467(cxv, 10 May 1465)) Mora,Divs.base,.
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iii) The decline of the cortes
Loaders oi rebellious noble ai1lances, however, while
finding it easy to justify their actions, iound it much
harder to impose practical limitations on royal power since
no constitutional machinery existed which could be easily
adapted to this end,
The cortes certainly did not act as an effective
check on the monarchy* It is true that occasionally the
cortes appeared to be acting as a limitation on the royal
power. In the cortes of 1420, 1440, 1442, 1451, and 1455,
for example, protests were made about the use of the royal
absolute power and in some cases the Crown was apparently
forced to agree to limitations on its power.* Vet on the
whole, an examination of the powers and procedures of the
cortes shows that they were too weak to piay an independent
2
role in politics.
There were two matters of general importance over
which the cortes could theoretically wield considerable
power • legislation and taxation,"' It has already been
seen /
1 An example of how such evidence can give the misleading
impression that the cortes maintained, their powers in
the fifteenth century in Carlyle, op,cit»,vi,133-6*
2 The view that the cortes declined drastically in the
fifteenth century is now generally accepted: see fuarea,
Los Trastamaras, op, 14*15 and. benito Kuano, Toledo,p» 147
®4iich reflect the findings of h.Piskarski, Las Cortes
de Cast 11la (Larcelona, 1930),
3 But see Piekorski, op,cit»,pp,73»4,l88,i93.
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seen that both John 12 and Henry IV managed successfully
to legislate by virtue of their own absolute royal power,*
It is true that they specified that these laws were to be
observed 'as if they had been made in cortes'» Yet this
was a minor concession to the once prevalent situation
whereby only the king and the cortea could legislate and
such legislation could only he repealed by the cortea,
Despite their protests,even the procuradorea of the cortes
recognised the existence of the new royal power to legislate.
In 1455, for example, they asked Henry IV to confirm his
father's laws - both the laws he had made in the cortes
2
and those which he had made by virtue of his own power.
The need to obtain the consent of the cortes for the
imposition of certain forms of taxation became established
in the fourteenth century. It seems probable, however,
that the monarchy failed to challenge this limitation on
its authority during the fifteenth century precisely be-
•cause it was not a limitation of practical importance.
In fact the consent of the cortes was only necessary for
the levying of three taxes - the pedido. moneda, and
moneda forera. The consent of the cortes was invariably
granted before the presentation of grievances to the king.
Attempts made by the cortes to limit the use to which the
taxes /
1 See above M .
2 Piskorski, op.cit,,p.145,
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taxes could be uaea were disregarded by the monarchy*
All other taxation was levied without the consent of the
cortea. Significantly, the greatest source of royal in*
tcome, the aicabala. which had been subject to the consent
of the cor tea during the fourteenth century, escaped the
control of the cortes completely during the fifteenth
century and was levied regularly each year without con*
ssent * *
The lack of power of the cortes wa« paralleled by the
2
degree of control which the Crown exercised over procedure.
In practice the cortes were small assemblies who met toget¬
her with the 'court1 - that is, those nobles.ecclesiastics,
and ie tr&dos who were court officials or members of the
royal council. The procuredores of these towns were either
members of the patrician oligarchies or were directly nomi-
•nated by the king. Their expenses were paid by the Crown.
Nevertheless they theoretically constituted a representative
assembly of the three estates of the kingdom. They obed-
iiently voted the taxes which the king demanded, presented
petitions which were examined by the lot ratios, received
vague assurances about complaints contained in these peti¬
tions, and dispersed at the will of the king until the
latter /
1 Ibid, pp.103.10?,150.154,156-161, On one occasion, in
Tito, John II levied taxes without consent and subsequently
agreed not to do the same again.
2 See Appendix FF below
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latter should again choose to summon another corteg.
The very weakness of the cortes explains the some*
ttimes bewildering changes of attitude displayed by the
procuradorea towards the Crown, Since the machinery and
procedure of the cortes was control 1 ed" by the Crown,
changes in the balance of power at court were reflected in
cortes. It has already been noted how John 11 and
Alvaro de Luna used the corteg of Olraado in 1445 to en-
1
•dorse their policy of absolutism. From the infante
Enrique in 1420 down to Juan Facheco in ^enry IV*g reign,
the same use of the corteg wag made by opposition leaders
Z
once power had been acquired at court. The nobility
used the cortes to publicize concessions which they had
already obtained from the Crown. Yet they never envis¬
aged. the cortes as an institution which could be power-
jful enough,or meet with sufficient regularity, to impose
control on the monarchy. In 1440, for example, the
Aragonece party used the cortea of Valladolid to endorse
their plan of control over royal government. The king
was unpleasantly reminded by the procuradores of the
unhappy experiences of the monarchy in France and the
•reformers1 put forward their proposals, Yet, even at
this /
1 See above VV'
2 See Budrea, Log Irastamarag, pp.74-5,258-9,
I
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this high poiut oi apparent opposition by the corteo.
the pro cur ado rea were merely conf inning the plans of
those in control at court* These plans envisaged control
ol the loyal council by the nobility and the role of the
cortes remained insignificant.* In fact it was by con*
strolling the royal council that the fifteenth century
nobility hoped to control the monarchy*
iv} Control of the royal council**
The great nobility of Castile* like their counter-
Jparts in Trance and attempted to control the
monarchy by controlling the royal council,^ The royal
council offered the most effective opportunities for
attempting this limitation of the monarchy. In theory
there was a well established tradition that the king should
rule with the advice of a council* moreover, unlike the
corteg, the council was an institution which functioned
regularly, closely accompanied the king, and had its
fflea tings /
1 Corteg. iii.368-92(1440) j Snare*. Log Trastamaras.pp*162-3*
2 ThZre were several types of council at varying periods - a
council of justice, a secret council* a royal council
proper, and an embryonic council for the military orders*
Here the term 'royal council1 refers to the body which
helped the king to exercise general political control*
3 At a rough estimate there were some fourteen coups d'e'tat
or major changes in the royal council during John ll's
reign alone.
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meetings, procedures ar«d secretariat formalised in
*
ordinances•
The degree to which conciiiar procedures were formal*
:ised also provided the opportunity for stressing the
implication that the council gave proper arid collective
advice to the king, as against the incompetent advice of
favourites. Throughout the century these 'favourites'
naturally provided the obvious link between the royal
3
councils and the monarch. On occasions this situation
led to the existence of an Informal but regular inner
council. Thus a council of fixed membership and powers
could be set against individual favourites and 'inner
counci is'
Once the council was cont rolled, political decisions
could be given a semblance of legality. In 1420, for
example, the Infante Enrique used the council as a cover
for his more dictatorial acts, indeed he even managed
to combine the role of the council with his propaganda to t
cor fees. By placing soma of. the representatives o£ the
corteg in the council he gave expression to the vague
feeling that the council should in soma way be representati
At /
1 For ordinances of 1406,1432,1436,1442,1459 and 1465 see
Escorial,2.II.I4.,fols.77R*79h, X.XI.14.,105R-115R,
X„II.19.,foi s.20ii«2lV j B.N,,MS,, 13259 fols.lSSR, 332R-
336K» C.M.U.A.H..355-479(cix.l465).
2 The v e ry ti "eg ree "of forma li sat ion itself derived from
attempts to control the monarchy.
3 A good example of Alvaro da Luna in just such a role,
Halconero,pp.133-5,
4 Tienry^TyJ for example, created an inner council made up
of the archbishop of Toledo, Juan Pacheco, and Diego
Ayiag de Avila; hscorial,X.II.14.,fols.105h-107R.
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At the same time, however, he persuaded this council to
vote him 20,000 mrs and thus usurped a power reserved to
the cortes proper,* Other nobles may not have been so
skilful in their manipulation of the council, yet the
council remained the favourite instrument for legilining
changes in political power. The coup d'e'tat at Itamaga
in 1443, for example, began with the king of Navarre
summoning the council and ended with the council imprison*
2
: ing some of John !Z*s officials* Even John II himself
used the council in this way when he ordered that the
decision to execute Alvaro de Luna should be signed by
3
those letrados who were members of the council.
Despite the apparent advantages, however, attempts
to control the royal council met with serious obstacles.
The cor tee had managed, during periods of the fourteenth
century, to bring pressure to bear on the process of
appointing councillors. By the fifteenth century, how*
J ever, the power of the cortes had declined and all that
remained of this intervention were Ideas as to the general
nature /
1 See Suareas Fernandas, Kelaciones entre Portugal y
Castl11a. p,39# The money was 'never collected since
the Infante's period of power only lasted from July
to November 1420, The view that buenos omes from the
cortes should be represented in the council was a
legacy from the fourteenth century • in the fifteenth
century the view was never put into effect save by the
infante. See Piskorski, op.cit.. pp,177*8,180*4}
Cortes, iii.20*1 (18.1419). 4(S> (1423) . 120*1 ( 5.1432) .
2 ^alconero. pp,435*9*
3 ,74*7(xxxv 1 ii. 1453) , The king, indeed, seems
to have preferred arresting his enemies at council
meetings: see, for example, Balconero. PP.39,123*5,
248*9*
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nature of the royal council.* There was, moreover, a
clear distinction throughout the fifteenth century between
honorific and effective councillors. Many lay and eccle¬
siastical aristocrats were, by convention, honorific
councillors. They held the title of councillor but lacked
the substance of power enjoyed by the effective council1»
2
sors. These latter were appointed by the king alone
and no one in theory had a right to be an effective coun*
scillor. Similarly the king could take his advice from
anyone whom he wished to consult. John II stated this
position very clearly, in 1439, when he argued that, al though
it was customary in Castile, as in other countries, for
the king to rule with the advice of the council, this
did not prevent him from taking advice from anyone else
in the kingdom or from continually consulting Alvaro de
Luna. Similarly, of course, an *absolute* king did not
3
have to accept the advice of his council.
To overcome these problems formulae were devised
which were written into sentencias or judgements. In
theory the sentencias were the result of arbitration on
the /
1 See above V'S-8s", 1 .
2 John 21, for example, appointed don ^edro del Purgo,
abbot of Sahagun. to the council and provided that all
future abbots of Sahagun should be members of the
royal council! A.H.N, .CIero, lJergs., carp.943.doc. 16.
23 march 1454. The appointment of the king of Granada
to the Castilian council could even be envisaged! Hem.
Pivs.Haas.. p.31•
3 The whole text of this important letter in Halconero.
pp.263*76.
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the issues dividing the monarchy and its opponents* In
reality the sentencias represented the attempts of the
victorious rebels to limit royal power* The sentencias
dealt with many grievances formulated against the royal
government and sometimes appeared to embody the complaints
1
of the three estates of the whole kingdom* The important
points,however, were those which concerned the great nobi-
ility and their attempts to impose control on the member-
sship and powers of the council*
The membership of the council had to be determined
clearly,if the fruits of political victory were not to be
lost between powerless honorific councils on the one hand
and inner councils on the other. The fifteenth century
ordinances • both those inspired by the monarchy and those
inspired by the nobility - envisaged an effective council
2
containing between eleven and sixteen members* When the
Crown1! opponents were vie torious,they determined who these
councillors were to be and arranged for a suitable balancing
of faction interests within the council. Yet such arrange-
sntents were the direct result of political victory or pres¬
sure and there was no permanent machinery to limit royal
3
power once this political pressure slackened*
The /
1 See, for example, the sentencia of 1465 in C,D,R,A,H.*
355-479 (cix)*
2 See the ordinances cited above . Vss,<vi .1.
3 In 1420, for example, membership was arranged to accomo-
idate the three main political factions at court: Cron.
Luna., p.45, For an attempt to devise a regular proced¬
ure for filling vacancies see C,P,R,A*H.*407-8 (cix,1465),
4B8.
The attempts to control the membership of the council
wore accompanied by attempts to make the council the centre
of government# This entailed curtailing the royal power#
and increasing the powers of the council. The provisions
of the victorious Aragonese party in 1442 serve as an
example# The power of the Crown in ecclesiastical
appointments was transferred to the council#* John 11
was virtually prohibited from granting privileges on his
own initiative# Control of privileges# and to a large
extent this meant control of Crown revenues# was now
vested in the council# All privileges could only be
granted with the consent of the council or by a majority
vote within the council# John II was left with the power
to initiate expenditure of a trivial nature,^ All
judicial cases affecting the great nobility were made
dependent on the council for their determination and the
sentencia definitiva had to be examined before the king
3
in his council. The decisions of the council were to
be kept in a register and the secretaries were only to
draw up letters on the basis of decisions made in the
council#* Similar powers were vested in the royal
council i
1 B.N# #MS##13259»fols#332R-333R#
2 Ibid. fol.332K and V# This part of the ordinance is
also printed in Cortes, iii,402-4 (2.4,1442). These
cortes were in general used to endorse controls attempted




council by the sentencla of 1465.*
The constitutional provisions of the sentencias
appeared impressive. Tet in the last analysis these pro*
{visions were only effective as long as the realities of
political power made control of the royal council feasible.
To control the king the council had to be controlled, and
this control could only be maintained by the ability to
exert a continuous threat of political rebellion or revolu-
:tion. Moreover, the forces of opposition had to be
united. As soon as factions appeared a 'favourite*, such
as Alvaro de Luna, could play off factions of the nobility
against each other in the council, while retaining royal
2
influence and protection. Time and again constitutional
limitations,imposed by victorious rebel leaders^were dis-
J regarded by the monarchy as soon as their political power
appeared to be crumbling. Was this not. after all. a
return to the normal situation by which an 'absolute' king
chose his own councillors and accepted or rejected their
advice?
v) /
1 C.P.R.A.H.. 368,387,428-30 (cix,1465)
2 See, for example, Luna's scheme for rotating membership
in 1419: Cron.Luna. p.34.
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v) The deposition of Henry IV,
The repeated failure© of the nobility to control the
royal powers by using the council raised the problem of
alternative and wore extreme methods. In January 1465/
Lenry IV was forced to accept the most impressive of the
fifteenth century aentenciag. The sentend a of Medina
del Casnpo contained proposals for reforming a whole series
of 'abuses* which affected not only the nobility, but the
Church, the towns, the economy, and the administration of
justice,* Yet the very next month the king issued an
order declaring the whole senteucia to be null and void.^
Within the ranks of the rebel nobility the idea had already
been put forward that more effective use should be made of
Henry IV*s half brother, Alfonso, On the 5th of June, in
the *farse' at Avila, ^enry IV's effigy was deposed by
3
some of the nobility and Alfonso XII was proclaimed king.
The deposition of Henry IV was justified by its per-
jpetrators with two basic arguments. In the first place
the king was guilty of heinous crimes, a long list of
which were read out publicly at the deposition at Avila,*
*his /
1 This sentencia has been described by one historian as a
'verdadera Carta "'agna* : ^uarea, bps Trastimaras, p.261,
The full text of the sentencia is "in C«D«k,A,ft,","355-479
(cix.,1465),
2 Su4ress, Los Trastrfroaras, pp.262-5,
3 On these events see ibid, pp,256-67»
4 Ibid, p.267,
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This argument teas not directed against the institution of
monarchy but against the person of the king. Inevitably
the word 'tyrant* was linked to this argument and reference
was made to the fate of r!edro the Cruel, Secondly, it
was argiied that the monarchy of Castile, as an institution.
was elective and that the deposition was therefore legal.
The power of the nobility and people,
argued Mosen ^iego de Valera,
to elect and depose a king, and for far
lesser reasons than those which can be
proved against King Henry, was no innovation
in the kingdoms of Castile and Leon, as ^
could easily be proved by canonical authorities.
The new attempt to limit royal power by 'electing'
an alternative king suffered from severe disabilities.
The deposition of Henry IV was the work of a faction and
did not gain general acceptance. For many of the nobil*
tity, clergy, and towns, Henry IV remained the legitimate
king whose cause was also supported by the papacy. The
gravest disability, however, was the nature of the 'elected*
monarchy which had been created. It was immediately
apparent that the 'election* was nothing more than a
cynical attempt to legalise the grants and privileges
which the electors bestowed on themselves. The sharing
of /
1 See, for example, Mem.Divs.BassPP.97*9.
2 Ibid, p.98.
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of these profits, moreover, was authorised by the boy
king's absolute royal power which was controlled by his
electors but was not constitutionally limited. The
failure of the 'elective* experiment was complete. The
argument that the monarchy was 'elective' was clearly
untenable in view of the laws of succession. The failure
of the rebels to limit the royal power in constitutional
terms,ensured that the expedient of election would not be
again considered as a practical possibility.
The repeated failure of the uobility to use their
victories in order to limit the powers of the monarchy as
an institution goes far in helping to explain the sustained
growth of royal power. The aim of the nobility was clearly
not to limit absolutism but to use this absolutism for their
own purposes. It was precisely for this reason that the
nobility did not support the cortcs.* The deposition of
Henry IV did not alter this situation substantiaUy.
Professor Benito huaao is surely right when he argues that
there was no at tempt, during all this period, to attack the
principles of monarchy - the rebel leaders, indeed, con*




1 The nobility, for example, were only too willing to
support the monarchy's total disregard of the cortes'
attempts to prevent the alienation of crown lands and
revenues.
2 Benito Ituano, Tpjedo. pp. 155-6.
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The powers of the monarchy consequently remained theo*
!reticr,lly intact. ?hen members of the nobility managed
to gain control at court, they used these powers them-
'selves. In 1467, for example, the nobility used Alfonso
XH's 'own will, certain knowledge, and absolute royal
power* to invalidate oaths and buiaages paid to Henry IV
and to pardon misdeeds committed by their own followers.*
Queen Isabella was to receive these powers intact* She
did not have to struggle to gai n their acceptance since
they were not subject to dispute. The real problem con*
ssist'ed in determining who was to control and wield royal
absolutism,and the answer to this problem inevitably
rested with the characters and determination of the monarchs
themselves,
2) Politics and the General Economic Background
The discussion on constitutional issues has been
necessary because most accounts of the political history
of Castile in the fifteenth century imply that these were
the issues that motivated the civil wars and disturbances,
At /
I This example in C.P.R.A.H,. 528*36 (cxli,20 Jan,1467)
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It is true that the monarchy formi la ted policies of
absolutism which profoundly affected the terms in which
protagonists expressed themselves. the nobility
did not put forward a programme of constitutionalisai and
their real aims in attempting to control royal absolutism
remain obscure. Moreover^ the constitutional issues fail
to provide any adequate connection between the central issues
and the equally important issues which agitated the towns and
countryside of the kingdom. To provide an adequate inter*
tpretation it is necessary to examine the effects of
economic factors on politics and society generally.
Above all it is necessary to examine the evidence of
prices once again. It has already been noted that the
prices of grain and cloth are given in money of account
and that they may be deceptive as far a® the true economic
and secular trend is concerned, Tet these same prices are
accurate and, indeed, indispensable for the social and
political realities which faced contemporaries,* These
are prices which underline the important debasements of
the Castilian coinage and draw attention to those crucial
years of crisis when monetary anarchy was closely linked
to political and social anarchy.
The /
1 See above p,67.
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The long term nominal price movement' seems to
divide naturally into two periods# From 1400 to 1435
the price movement remained fairly stable but from 1435
to 1480 there was a general rise in prices. Within these
two general periods two further movements stand out. The
years 1407-14 saw a sharp price movement and the years
1448-80 witnessed a high degree of price inflation which
reached chronic proportions by 1460,* These price move¬
ments coincided with the main periods of debasements of
the coinage and the periods of agrarian crises with their
associated phenomena of hunger, plague, and epidemics.
The agrarian crises of 1434-38 coincided with the beginn¬
ings of the price rise and the period of sharpest price
inflation was also the period when, increasingly, hardly
2
a year was exempt from the effects of agrarian crises.
The reign of Henry TV (1454-74) was marked by constant
debasement of the coinage. Indeed in the 1460's - at
the height of agrarian crises and price inflation - private
as well as royal mints were busy producing a debased coin-
sage. The count of ^enavente, for example, minted coins in
Villalon and Alfonso XII minted his own coinage, Inevit-
Jably the lure of quick profits enticed men to further
debasements
It /
1 See Appendices B and C below \^-SS7-t3
2 See above pp.77-82 and Appendix A below t-
3 See above p.88 and L.Sa'ea, Dwaoatracion del valor de las
uionedas pp.2-3.
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Is it not significant, therefore, that most oi the
evidence cited in support of the 'catastrophic anarchy*
view of fifteenth century Castile dates from the
period 1448*1480? In this connection it is worth glanc*
:ing at Benito Guano's excellent analysis of the distur*
J Banc es in Toledo during the fifteenth century. 'There
is hardly a year during these two decades (1454*74)*, he
writes,
which is not affected by some dramatic or violent
event. As a whole the period is like a night*
:mare of fears, calamities and upsets from which
salvation was only to be achieved • as for the
whole of Bpain • during the following reign.
The dates 1454*74 are the conventional ones of &mnry IV * s
reign and, in fact, Benito ifus.no devotes forty nine pages
to the troubles of 1449. The period 1400*1448 is covered
in a mere twenty pages while the anarchy of the period
1449*74 is discussed in over eighty seven pages. The
political history of the period does ,in fact, coincide
with the pattern of price movements, debasements, and
agrarian crises. it seems plausible to argue that,
after a period of monetary and political instability in
2
the late fourteenth century, the period 1400*1445 was
conducive /
1 Benito hueno, Toledo, p.84.
2 Within the long term movement of debasements during the
later middle ages two periods stand out. The first
period covers the years 1370*1395. Henry II (1369*79)
debased the coinage to pay for debts incurred in wars
against Pedro I. John I (1379*90) debased the coinage
still further to x>aY for his wars against Bancaster
and the Portuguese. ^rice inflation reached chronic
proportions and stability was not restored until raea-
tsures, introduced in 1391 by wenry 111 (1390*1406),
began to take effect in subsequent years. The second
period coincided with the reign of Henry jy (1454-74),
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conducive to political stability whereas the period 1445-
1460 led to hardships, impoverishment, and political chaos•
The relationship between political issues and the
economic background was. however, far more complicated.
Was debasement of the coinage the cause or the consequence
of violent political upheaval? It would be rash to
claim that the civil and foreign wars of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries were caused by debasements and price
inflation. On the contrary these wars • for example
John I#a wars against Lancaster - may have caused the
monarchy to resort to debasement. But the wars did not
Inevitably lead to debasements and it cannot be argued
that other forms of political disturbances in the towns
and countryside prompted a policy of currency manipulation.
In short the relationship was a complex one in which causes
arjd effects had interchangeable roles. The simplest and
directest relationships are best dealt with first#
3) Popular movements
i) The chronology of urban revolt
Urban uprisings were directly connected to the hard-
Jships imposed by rising prices and shortages of grain.
In many cases it is hard to separate popular movements
from /
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from more complicated political situations. There can
be no doubt, however, that urb&x* agitation grew progress-
lively more serious during the fifteenth century. It
was a problem that caused concern to the procuradores of
*'ie cortcs. In 1473, for example, they reminded Henry
IV of the seriousness of the problem because
we see from experience that the people,
especially- the common and lower sort of
people, have reached such a degree of
audacity, bad living, contempt for your
justice and contempt of our holy catholic
faith, that they dare to rise up in pursuit
of vain desires and fantastic pretences.
They cause and create riots and fights with
their neighbours and fellowuten, and if they
manage to carry the day, they rob them,
take their possessions, and throw them out
of the cities, towns and places where they
live.1
2
Table XXVII attempts to list those urban political
movements in which popular elements played an important
or preponderant role. There can be no doubt that some
urban popular movements are missing from the list and
that the relative importance of each movement is not
apparent, Vet, despite these qualifications, the chron-
Jology of urban revolt speaks for itself. There is an
almost complete identification with the patterns of de-
'basements /
1 Cortes,iii.878-9(27,1473).
2 See Appendix DD below -U0
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debasements, price rises, and agrarian crises which have
been discussed. The serious urban disturbances of 1391
coincided with the peak of the debasement crisis of 1370-
1395, and it may well be suspected that they coincided
with the peak of the price rises resulting Iran these de-
Jbasemente, From 1400 to 1449 there is no evidence of
serious popular urban agitation. The disturbances in
Cordoba in 1406 are tabulated on the authority of Amador
da los Ki'oa who cites no evidence for them and, indeed,
does not even discuss them,* The period 1449-1474, on
the other hand, contains a whole plethora of riota and
popular uprisings. These began with a serious uprising
in Toledo in 1449 and ended with the wave of massacres
in 1473 which were strongly reminiscent of those of 1391*
These movements coincided with the sharp rise in prices
and the ^rowing agrarian crisis,
ii) Hunger riots in the towns
Urban uprisings took various forms. The price of
grain gives a sure indication of one type of urban revolt.
The long term rise in grain prices caused progressive
hardship /
1 .Amador de los kios, op.cit.* p,1030. But see J,Torres
Pontes, *Moros, judlos y converses en la regencia de don
Fernando de Anitequera*, C,H,E#, xxxi-xxxii( I960), 72,
sou
hardship. i'ar more important, however, were the wild
fluctuations in the seasonal movements of grain prices,
feheat was a daily problem for the urban poor who could
A.'VWA
not store grain ^ard times. «*ven without a harvest
crisis, the seasonal variation of grain prices could be
substantial, from a low level in the autumn to high
prices in June and July, *>ad harvests entailed drastic
price increases within very short periods of time. Urban
and royal authorities tried to mitigate the worst effects
of seasonal price fluctuations by turning to the inter*
^national merchants and appealing to them to import grain,*
Such measures, however, could not compensate for the
immediate social effects of seasonal fluctuations. These
effects are most easily seen in the alborotos de hambre
(hunger riots), such as that in oeviile in 1462 which is
described by Garci ranches* '
In the year 1462 there were great floods
during January in Seville and a fanega of
wheat rose to 120 mrs. People could not
find food to eat and so they ate rotten
biscuits from the Crown (naval stores)
during this month of February ...
Monday, 29th of March of this same
year. At seven o'clock a hunger riot
started in Seville. The mass of the
people armed themselves and searched for
bread. The gangs went from house to
house searching for bread and saying that
it /
1 See above, pp,79,81.
2 Garci Sanchez, pp»45-7 where details are also given on
changes in the face value of coins, attempts to keep
prices stable, and imports of wheat.
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it hau becu atoi'tsu away as a remedy
[for hard times}. Everyone hid their
valuables* thinking, that they wished
to steal their coffers* This lasted
tixl mid-day.
Clearly this hunger riot was directly caused by the
seasonal movement of wheat prices. hot all such dis¬
turbances were so clearly linked to a shortage of grain*
yet the problem of food was never far away from riots. In
some cases - Seville in 1462 and 146?* and Burgos in 1471 •
it is possible to discern a very close connection* and in
general one must link the disturbances of the period 1449-
1474 to the background of agrarian crisis and price rise.
iiii taxation and urban revolt
inevitably popular agitation was also aimed at tax.
collectors and taxation in general* This was partly
due* no doubt* to a situation in which taxes were viewed
as a tangible grievance during periods of economic distress*
But tnere were other factors which added to the unpopu¬
larity of taxes* Koyai taxes were farmed and the farm
of each particular tax was listed in the royal accounts
as /
1 Ibid, pp,45*59-60; L.Serrano* Los heyea Catcflicog y la
ciudad cle Burgos,* p• 113•
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as a price. The royal officials, in fact, were using the
word 'price' accurately, since the right to farm taxes
was offered to the farmer who offered the highest price.
Like other prices, the prices of tax farms rose during
the century* and for the pecheros or tax payers this
meant increased taxation. Also, as has been seen, urban
authorities tried to alleviate grain shortages by arrang¬
ing for grain imports. Such operations were costly and
towns often imposed extra taxes to pay for them. It is
not surprising, therefore, that popular riots were sparked
off by attempts to impose and levy taxes. The rebellion of
Toledo in 1449 began as a result of a heavy tax levied by
command of Alvaro de Luna. The populace, incited by an
2
odrero, rioted and set fire to the house of the chief tax
farmer. The dangerous mood of the Toledo populace - in
this case leading to serious rebel lion - was thereafter
su tuned up by the saying:
hhen the odrero blows the flames,
Toledo must riot,*
Toledo, however, was no exception. The unrest in Burgos
during the period 1459*64 was connected with increases in
4
municipal taxes and royal alcabalas. In Seville, in
September /
1 Royal income thus tended to keep pace with nominal prices
- in marked contrast to seigneurial income,
2 An artisan of leather goods.
3 See Benito Ruano, Toledo. p,35 and &aer. History.11.279.
4 L,Serrano, op,clt.,p»59»
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Sep timber 1463, ar».».eU mobs attacked the royal asle tente.
Pedro kanri t2ue , and threw him out of town because of an
attempt to impose new taxes on meat and fish. Indeed,
in this case, only the intervention of the nobility pre-
:vented the infuriated populace from stoning kt&nrique to
death.* In Cuipuzcoa, in 1469, attempts to collect the
2
nedido taxes resulted in riots and insurrection.
iv) b£ban uprisings agains_| Jews and converses
The most serious popular uprisings were directed
against Jews and conversea. Ihe chronology of racial and
religious massacres has, of course, been noted by his tor-
•ians. Por iJiier, the first half of the fifteenth century
was a period of freedom for the •'ewe and conversoe because
of the religious laxity and moral deterioration at the
royal court, 'It was only in the late 1440s1, writes
Baer,
that the converse problem was revealed in
all its gravity| and than it suddenly
became a political and religious factor
of the first magnitude ... The first racial
conflict broke out in 1449 in the city of
Toledo.
In /
1 Garci Sanchez, p.40,
2 Amador ue las nios, op.cit..pp.662-3.
3 Baer, History. if. chapter xii passim deals with the
sudden deterioration in the 1440s but fails to provide
an explanation: see especially pp.244-9.270-9.
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In fact the incidence of popular fanaticism against Jews
ar,ti converses coincides perfectly with the chronology of
price movements and agrarian crises* 'Hie period 1400*
1445 saw the re-estab 1 iehcaent of the position of the ^ews
and conversoa in government and society which had been
eeverely shaken by the massacres of 1391•* ^he only
dangers presented to this recuperation of the -ews and
conversos came from tit© activities of Vincent Ferrer and
2
repressive royal legislation in 140b and 1412* There
were* however* no popular uprisings against the Jews and
coriversos of uastils during this period, On the other
hand, after 1445, a whole series of disturbances and
massacres troubled the kingdom and culminated in the
widespread pogroms of 1473*
The relationship between bard times and religious
and racial persecution is not surprising* There was
the constant suspicion that conversos were still practis¬
ing Jews* There was the jealousy of conversos who had
succeeded in entering the ranks of the patrician olig¬
archies, Above all* Jewish and converse merchants and
tax collectors were hated. Inevitably they* like other
merchants and tax farmers* escaped the worst consequences





held the "^ews and convereos to be responsible for hard¬
ships since they raised the prices of their merchandise
aid remorselessly collected the taxes. Conversos in
municipal and royal government were seen to be condoning
these extortions. In 1449, for example, Alvc.ro de Luna
entrusted the task of raising money in Toledo to Alonso
Cota, a converse who was a rich merchant and treasurer
of the town council. It was Cota * s house which was the
first target of the enraged populace, but the disturbances
soon turned into a general attack on the converses as a
whole. The same identification between economic hard¬
ship and racial violence caused the attacks on Jews and
2
merchants in Medina del Campo in 1461 and the attacks on
3«*ewi3h tax collectors in Tolosa in 1469. In other cases *
in Sepulveda in 1468 and the wave of massacres in 1473 *
the attacks appeared to be purely racial and religious.*
Yet it is clear that the racial and religious problems
were present for most of the century and that the per¬
secutions and killings were sparked off at the height of
an economic crisis.
v) /
1 See ibid, pp.277-83 and Benito Ruano, Toledo# pp.33-79.
2 G&rci anchee. pp.43-4. ""**
3 Amador de los h{08# pp.cit«. pp.662-3.
4 Ibid. pp.643,635-40j baer, History. ii,306-8.
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v) Urban revolt » the degree of violence
The final point to note about urban disturbances
is the degree of violence which they entailed* Destruc¬
tion, pillaging and massacres were substantial despite
attempts by the nobility and urban authorities to prevent
them. In some cases popular anger subsided after speei-
ific acts of violence. In Burgos in 1467, for example,
the mobs dispersed after they had succeeded in lynching
routier captain, Garcia Klendes de Badajoa#^ But in
the same ysar in Toledo destruction and killings reached
alarming proportions. The worst excesses started on
the 2i»t day of July. Early in the afternoon the parish
bells of Toledo, with the exception of those in the
converao districts, summoned the populace to arms. One
thousand armed men gathered at the cathedral and, joined
by others from outside the town, began a systematic
attack on converse, property. The fires lasted for more
than twenty four hours, Converso re^idores were killed
and then strung up naked and upside down as a public
spectacle. Interventions by the royal authorities failed
to prevent the excesses. Indeed more converspg ware
cruelly put to death on the 6th of August, Tike riots
in /
1 L.Serrano, op.cit., p.lOlj P&lanco liomero, op.cit, ,P«72»
2 Benito huano. Toledo, pp,97-9.
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In Toledo in 1467, however, were only- a prelude to the
massacres of 1473* This time the troubles originated
in Cordoba where racial conflict had built up over a con*
: s idarable period of time* The riots began with an
attack on the house of one of the richest conversos of
Cordoba* Labourers and peasants from the surrounding
countryside streamed in to join the urban populace in
a wave of destruction which lasted three weeks* The
riots spread to other towns* In Ecija, Seville* and
Jeres* the great nobility managed to prevent massacres*
elsewhere the mobs gained the upper hand* In Jaen*
for example* the constable, Miguel Lucas de Xranso,
attracted the hatred of the urban population by defending
and protecting the conversos* Mosen Diego de Valera
tells how the constable fell victim to the popular fury
during mass at the cathedralt
,** as the constable knelt down to pray
one of the common people (uno del pueblo),
who was nearest to him, gave him suck a
mighty blow on the head with an iron cross¬
bow that he knocked him to the ground*
Then all those who were near him set on him
with lances and swords with such fury that*
when they had finished* he no longer had
the appearance of having once been a human
being *
And then they all set out. together
to rob and kill the conversos.
vi) /
■Divs.Hass.,PP*240»5. See also Daer* History.il*306»8
and Amador de los llios, op.clt* »pp*635»40.
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vi) Rural anarchy
An anonymous writer was surely correct when he
connected the rural anarchy during the latter hall of
Henry IV*s reign with debasement of the coinage and the
sharp rise in prices.
The affairs of the kingdom reached such
a confused state that the vara of cloth,
which used to be worth two hundred airs,
became worth six hundred mrs •••
Livestock and all other goods in the king*
tdom were sold at such high prices that
the poor hidalgos, who bought and sold
these things, and all other people were
ruined During this period the most
abominable expedients imaginable were
practised. Robbery and violence were
so common in these realms that the
greatest respect was accorded to those
who robbed and cheated by the most
treacherous and subtle means. Many
caballeroa and escuderos constructed
innumerable castlesmrr"over the kingdom
with the sole purpose of using them as
bases for their acts of robbery, hater,
these oppressions became so common that
they even came to be publicly perpetrated
in the cities and towns, without the j
refuge of stone fortresses being necessary ...
Brigandage, as has been seen, was widespread and in many
cases reflected the inability of the lesser nobility to
meet their economic problems by legal means.2
Recourse to armed robbery, extortionate taxes on
goods in transit, holding people to ransom, and preying on
the /
1 Cited in L.Saes, op.cit,. pp,3*5,
2 bee above pp.190*2,
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the outskirts of the towns wore ail activities which
characterised life in Galicia and the Basque provinces
during the fifteenth century and also affected Castile
during the reign of Henry IV* Vet*in the centre and south
of the kingdom,political issues made the recourse to vfci*
tlence something more than mere brigandage* The struc-
sture of royal government and taxation was well artleu*
slated and was the chief object of attack by a nobility
trying to recoup their losses* In an area like Murcia,
for example, the framework of royal government and taxa-
:tion was amputated in favour of the nobility. Hence
the professional mercenaries and noble thugs were drawn,
by a process of clientage and patronage, into political
issues which were * respectable*• Rodrigo de Vi1landrando,
after all, was granted many privileges by a grateful John II
and ended his days as count of Ribadeo and married to a
' o 2
noble woman of the Stuniga family* Yet political issues
entailed armies rather than robber bands and the destruc¬
tive effects on rural society could be correspondingly
greater* In June 1453, for example, a royal official
was sent to the lands round Medinaeeli to assess the
destruction caused by a mixed force of Aragonese,
Navarrese /
1 Torres Fontes, Fajardo* chapters iv»vi, passim.
2 Claros Varones* pp*62»71*
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Navarrese, and Castilians who, led by Mosen Reboiledo,
launched an attack on the Medinaceli and Guadalajara
regions* The results of the inquiry give a grim picture
of brutality, sacking and burning, depopulation, and the
complete destruction of small villages. The sharp drop
in population had still not been fully made up over thirty
years later, and there was a substantial increase in
deserted villages,'
Galicia and the Basque provinces, on the other hand,
were far removed from the central political issues and the
structure of royal government and taxation was extremely
weak. In these areas the nobility could not recoup their
losses by attacking the royal sources of income, since
the^e were not substantial. Instead the depredations of
the nobility in the north were aimed directly against the
peasantry and the Church* Indeed, unlike Castile,
seigneurial reaction and the oppression of the peasantry
in Galicia led to a widespread peasant revolt. The
peasant hermandades of Galicia were associations of the
rural oppressed who directed their fury against the
nobility and their castles. Occasional signs of peasant
unrest during the fifteenth century finally erupted into
armed /
1 See Appendix EE below ^ - *
2 For what follows see Portella Pasos, Galicia en tiemoo
de los Fonsecas (Madrid, 1957), pp.11-27, 42-75 and
Palanco Romero, op.clt»»pp.55,72*4.
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armed uprising In 1467. The bands of peasants attacked
and destroyed over one hundred noble strongholds which
had served as bases for robbers and brigands. In some
cases the revenge of the peasantry was brutal. The
countess of Santa Maria, for example, was hacked to pieces
by her peasantry. But the peasants also aimed to reduce
arbitrary seigneurial dues and taxes to former levels
laid down by custom. In 1467, for example, the hermandad
succeeded in forcing the abolition of some exactions in
the lordships of the archbishop and cathedral chapter of
Santiago.
Faced with widespread peasant uprisings many of the
great nobility of Galicia fled. Some, like the arch*
sbishop of Santiago, went to Portugal but the majority
fled to Castile, The triumph of the Galician hermandad
was short lived. In September 1468, Henry IV and
Isabella settled their differences by the agreement of
Toros de Guisando and the unemployed soldiery of Castile
was immediately used by the Galician nobility to crush
resistance in the north. By the end of 1469* the Galician
nobility had re-established themselves and the seigneurial
reaction was once more in full swing. The cry of 'Cong
live the king and death to the caballeros* was silenced.
4) /
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4) The Structure of Pam Politics
II is difficult to describe the rolationship between
government and society succinctly. Society in fifteenth
century Castile was not feudal, the monarchy was not a
feudal monarchy, and the laws governing society were not
feudal laws. To apply the term 'bastard feudalism* to
Castile would be misleading,if only because of the absence
of contracts of indenture and an earlier 'legitimate*
feudal ism.
Government, in fact, worked on a basis of patronage.
The king claimed absolute royal power and there was a
remarkable growth in the royal bureaucracy, but the king
still had to secure co-operation in order to govern.
To secure Co-operati on the king had at his disposal grants
of lordships and titles, cash and pensions, offices in
central and local government, monopolies over certain
economic activities, and substantial influence over the
disposal of church patronage. All these rewards and
grants could be used by the monarchy to gain both service
and obedience from the nobility. The Mbro do Asientoe
of John II'e reign, for example, was drawn up by royal
officials in a manner which allowed the workings of the
patronage /
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patronage system to be seen at a glance.* The great
nobility, however, exerted political pressure on the
monarchy in order to acquire pensions and privileges.
What were the bonds which served to unite the nobles of
the various political groupings?
i) Political groupings
It is clear that marriage alliances and family ties
were of crucial importance in politics. The great noble-
iraan was not interested in royal absolutism or the cortes.
Anstead he placed his trust in relatives and did his ut¬
most to advance the interests of his family. Thus, for
example, the political struggles of John Il's reign were
largely caused by the actions of Ferdinand of Antequera
who deliberately pushed his children into commanding
positions throughout the peninsula. The point is well
made by Fernan Perez de Guzman.
Some men held that this infante [Ferdinand
of Antequera] was avaricious because he
secured the order of Santiago for the
Infante mriqus and the order of Alcantara
Tortile Infante Sancho. These opinions are
easily dismissed, for experience shows that
every member of the great nobility who gains
power or becomes a favourite, takes as much
as possible for himsdf in the way of titles,
offices, and vasal log.
This /
1 See Appendix L where inf ormat ion on noble income is
arranged more or lets as it is in the original Libro.
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This king of Aragon ~Ferdinand of
Antequera died «** In Igualada and hie
death caused the peace and tranquility of
Castile to be disturbed* He died at the
age of thirty four* The sons he left
behind were don Alfonso* who today reigns
in Aragon, don Juan, king of Navarre, the
Infante don Enrique, master of Santiago,
the infante don Pedro, who died from canon
shot at the seige of Naples, and the
Infante don Fancho, master of Alcantara,
who died shortly before his father* His
daughters were dona *"aria, queen of Castile,
and dona Leonor, queen of Portugal* Hence
his sons and daughters gained possession
of the four kingdoms of -pain**
Marriages, of course, were arranged with economic
as well as political prospects being kept firmly in mind*
When, in 1420, the Infante Enrique threw all his political
weight into the struggle to gain the hand of John II's
sister, his main objective was a dowry which would include
the vast marquisate of Villena* <-*ften, however, marriages
were aimed chiefly at creating political alliances* The
result was that political problems involved an extra*
{ordinary ramification of family relationships * If the
political narrative is seized at any particular point the
ramifications appear at once*
The year is 1442* Alvaro de Luna has been exiled
from the court and the king of H*varrc and some of the
Castilian nobility have gained power* But
* * * the /
1 Generaciones, pp#28-9»
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• •« the king .John II of Castiltj began to
place greater trust in the admiral than in
any of the others and, as a result, the
king of Navarre was extremely annoyed.
The count of Castro, since he was a very
prudent noble and knew that the king of
Navarre was annoyed about the admiral's
close relationship to the king, said to
himi *My lord, it grieves me greatly to
see you vexed that the king relies more on
the admiral than on any other noble. If
you look at the matter properly you will
see that there is no one in Castile whom
you can trust more * both because of his
relationship to you and because of the love
for your service which he has always shown.
To put a quick end to theee problems and to
be certain of the admiral and all his re*
slatives, who are the greatest men In the
kingdom of Castile and whose lead everybody
follows, you should in sty opinion marry dona
Juana, hie daughter, and his lordship the
infante should marry dona Beatris, sister of
the count of Benavente, In this way, my
lord, you can be sure of the admiral and his
relatives and they can be sure of you,
The importance of such matrimonial alliances was clear to
the count of Castro* Aftsr all,it was during this very
period that the admiral was using his influence against
the party of the infantes of Aragon, led by the king of
Navarre, in order to persuade the king to give the arch*
{bishopric of Toledo to his nephew, Garcia de Osorio*
The count of Castro supported the claims of the candidate
of the infante of Aragon for the archbishopric partly, at
least, because he himself wae influenced by family ties.
His itdfile, Sancho de Bojas, had been a close supporter of
the /
1 Cron.Juan II, pp.606*7,
2 Ibid, ppj&07*B»
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the king of Navarre's father, Ferdinand of Antequara,
and had be an rewarded with the archbishopric of Toledo,
The archbishop's support for the Aragonese party had been
inherited by his nephews,* It was natural, therefore, that
the count should advise the king of Navarre to arrange a
political marriage. This was sound advice. After the
king of bavarre's marriage to Juana Lnr(quea * a marriage that
produced Ferdinand the Catholic - the admiral provided
valuable and consistent support for the Aragonese party,
Such a marriage provided the king of Navarre with perman*
2
;ent political allies within the kingdom of Castile,
This was a pattern that was repeated throughout the ranks
of the nobility. The count of Castro's unwavering support
of the Ar&gonese party's cause, for example, resulted in a
series of confiscations and exiles which he counterbalanced,
not only by gaining lands and titles in the Crown of Aragon,
3
but also by marrying a Valencian noblewoman.
Family ties helped to strengthen political bonds,
but the great nobility also negotiated political alliances
with each other for specific purposes. These wore alii*
lances made between the leaders of different political
groupings /
1 See in general Gcneracioaea p,56 and in particular I,
Garcia Ramila, Eatudlo del burgal6s ilustre, don Diego
Gotaea de bandoval (Burgos, 1953), pp,13«49, """
2 SeePuigar* s" interesting comments, Ciaroa Varorvea ,pp.26«7,
3 Garcia i-amila, op,clt.,pp,32.35*9,48 and Generaciones.
pp,87-8,
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groupings* The leagues and federations of the great
nobility, therefore, tended to be the result of a mixture
of hard bargaining between independent noble leaders and
natural alliances resulting from close family ties. In
1460, for example, some of the ^astilian nobility, led by
Archbishop Carr i 1 lo, formed a league which ostensibly aimed
•to reform the evils of Castile*The formation of this
league was watched anxiously by Juan Pacheeo, Henry IV*s
favourite, and the king of Aragon, John II (formerly king
of Navarre), who both sensed a threat to their interests.
Family ties were set to work. Pacheco, fearing an alll-
:anee between the Castilian nobility and the king of
Aragon, tried to safeguard his own position at court by
having his brother, Pedro Giron, master of Calatrava,
join the league. The leaders of the league, including
the admiral, feared the consequences of defeat and wished
to have the support of Aragon. Consequently John II of
Aragon was asked to join the league by his father-in-law,
the admiral. Pacheco and Giron were brothers. John
II of Aragon, as we have ssen, was the son-in-law of the
admiral. These family ties help to explain the actions
of Git6n and the adhesion of John 21 of Aragon to the
ler, gue /
1 For what follows see Benito Ruano, Toledo, pp.85-6,
note 6,
league* *et they were slender ties with which to bind
the members of the league as a whole* Hence the basis
of the alliance had to be negotiated in advance. For
his part, the king of Aragon agreed to give refuge to the
members of the league if defeat should result in their
expu1sion from Castile* He al so promised to provide them
with suitable sources of income to maintain their status
during any period of exile* In return, the leaders of
the league swore to restore to the king of Aragon and
his supporters those mercedes which they had held in
Castile during the period when the Aragonese party had
held power* This last point, however, needed to be
qualified* Pacheco and Giron had gained from the con-
tfiscations of the wealth of the Aragonese party, yet
Giron was now attached firmly to the league. Conse-
fquently, it was agreed that the restoration of the king
of Aragon*s incomes in Castile should not include any
form of wealth held by Giron and Pacheco. in short,
the leaders of this Castilian 'league of the Common Weal*
had to arrange a harmony between their conflicting and
selfish interests before political operations could
commence* In their desire to gain extra sources of




Political alliances were made between manbers of the
great nobility who were leaders of their own political
groupings* What was the nature of the ties which bound
the great noble and his followers together? The king was
the greatest patron but he was not the only one. The
grouping of clients in support of a great noble patron
was a feature which contemporaries recognised, even if
only in vague descriptive terms,* The master of C-alatrava,
Gonzalo Nunez de Guzman, for example,
acquired great status, reputation and fame.
He had great men in his following and some
who did not live with him. but received
money from him each year,*
Lesser nobles or clients who entered the service of a
great lord were rewarded from the lord's patronage re*
:sources, Patronage webs covered the towns and churches,
and the great nobility also enjoyed a political influence
which could be used to gain offices and rewards at court
for their supporters.
These patron-client groupings were extremely flexible.
Homage was not usually rendered by a client to his great
noble patron and oaths seem only to have been used to bind
political /
1 Much of what follows on patrons and clients owes a great
deal to studies on French and Lnglish history: see, in
particular, J, Russell Major, 'The Crown and the Aristo-
:cracy in Renaissance France1, A.H.R., lxi(1964),631-45,
Later medieval Castilian political history has not been
analysed along these lines,
2 Generaciones, p.50. For detailed descriptions of the
exceptionally large clientage grouping of Alvaro de Luna,
®e® Gron.Luna, pp.67*8 and Ref.Halconero. p.167,
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political alliances between the great noble leaders.
The patron, moreover, did not always provide any regular
payments of rewards for his supporters. The monarchy
and the military orders, it is true, made payments of
tierra which were remarkably like money fiefs and some
of these payments were distributed by the great nobility
to their clients. Yet tierra payments lacked the form-
Jality of money fiefs and they only formed one of the
many rewards of the patronage system. -Rather than
regular payments or money fiefs, the essence of the
patron-client relationship was the service of the client
in return for the favour of his lord in securing rewards.
A great nobleman's clients and supporters expected rewards
and received them in much the same way as the great nobles
received their income from the Crown. The relationship
was, of course, a matter of mutual agreement and benefit
which could be terminated if either party felt aggrieved,
Vhen, for example, the Infante ^nrique acted in a high
handed fashion against the toridores of Toledo in 1429,
they wrote him a bitter letter and 'they let him know that
they no longer wished to be his or receive tierra. stipends
or any other payments from his revenues',*
The /
1 Cron.Juan II. p.456. This chapter of the chronicle gives
& good description of the workings of the clientage
groupings.
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Hie success and prestige of the great noble conditioned
the extent to which he could win support. The great noble
could gain support in the expectation of possible rather
than actual control over new sources of patronage: yet
failure to provide for such expectations could lead to a
disastrous loss of prestige and support. Such was the
case of Pedro Wanrique who, according to some men, 'did
not have enough power and authority to enable him to
satisfy so iaany and great men or, when by chance he did
acquire power, they were not satisfied*• In general
terms the granting of favours and rewards meant that if
the great nobility gained substantial wealth from the
monarchy they, in their turn, alienated a good deal of
their wealth to their supporters, Ferdinand of Ante-
squera, for example, 'was always in debt. The lands
he held in Castile, together with income which he acquired
from his position as regent, brought him more than 180,000
florin® in Castile, But he granted out more than 200,000
florins in tierras and mantenirnientos with the result that
2
he remained in debt and pawned the jewels of his carnara*,
ii) /
1 Generaclonea, p, 84 ,
2 Cited by JT^'orres Fontes, *La regencia de don Fernando
de Antequera', A,£,M,,1(1964),p,383,
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ii) Howards and cl ientajge
Patrons rewarded their supporters from a wide range
of resources which they captured from the Crown, the
Church, and the towns. The granting of lands and titles
served to bind a man like Diego Cornea de Sandoval to his
patron, the 1 nfante Juan, In theory such grants were
issued by the king of Castile, but in practice man recog-
:nised that others were disposing of royal patronage.
f j $
Fornan Perez de Guzman, for example, leaves no doubt as
to who actua 1 ly made Diego Gomez de Sandoval a count and
directly links his fortunes to that of the Aragonese
party:
When his father died he inherited very little
wealth but the king of dragon {Ferdinand of
Antequeral , when he governed Castile, greatly
enhanced his power with vasallos and offices.
Later the king of Navarre, his son, gave him
the condado of Castro in Castile and Denia and
Ayora in Aragon, in this way he became one
of the greatest nobles of Castile,*
This succinct account accurately depicts the dependence
of the count's fortunes on the Aragonese party. As early
as 1412, Sandoval was given the lordship of kerma by
Ferdinand of Antequera in return for military support in
Aragon against the count of Urgel, In 1455 Diego G&mez
de Sandoval, count of Castro since 1426, died in exile in
his /
* Ceneracionest pp»87-8,
2 Garcia""Hami "fa, op.cit»,P,19,
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his Valencian lordships o£ Denia, Javea, and Ayora which
1
his patron, the king of Navarre, had given him in 1431*
during his lifetime his patron's great enemy, Alvaro de
Luna, had disposed of royal patronage in a similar fashion
2
by creating at least half a dozen counts*
Inevitably, in their attacks on the royal resources
of patronage, the nobility concentrated a good deal of
attention on acquiring offices in church and state for
their clients. As the example of don hodrigo de Pimentel
and the order of Santiago has shown, control of a military
order implied control of a formidable machine of patronage.
The encomiendas of the militax-y orders could provide their
holders with a substantial income of between 70,000 and
400,000 ore per year.* isoreover, the comendador and the
bishop were also powerful figures in local and regional
politics. It was, after all, only natural that a &endo*a
'/
should be bishop of Biguenu^ and a Figueroa bishop of
Badajoz since these sees lay in regions dominated by
4
these families. Hence, as with the royal finances,
noble and ecclesiastical power tended to fuse together
at the local level.
The introduction of clients into key offices in
church /
1 Ibid* p.48.
2 1ee Halconero. p,l?9»
3 See above |>\>. 322-0 . /
4 See Tarsicio, Piece ion, pp.43,78,82.
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church and state strengthened the control of the great
noble leaders* When Ferdinand of Antequera secured the
archbishopric of Toledo for francho de P.ojas, and when
AJvaro de Luna did the same for his brother, it was clearly
expected that these men should throw their new prestige
into the support of their patrons. Moreover, hardly any
office was unworthy of attention. In 1447, for example,
the count of Castro held the office of the 3«cret seals
with a salary of 12,000 mrs per year and Pedro de Guaraan,
besides holding 102,200 tars per year from the Crown in
tierra and mercedes. held the office of alguacil i:ayor of
Seville with a salary of 28,000 mrs per yea.r»* Even a
clerkship of the exchequer wag worthy of attention and the
royal documents sometimes indicate clearly the determining
influence of the patron in such appointments. On the 20th
of February 1446, for example, Alfonso XII, the puppet of
Piraentel and other great nobles, wrote to his contadores
taayores?*
My wish is that the 6,480 mrs of racion
which Ruy Fernandas of Jaen, inhabitant of
Madrid, held from me as clerk of the exchequer
and the 3,000 ara of qujtacion attached to the
same office and" the 3,000 tars which he held
for two lances, are to be given and held #»*
each year for life by Francisco del Castillo,
servant of don Rodrigo Pimente.1, count of
Benavente, and a member of council, inns*
:usuch as the said Ruy Fernandas is dead,2
It /
1 Fuarez, Libro, pp.340,367i A.M.E,,caja 1447*8, noialaa
de lo ordinario,
"I X.G.S.,£xp,Hac.,leg. 1, doc. 167. For a description of
a distribution of minor offices by Luna to his clients
see Halconero. p.163,
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It is clear that not all clients were drawn front
the ranks of the nobility and that clientage spread into
the lower regions of royal and urban admiais(ration. The
fact was that a noble like the count of Castro never act*
dually did any work in the royal chancery, despite the
office he held, and that the necessary political penetra*
stion of the royal framework of government, both at the
centre and in the localities, could only be achieved by
including adminia trators, civil servants, and patrician
oligarchs within the patronage system.
The great nobility certainly managed to instal or
acquire clients in posts in the central royal administra*
stion, although the extent of those 'placements' cannot
be assessed with any degree of accuracy* Certainly many
of the lesser offices • for example clerkships of the royal
exchequer - were held by servants of the great nobility,*
The key offices - those of the royal secretaries, contadores
ma yores, and oidores of the royal audiencia » were harder
to acquire since the monarchy naturally controlled thera
closely, Alvaro de Luna's political domination in John
II*« /
1 The following, for example, held offices as escribanos
de c^marai* Gonzalo Gonzalez Capoche, secretary of
the arcKEishop of Toledo; f'edro Alfonso de Aguilar,
secretary of the Infante Lnriquej Anton Gonsilez de
Almonte, secretary ol the duke of Medina Sidonia, See
documents for the years 1431,1443,1450 and 1455 in B.N.#
MS., 13018, fol,224it; A.G.S. ,E.M,R,, leg,2,no,27 | A.D.M.,
Ale,Due,,leg.55,docs.36,39.
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II1 s reign is, perliaps, foes t explained in terms of his
success in placing his clients in these key offices. Luna,
unlike the infantea of Aragon, for long enjoyed the com¬
plete confidence of the king and there was, therefore, no
apparent conflict between the king and the constable when
such appointments were made. Nevertheless, by placing
his clients in these offices, Alvaro de Luna tightened hie
hold on the royal administration, Diego Gonzalez de
Toledo, for example, became oidor. rofereadario, contador
mayor de cuentaa, and a member of the royal council.
Another of Luna's clients, Ruy Garcia de Villalpando, be-
2 *
• came an oidor and a member of the royal council, Fernan
/ V
Lopex de f'aldana, 'servant and cro-ture of the constable',
became contador mayor and at various times held other
3
offices in the roy^Jt chancery and king's household,
Alfonso Perez de Vivero, brought up as a page and camarero
in Luna's household, rose in the royal administration to
the high rank of royal secretary, contador mayor, and royal
counci1 lor
The same examples of Luna clients can be used to
demonstrate the extension of patronage into the towns,
Alvaro de Luna and his son were themselves successful in
acquiring /
1 See above
2 He was already an oidor in 1425 and remained in high office
until Luna's downfall in 1453.
3 Fernan Lopez de uuldana was another of the many Luna
clients who were promoted to high office after the purge
of 1429. On hie promotion and relationship to Luna see
Cron.Luna. p.71 and the accusations of the Aragonese
party in B.N.,MS,,13105, fols.23R-28R.
4 A useful summary of his career in Donapetry, Historia
de Vivero, pp.159-69.
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acquiring the offices of alcalde cayor and alKuacil mayor
of Toledo respectively. r*uy Garcia de Villapando held
the 1 ieufctmancy of the alcaldxa a*ayor of Toledo and later
became aais tente.* Diego Goriaalea de Toledo's brother,
^'ero Franco, was treasurer of the royal mint in Toledo and
*
2
Alfonso Franco, as we have seen, held the office of reuidor.
Fernan Lopes de Saldana was given charge of the royal
dockyards of Seville, where his father already held the
office of regidor. and Alfonso Peres de Vivero was taade
3
laayordomo perpetuo of beville.
On the whole, however, power in the towns continued
to lie in the hands of the great nobility. These nobles,
as alguaciles ma/ores and alcalaes ■aayorea, received hand-
:some salaries which distinguished them clearly from the
rank and file of the patrician oligarchs who were often
their clients. The attraction of the political and
financial opportuaiiies offered by the towns,goes far in
helping to explain the apparently confusing pattern of
local politics. The struggles between the Ponce de Leon
and Guzman families to secure political domination over
the town of Levilie were similar to other conflicts in
Toledo, Avila, Palencia, Burgos, and h-urcia. Inevitably,
such /
1 Benito Kuano, Toledo. pp.30*1,77#
2 See above ty.uw-2..
3 See A.14.S. ,ca ja 142£*9.no»u»a de qui lactones and caja
1449-50, royal letter dated 29tli April 1448,
4 See ^enito Kuano, Toledo, pp.148-52 and Palanco Homero,
op.cit..pp.41—9.
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such struggles became linked to the problems of court
politics and also caused division among the officeholders
of the urban oligarchies* The fact was that the great
nobility were both a court nobility and an urban nobility*
Holding royal pensions and mercedes they depended on the
court for much of their income* even if they did not re*
<side in a court which was perpetually on the move*
Finally* aa might be expected* pensions and mercedes
of royal revenues also figured prominently in the rewards
which patrons distributed to their clients* It is im¬
possible to give an accurate assessment of the extent
to which royal privileges were re-alienated by patrons to
their clients* Moreover* even if such an estimate could
be made it would fail to account for royal privileges
granted directly to the client at the instigation of the
great noble** The evidence for individual transactions*
however* abounds. The Infante Juan* for example* re¬
garded Diego Gomea de andovai's support in 1420 by re-
alienating to him 50*000 florins per year which he held
from the Crown* The allegiance of a town might be
similarly confirmed or acquired by a judicious grant of
money* In March 1442* for example* the king of Navarre
and the *nfante Enrique secured their position in Toledo
by /
1 But see, for example* the figures for the king of
Navarre's extensive re-alienations of roercedes and
amntenimientos in L.B'uarez Fernandez, 'Mas rentas
castellanas del infante don Juan* rey de Navarra y
de Aragon'* Hisp.,xix(1959)» 192-204,
2 Garcfa Ramila* op.cit,,p.34,
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by renouncing inercedes of 30,000 rara and 40,000 tara per
year to the alcaide mayor of the town, Pero Lopez de
Ayala.1 These were mercedea which were held from the
Crown but - as with all such raercedes - the holders could
freely renounce or sell them.
In return for these rewards the great nobility ex¬
pected loyal service from their clients. The actions
of the count of Castro after the defeat of the infantes
of Apagon in 1429, for example, showed a shrewd blend of
loyalty to his patrons and self interest. The count
remained within the kingdom, continued to inform the
infantes on political developments, refused to surrender
the areas and castles under his control, and imposed
personal peace terms on John II of Castile which stipulated
that he could not be summoned for any military offensive
against his patrons. At the same time, however, the
count succeeded in guaranteeing that his incomes from the
2
Castilian Crown continued to be paid.
Clients placed in the royal bureaucracy were also
expected to serve the interests of their patrons as well
as those of the king. In 1444, for example, John II's
wife died and secret arrangements were made for a Franch
marriage. Moa en Diego de Valera was ordered to collect
secret /
1 Benito Ruano, Toledo, p.22 note 26.
2 Garcia liamila, op.cit. .pp. 30-2 and Cron.Juan 11. pp.
456-7,481.
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secret letters at court and to present himself to the
royal secretary, Pedro Fernandez de Lorca, in order to
obtain the necessary cash for his diplomatic mission in
France. The secretary, however, was one of Alvaro de
Luna's clients and immediately passed all the information
to his exiled patron who was desperately anxious to arrange
a Portuguese marriage. In the event John II married
Isabel of Portugal.* The actions of Pedro Fernandez de
Lorca illustrate the way In which a client was expected
to serve his patron. Indeed, one of the chronicles records
a speech by Alvaro de Luna in which the constable ecapha»
:sised that these were the very qualities which he expected
2
his clients in the royal administration to display.
The existence of clientage on a large scale could
produce a certain stability and cohesion in political
groupings. At court, for example, Alvaro de Luna's
control of the royal bureaucracy was so well established
over a considerable period of time that
not only were all matters relating to the
royal revenues, treasures, offices of the
household and judicial matters of the
kingdom decided by his ordinance, but nothing
at all was done without his command. For
although writs, sentences, assignments,
privileges and gifts were granted in the
king's name and signed by him, yet the
secretaries did not write, nor the king
sign, nor the chancellor seal, nor the
letters have any effect or application
without the constable's approval.
Similarly /
1 See Diego de Valera's own account of this episode in
Cron.abreviado, p.314.
2 See Cron.Luna, p.315.
3 Generaciones, pp.120-1.
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Similarly in the localities the web of patronage and
alliances allowed the great nobility to drag the towns
into their political movements, In 1440, for example,
the rebellion directed against Alvaro de Luna gained the
support of many of the town controlling nobility, with the
result that Toledo, Avila, Segovia, Zamora, Valladolid,
Burgos, Plasencia and Guadalajara joined the forces of
the opposition.*
5) Conclusions on the Causes and Chronology of Political
Instability
i) John II and Henry IV
An able king who used patronage judiciously could
ensure co-operation from most of the great nobility and
royal government could be seen to work effectively. If
the king was weak the use of patronage could seriously
impair royal power. The difference, perhaps, lay between
rewards which were granted in return for faithful service
under an able king, and the extensive bribes which a weak
king granted when faced with open or implied threats of
political rebellion. If the king was a minor or politi¬
cally inept, royal patronage and income could fall into
the /
1 Benito Ruano, Toledo, p.149.
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the hands of particular factions or individuals*
Seen in this light, the minority of John II and the
political incompetence of Henry IV were both important
factors in accounting for the political instability in
Castile during the fifteenth century* John II's minority
allowed Ferdinand of Antequera, even after he became king
of Aragon, to use the patronage resources of the Castilian
monarchy in order to forward the interests of his family
and supporters, I3y the time John 11 was old enough to
rule, the various members of the Aragoneae party were
solidly entrenched in political power and had control of
many of the resources of royal patronage. The assault
by the king and Alvaro de Luna on the power of the
Aragonese party inevitably caused a political crisis if
only because of the extent of the pensions, privileges,
and offices which were at stake* The king of Navarre
alone, as has been seen, had sums of approximately
3,000,000 tors and 7,500,000 cars at stake during the two
decisive points of the struggle, in 1429 and 1444, when
the Infantes of Aragon were expelled from the kingdom.*
The very power of the infantes of Aragon made the
task of monarchical recovery in Castile extremely diffic¬
ult, So too did the strategic factors involved. To
a /
1 See Appendices H, I, and GG for Navarre's Income and
for the chronology of political events*YV'^'
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ft certain extent the problems posed by the Infante Juan'i
control of royal income provided the Castillan monarchy
with an advantage in that the infante, anxious to retain
his mereedea. invariably preferred to negotiate rather
than fight on the battlefield. Indeed it was Alvaro de
Luna who, time and again, tried to force a decisive battle
which would crush the Aragoneae party completely. The
Infante Enrique, on the other hand, relied less on income
which he held from the Crown, His power lay in his
control of the military order of Santiago and in the
peripheral areas of the kingdom to which he could retreat
when outmanoeuvred at court or in battle. Doth infantes,
moreover, enjoyed refuge and support in the kingdoms of
Navarre and Aragoa, The political crisis of John II's
reign was, therefore, an international diplomatic struggle
as well as an Internal problem of power politics. Both
Aivaro de Luna and, later, Henry IV sought the support of
Portugal in order to redress the balance against Ax-agon.*
The task i facing John II and Alvaro de Luna was,
therefore, threefold. In the first place,they had to
expel the Aragonese party from the central basis of power
at court. Secondly, they had to secure effective control
over peripheral areas of the kingdom which could serve as
bases /
1 See Sua res, Los Trastamaras. pp,80-1,85-7,91-2,106,
108-17,124-6,187,305-^
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bases for a counter-attack on the monarchy. Finally,
they had to construct a diplomatic alliance against
Aragon. This task was largely achieved by 144$ and the
decisive battle of Oimedo. By this date the ^nfante
Enrique had been crushed, the order of Santiago had passed
to Alvaro de buna, and royal authority was accepted in
almost all areas of the kingdom. Moreover the mis takes
of 1429 were not repeated. In that year also the Aragonese
party had been defeated, the leaders driven into exile, and
their revenues confiscated. Subsequently, when Aragonese
and Cass ti1ian diplomats met to discuss the possibility of
compensation for these revenues, John II and Alvaro de
Luna prolonged Renegotiations until they broke down.
Such a line of action was an open invitation for the
infantes of Aragon to recover their power by armed inter-
svention. After the battle of Qlraedo in 1445, however,
a negotiated settlement as signed 3,500,000 mrs per year
to the king of Navarre.* This was a considerable sum of
money. Yet the opponents of the monarchy had been
decisively beaten and the payments could be stopped at
any given moment* The price of the pension was the king
of Navarre*s abstention from Castillan politics.
That the prolonged crisis of John II'a reign ended
in a victory for the Crown was due as much to the grim
determination /
1 buarez Fernandez, ubl supra, p.195,
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determination of the king and his favourite as to the
disunity displayed by the infantes of Aragon, Both John II
and Alvaro dc Luna were endowed with the qualities necessary
for such a struggle. The king, motivated by greed, could
at times show a remarkable ruthlessness in attacking
opponents and confiscating their possessions,* His
favourite, on the other hand, possessed considerable poli¬
tical acumen and military skill. Both men countered the
power and pretensions of the infantes by stressing the
majesty of the king and by launching a policy of absolu-
:tis/m. The reign of John II, therefore, was not one
which was marked only by noble anarchy. On the contrary,
the crises were partly of the monarchy's own making and
are evidence of a deliberate policy to restore a royal
power which had been seriously compromised during a long
minority.
The reign of Henry IV provided a marked contrast to
that of John II, Unlike John 12, Henry IV was not a
minor when he ascended the throne of Castile, Moreover,
he inherited a situation in which royal authority appeared
to be firmly established. The Aragoness party had been
defeated /
1 Many contemporaries believed that the downfall of men
like Pernan Alfonso de nobles and Alvaro de Luna was
prompted as much by royal greed as by other motives.
This belief is supported by documentary evidence: see,
for example, C.Espejo, 'El leones Fernand Alfon de
ftob£es*, B.S,E.C..iii(1907-8).170-75.177-84 and above,
pp.161-2 where my calculations of Luna's income are
based on surveys carried out at John II's command.
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defeated aad the great nobility deprived of effective
leaders. Alvaro de Luna himself had been executed and,
whatever the personal motives involved, John II had pub*
:licly justified the execution by arguing that his favour*
site had usurped royal powers*
Henry IV, however, lacked the will to govern* Time
and again he failed to press home an attack on his enemies
when he was in a commanding position* The king*s indeci¬
sion and lack of resolve led to failure and the loss of
supporters, Henry IV'a weakness was made clear to him, for
example, in an episode In 1464 which is justly famous. In
September of that year, the rebel nobility published a
manifesto throughout the kingdom which contained a most
virulent attack on the person of the king* Keary IV was
accused of protecting the heathen, despising the Church,
manipulating the coinage, perverting justice, and surrend¬
ering his person and powers to be It ran de la Cueva* For
the first time the rebels publicly alleged that Juana was
illegitimate and that Menry IV was not her father* They
demanded that prince Alfonso should be recognised as heir
to the throne and claimed the right to resort to arms if
their demands were not accepted. At this Stage Henry IV
enjoyed considerable support from the nobility and towns
and /
537 «
and a vigorous royal offensive was both desired and
expected. The king summoned a council meeting to consider
the insulting manifesto and decide on a course of action*
The first to speak at the council meeting was Lope de
Barrientos, bishop of Cuenca, who had been on© of the ablest
councillors of John II, His advice contained that blend
of calculated realism and principle which had character!-
tsed royal policies during John II*s reign. The king was
God* s anointed and the rebels were traitors. The king
relied on trtith and justice whereas the rebels relied on
duplicity. The king had the advantage in the balance of
power since he was richer, more powerful and better suppor-
J ted than his enemies who lacked support and resources and
were disliked by the people, In these circumstances the
king should not come to any arrangement with the rebels
but should, at all costs, confront them in battle. The
bishop's advice was not to Henry IV's liking.
And since fighting and the rigour of arms
was foreign to the king's temperament and
hateful to his disposition, he turned to
the bishop and said rather sharplyt
•Those of you who do not have to
fight or set your hands to arms always dispose
freely of the lives of other people, 16
it really your wish, my lord bishop, that
battle be waged at all costs so that men on
both sides perish? It is well seen that
those who have to fight in battle are not
your sons and that it cost you nothing to
raise them, I would have you know that
this matter must be dealt with in a different




Then the bishop, a bold man, answered
him impatiently!
♦I have already noticed, Sire, and I
now see that your highness does not wish
to reign in peace or retain the freedom of
a king. Since you do not wish to defend
your honour or avenge outrages, you mast
not expect to reign with fame and glory.
Therefore, T must tell you that from this
point on you will be reputed the most abject
king who ever reigned in Spain and you will
regret these lost opportunities when you no
longer have a choice.* *
The bishop's words were prophetic. The king's
decision to negotiate was disastrous and within a year
his effigy was dethroned and kicked to the ground in the
ceremony at Avila. Henry IV, inclined by nature to buy
political support, now had to compete with Alfonso XII.
'I declare arid give my royal worcP, Henry IV
told the papal legate, 'that from this
moment on if they [ the supporters of Alfonso
XI lj return to my service as my natural
subjects, not only do I wish to forgive
them but 1 also wish to grant them mercedea
and enlarge their fortunes'.*
In this competition to buy political support all the re-
ssources of royal patronage were used and the monarchy
had cl arly lost control of the political situation*
ii) The crisis In noble income
The personalities and abilities of John II and Henry
IV are important factors which have to be considered in
any /
1 Croa, :;nrlaue IV.. pp.139-9. See also Snares, Loa
Trastaiaaras, pp.256-67.
2 Cited by Benito Huano, Toledo, p.149.
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any analysis of fifteenth century politics* Vet these
points only acquire a real significance when they are
placed in the context of political and economic chron*
tology* After ail, the reign of John II was not one
of unqualified success and the reign of Henry IV was not
one of unmitigated political disaster* In 1445 John II
decisively crushed his enemies at the battle of ulinedo
and the intricate political conspiracies of the great
nobility seemed to have come to an end* Vet,within
four years,the populace of Toledo introduced a new ele*
:ment into politics when they unleashed their fury against the
conversos and tax collectors* The nobility were quick to
seise the opportunity and turn the uprising into a re*
*bellion against the drown. From this point on the
political history of Castile contained an explosive mix*
rture of noble intrigue and popular unrest* Yet complete
anarchy was not unleashed at Henry IV'i accession to the
throne in 1454* The chronicler £ernando del Pulgar
emphasised the differences between the first and second
decades of lienry ZV(s reign and historians have also
trade the same point. Within the general context of in*
I stability during Henry IV4s reign* the last ten years
were infinitely more disastrous than the first ten*^
Political /
1 See Cl&ros Varones, pp.9-20 and 1"arsicio, Isabel. pp*52-9*
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Political instability, in other words, kept pace with
deteriorating economic conditions.
In general terms the crisis in the great nobility's
income is central to the political history oi all this
period. As has been seen, brigandage and war enabled
the rural nobility to recoup their fortunes to a certain
extent. The same crisis faced the great nobility - yet
here the process was more complex, faced with civil
arid international wars, the later medieval Castilian
monarchy found it only too easy to escape the short term
effects of financial crisis by debasement of the coinage.
In the long run this merely aggravated the relationship
between the Crown and those living on fixed incomes, and
throughout this period this included many of the great
nobi1ity,
It lias been argued in this study that it is mis*
:leading to assume that a catalogue of lands, titles,
and lordships is a reliable indicator of the wealth and
sources of income of the various noble families and
ecc les iastical and urban institutions. The existence
of these lordships did not mean that the lords exploited
the land by demesne farming. It is probable, remembering
the experience of other areas of western Europe, that
such a situation had arisen in the fourteenth century,
as /
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as a consequence of the black Death, whan labour short*
lages and a fall in demand encouraged the commutation of
services and the leasing out of demesne land. The lack
of demesne exploitation, static seigaeurial duos, and
long leases created an unfavourable situation for the
great nobility which was aggravated by debasements and
devaluations* wily strong monarcha, such as John XX and
Ferdinand and Isabella, could break out of the vicious
circle by resorting to forced loans and the confiscation
of church plate. \>eak kings, like Henry IV, rendered
the vicious circle yet more vicious by continuous debase*
Jment s« *
The crisis in noble wealth was a crucial factor in
motivating the politics of the great noble families* It
is true that the chief criterion for assessing nobility
was birth* Yet it is equally true that the chief crite¬
rion for determining status within the ranks of the
nobility was wealth and power* 'In these days', wrote
Fernan Perez tie tiuzman, 'he who is richest is most noble*
So why should we look in the book of lineages when we will
2
find that their nobility lies in their wealth*'
It /
1 For example John II in 1429, unlike Henry IV at a later
date, eschewed a policy of debasement, confisca ted
church plate and imposed forced loans* A,M.S*,caja
1429 (pedido), for example, contains some 300 folios
on forces! i'o'ans in Seville alone*
2 Generaclones, p*49*
It hag been noted that, from one point of view,
the reign of John II can be interpreted as an absolutist
crusade to restore the power of the monarchy after a long
and debilitating minority. It ha3 also been argued that
the nobility did not oppose the claims made by the king
to wield absolute royal power. Why, then, did the
nobility participate so actively in the political crises?
Fornan ^e'rez de Guaman was in no doubt as to what the real
issues were:
,the greed of the nobility to augment and
enlarge their lands and revenues cannot be
forgiven. Setting aside conscience and love
of patria* they created the conditions which
allowed them to profit, I do not doubt that
it pleased them to have such a king, for
during this turbulent and agitated period the
lively waters of the river could make them rich
fishermen ,,, But during all this period it
could not truly be said that there was any
danger, either in word or deed, to the person
of the king* The truth, if we set aside all
prejudice, is clear. However much the
princes and the other great nobles who followed
them might say that they wished to free the
will of the king from the power of the con*
:stable ... their real motives were to possess
and take over the position of the constable •••
In this way they could enrich their lands and
families* For they knew that as long as the
constable retained his position, they could
not gain their.objectives and so they worked
to remove him.
The quest by the nobility for new sources of income
caused political alliances and clientage groupings to
break down and reform into new patterns with bewildering
speed /
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speed, It was this compulsive search for wealth which
caused Fcrnan Perez de Guzman to reflect that political
ins tabi lity and endless confiscations were the prevailing
features of life in C stile, Alva.ro do Luna, for example,
,,, made the king carry out many and grea t
executions, imprisonments, expulsions, con*
:flocations of wealth, and deaths. In this
he found substantial support because, by-
sharing out among some what he confiscated
from others, he had plenty of helpers. For
the praiseworthy custom of the Ca? til!ans
has reached such a point, that men will
consent to the imprisonment and death of a
friend or relative in order to have a
share in the boo ty>
The fact was that the balance of power in clientage did
not necessarily lie with the patrons. Individual nobles
could and did sell their support in ways which best suited
their own search for income, Moreover, whatever their
social and economic origins, successful clients became
increasingly independent. Thus, even royal officials
who had been * raised from the ground* gained sufficient
power and status to enable them to pursue their own poli¬
tical interests. Their sons received mayorascos or
bishoprics and their daughters married into noble famil-
:ies, The downfall and execution of Alvaro de Luna
was, accordingly, an object lesson in the vagaries of
fortune, Flarly in hi® career, when he was exiled from
the /
1 Ibid, p.136, t
2 See, for example, the cases of Diego Gonzalez de Toledo
and Diego Arias de Avila,above, ^ UGo -
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the royal court in 1427, the constable had been betrayed
by one of his most important clients, the contador mayor
Fernan Alfonso de Tobies.* Years later, in 1453,
while the king was in Burgos, the constable
perceived that Alfonso **'er©as tie Vivero,
whom he had raised from the ground and made
into a very great uian ana placed in an
important position near the king, was working
with the king to achieve hi© disgrace and
ruin and, unable to suffer this, he had
him killed#''
The murder of the royal secretary and contador mayor was
the immediate cause of Alvaro de Luna's imprisonment and
execution#
These were spectacular but by no means isolated
examples oi the breakdown of clientage# Moreover Alvaro
de Luna's fate was not unique, as fernan ^e'res de Lusman
pointed out# 'Many other great and middling men were
ruined# lor Castile finds it easier to acquire new
wealth than to retain wealth already acquired# Often she
destroys those whom she herself has raised up»'^
iii) The fusion of popular injurrection arid noble
intrigue
Towards the middle of the fifteenth century the two
disruptive elements in Castilian politics * noble intrigue
and /
1 C.Lspejo, ubi supra, passim, bee also Fernan *'erea de
Guzman's highly prejudiced treatment of this incident
*n ^cneraeianes. pp» 105-8#
2 Generaclones, pp,126-7# For the circumstances surround¬
ing the murder see ; uares, Los Trastamaras. pp#206-9
and the vivid account in Cron#Luna»"pp#344-60#
3 Oeneraciones» p#88#
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and popular insurrection * fused together to form a new
and far more serious threat to the stability of the king*
Sdom. The example of the rebellion of Toledo in 1449
shows how easily popular grievances could be widened into
a general attack on the court. The rebellion, as has
been seen, began as a popular uprising against tax collec*
1
:tors and converses. Almost immediately a nobleman*
1'ero Saruiiento* intervened and redirected the popular fury
into a broadly based movement against Alvaro de Luna*
This was not a difficult task* since ail that hero
barmiento had to do was identify Alvaro de Luna as the
real perpetrator of all the Hardships suffered by the
populace. The hatred of the conversot and their success,
the burning resentment against taxation and tax officials,
the growing economic hardships suffered by artisans and
peasants, the suspicions of corruption in municipal
government • all these were inextricably linked together
and blamed on Alvaro de Luna* They were also linked to
the decline in the economic fortunes of the greater anJ
le saer nobility. All this was made clear in the reouerl*
ttaiento which Fero hartalen to seat to John 11.
Inasmuch as the said Alvaro de Luna has
sought and found ways to give the said
offices I in church and state]] to infidels
and heretics, enemies of our sacred laws
and of our king and persons and wealth;
so f
| Above \r\-soz-s ■
m Tor what follows generally see the excellent study in
Benito huano, Tolsdo. chapter II passim and the same
author* s, 'La *?;entencia•kstatuto" de ^ero Sanaiento
contra loa conversos Toledanos', A.U.M.. iv( 1957) .277*306.
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bo these people, with hate and enmity and
by virtue of their offices, have usurped
an& taken the lordship which belongs to
the great nobility of your kingdoms and the
greater part of all the wealth oi the true
Christians and all the estates#
Moreover the said A1vara de Luna, your
constable, has found ways by which he farms
your taxes, revenues, and rights to these
heretics and Infidels, using global farms
and identifying his interests with them,
and making you grant unjust and inhuman
laws with the result that your revenues
are farmed for his own fiendish interests.
Many people have been ruined as a result
of this •## and all the estate of the artisans
and labourers is lost.1
Later Pero Sarmiento elaborated the same theme in his
Sentencia*£statuto on Toledan government. The converaos,
Sarmiento alleged, had summoned Alvaro de Luna to their
aid. These were the very converaos who
by means of great swindles and fiauds have
taken, carried off, and stolen, great and
innumerable sums of cars and silver belong*
:i«g to the king, our lord, and to his
revenues, rights and taxes) and have de*
rstroyed and ruined many noble ladies,
caballeros. and hijos dalgoi and coase-
j';uently have onpre9s destroyed, robbed,
and devasted all the vast majority of the
ancient houses arid riehes of the old
Christians of this town, its land and juris*
•.diction, and of all the kingdoms of Castile
... Furthermore, during the period when they
held the public offices? of this town ...
many of the places belonging to the town were
depopulated and destroyed and the lands and
places belonging to the town were alienated
and lost. Moreover, all the mrs of the
revenues and common property of this town
have been eaten up in their interests and
concerns, with the result that all the
possessione and honours of the patria have
been /
1 The complete text is in Benito huano, Toledo, pp.186-90
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been used up and destroyed sad they have
become the mastere In order to destroy* the
holy faith and the old Christians ...
Inethe towns, therefore, popular unrest came to be
used as a weapon against the precarious stability brought
about by political control and clientage. Respite the
careful control which the monarchy imposed on Toledo, for
example, the racial hatred in the town sparked off serious
rebellions against royal authority in 1449 and 1467, By
the 1470s hatred of conversps could be used by nobles of
all political persuasions. In 1473, for example, Juan
facheco ousted Isabella's supporters in Cordoba by deli¬
berately fomenting a popular movement against the coitversoB.
A year later, in Vullabelid, Isabella's supporters sought
popular support by allowing the jjopulace to attack conversos
2
and their property. The monarchy would only escape from
this labyrinth when royal authority itself took the initia¬
tive against the couvcrsos«
fv) The anarchy of the 1460b
The anarchy in Castile coincided with the economic
crisis of the 1460s. It was during these years that the
nobility had their greatest successes in gaining control
of royal revenues and patronage. The search for new
sources /
1 ibid..pp.191-6.
2 fee baer, A History,iI.306-9 and Amador de loe iiios,
op.clt..P»%40«
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sources of income was, of course, not confined to the
latter half of Henry IV*s reign, Yet there was a signifi-
scant difference in the balance of power between the
monarchy and the nobility. At the turn of the fourteenth
century it was still possible for the monarchy to step in
and resume a tax in a lordship which had already been
alienated. Subsequently, during the reign of John II,
the Crown did manage on thawhole to resist noble encroach¬
ments on the central power, The i:amcnse revenues piled
up by the Infante Juan were, after all, confiscated on at
least two occasions.* bith the 1460s, however, there
were two kings both of whom alienated revenues desperately
in attempts to win political support. Not only were
specific revenues alienated but their administration was
2
alienated as well.
From the economic point of view the period from 1460
onwards was one of general and widespread crisis - there
was an almost constant shortage of grain, outbreaks of
plague were frequent enough to be almost continuous and
there was an almost vertical price inflation from 1460
to 1475, is it surprising that this was the period when
price
the nobility, faced with a sharp/rise and inadequate in-
Scome, made their greatest effort to acquire new revenues?
V.hen /
1 In 1429 and 1445.
2 ?ee above pp.173-6.
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When the boy Alfonso was elected king in 1465, his
electors were in fact making a bid for complete control
of all royal wealth. noyal privileges granted by the
boy-king to a uon Juan i~'aeheco or a count of Bonavente
were authorised by a royal council dominated by precisely
these members of the nobility. was during this period
too that monopolies in favour of the great nobility were
established on profitable economic activities,^
The success of the great nobility was not restricted
to their acquisition of central power, for the 1460s saw
the local fabric of royal adminisirat ion crumble before
the onslaught of the nobility. The situation in T'ureia
during the fifteenth century illustrates the process. It
o./Uld hardly oe argued that, prior to the 1460s, the poli¬
tical life of "turcia was marked by stability. Yet,
prior to the 1460s, the struggles for power in ; urcia were
linked to political issues at court and took place within
a context which involves support or opposition to royal
policies," koyal correnidorcs and aaiatentes were sent
to *»ureia and intervened to establish royal control,
hven as late as 146<*, for example, the royal asistente.
Pedro de Castro, was preparing to break the hold of the
nobility over the town government of iuurcia by isolating
the I
1 See above pp.40-1,174.
2 See Torres Pontes, E'ai&rdo, chapter II and especially
pp.35-42.
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the greatest noble, i-euro Fajardo, and replacing the
oligarchy with rcaidoros appointed on an annual basic.
Indeed, the assistente1 s enemies ev©r; alleged that he had
openly declared 'that he would appoint snoamakcrs and
painters as regidores at this town as he had done in the
j
town of beon when he was corretuaor toere , Yet
the 1460e witnessed a complete collapse of royal authority
in Hurcia, The adelantado, fedro fajardo, ruled i-urcia
virtually as if it were an independent kingdom, 'tis
support of Alfonso XI1 gained him the greatest amount of
privileges am left uim free to establish complete control
in Murcia. *tAoreover, after Alfonso Xll's death, he re-
* fused to recognise u«iuy IV as a fug of Castile, deapite
the settlement of the Tores da Cuisando, ^ence, from
the death of Alfonso XI1 until the accession of Isabella,
-*urcia remained without a monarch, Pedro fojaxda, con-
strolling the towns and countryside of murcia, was regarded,
in the words of the actas caprtularaa of the town council
7
of *»urcia, 'almost as a viceroy1 » The situation was
aptly summed up by Fernando del ^ulgar when, in 147 3, he
wrote to the bishop of Corla; -
As /
* pp.50, ei, 92*3.
2 HH«» pp.17-19,99,116-7,
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As far as the kingdom of ^ttrcia is concerned,
1 swear to you, ray lord, that we regard it as
being as foreign to us as the ktnrdom of
Navarre because no letters, messengers,
pracuradorcs, or quaestors, have gone there
from herq or come here from there, for over
five years »•#
Pulgar was not exaggerating the degree of estrangement and
the loos of royal control. All the roycl finances of
the kingdom of bureta during t?ie ton years 1465-1474, for
example, were in the hands of h"edro Fajardo, This was
only one more example of Alfonso XTT'b generous privileges
which, in this case, added over 9,900,f)00 mrs to the
income at 1'edro Fsjardo's disposal. Logically enotigh
the first item of expenditure which Pedro Fajardo incurred
each year was t. sun of A5,000 mrs, payable to hodrigo
Firaentel, count of Benavents, who was one of the boy-king's
principal supporters and counci 1 tors
The degree of itxlependence which Pedro Fajardo
established in Murcia during the 1460s was not much greater
than that established by the groat nobility in other areas
of the kingdom of Castile, Don Fedr ■> Oiron, as the pre-
tabmle to his letters show, enjoyed viceregal power in
Anda! us in :
We, don **edro Giron, by the grace of God
master of the military order of Calatrava,
camarero mayor of the king, our lord don
Alfonso, and a member of his royal council,
and his viceroy (vino Key) appointed and
deputed by his highness for the whole of
Andalusia and its cities, towns, and places,
and /
1 Cit ed ibid ., p,119•
2 Ibid,, p«103 and, for the accounts for these years,
pp,245-62•
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and with powers to take any revenues
belonging to the said lord and king;
and with powers to use such inrs and
spend then in matters convenient to his
service,or in any other matters which
the said king can.do by virtue of his
supreme poorer ♦#*
This was the ideal at which the great nobility aimed • to
wield the absolute royal power of the Crown to their own
financial advantage. Giron was an exception in that he
was theoretically a viceroy. North west of I'urcia, as
we have seen, Ped.ro de Aeuna usurped all royal revenues in
his lordships during the period 1463-1470. In the west,
the whole Neon province of the order of Santiago was under
the control of Rodrlgo ^imentel, count of Benavente, who
di-posed of royal revomi.es as well as the wealth of the
3
order whose titular master wee Alfonso XII, In the east*
on the frontier with Aragon, the count cf '^edinaccli
4
usurped all royal revenues during the period 1464-1475*
In the north, in Gnlicia and the l*asqug provinces, the
royal administrative fabric was always weak and the nobility
turned their attention to plundering the wealth of the
Church, both by usurping the revenues of rectors arid by
launching full scale assaults on such vulnerable bishoprics
v 5
as Tuy, Fondonedo, Lugo, and ^renfsc, In some areas ot
the /
1 Letter ol" 15 Jan. 1465 in Co1. D i p .Carraona. pp.62-3,
2 Above p.170.
3 Above t>j>. 32o - x
4 Above p.170.
5 Above pp.255-6,2b3 and Fortela Pazos, Galicia en tiempo
de los FonsecAS, pp.73-5.
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the kingdom, a semblance of royal authority remained.
Yet this semblance of royal authority was purchased at
a high price* In 1468, for example* Henry IV regained
nominal control over Toledo* In practice* however*
authority in Toledo remained with I'ero Lopez do Ayala
whose support was bought for a merced of 1,000*000 mrs
per year, half the revenues of the royal mint of Toledo
for life, the lordship of huorsalida, the title of count,
and a me reed of 90,000 mrs per year for his sua,*
1 Benito Kuano, Toledo, PP»108«9*
